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Preface
The prospect of widespread youth unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa (hence-
forth ‘Africa’) is a serious concern for governments today, both on the sub con tin-
ent and in developed countries. Underlying this is a sense of alarm or urgency, 
borne out of the view that Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ is an unprecedented global chal-
lenge, and that African economies will struggle to absorb enough young job 
 seekers in the coming decades. Concerns are particularly pronounced in rural 
Africa, where most of the world’s poor population reside and where farming is 
still the main livelihood for most households. The conventional view is that 
African youth do not aspire to work in agriculture, because the sector is charac-
terized by low productivity and is far from the dynamic lifestyles offered by cities. 
Yet job prospects in Africa’s cities and towns are also limited, and so most young 
Africans will inevitably need to find work somewhere in the rural economy.
While Africa’s youth bulge presents a challenge, it can also be viewed as an 
opportunity for rural development. A young and better-educated workforce 
might encourage greater use of more sophisticated farm technologies, commer-
cial agricultural practices, and an expansion of rural nonfarm enterprises. These 
are crucial steps for accelerating agricultural transformation in Africa, and young 
men and women could be the ‘agents of change’ that the region so badly needs. 
The debate around youth employment in Africa is therefore one of contrasts—
between urgent concern on the one hand and cautious optimism on the other.
Although African youth receive greater attention today from researchers and 
policymakers, there are still major gaps in our knowledge. Most reports from 
international organizations, for example, adopt a regional perspective and iden-
tify general trends and constraints. This overlooks differences between African 
countries. While some studies do consider youth employment within countries, 
these rarely focus on the specific challenges facing youth in rural areas. As a 
result, many policies aimed at rural youth in Africa are based on stylized facts 
drawn from cross-country data and general frameworks.
This book questions some of the stylized facts: Is Africa’s youth bulge unprece-
dented? Are youth more likely than adults to adopt modern farm technologies 
and practices? Are youth more likely to engage in rural nonfarm activities or 
migrate to urban centres? Are policymakers adequately responding to the youth 
employment challenge, and are rural youth themselves mobilizing and demand-
ing policy reforms from their governments?
To answer these questions, this book presents a series of thematic and country 
case studies that analyse household and firm surveys across a range of country 
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contexts. The book’s country focus and use of survey data better reflects the wide 
variations in trends and constraints observed across and within African coun-
tries. The book’s focus on rural Africa and the participation of youth in agricul-
tural transformation fills an important gap in our understanding.
This book finds that a balance between alarm and optimism is warranted. 
Addressing youth employment in Africa is a global challenge, but it is one that 
was overcome by other developing regions when they underwent similar demo-
graphic transitions three decades ago. The pressure to create jobs in rural areas is 
acute, given that Africa’s rural population is growing, and its rural economy is 
underdeveloped. Yet evidence also suggests that agriculture is transforming in 
many countries, albeit slowly, and that youth are often participating in this pro-
cess. Unfortunately, the idea that youth are better positioned than adults to adopt 
new farm technologies or run successful nonfarm businesses is not borne out in 
most of the book’s case study countries. Even where there is evidence that youth 
are leading agricultural transformation, the differences between adults and youth 
are small or the transformation process itself is modest.
More needs to be done by governments to help youth in rural Africa. However, 
the book finds that, while youth employment is a major policy goal today, policies 
themselves often fall short of addressing the constraints facing young job seekers. 
This partly reflects a lack of understanding about country-specific constraints and 
opportunities—a gap that this book only begins to address. Fortunately, while the 
policy reforms and actions needed to address Africa’s youth bulge are daunting, 
the book finds that there is increasing alignment between African governments, 
who have made youth employment a policy priority, and African youth, who are 
demanding policies to improve their job prospects.
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1
Africa’s Rural Youth in the  
Global Context
Valerie Mueller, James Thurlow, Gracie Rosenbach,  
and Ian Masias
1.1 Introduction
Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa are under enormous pressure to create more 
and better jobs for the region’s young and rapidly growing population.1 Africa is 
undergoing a ‘youth bulge’ in which the share of young people in the working age 
population is peaking due to past declines in mortality coupled with persistently 
high fertility (Canning, Raja, and Yazbeck 2015). This demographic transition has 
created a sense of urgency, and even anxiety, within national governments and 
the international development community (Resnick and Thurlow 2015). With the 
advent of the Sustainable Development Goals (UNDESA 2016), most policies and 
strategies in Africa today focus on promoting ‘inclusive growth’, which means 
that the population, especially the poor, should not only benefit from, but also 
participate in, the development process. This has made job creation a major policy 
objective, alongside the more traditional goals of accelerating economic growth 
and reducing poverty and hunger.
The successes of other developing countries, especially in Asia, provides African 
governments with what is sometimes considered a ‘blueprint’ for inclusive growth. 
Rapid economic growth in East Asia, for example, was accompanied by a process 
of ‘structural change’ in which the share of workers employed in agriculture 
declined as jobs were created in more productive and remunerative industrial 
sectors (McMillan, Rodrik, and Verduzco-Gallo  2014). This led to substantial 
poverty reduction, in large part because poor workers, especially farmers and their 
families, were able to take advantage of better job opportunities, often by migrat-
ing to cities and towns (Ravallion et al. 2007). Urbanization and structural trans-
form ation were supported by rising agricultural productivity (Ravallion  2009). 
This allowed workers to leave farming without raising food prices and urban 
wages, which might have jeopardized industrialization (Zhang, Yang, and Wang 
1 Unless stated otherwise, the terms ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ and ‘Africa’ will be used interchangeably 
in the book.
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2011). Strong agricultural growth meant that rural poverty continued to fall, even 
as economies reoriented towards urban industry (Christiaensen, Demery, and 
Kuhl  2011). This stylized model of development, drawn from the East Asian 
ex peri ence, is characterized by rapid economic growth and urbanization, under-
pinned by agricultural and structural transformation.
Unfortunately, Sub-Saharan Africa does not appear to be emulating the East 
Asian model. Africa’s populations are urbanizing, and its economies are growing, 
but there has not been a major shift towards high-value manufacturing (Diao, 
Harttgen, and McMillan 2017). Structural change in Africa is instead driven by 
workers moving out of agriculture into informal services, particularly small-scale 
retail trade (de Vries, Timmer, and de Vries 2015; McMillan, Rodrik, and Sepúlveda 
2017). This has limited the contribution of structural change to economic growth 
(Rodrik 2016). Urbanization without industrialization has also given rise to ‘con-
sumption cities’ rather than engines of national economic growth (Gollin, Jedwab, 
and Vollrath 2016). Africa’s pathway is partly an outcome of today’s competitive 
global economy, which can make it more difficult for late-transforming economies 
to adopt an export-oriented industrialization strategy (McMillan, Rodrik, and 
Verduzco-Gallo 2014). It raises doubts about whether Africa can create enough 
jobs for its growing population (Canning, Raja, and Yazbeck 2015), especially the 
kinds of jobs that its young men and women aspire to (Sumberg et al. 2012).
Africa has also yet to undergo substantial rural transformation. Agricultural 
productivity in rural areas remains low, with few farmers using improved technolo-
gies (Christiaensen and Demery 2018). Although the agricultural sector is growing, 
a large part of this growth is driven by extending farmlands, rather than raising 
productivity (Benin  2016). Africa’s rural population continues to expand rapidly, 
despite urbanization, and this raises further concerns about whether higher rural 
population density will eventually undermine the traditional role of farming in pro-
viding poor Africans with a basic livelihood (Chamberlin, Headey, and Jayne 2014). 
Indeed, most of the world’s poor people today reside in rural Africa, and global 
projections indicate that this concentration will become more pronounced if cur-
rent trends continue (Thurlow, Dorosh, and Davies 2019). Projections also indicate 
that, even with urbanization, about half of Africa’s new job seekers will need to find 
employment in rural areas, at least until 2030 (Filmer and Fox 2014; Thurlow 2015).
Ensuring that Africa’s rural youth find decent jobs therefore lies at the heart of 
the global development agenda. However, it does not necessarily follow that 
Africa has a ‘youth problem’. While there are concerns about Africa’s youth bulge, 
there are also reasons for optimism (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003). Young 
Africans may prove to be the ‘agents of change’ that the region sorely needs 
(Resnick and Thurlow 2015). African youth, for instance, are better educated than 
previous generations and so may be better positioned to adopt new technologies 
and establish new kinds of enterprises. This could help rural households raise and 
diversify their incomes by adopting modern technologies, operating nonfarm 
enterprises or migrating to cities and towns in search of work. Concerns about the 
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shortcomings of Africa’s development trajectory may also be overstated. While 
Africa is a late-transforming region, it is not clear whether the economic conditions 
and challenges it faces today differ significantly from those faced by other devel-
oping regions when they underwent their own demographic transitions. Africa’s 
challenge may not lie with its youth bulge per se, but rather in creating better jobs 
for its entire workforce, both young and old.
The opportunities and challenges of African youth receive greater attention 
today from researchers, governments, and development partners, but there are 
still gaps in our knowledge and often an overreliance on stylized facts and general 
frameworks. Recent reports from international organizations document Africa’s 
demographic transition and the need to create jobs for young men and women 
(see, for example, AfDB et al. 2012; AfDB 2016; Filmer and Fox 2014). However, 
while these reports are grounded in cross-country data and have raised the profile 
of youth, their regional perspective often focuses on general trends, constraints, 
and policy needs. Recent academic studies address youth employment issues 
within selected African countries and confirm the importance of understanding 
country-specific contexts (see, for example, Hino and Ranis 2014; Resnick and 
Thurlow  2015). However, these studies tend to consider youth employment in 
general, rather than the specific challenges facing youth in rural Africa. Yet it is 
here where the world’s working poor are concentrating and where the challenge 
of meeting the needs and aspirations of African youth is perhaps most daunting.
This book investigates the role of rural youth in Sub-Saharan Africa’s develop-
ment. Are rural youth active participants in the national growth process? What 
barriers do they face in acquiring more productive jobs, and are there policies in 
place to help them to overcome those barriers? How are rural youth involved in 
agricultural technology adoption, rural income diversification, and urban migra-
tion, and how do these intersections affect rural transformation? These and other 
questions are addressed throughout the book, drawing on household surveys 
rather than cross-country data. Thematic chapters discuss youth dynamics across 
countries, including migration, political participation, and representation in 
national policies. Case study chapters analyse selected African countries, focusing 
on what household surveys tell us about the participation of youth in rural trans-
form ation and national development. Together, the authors present a holistic pic-
ture of the challenges and opportunities facing youth in rural Africa today and 
what this means for inclusive growth in the region. The remainder of this chapter 
revisits the cross-country data and considers whether there is something unique 
to Africa’s youth bulge today. It also highlights the diversity of African countries 
and the need for country-specific analysis rather than stylized facts.
1.2 Africa’s Youth Bulge in Historical Context
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of Sub-Saharan Africa’s demographic 
transition is that it occurred far later than in other developing regions. Using 
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historical and projected population estimates, we can identify when countries’ 
youth bulges peaked (or will peak).2 This is defined as the year when the share of 
youth in the working age population is highest. Africa typically defines ‘youth’ as 
people aged 15–34 years, as opposed to the 15–24 years used elsewhere. This 
reflects the notion that, because of socioeconomic constraints, Africans are living 
in ‘waithood’ or a prolonged period before they can support themselves and their 
fam ilies (see Resnick and Thurlow  2015). Africa also uses a more expansive 
definition of the working age population than, say, the United Nations, which limits 
the workforce to people aged 15–64 years. For this chapter’s global comparison, 
we will adopt the more restrictive definition of youth (15–24 years), but later 
chapters will consider both international and African definitions. Figure  1.1 
shows the estimated years when developing countries’ youth bulges peaked.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s youth bulge peaked in 2003, whereas other regions peaked 
sometime between 1976 and 1985.3 Despite being decades later, the magnitude of 
Africa’s youth bulge is similar to that of other regions. Regional averages, however, 
hide wide variation across countries. Within Africa, Mauritius’ youth bulge peaked 
in 1967, but it will only peak in 2027 for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
2 Developing countries include all low- and middle-income countries, as classified by the World 
Bank in 2018. Note that all statistics for Sub-Saharan Africa exclude South Africa.

































Year in which youth share of working age population peaked 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) South Asia (SA)
Latin America/Caribbean (LAC) East Asia/Pacic (EAP)
Middle East/North Africa (MENA)
Figure 1.1. National and regional youth bulge peaks, 1960–2030
Notes: Sample includes the 109 countries and dependencies that were, as of 2018, recognized by the United Nations 
and fall within the low-and middle-income categories and regional groupings defined by the World Bank. Youth 
bulge is defined as the share of youth (15–25 years) in working age population (15–64 years). Regional averages 
are weighted by countries’ populations.
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical and projected population data from UNDESA (2018).
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Similarly, South Africa’s youth bulge peaked at 35.5 per cent, whereas Cape Verde 
peaked at 48.1 per cent. This variation underscores the importance of conducting 
country case studies and avoiding stylized facts about Africa’s youth challenge.
Africa’s delayed demographic transition means that it will soon become the 
main source of growth for the world’s workforce. Figure 1.2 reports annual changes 
in the global working age population, with projections until 2100. The largest 
annual expansion occurred in 2003, when the global working age popu la tion 
increased by 74 million people. This expansion is expected to decline until 2100, at 
which point the absolute size of the global workforce will have plateaued. However, 
from 2046 onwards, Africa will be the only region with a growing working age 
population–a trend that is expected to continue into the next century. The scale of 
Africa’s employment challenge is also evident from the figure. Africa’s potential 
workforce will increase by 21 million people per year during the 2020s, rising to 
30 million people during the 2050s, after which it will begin to decline.
The absolute size of Africa’s young and growing workforce may be daunting from 
the perspective of other regions, especially developed countries. However, it is 
more informative to reflect on the situation that young Africans face within their 
own economies. Moreover, since we would like to understand if there is something 
unique about Africa’s youth challenge, other than its delayed occurrence, it is use-
ful to compare the economic conditions in Africa today to those of other regions 

































Sub-Saharan Africa Other developing countries
Developed countries Global total
Figure 1.2. Annual change in global working age population, 1950–2100
Notes: Sample includes the 203 countries and dependencies that were, as of 2018, recognized by the United 
Nations and fall within the low-and middle-income categories and regional groupings defined by the World Bank. 
Working age population includes all people aged 15–64 years.
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical and projected population data from UNDESA (2018). 
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Table 1.1. Economic conditions over the 15 years following regions’ peak youth bulges
Developing country region EAP LAC MENA SA SSA






Population at peak (millions) 1,475 286 158 858 642
Rural population share (%) 75.3 40.9 54.1 78.5 70.1
Annual population growth  
after peak (%)
1.4 2.2 2.9 2.3 3.0
Rural areas 0.2 0.3 2.0 1.9 2.2












GDP per capita at peak ($) 820 6,498 4,266 457 814
National GDP share at peak (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Agriculture 27.9 4.6 6.1 38.9 20.8
Industry 37.5 47.6 58.7 31.7 38.4
of which manufacturing 7.1 15.4 4.5 11.0 8.6
Services 34.6 47.9 35.2 29.4 40.8
of which trade services 11.7 14.0 6.4 7.8 12.4
Annual GDP per capita growth  
after peak (%)
6.0 0.6 −2.1 2.2 3.4
Agriculture 2.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 3.1
Industry 7.5 0.1 –2.8 3.0 2.7
of which manufacturing 6.0 0.2 1.5 2.9 3.4
Services 6.7 1.0 –1.5 3.5 4.1







Labour force participation 
rate after 15 years (%)
79.7 63.2 48.3 61.5 70.1
Youth (15–24 years old) 64.7 54.4 36.9 49.2 49.8
Unemployment rate after 
15 years (%)
4.4 6.0 13.2 3.9 6.1
Youth (15–24 years old) 10.4 11.1 26.9 8.6 12.7
National employment share 
after 15 years (%)
100 100 100 100 100
Agriculture 46.1 27.9 30.3 62.4 59.8
Industry 24.9 21.2 24.6 14.7 10.6
Services 29.0 50.9 45.1 22.9 29.6
National employment share 
after 15 years (%)
100 100 100 100 100
Self-employed workers 58.0 43.7 44.9 81.9 76.7
Employers 1.9 5.3 7.3 1.8 2.6
Family workers 25.7 9.3 11.4 19.7 24.3
Own-account workers 30.4 29.1 26.1 60.4 49.8
Wage and salaried workers 42.0 56.3 55.1 18.1 23.3
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reports key economic and demographic statistics for each region during the year 
when their youth bulges peaked and over the subsequent 15 years. For example, 
East Asia’s youth bulge peaked in 1985 and so the table reports changes for this 
region over the 15-year period, 1985–2000.
In some respects, Africa today faces more challenging conditions than other 
regions did a few decades ago. However, there are also areas where Africa’s condi-
tions or trends are no worse, and are sometimes better, than they were elsewhere. 
For example, Africa is still at an early stage of economic development, but so too 
were East Asia and South Asia at the time of their youth bulges. This is measured 
by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, which was $814 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2003, but was only $457 in South Asia in 1978 (measured in 2010 prices). 
In contrast, the Middle East and North Africa had much higher GDP per capita 
during its demographic transition, but this declined over the next 15 years 
(–2.2 per cent per year), whereas Africa’s has grown relatively fast (3.4 per cent per 
year). Overall, Africa’s economic conditions in 2003 appear to be most like those 
of East Asia in 1985, both in terms of GDP per capita and the sectoral structure of 
their regional economies. However, as discussed earlier, East Asia then went on to 
enjoy a period of far more rapid growth and structural change than Africa has in 
recent years.
One of Africa’s major challenges is its high population growth rate. This means 
that, despite very rapid urban population growth, Africa’s rural population is still 
growing much faster than it was in East Asia. From a demographic perspective, 
Africa has far more in common with South Asia. Both regions had high rural 






Primary school enrolment ratio 
at peak (gross)
115.9 107.2 85.5 76.9 83.9
Total change over 15 years –8.5 5.2 7.4 12.1 13.0
Secondary school enrolment 
ratio at peak (gross)
34.3 43.2 39.8 25.1 27.1
Total change over 15 years 24.6 32.5 17.7 17.0 11.2
Notes: GDP data is from UNSD and includes the 109 countries and dependencies that were, as of 2018, 
recognized by the United Nations and fall within the World Bank’s low- and middle-income categories 
and regional groupings. All other data are regional estimates from the World Bank. EAP is East Asia 
and Pacific; LAC is Latin American and Caribbean; MENA is Middle East and North Africa; SA is 
South Asia; and SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). High-income countries are 
excluded. Growth rates reflect changes over 15 years after the year in which a region’s youth bulge 
peaked. Official urban definitions are used. GDP is measured in constant 2010 US dollars unadjusted 
for purchasing power parity. Gross enrolment ratios are actual enrolment divided by the population 
with the correct age for that level of schooling (i.e. higher ratios may indicate late-enrolment or 
repeated grades).
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the World Bank (2018) and UNSD (2018).
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transitions. Given their similar stages of development, it is not surprising then than 
a large share of Africa and South Asia’s workers continued to be self-employed 
in rural agriculture 15 years after their youth bulges peaked. It is also in these two 
regions where most of the world’s poor population are concentrated today (Thurlow, 
Dorosh, and Davies 2019). This underscores the importance of creating jobs and 
income opportunities in rural Africa.
The table also compares education levels across regions. Again, we find that 
Africa has more in common with South Asia. Both regions had low primary and 
secondary school enrolment at the peak of their youth bulges, and even though 
enrolment increased over the next 15 years, much of these gains were achieved by 
closing primary school enrolment gaps. In contrast, East Asia and Latin America 
started with much higher school enrolment and were far more successful in closing 
secondary school enrolment gaps. The quality of education in Africa vis-à-vis 
other regions three decades ago is difficult to assess. Nevertheless, Africa has moved 
closer towards achieving universal primary schooling, and this highlights the 
better educational attainment of young Africans compared to adults. Africa also 
has much higher labour force participation. This is because more women are part 
of Africa’s workforce today than they were in other regions, except for East Asia. 
Of course, high participation rates mean that more jobs will be needed as 
Africa’s population grows. However, it also means that a larger share of the 
African population is participating in, and hopefully benefiting from, the region’s 
growth process.
Finally, we compare the pace of economic growth and structural change during 
countries’ demographic transitions. As mentioned earlier, successful economic 
development is usually accompanied by a falling share of workers in agriculture, 
and a shift in employment towards more productive sectors, leading to faster eco-
nomic growth. Figure 1.3 uses employment data collected from national popu la-
tion censuses and household and labour force surveys around the period when 
countries’ youth bulges peaked. Unfortunately, not all countries have such data, 
especially those whose youth bulges occurred during the 1960s and 1970s when 
surveys were conducted less frequently or not at all. It is also not possible to esti-
mate comparable changes in employment patterns for countries that have only 
recently (or not yet) undergone their peak youth bulge. As a result, the figure only 
includes information for about half of all developing countries, and so regional 
averages are not reported.
Despite limited country coverage, it is still possible to discern regional patterns 
from the figure. East Asian countries, for example, generally experienced strong 
economic growth (horizontal axis) as well as a rapid decline in agricultural 
employment shares (vertical axis) (see China and Indonesia). In contrast, Latin 
American countries experienced more modest, or even negative, economic growth, 
and a more gradual exit from agricultural employment (see Mexico). Again, there 
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is especially wide variation across African countries. A few fast-transforming 
economies experienced rapid growth and structural change similar to East Asia 
(see Botswana and Rwanda). However, economic growth in most African coun-
tries is slow, and workers are only gradually leaving agriculture. This is consistent 
with projections suggesting that most of the jobs created in rural Africa until 
2030 will be in agriculture (Filmer and Fox 2014; Thurlow 2015).
In summary, the lateness and absolute size of Africa’s demographic transition 
is unique. The region will soon become the main driver of growth in the global 
workforce, and African economies will need to create large numbers of jobs just 
to keep pace with rapid population growth. Fortunately, African economies are 
growing, but, except for a few countries, they are not matching East Asia’s high 
rates of economic growth and structural change. Moreover, Africa’s rural popu la-
tion continues to expand, despite rapid urbanization. Together, these trends 
indicate that creating rural employment, including in agriculture, will be crucial 
in ensuring that African economies can absorb enough job seekers into the 



























































Average annual GDP per capita growth rate (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) South Asia (SA)
Latin America/Caribbean (LAC) East Asia/Pacic (EAP)
Middle East/North Africa (MENA)
Figure 1.3. Rates of economic growth and structural change during the 15 years 
following countries’ peak youth bulge years
Notes: Sample includes 62 low-and middle-income countries (32 in SSA, 6 in SA, 12 in LAC, 8 in EAP and 4 in 
MENA). Reported changes are for the 15 years immediately after the year in which a country’s youth bulge peaked. 
GDP is measured in constant 2010 US dollars and not adjusted for purchasing power parity.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from ILO (2018), Timmer et al. (2015), and World Bank (2018).
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provide better jobs for its adult workforce, who also aspire to improved living 
standards and working conditions. In that regard, Africa does not necessarily face 
a youth challenge, but rather the broader challenge of promoting inclusive growth 
and decent employment in today’s competitive global economy.
1.3 Framing Agricultural and Rural Transformation
This book focuses on the participation of rural youth in national development. 
Agricultural and rural transformation are therefore important concepts that 
help structure the research questions and analysis. As discussed earlier, economic 
development is strongly associated with structural change, which occurs when 
workers leave agriculture for more productive jobs in other sectors (Johnston and 
Kilby  1975; Chenery and Syrquin  1975). However, structural change is not the 
only driver of economic growth. Economy-wide labour productivity also rises 
when workers within a sector become more productive without needing to move 
to other sectors of employment. Agricultural transformation refers to a process in 
which farm productivity rises, leading to growth in the broader rural economy. 
Timmer (1988) provides a framework with four stages that are summarized 
in Figure 1.4.
During the first stage (subsistence agriculture), most rural inhabitants are farmers 
engaged in food production for their own consumption and use rudimentary 
technologies and farming practices. The focus for policy at this stage is raising farm 
productivity, such as through greater use of improved seeds, chemical fer til izers, 
and soil and water management. Land and labour resources at this stage are likely 
to be underemployed and it may not matter if technological improvements are 
labour- or land-saving. Since youth in Africa are better educated than adults, 
many expect that they are more likely to adopt improved farm technologies (see 
Sheahan and Barret 2017). The country chapters in this book assess the contribu-
tion of youth to ongoing changes in the farming sector.
During the second stage, there is an expansion of farm-nonfarm linkages, as 
farm productivity rises and farmers begin to produce marketable surpluses. This 
leads to growth in goods that are produced in rural areas and primarily sold to 
other rural households. The rise of rural markets creates nonfarm jobs linked to 
agriculture, such as traders and transporters. Nonfarm workers may live in rural 









1 2 3 4
Figure 1.4. Timmer’s four stages of agricultural transformation
Source: Authors’ interpretation of Timmer (1988).
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occupations. New job opportunities encourage farmers to diversify incomes or 
exit agriculture entirely. However, at this stage of agricultural transformation, 
farming remains the primary driver of national growth and job creation. Youth 
are again expected to play a key role during this stage. Better-educated people 
are more likely to run rural nonfarm businesses (Naglar and Naude 2017), and 
emerging land constraints may mean that it is youth who are more likely to seek 
off-farm work (Bezu and Holden 2014). The country chapters examine the links 
between youth, education, and rural nonfarm employment.
The third stage of agricultural transformation involves a strengthening of 
rural-urban linkages. Nonagricultural sectors, particularly in cities and towns, 
become drivers of national development. Agriculture increasingly supplies urban 
consumers and rural inhabitants migrate in search of urban job opportunities. 
Migrant workers may remit incomes back to their rural families or occasionally 
return to rural areas to alleviate seasonal labour shortages. Outmigration may 
require labour-saving technological improvements in agriculture to prevent food 
prices and urban wages from rising and stalling structural change. At this stage, 
urban nonagricultural growth drives national development and pulls agriculture 
behind it. Chapter 2 in this book specifically addresses the role of youth in migra-
tion decisions, and the various country chapters examine the links between youth 
and urbanization.
The final stage is the transition to modernized agriculture. This is most relevant 
for today’s developed countries, where high rural-urban inequality and concerns 
about national food security may prompt governments to subsidize agriculture 
and protect ‘rural lifestyles’. Few, if any, African countries, or even areas within 
these countries, have reached this late stage of agricultural transformation.
Although Timmer’s framework was developed three decades ago and is 
grounded in the Asian experience, it still provides a useful device for analysing 
the pace and participation of youth in Africa’s agricultural and rural economies. It 
underpins the view that, despite global developments since the 1980s, agricultural 
transformation is still essential for economic development in Africa (Diao, Hazell, 
and Thurlow 2010; Timmer and Akkus 2008). Not only will Africa’s youth need to 
find jobs in agriculture and rural areas, but they could help drive the trans form ation 
process. Chapters 3 and 4 in this book examine whether the needs and potential 
of youth are reflected in national policies, and whether youth are more politically 
active and demanding of their governments.
1.4 Evidence of Agricultural Transformation in Africa
Most African countries today, or at least most rural populations within African 
countries, are in the second or third stage of Timmer’s transformation frame-
work. Farmers still grow some of the food they consume, but most now sell at 
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least some of their output in local markets (Carletto, Corral, and Guelfi 2017). 
This marketable surplus is the result of rising farm production levels over the last 
15 years. Figure 1.5 reports the growth in agricultural land and labour productivity 
that occurred after Africa’s youth bulge peaked in 2003. The figure shows that both 
land and labour productivity increased for most African countries, including the 
region as a whole. However, land productivity growth exceeded labour productivity 
growth in almost all countries, implying that agricultural labour grew faster than 
agricultural land. This reflects growing concerns about rising rural population 
densities and the ability of available lands to support the livelihoods of a rapidly 
growing rural workforce.
The case study chapters in this book examine the contribution of youth to agri-
cultural transformation in five countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, and 
Tanzania. These countries were selected to capture the variation in trends 
observed across Africa, although data availability was also a consideration. As 
indicated in the figure, Ethiopian agriculture is transforming rapidly, whereas 
Malawian and Senegalese agriculture are not. Ghana and Tanzania are close to 
the African average. The case studies allow us to examine the role of youth in 























































Average annual growth in agricultural GDP per worker (%)
Figure 1.5. Agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 2003–2016
Notes: Sample includes 42 Sub-Saharan African countries (excluded are Eritrea, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, 
South Africa, South Sudan, and Sudan). GDP is measured in constant 2010 US dollars unadjusted for purchasing 
power parity. Agricultural land includes lands used crop cultivation and animal husbandry.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from ILO (2018), FAO (2018), and UNSD (2018).
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raising farm productivity–the first stage in Timmer’s framework–taking account 
of how this may vary across African countries.
Although Africa’s rural economy is dominated by agriculture, a large share of 
rural incomes is earned in the rural nonfarm economy (Carletto, Corral, and 
Guelfi 2017). This is important for the second stage of Timmer’s framework, when 
farm-nonfarm linkages expand. Household surveys suggest that more than a 
third of rural incomes in Africa are generated through nonfarm employment 
(Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon 2007), and that most rural households engage 
in some form of nonfarm activity (Davis, Di Giuseppe, and Zezza 2017). As men-
tioned earlier, most of the structural change in Africa in recent years was driven 
by workers leaving agriculture to work in informal services. Many of these ser-
vices are agriculture-related, such as the trading and transport of food and agri-
cultural products. While these are not the kinds of high productivity industrial 
jobs that dominated the East Asian experience, their growth has helped reduce 
poverty in many parts of Africa (Dorosh and Thurlow 2016).
Figure  1.6 reports changes in urban population shares and nonagricultural 
employment shares since 2003. For Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, the decline in 
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Figure 1.6. Urban population and nonfarm employment shares in sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2003–2016
Notes: Sample includes 44 Sub-Saharan African countries (excluded are Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, South 
Africa, South Sudan, and Sudan). Official definitions of urban areas are used.
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from ILO (2018) and UNDESA (2018).
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regional average lies close to the diagonal line in the figure). This suggests that 
there was no significant change in the share of rural nonfarm employment in the 
region. Again, we find that regional averages hide wide variation across countries–
differences that are captured in our choice of country case studies. The exit from 
agriculture in Ethiopia, for example, greatly exceeds the pace of urbanization, 
suggesting that many of the workers that left farming found employment in 
the rural nonfarm economy. The opposite is true for Senegal, where agricultural 
employment has risen, despite urbanization. This suggests that some of Senegal’s 
rural nonfarm workers are returning to agriculture. Tanzania and Ghana are 
again closer to the African average, and there was little agricultural trans form ation 
taking place in Malawi. Detailed household surveys allow the country chapters to 
investigate whether it is youth or adults, or young men or women, who are more 
actively engaged in the rural nonfarm economy.
The third stage of Timmer’s framework is characterized by a strengthening of 
rural-urban linkages. There is some evidence that Africa’s urban consumers are 
increasingly driving demand for agricultural products (Tshirley et al. 2015). As 
mentioned earlier, rapid urbanization is a defining feature of African development. 
Moreover, expanding urban populations and migration within rural areas has meant 
that many of Africa’s rural inhabitants today reside in ‘peri-urban areas’ adjacent to 
major urban agglomerations (FAO 2017). It is in peri-urban areas where rural-urban 
linkages are expected to be strongest and where agricultural trans form ation 
should be most advanced (Dorosh and Thurlow 2014).
Cross-country data suggests that young African men may be more likely to 
migrate than either adults or young women. Figure 1.7 estimates the relative speed 
of urbanization for youth and adults (horizontal axis) and for young men and 
women (vertical axis). This is measured by estimating the gap between average 
annual urban and rural population growth rates for each population subgroup. 
A large positive number means that the subgroup’s urban population is growing 
much faster than its rural population. The figure reports differences in the speed 
of urbanization between two population subgroups. For example, the horizontal 
axis focuses on the differences between youth and adults. The relative speed of 
urbanization is generally positive, implying that African youth are concentrating 
in urban areas faster than African adults. This is consistent with findings in other 
studies (see De Brauw, Mueller, and Lee 2014; Holden and Otsuka 2014), but it 
hides how most urban migration is to smaller towns, rather than bigger cities 
(Mueller et al. 2019). The tendency for youth to urbanize faster than adults is most 
pronounced in Ghana and Malawi, but it is negligible in the other three case study 
countries. Similarly, there is some evidence that young men are urbanizing faster 
than young women. Our case studies capture variation across African countries. 
This variation may reflect differences in education or other factors that influence 
the decision to migrate. A thematic chapter in this book analyses youth migration 
decisions using detailed household surveys rather than country-level data.
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In summary, African agriculture is transforming, albeit slowly and with 
some cause for concern. Agricultural land and labour productivity are growing, 
but so too are rural population densities. This suggests that agriculture’s con-
tribution to future job creation may be constrained as lands become scarce. 
Africa’s rural nonfarm economy is also expanding, although in many countries 
it is not keeping pace with urbanization. On average, workers are leaving 
 agriculture and moving to urban areas faster than they are finding work in the 
rural nonfarm economy. As urban centres become congested, more of the 
population are likely to reside in peri-urban (or peri-rural) areas where rural-
urban linkages are often strongest (Thurlow, Dorosh, and Davies 2018). Recent 
estimates suggest that one third of rural Africans already live within one-hour 
travel time of cities with populations of 50,000 people or more (SOFA 2017). 
The nonfarm economy surrounding cities and towns will therefore play an 
important role in creating work for rural job seekers, including youth. This 
means that, while agricultural transformation is proceeding in Africa, it is not 
only uneven across countries, but also across areas within countries. This under-
scores the need for detailed country case studies and cautions against an overreli-
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Figure 1.7. Speed of urbanization for youth and adults in sub-Saharan Africa, 2003–2015
Note: Sample includes 44 Sub-Saharan African countries (excluded are Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, South 
Africa, South Sudan, and Sudan). Speed of urbanization is the difference between average annual urban and rural 
population growth rates, i.e., a number greater than one implies that the urban population share is rising over time). 
Figure compares the speed of urbanization for different population groups, i.e., a number greater than one means 
that the first group is urbanizing faster (or deurbanizing slower) than the second group.
























Table 1.2. Country case studies
Sub-Saharan Africa or Case Study SSA Ethiopia Ghana Malawi Senegal Tanzania





n Population, 2016 (millions) 1,033 102 28 18 15 56
Rural share (%) 61.0 80.1 45.3 83.5 53.7 67.7
Population growth, 2006–16 (%) 2.8 2.6 2.5 3.0 2.9 3.2
Rural areas 1.9 2.2 1.0 2.9 2.2 2.2
Urban areas 4.2 5.0 3.8 3.9 3.9 5.7
G
D
P GDP per capita, 2016 ($) 1,173 426 1,617 448 962 792Agriculture share (%) 22.3 35.8 23.9 29.9 15.5 25.2
GDP per capita growth, 2006–16 (%) 3.1 7.5 4.4 2.5 1.5 3.3






t Labour force participation, 2016 (%) 68.2 82.3 76.7 76.8 57.0 83.3
Youth (15–24) 48.6 75.0 53.6 63.0 41.3 72.0
Unemployment rate, 2016 (%) 7.3 5.1 2.3 5.9 4.8 2.2
Youth (15–24) 13.8 7.3 4.7 7.8 5.4 3.8
Agricultural employment, 2016 (%) 57.4 69.0 41.2 84.7 53.6 67.2
Annual change, 2006–16 (%-point) –0.53 –1.10 –0.38 0.04 1.38 –0.74
Note: GDP is measured in constant 2010 US dollars unadjusted for purchasing power parity.
Source: Authors’ calculations using GDP data from UNSD (2018) and other data from the World Bank (2018).
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Our country case studies reflect some of the important variations observed 
across Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 1.2 provides current statistics for the five coun-
tries and the region. By design, our cases are either low- or lower-middle-income 
countries, often with a greater dependence on agriculture and with a larger share 
of the population in rural areas. Youth unemployment is lower amongst our 
case study countries than in Africa as a whole, which partly reflects our focus on 
agrarian economies, which have lower unemployment rates than more mining-
based economies like Nigeria or South Africa. Ghana and Ethiopia are two of 
Africa’s fastest transforming countries, but Ghana is at a later stage of development 
(i.e. GDP per capita is higher and the population is more urbanized). Ghana is 
also one of the earliest African countries to experience a demographic transition 
(i.e. its youth bulge peaked in 1987), whereas Ethiopia is one of the last countries. 
Malawi is at a similar stage of development as Ethiopia, although Malawi, like 
Senegal, is not experiencing rapid economic growth and the share of employment 
in agriculture is not falling. Labour force participation in Senegal is one of the 
lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, largely because women are less likely to work and 
because international migration is particularly important for Senegal. Finally, 
Tanzania provides an intermediate case. The country is transforming, and workers 
are leaving agriculture, often for urban areas, but the economy, particularly agri-
culture, is growing much slower than in Ethiopia or Ghana. Our five case studies 
therefore reflect the diversity of African countries and allow us to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of youth in rural areas.
1.5 Organization of the Book
There is a large body of research on agricultural transformation and structural 
change in Africa (see, for example, Diao et al.  2007; McMillan, Rodrik, and 
Sepúlveda 2016). Few studies, however, examine employment through a youth lens 
and with a focus on rural Africa. This book provides new empirical evidence on 
the participation of rural youth in national development processes. Cross-country 
evidence is informative, but cannot substitute for detailed case studies that use 
micro-level data to reveal countries’ unique characteristics and challenges. It is 
only through the collection of robust country-specific evidence that we can move 
beyond stylized facts and determine to what extent African youth should be a 
source of optimism or a cause for concern.
The book is separated into two parts. Part I includes three thematic chapters 
that cover important under-researched areas for youth employment. Rising 
popu la tion densities in rural areas has raised concerns about the future role 
agriculture in job creation and the prospect of accelerated urbanization. Chapter 2 
uses new household survey data to investigate youth migration patterns in four 
African countries, paying particular attention to the effect of land scarcity on young 
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people’s decision to migrate to urban centres. Despite urbanization, rural job 
creation is a major policy goal for many African governments. However, it is unclear 
whether national polices adequately reflect and address the constraints facing 
young job seekers in agriculture and rural areas. Chapter 3 reviews national policies 
in 13 African countries, and uses a novel approach to classify policies according to 
the employment constraints they address. One reason for the attention given to job 
creation is the belief that unemployed youth are a potential source of political 
instability and unrest. Chapter  4 examines whether African youth are more 
politically engaged than their older counterparts, and to what extent their demands 
for political action are motivated by concerns about jobs and unemployment.
Part II includes five country case study chapters that examine youth employ-
ment dynamics in Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, and Tanzania. The chapters 
address a common set of questions about the roles that youth are playing at different 
stages of agricultural and rural transformation. How are youth driving the changes 
that are taking place within the agricultural sector? Are youth more involved in 
off-farm employment and rural income diversification? And are youth more spa-
tially and occupationally mobile than previous generations? The chapters also 
address questions that are specific to their respective countries. Chapter 5 focuses 
on Ethiopia’s land constraints and asks if this is driving youth off the farm and 
into the rural nonfarm economy. Chapter 6 addresses Malawi’s weak agricultural 
transformation, and asks if rural households, particularly youth, are engaging in 
multiple forms of employment that may not be adequately reflected in national 
data. Chapter 7 reflects Ghana’s later stage of development by focusing on the link 
between urban development and the livelihoods available to rural youth living 
close to cities or towns. Chapter 8 combine household and firm level analysis for 
Tanzania to examine what determines the success of rural nonfarm enterprises, 
including the role of young entrepreneurs. Finally, Chapter 9 on Senegal pays 
particular attention to international migration and whether young migrants are 
contributing to rural transformation in their home country. Chapter 10 concludes 
by summarizing the major findings and discusses their implications for youth 
employment and inclusive growth in rural Africa.
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Can Migration be a Conduit for 
Transformative Youth Employment?
Valerie Mueller and Hak Lim Lee
2.1 Introduction
Migration has traditionally been considered a necessary component of the 
transformation process (de Brauw, Mueller, and Lee  2014). Rural workers are 
attracted to higher earning potential in the manufacturing or rural non-farm sectors 
(Harris and Todaro 1970). The latter process, which occurred in India, for ex ample, 
was primarily driven by innovation and shifts in rural worker prod uct iv ity. Both 
of these factors allowed for the creation of a rural labour surplus to transfer into 
the modern sector, as well as generated demand for additional goods and services 
in rural areas by augmenting the income of farmers (Hazell and Haggblade 1990).
Given demographic trends, African youth will be responsible for spearheading 
economic growth. Yet, they face more substantive barriers than their predeces-
sors: declines in arable land (Jayne, Mather, and Mghenyi  2010, Muyanga and 
Jayne  2014), a lack of Green Revolution (Headey, Bezemer, and Hazell  2010, 
Nin-Pratt and McBride 2014) or government-sponsored industrialization (Jedwab 
and Vollrath 2015), and competition from the global economy (Headey, Bezemer, 
and Hazell 2010). In this chapter, we examine whether migration offers youth (ages 
15–24, 25–34) access to more transformative forms of employment in four African 
countries, following the traditional pathways to structural change. While a few 
seminal youth migration studies have raised awareness of orphanhood in Africa 
(Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2006, Beegle et al. 2010), applications which 
demonstrate whether migration is a conduit for diversification and productive 
employment among youth are rare.
In what follows, we first establish the knowledge gaps in the literature with 
respect to the relationship between migration and sector-specific youth employ-
ment in Africa. We then focus on addressing a few of the highlighted knowledge 
gaps using descriptive evidence in four countries. First, we present statistics on 
the level of engagement in exclusive non-agricultural employment and joint 
non-agricultural and agricultural employment by youth migration status. Second, 
we illustrate whether migration allows youth to generate greater returns to 
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production. In particular, we compare the agricultural income per capita of youth 
migrants and non-migrants over time. We further disentangle whether migrants 
are more likely to move into high-return versus low-return non-agricultural 
occupations to supplement the income analysis.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Youth Engagement in the Agricultural Sector
Recent empirical evidence in Africa suggests declining trends in the size of 
landholdings of rural households (Jayne, Mather, and Mghenyi 2010, Muyanga 
and Jayne 2014). In a few concentrated countries, these associations are driven 
by the underutilization of land due to conflict, forested area, or remoteness and 
isolation (Chamberlain, Jayne, and Headey 2014). Other African countries, spe-
cifically those covered in the LSMS–ISA, suffer from limited surplus of land and 
high population pressure. In light of the emerging scarcity of arable land, there 
is a growing research interest to uncover whether diminishing landholdings 
has been accompanied by increased agricultural intensification to maintain or 
enhance yields.
Sheahan and Barrett (2014) examine various input practices (use of fertilizer, 
improved seeds, agro-chemicals, animal traction, and mechanized equipment) 
among households in the LSMS-ISA countries. Although modern input use is 
relatively low in aggregate, the application of inorganic fertilizer and agro-chemicals 
has become more common in Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nigeria than documented in 
previous work by Minot and Benson (2009). Using alternative data sources, 
Headey and Jayne (2014) and Muyanga and Jayne (2014) show the application of 
the aforementioned inputs is positively related to changes in population density. 
The intersection between input intensification, land size, and labour use is of 
notable importance for understanding employment trends more broadly and 
youth employment patterns specifically.
Thus far, multiple studies find negative relationships between farm size and 
input use (Barrett, Bellemare, and Hou 2010, Bellemare 2013, Carletto, Savastano, 
and Zezza 2013, Headey, Dereje, and Taffesse 2014, Larson et al.  2014, Sheahan 
and Barrett 2014), which suggests intensifying farming practices may be used 
to overcome land constraints to productivity. For the case of Ethiopia, Headey, 
Dereje, and Taffesse (2014) find a small, positive correlation between farm size 
and hired labour, but a much stronger negative relationship with family labour 
and farm size. Their interpretation of the results is that small farms use land more 
intensively while large farms are labour constrained. Complementary relation-
ships between labour and input use, particularly for small farms, could suggest 
an increase in the demand for family labour and perhaps youth employment. 
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Projections of youth employment in agriculture will depend not only on farm size 
but the substitutive and complementary nature of modern inputs and labour by 
stage of one’s life cycle status.
The existence of agricultural wage labour markets and land rental markets may 
provide additional forums for youth to continue engaging in agriculture, under 
sparse opportunities for landownership (for example, as shown in Ethiopia by 
Bezu and Holden (2014)). With respect to the latter, Deininger, Xia, and Savastano 
(2015) show land-poor households and households with younger heads are more 
likely to take advantage of these opportunities to access land in Malawi, Nigeria, 
Niger, Tanzania, and Uganda. Dillon and Barrett (2014) foreshadow limitations 
to off-farm employment opportunities in the agricultural sector given existing 
market failures. First, in most cases, the percentage of households hiring workers 
for non-harvest types of employment exceeds the percentage of households 
hiring workers for harvest employment. Second, as the number of acres per 
household member increases, the hiring of outside workers does not increase 
proportionally. Economies of scale of labour, or credit market failures possibly 
explain these patterns.
The above studies imply youth participation in agricultural employment will 
depend on at least two factors. First, if land-constrained households are driven to 
intensify their land to overcome productivity constraints, then youth employ-
ment on family farms will depend on the complementary nature between those 
inputs and youth labour. Furthermore, whether youth self-select into on-farm or 
off-farm agricultural jobs will depend on the factor-bias of the input technology 
adopted (Bustos, Caprettini, and Ponticelli 2016). Second, increased access to 
land and opportunities for employment off of the farm may allow youth to con-
tinue working in agriculture. Understanding the nature of local land rental and 
sales markets will be important in measuring the determinants of youth employ-
ment in the agricultural sector, as well as the composition of medium and large-
scale farms to gauge demand for agricultural wage labour.
2.2.2 Youth Diversification Out of Agriculture
A few stylized facts regarding diversification trends out of agriculture have emerged 
from the Sub-Saharan Africa employment literature. While diversification out of 
agriculture is on the rise (Jones and Tarp 2012), agriculture continues to absorb a 
significant share of the workforce (Jones and Tarp  2012, Page  2012, Davis, Di 
Giuseppe, and Zezza 2014, McCullough 2017). The nonfarm wage sector (private 
and public) has grown but participation remains less common (Jones and Tarp 
2012, Fox and Sohnesen  2012); instead, the informal sector is the principal 
locus of new job creation (Jones and Tarp  2012, Fox and Sohnesen  2012, De 
Vreyer and Roubaud 2013, Nagler and Naudé 2014). Household entrepreneurship 
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has the potential to increase the marginal productivity of labour and enhance 
welfare (Reardon 1997, Grimm, Knorringa, and Lay 2012, Nagler and Naudé 2014, 
McCollough 2017).
Earlier household analyses emphasize the importance of household demographic 
composition and household head’s age on diversification out of agriculture. Jones 
and Tarp (2012) and Nagler and Naudé (2014) find the percentages of adults and 
young male workers (Jones and Tarp only) are negatively associated with spe cial-
iza tion in agriculture in Mozambique. Bezu and Barrett (2012) monitor employment 
transitions into and between low- and high-return rural nonfarm employment 
using panel data from Ethiopia (1999, 2004). They find transitions from low-
return to high-return rural nonfarm employment are positively correlated with 
the number of children aged 5 to 14 in 1999. The authors posit that children may 
not directly engage in rural nonfarm employment, but serve as substitutes for 
adult household labour. Older heads are also found to be more likely to diversify 
out of agriculture (Nagler and Naudé 2014), but other studies have shown older 
heads can also revert back to agriculture after operating an enterprise (Bezu and 
Barrett 2012).
A logical next question is how will these trends affect youth. Researchers have 
first focused on educational trends to understand whether youth have different 
earning potential than previous generations. While education levels have 
increased, they remain low (Filmer and Fox 2014, Garcia and Fares 2008, Elder 
and Kone 2014). Rural youth are much less likely to be in school than their urban 
counterparts (Filmer and Fox  2014, Garcia and Fares  2008). Although labour 
participation remains high (McCullough 2017, Gracia and Fares 2008, Jones and 
Tarp  2012), underemployment is rife (Shehu and Nilsson  2014, Jones and Tarp 
2012). Opportunities to diversify out of agriculture, particularly into high-return 
activities, may be low given extant skill deficits (Filmer and Fox 2014).
Elder and Kone (2014) report findings from the ILO’s School-to-Work Transition 
surveys (2012–13) covering 15–29 year old individuals at the national level for 
eight countries in SSA (Benin, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, and Zambia) with an average sample size of 3,300 persons. Forty-six per 
cent of the unemployed youth indicate employment searches lasting longer than a 
year, mainly in pursuit of establishing their own business or farm, or finding a job 
in the public or private sector. The biggest obstacle to finding employment was 
articulated to be a paucity of jobs, as well as insufficient qualifications for existing 
jobs. They find working youth tended to engage in skilled agricultural and fishery 
occupations (35.7 per cent), followed by service (25.7 per cent), shop and market 
sales work (18.3 per cent), elementary occupations (18.3 per cent), and craft and 
related trade work (10 per cent).
The aforementioned studies contend relatively high youth participation rates 
with a concentration in the agricultural sector in rural areas. One open question 
is to what extent are these rates influenced by the mobility of youth. Youth 
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migration patterns motivated by education (de Brauw, Mueller, and Woldehanna 
2013) and orphanhood (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2006, Beegle et al. 2010) 
have been documented in various African contexts. The omission of youth 
migrants from surveys could influence how labour participation rates and shifts 
in employment are perceived in the broader literature.
Another discrepancy in the literature arises from the lack of detailed informa-
tion on agricultural occupations and youth productivity. McCullough (2017) 
shows that the measure of productivity can affect marginal productivity of labour 
estimates. For example, when measuring output per person per year, the prod uct-
iv ity of workers receiving wages in industry, agriculture, and enterprises are 
higher than on farms in Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda. However, when the 
prod uct iv ity ratio is based on output per hour, then she finds farm productivity is 
higher than for all other sectors in Ethiopia and Malawi but not Tanzania and 
Uganda. The differences are largely due to a higher number of hours supplied to 
nonfarm work. It is possible for youth to remain in agriculture, but they are posi-
tioned to drive a structural transformation in agriculture with respect to being 
more productive, more likely to work in modern agricultural jobs or jobs at 
higher stages of the value chain. In this context, migration may still be utilized by 
youth in order to access land to facilitate entry into more commercialized agricul-
tural self-employment.
2.3 Data
We use the Living Standards Measurement Study-Integrated Surveys on 
Agriculture (LSMS–ISA) in Ethiopia (2011–12, 2013–14), Malawi (2010–11, 2012–13), 
Nigeria (2010–11, 2012–13), and Tanzania (2008–19, 2010–11) (World Bank 
2016a, b, c, d) to construct an individual dataset of youth ages 15–34 for descrip-
tive statistics on youth migration between baseline and endline per country. 
Approximately, 5,364 observations in Ethiopia, 4,060 in Malawi, 7,383 in Nigeria, 
and 4,618 in Tanzania are used to create the migration statistics. Otherwise, 
when we focus on rural non-migrants, rural–rural migrants, and rural–urban 
migrants, we have 4,732 observations in Ethiopia, 2,960 in Malawi, 5,179 in 
Nigeria, and 3,101 in Tanzania, respectively. The analyses using the employment 
and income outcomes draw from smaller youth samples since we are missing 
individual responses for those outcomes over time.
We define a person as a migrant if he was a member of the household at baseline 
and departed the household in the follow-up survey. Different instruments were 
used to detect migration in the surveys. For the Malawi and Tanzania surveys, 
the migration definition is based on the diligent tracking of split-off households. 
In Ethiopia and Nigeria, we rely on information reported by the proxy respond-
ent in the follow-up survey on the whereabouts of each household member from 
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the baseline roster. Since the baseline and follow-up rounds are two years apart, 
our measure of migration is over a two-year period and therefore considered a 
permanent move. However, a key limitation in our  interpretation of migration 
across regions will be our inability to disentangle the variation in mobility that 
stems from differences in contexts across countries from the vari ation in mobility 
due to measurement differences  associated with the use of different survey instru-
ments and interview times across countries.
We additionally define the migrant by origin and destination using rural and 
urban classifications established in the surveys: rural–rural, rural–urban, urban–
urban, urban–rural. We are unable to compute representative urban–urban 
and urban–rural migration rates for Ethiopia, because the baseline survey did not 
sample large towns until the second round and therefore are omitted from the 
sample. The definition of urban in Ethiopia typically consists of small (population 
less than 10,000) and large (population greater than 10,000) towns. Thus, the 
urban–urban and urban–rural migration rates constructed in this chapter reflect 
migration within and to smaller towns rather than within and to metropolitan areas.
Detailed information on individual employment was extrapolated from the 
wage, agricultural on–farm labour, and non-agricultural enterprise modules of 
the surveys. These modules document any engagement in wage or self-employ-
ment activities over a 12-month period. We focus on labour participation rather 
than hours supplied. In our descriptive statistics, a youth is considered to have 
engaged in a specific activity irrespective of the number of hours reported. This 
allows us to avoid measurement issues associated with missing hours in the sup-
plied values, but of course fails to account for differences in partial versus full 
employment. For the purpose of the analysis, we define employment portfolios 
into four categories: exclusively agriculture, exclusively non-agriculture, mixed 
agriculture and non-agriculture, and student. For brevity, an individual who was 
actively a student is automatically placed in the last category, despite evidence of 
engagement in farm or off-farm activities.
One of the aims of this piece is to evaluate whether relocation offers youth 
opportunities to diversify employment or improve their agricultural production 
prospects. This requires knowledge of employment of migrants and non-migrants 
over time. Since tracking at the individual level was only performed in Malawi 
and Tanzania, detailed descriptive statistics on employment and income patterns 
by migration status are only available for these countries.
We compute income by source for each household to illustrate qualitatively 
whether migration improved the prospects of youths (ages 15–34). The recall 
period for income dates 12 months prior to the interview for the Tanzania surveys 
and 12–18 months prior to the interview for the Malawi survey. Incomes are win-
sorized at the 5 per cent level to remove influences from outliers and measure-
ment error on descriptive statistics.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Youth Migration
Figure 2.1 provides the youth migration rates by country and gender for two 
cohorts: 15–24 and 25–34. We focus on those splitting from their household, 
originating from rural areas given the premise of the book (see Figure 2.2).1 
The percentage of young men in rural areas migrating to other rural areas is as 
high as 13.6 per cent in Ethiopia and 17.6 per cent in Malawi. Rural–rural 
migration rates for women in these two countries are slightly greater than the 
rates of young men at 17.5 per cent and 23.3 per cent. Rural–urban migration 
rates are considerably lower. The highest migration to cities occurs among 
Ethiopian young men (9.7 per cent) and women (8.4 per cent). The remaining 
countries have rural–urban migration rates within the range of 2 to 5 per cent. 
Young adults (25–34) are less mobile than the younger cohort, particularly in 
Ethiopia and Malawi.
Figure 2.3 displays the primary motivation for youth migration. Interestingly, 
the rates of rural youth claiming to move to other rural areas for employment 
reasons are quite similar across cohorts with the exception of Malawi. For ex ample, 
13.7 per cent of 15–24 year old migrants report moving for employment in Nigeria 
compared to 12.6 per cent of 25–34 year old migrants. The distinctions in reasons 
for moving are more pronounced among classes of rural–urban migration. The 
most drastic example takes place in Ethiopia. Approximately, 31.9 per cent of 
15–24 year olds state having moved for work, while 55.4 per cent indicate having 
moved for education. This can be compared to 49.6 per cent of rural–urban 
young adult migrants reporting having moved for employment and a mere 12.5 
per cent for education.
We further compare the distances travelled by migration pattern (not shown 
here). The median distance that young (15–24) rural–rural male (female) migrants 
travel is 1.4 (1.4) kilometres in Malawi, and 0.2 (1.6) kilometres in Tanzania. These 
figures can be compared to those obtained for rural–urban male (female) migrants 
who undergo median travel distances of 68.1 (59.8) kilometres in Malawi, and 90.3 
(54.5) kilometres in Tanzania. These figures are qualitatively comparable for the 
older youth cohort. For example, the median distance that mature youth (25–34) 
rural–rural male (female) migrants travel is 1.2 (0.3) kilometres in Malawi, and 0.3 
(3.4) kilometres in Tanzania. These figures can be compared to those obtained for 
rural–urban male (female) migrants who undergo median travel distances of 
74.8 (25.2) kilometres in Malawi and 61.9 (37.7) kilometres in Tanzania. Workers 
1 Figure 2.2 illustrates youth migration rates for those departing with the entire household. Rates of 
migration are much lower, although still noteworthy in size for rural populations in Malawi and Tanzania.
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Figure 2.1. Youth migration rates
Note: Sampling weights used to calculate statistics 
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Migration Rates: Youth (Ages 15–24) Household Movers
Ethiopia Malawi
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Figure 2.2. Migration rates of youth moving with their entire household
Note: Sampling weights used to calculate statistics 
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moving to urban areas are not only more likely to claim that they are moving for 
employment but they are travelling greater distances to fulfil their objectives.
One might expect differences across cohorts within migration patterns due to 
variations in life cycle stages. For example, the concept of ‘waithood’ refers to African 
youth delaying marriage and other milestones due to unemployment (Honwana 
2012). However, what is particularly interesting is that the distribution of employ-
ment migrants is quite consistent across cohorts within the rural–rural migrant 
sample and markedly distinct across cohorts within the rural–urban migrant sample. 
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Figure 2.3. Motivation for youth migration
Note: Other motivation category omitted. Sampling weights used to calculate statistics 
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A major portion of rural–urban migration may comprise industrious rural youth 
looking for auxiliary employment opportunities, or, as in Ethiopia, moving to attend 
secondary and tertiary schools unavailable in their rural locales with the possibility 
of remaining at their destination for employment upon completion of their degrees.
2.4.2 Evolution of Sectoral Employment among  
Tracked Migrant and Non-migrant Rural Youth:  
Malawi and Tanzania Case Studies
As standard panel surveys track the developments of non-migrants, the omission 
of rural–urban migrants from surveys may be responsible for reporting bias in 
rural youth employment trends. We next compare the employment patterns of 
migrants and non-migrants by rural youth cohort starting first with available data 
in Malawi (Figure 2.4). The majority of rural–urban migrants (aged 15–24) were 
students at baseline (50.7 per cent). Slightly fewer rural–urban migrants were 
students following their move (21.7 per cent of migrants compared to 24.9 per cent 
of non-migrants). All migrants and non-migrants engaged in similar levels of 
mixed sector employment (9.6 per cent of youth rural–urban migrants and 
9.0 per cent of non-migrants) in the follow-up round. While the trend for non-
migrants in the youth cohort was an increase of 11.5 per cent working exclusively 
in the agricultural sector after the baseline, 12.6 per cent of youth migrants left the 
agricultural sector upon arrival in urban areas. Furthermore, the percentage of 
rural–urban migrant youth exclusively working in non-agriculture increased 
from 2.1 per cent to 28.6 per cent.
The young adult cohort employment statistics suggest similar trends as 
observed for the youth cohort. At baseline, a more substantive portion of rural–
urban migrants begin in mixed livelihood strategies (34.5 per cent compared to 
19.5 per cent), and much fewer in agriculture (43.4 per cent compared to 75.6 per 
cent). The rural–urban migrants then shift exclusively to non-agriculture, when 
only 6.2 per cent of rural–urban migrants were in this category of employment 
before the move. By the follow up survey, 55.0 per cent of rural–urban migrants 
worked exclusively in non-agriculture compared to 1.7 per cent of non-migrants 
within the same age group.
The statistics in Figure 2.4 suggest rural–rural migration enables diversifica-
tion more than entry into the non-agricultural labour market. For the youngest 
cohort, exclusive employment in agriculture at baseline is similar among stayers 
and movers to other rural areas (47.7 and 45.5 per cent, respectively). Yet, the 
percentage of rural–rural migrants working only in the agricultural sector 
increases to 60.7 per cent, while for non-migrants the increase is slightly lower 
(59.2 per cent). Although fewer rural–rural migrants engage in mixed sectoral 
employment than non-migrants (2.2 per cent compared to 5.4 per cent), 
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a remarkable percentage of rural–rural migrants diversify in the follow-up round 
(15.4 per cent compared to 9.0 per cent). The patterns of diversification among 
the older cohort of rural–rural migrants are quite similar, with the exception that 
there was an overall decreasing trend in agricultural labour market participation 
for 25–34 year olds irrespective of mobility in the follow-up round. All rural–
rural migrant cohorts are more likely to participate in the non-agricultural sector 
but at a more modest level than their rural–urban counterparts.
The findings in Malawi offer the hypothesis that migration may facilitate 
entry into labour markets auxiliary to agricultural wage and self-employment. 
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Figure 2.4. Employment patterns for rural youth in Malawi
Note: Unemployment category omitted. Sampling weights used to calculate statistics. 
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non-agricultural sector. However, it appears that rural–urban migration in Malawi 
offers a more significant fraction of youth to gradually progress out of agricultural 
employment into exclusive non-agricultural employment.
We next turn to the evolution of employment trends for rural youth in Tanzania 
(Figure  2.5). The youth migrant employment trends are similar but more pro-
nounced than witnessed in Malawi. Fewer rural–urban migrants than  non-migrants 
were employed in the agricultural sector at baseline (36.7 and 46.1 per cent, re spect-
ive ly). By the follow-up round, 28.6 per cent of rural–urban migrants left the agri-
cultural sector when the trend among rural youth was a 10.2 per cent increase in 
labor participation in the agricultural sector. Although slightly more rural–urban 
migrants were in the non-agricultural sector at baseline (2.1 per cent compared to 
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Figure 2.5. Employment patterns for rural youth in Tanzania
Note: Unemployment category omitted. Sampling weights used to calculate statistics. 
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round compared to a status quo participation of this sector among non-migrants. 
The trends are quite similar for young adult rural–urban migrants.
In Tanzania, rural–rural migration did not have as much of a prolific impact on 
labour diversification as in Malawi in the follow-up round. Rather, rural–rural 
migration encouraged a greater percentage of youth and young adults to participate 
in exclusive agricultural employment. Similarly, the percentage of youth and young 
adults working in mixed livelihood strategies diminished from 7.4 per cent to 4.9 
per cent and 20.6 per cent to 7.0 per cent, respectively. The growth in participation 
of exclusive non-agriculture employment almost compensates for the observed loss 
in mixed sectoral employment for the 15–24 (but not the 25–34) age cohort.
In summary, our case studies show that over the time period covered by the 
first two rounds of the Malawi and Tanzania panel surveys, migration to urban 
destinations offered opportunities for youths to enter the non-agricultural mar-
ket. Rural–rural migration instead guaranteed prospects for diversification with 
smaller entry into the exclusive non-agricultural sector.
2.4.3 Shifts in Space and More Productive Occupations:  
Malawi and Tanzania Case Studies
As a first attempt to gauge whether moves are productive, we compare the change 
in the logarithm of household income per adults among youth originating from 
rural areas (15–34) and their non-migrant counterparts. Figure 2.6 illustrates the 
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Figure 2.6. Change in income per adults by migration status in Malawi (ages 15–34)
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distribution of changes in income which occurred in Malawi, where the dark 
gray- and light gray-shaded areas reflect the values for the non-migrants and 
migrants, re spect ive ly. On average, the sample of youth experienced losses over 
this time period. Yet, migrant youth income improved significantly (2.7 per cent) 
compared to the losses of non-migrant youth (39.0 per cent) according to a 
simple t statistic (p-value = 0.00). We further reject that the distribution of the 
change in income is statistically equivalent across the two samples using a 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (p-value = 0.00) (Smirnov 1933).2
We perform a similar exercise using information from the Tanzanian youth, 
leading to quite similar conclusions. In Figure 2.7, we observe that the average 
change in migrant youth income per adult increased 37.9 per cent relative to an 
increase of 21.4 per cent experienced by their rural counterparts. We cannot reject 
that the changes in income per adult on average are statistically different across 
the two samples (t test p-value = 0.16), but the distributional differences by migra-
tion status remain (Kolmogorov–Smirnov p-value = 0.00).
Income measures traditionally suffer from a considerable amount of measure-
ment error, which may influence our ability to affirmatively associate migration 
with improvements in youth job prospects. To complement the above analysis, 
2 We also conduct a sensitivity analysis by reflecting on comparisons of income per individuals 
(rather than the number of adults) in the household. The patterns are similar as previously observed. 
The change in income averages and distributions remain different across samples (t test p-value = 0.00; 
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Figure 2.7. Change in income per adults by migration status in Tanzania (ages 15–34)
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we demonstrate whether migrants are more likely to move from presumably 
low-return agriculture to high-return nonfarm employment. This requires devel-
oping a typology similar to Bezu and Barrett (2012), categorizing the occupations 
of youth into low-return and high-return non-agricultural activities. We then 
show how the employment transitions between waves 1 and 2 vary by whether 
youth stayed in their baseline location, moved to a rural destination, or moved to 
an urban destination in the Malawi and Tanzania surveys.
Table  2.1 displays the employment transitions between waves by migration 
status in Malawi and Tanzania. In rural areas, 61.7 per cent and 53.6 per cent of 
the youth non-migrant population remained engaged in agricultural employment 
throughout the two waves in Malawi and Tanzania, respectively. These figures are 
comparable to the employment rates of the adult non-migrant population, which 
we also include in Table 2.1 as a reference but leave out of the discussion hereafter. 
The figures are only slightly reduced for the rural–rural migrant population 
(49.5 per cent in Malawi and 40.0 per cent in Tanzania). In short, the majority 
of the youth population who remains or moves within rural areas stays in the 
agricultural sector.
In both countries, rural–urban and rural–rural migration offer more pos si bil-
ities for youth to engage in high-return employment which confers the observed 
positive income change associated with mobility. A greater percentage of 
rural–urban migrants (17.3 per cent in Malawi and 15.5 per cent in Tanzania) and 
rural–rural migrants (13.7 per cent in Malawi and 10.1 in Tanzania) specialize 
in  high-return wage/enterprise activities compared to rural non-migrants 
(7.6 per cent in Malawi and 6.8 per cent in Tanzania). Further, 22.2 (19.6) per cent 
of rural–urban migrants and 15.3 (8.4) per cent of rural–rural migrants in Malawi 
(Tanzania) transition out of agriculture compared to 10.2 (4.8) per cent of rural 
non-migrants.
Relocation also offers the unemployed additional job opportunities in low- and 
high-return non-agricultural activities. Less than 1 per cent of rural non-migrants 
were unemployed and obtained a low-return or high-return wage or enterprise job 
in the later round in Malawi (Tanzania) relative to 7.5 (7.7) per cent of rural–urban 
migrants and 2.8 (2.2) per cent of rural–rural migrants. While the prob abil ity of 
obtaining a job in a high-return activity for the unemployed is marked higher for 
youth moving to urban areas, such movement comes with an add ition al risk of 
unemployment. Approximately, 4.6 and 12.7 per cent of rural–urban migrants were 
unemployed in Malawi and Tanzania, respectively, in both rounds, compared to 
and 1.7 and 4.0 per cent of rural–rural migrants and 0.8 and 3.3 per cent of rural 
non-migrants. However, the difference in the proportions of migrant youth that 
remain unemployed in both rounds (relative to non-migrant rural youth) is only 
statistically significant when comparing rural–rural migrant employment rates 



































Employment Transitions   migrant migrant   migrant migrant
Agriculture to student 0.000 0.016 0.032* 0.007 0.003 0.015 0.013 0.010
Agriculture to unemployed 0.021 0.031 0.121** 0.055** 0.013 0.037 0.208*** 0.120***
Agriculture to agriculture 0.617 0.617 0.172*** 0.495*** 0.627 0.536 0.097*** 0.400***
Agriculture to LR wage or 
enterprise
0.046 0.056 0.178 0.062*** 0.016 0.016 0.129 0.032**
Agriculture to HR wage or 
enterprise
0.080 0.046 0.044*** 0.090 0.031 0.032 0.067 0.052
LR wage or enterprise to student 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002*
LR wage or enterprise to 
unemployed
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.019 0.011
LR wage or enterprise to 
agriculture
0.030 0.030 0.011* 0.018 0.115 0.075 0.000 0.062***
LR wage or enterprise to LR wage 
or enterprise
0.026 0.022 0.035** 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.022 0.008
LR wage or enterprise to HR wage 
or enterprise
0.016 0.004 0.000 0.009*** 0.016 0.009 0.031 0.010
HR wage or enterprise to student 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
HR wage or enterprise to 
unemployed
0.004 0.002 0.029 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.007**
HR wage or enterprise to 
agriculture
0.061 0.031 0.000* 0.016*** 0.062 0.041 0.000* 0.021***
HR wage or enterprise to LR wage 
or enterprise



































HR wage or enterprise to HR wage 
or enterprise
0.070 0.030 0.061 0.024 0.038 0.016 0.011 0.014
Unemployed to student 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.006 0.001*** 0.000**
Unemployed to unemployed 0.007 0.008 0.046 0.017* 0.012 0.033 0.127 0.040**
Unemployed to agriculture 0.012 0.029 0.020*** 0.079 0.029 0.076 0.066*** 0.132
Unemployed to LR wage or 
enterprise
0.000 0.003 0.023* 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.017 0.005
Unemployed to HR wage or 
enterprise
0.001 0.004 0.052* 0.018* 0.004 0.008 0.060 0.017*
Student to student 0.000 0.012 0.034** 0.005 0.003 0.025 0.016*** 0.001
Student to unemployed 0.000 0.007 0.042 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.070 0.013**
Student to agriculture 0.000 0.043 0.038 0.052 0.004 0.034 0.000 0.028***
Student to LR wage or enterprise 0.000 0.000 0.038** 0.012* 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003
Student to HR wage or enterprise 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.046 0.008*
Individuals 1353 2276 84 600 1886 2612 96 388
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.1. T statistics test the difference between the proportion of migrants and non-migrants in each employment transition category for the 
consolidated 15–34 youth group. Rural–rural and rural–urban migrants are 15–34 years old.
Table 2.1. Continued
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2.5 Conclusion
The LSMS–ISA surveys are one of the few data collection efforts in Africa that 
enable researchers to view a more detailed snapshot of youth migration and 
employment transitions. We find young individuals, ages 15 to 24, are highly 
mobile in all four countries. The individual tracking protocols performed in the 
Malawi and Tanzania surveys allowed us to monitor transitions in income and 
employment between migrant and non-migrant youth samples. This analysis 
suggests migration is potentially welfare–enhancing both in terms of income 
improvements and employment prospects particularly for those migrants who 
were previously unemployed.
One thing to note is that, like any decision, youth face different tradeoffs when 
contemplating where to relocate. Rural–urban migration facilitates movement 
out of agriculture with a greater tendency towards high-return activities in 
Malawi and Tanzania, yet in absolute numbers this affects a small portion of 
youth. Rural–rural youth migration, in contrast, attracts a greater percentage of 
youth. It may be the most formative mobility pattern in the transformation pro-
cess by encouraging youth to diversify from exclusive employment in the agricul-
tural sector.
This chapter focuses exclusively on the migration and employment patterns 
of youth individuals. However, these patterns likely arise from decision-making 
behaviour at the household level. Of future interest will be to decipher the extent 
households spatially allocate young members to access income for agricultural 
intensification or farm expansion purposes, and further how these household 
decisions might be beneficial or harmful to youth in the long term. Understanding 
such household dynamics requires knowledge of whether youth migration pat-
terns are driven by a household wealth effect, for example, from increases in 
investments (Deininger et al. 2008), or a substitution effect between youth labour 
and investments. These complementarities are important as the former (not the 
latter) has the potential to be transformative for youth.
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Policies for Youth Employment  
in Sub-Saharan Africa
David Schwebel, Elisenda Estruch,  
Peter Wobst, and Ileana Grandelis1
3.1 Introduction
The global trend of increased youth unemployment has led many governments 
and international organizations to develop youth-targeted policies and strategies. 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in its Goal 8 commits to ‘promote 
sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment, and decent work for all’. Specific targets were incorporated into this 
goal, including on achieving full employment for young people (8.5); on substan-
tially reducing the proportion of youth not in employment, education, or training 
(8.6); as well as on developing and operationalizing a global strategy for youth 
employment by 2020 (8.b) (UNGA 2015).
At the regional level, the African Union (AU) has also a number of initiatives 
to promote youth employment. In its Agenda 2063, the AU commits to speed 
up actions to support young people through strategies that combat youth 
unemployment and underemployment (AU Commission 2015). In its Ouagadougou 
Declaration, the AU sets an overall regional framework for employment pro-
motion by all AU member states, emphasizing youth and women. The Action 
Plan of this Declaration underlined the importance of promoting agricultural 
and rural development. This was followed by the Ouagadougou+10 Declaration 
on Employment, Poverty Eradicationand Inclusive Development in Africa in 
January 2015, thus reiterating the importance of placing employment at the 
 centre of development strategies (AU Commission 2015). The Malabo Declaration 
on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity 
and Improved Livelihoods includes a specific target to create job opportunities 
for at least 30 per cent of the youth in agricultural value chains (AU Summit 
2014). Similarly, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
1 The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the views 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) or the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
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(CAADP) Results Framework (2015–25) proposes expanding local agro-industry 
and value chain development (VCD) inclusive of women and youth (NEPAD 2015).
At the national level, many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have included 
objectives on youth employment promotion in their policies. Yet, much effort is 
still needed at the policy level to push support on rural youth employment to a 
scale commensurate with the magnitude of the challenge. In particular, additional 
efforts are needed to foster policy coherence towards more youth-friendly 
approaches for agriculture and food systems’ development. Policy coherence 
should especially be encouraged between employment and youth policies, as well 
as agricultural and rural development policies.
This chapter presents a comparative qualitative policy analysis of national 
 policies in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), based on a framework that incorporates the 
main constraints affecting the quantity and quality of rural youth employment. 
Whilst youth employment promotion in agriculture and rural areas is high in the 
regional and national agendas, few policy analytical frameworks and inventories 
include rural youth as a target group and this prevents analysing in a systematic 
and structured manner how the issue is being addressed in existing policies. 
Hence, the chapter builds on existing frameworks, which acknowledge the need 
for integrated policy approaches to youth employment, and further expands them 
by adding specific attention to rural youth and to the linkages between employment 
and rural development. The chapter follows by applying the analytical framework 
to 47 policies from 13 SSA countries from 1996 to 2016. The analysis follows the 
policy discourse analysis literature and focuses on the formulation stage of the 
policymaking process, therefore reviewing if the policy documents address main 
constraints to rural youth employment. The policies examined include develop-
ment, agricultural, rural development, youth, and employment policies.
With the analytical framework, this chapter contributes to a more systematic 
and structured approach to raise awareness among policymakers and the devel-
opment community about existing gaps in addressing the constraints to rural 
youth employment at policy level. This framework allows for the first time to sys-
tematically assess policies of SSA with a youth employment lens associated to the 
different pillars of the Decent Work Agenda. The importance of developing such a 
framework lies in the fact that previous policy reviews showed the prevalence of 
actions focused on labour supply, and the need to have a stronger focus on inter-
ventions addressing the labour demand.
The policy analysis conducted reveals several areas for improvement to create 
better employment opportunities for rural youth in SSA. In particular, the main 
findings show that policies focus more on promoting labour supply strategies—
such as training programmes on entrepreneurship skills, rather than demand-
side ones—such as reducing the constraints to business development and job 
creation at the sectoral level.
In particular, the unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth in rural 
areas was the constraint to rural youth employment least addressed by the policies 
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analysed. Also, some constraints related to the quality of employment (labour 
regulations, social protection, and social dialogue) were insufficiently addressed. 
Yet, a sound institutional and regulatory framework is crucial to protect workers’ 
rights and vulnerable youth groups. Other relevant aspects often not addressed 
were access to social protection and youth representation in social and policy 
dialogue.
3.2 Rural Labour Market Dynamics and Effects  
on Youth Employment
Employment dynamics in rural labour markets are different from urban areas. 
They are generally characterized for a sub-optimal allocation of labour and lower 
income of workers, which leads to limited rural development (Tocco, Davidova, 
and Bailey 2012). The main employment challenge in rural labour markets is not 
unemployment, but a higher incidence of underemployment, especially through 
self-employment and casual wage employment in the informal sector. This is the 
result of structural constraints in rural labour markets that particularly affect 
rural youth participation in the labour force. In rural areas of developing coun-
tries, the lack of infrastructure, investments, farm inputs, and policy support has 
led to low levels of human capital, an agricultural sector with low productivity, 
and limited non-agricultural employment opportunities. It is therefore important 
to better understand how the conditions affecting labour supply interact with 
those affecting labour demand across rural labour markets (ILO 2008).
The ILO proposes a comprehensive rural labour market framework (Table 3.1) 
in terms of supply, demand, and institutions which is useful to analyse its impacts 
on rural youth in SSA. The supply side is mainly determined by demographics, 
access to productive assets, education levels, and social norms. The young popu-
lation in SSA is expected to continue growing in the next decades, leading to 
approximately 370 million young people joining labour markets in the next 
15 years (AfDB et al. 2015). This can produce an oversupply of unskilled labour in 
rural areas with limited employment opportunities in farm and nonfarm activities. 
One of the main limiting factors is the low access to productive assets through 
financial services for rural youth—including credit, savings, and insurance—to 
start their own business. Another factor is low levels of education and limited 
skills that curb the productivity of rural youth and hinder their entrepreneurial 
abilities. Social norms, which define the role that rural youth should play in a 
community or household, can also impair their ability to find a job or start a busi-
ness, especially for young women.
The demand side is affected by economic growth, investment levels, and market 
access. Low public and private investments in rural areas and agriculture causes 
limited rural enterprise growth and job creation, which contributes to widespread 
























Table 3.1. Main characteristics of rural labour markets
Supply side Institutions and intermediary structures and processes Demand side
Conditions influencing supply
 ■ Population growth and family composition
 ■ Social norms related to labour supply
 ■ Migration patterns and intensity
 ■ Urban growth and associated labour demand
 ■ Access to land and other productive assets
 ■ Nutrition and health
 ■ Education and skills
 ■ Income transfers
Types of work and workers
 ■ Waged workers, including permanent, fulltime, 
part-time, casual, temporary, seasonal, and so 
on
 ■ Self-employed, including both on-farm 
( smallholders) and off-farm (service  
providers and small-scale businesses)
 ■ Sharecroppers
 ■ Outgrowers and other rural workers under 
‘putting out’ systems
Categories of waged and/or self-employed workers 
who may be subjected to discrimination include:
 ■ Young workers
 ■ Women
 ■ Migrant workers
 ■ Landless poor
 ■ Indigenous people
Special consideration needs to be given in rural  
areas to:
 ■ Child labour
 ■ Bonded labour
Government policies, regulations, and services
 ■ Macroeconomic and financial policies
 ■ Agricultural and sectoral policies
 ■ Trade and agricultural policies
 ■ Public investment (infrastructure, education,  
health, and so on)
 ■ Rule of law and property rights
 ■ Land reform processes
 ■ Labour codes and regulations, including inter-
national labour standards (ILS)
 ■ Information and marketing systems
 ■ Employment services
 ■ Enabling environment for business and investment
 ■ Donor policy (ODA)
Social partners, civil society, and the private sector
 ■ Trade unions
 ■ Employers’ organizations
 ■ Farmer/agricultural producer organizations
 ■ Cooperatives
 ■ Advocacy and service organizations, including 
NGOs
 ■ Private enterprises
 ■ Value chain and sectoral organizations
 ■ Marketing intermediaries
 ■ Financial intermediaries
Social and cultural factors and economic institutions
 ■ Informal networks, family, and kinship ties
 ■ Cultural norms
 ■ Sharecropping
 ■ Contract farming and outgrower associations
 ■ Non-market-based labour exchanges
 ■ Debt peonage and bonded labour
Conditions influencing demand
 ■ General economic growth
 ■ Growth of agricultural output for the 
domestic market and for export
 ■ Market access for agricultural 
products with trading partners
 ■ Growth of rural non-farm activities
 ■ Public and private investment in  
rural areas
 ■ Technical progress in agriculture—
type and intensity
 ■ Relative factor prices in agriculture 
and in relation to other sectors
 ■ Labour productivity in agriculture
 ■ Public works
 ■ Urban growth
 ■ Farm structure
 ■ Seasonality
 ■ Landownership structure
Source: ILO  2008.
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opportunities (ILO 2008). Rural youth also have limited access to land—either to 
acquire or lease—due to unclear and insecure land rights, inheritance laws, and 
customs. Young rural entrepreneurs also face difficulties in accessing markets for 
their products and integrating into value chains.
As can be seen, the rural youth face particular constraints both in the demand 
and supply side when entering the labour force. Their ability to achieve successful 
transitions into rural wage and productive self-employment depends on several 
factors, but most notably on the aggregate labour demand and job opportunities, 
quality training that meets rural labour market demands, social protection that 
reaches rural areas, protection of workers’ rights, the elimination of youth 
 discrimination, and collective bargaining by including young people in agricultural 
organizations. To address all these factors, adequate balance should be found 
between general interventions that favor an enabling environment for decent 
rural employment promotion and targeted interventions for rural youth.
Rural labour markets have the potential to create quality jobs for the rural 
youth. Beyond farm jobs, there is also significant potential for job creation in 
rural nonfarm activities around food value chains linked to sustainable agriculture, 
agribusiness development, and related support services. In SSA, for instance, the 
demand for food is increasing due to growing population, urbanization, and rising 
household income. This creates opportunities for suppliers and suggests that there 
is a largely untapped reservoir of employment opportunities in agriculture 
(FAO 2016). However, for the agricultural sector to attract youth, youth-targeted 
policies and investments are needed to improve the quality of the available jobs. 
Better working conditions will not only be crucial to sustainably increase agricul-
tural productivity, but also key determinants to attract young people to rural jobs.
3.3 Methodology for Comparative Policy Analysis  
on Rural Youth Employment
Since the global employment crisis started in 2007, there has been increased 
attention on generating evidence on the most effective policies and interventions 
for governments to create jobs, especially for young people. Analytical frame-
works increasingly recognize that policies focused only on labour supply (such as 
skills development) are not enough, and that an equally serious problem is insuf-
ficient labour demand (enterprise development and job creation initiatives) as 
well as poor working conditions (such as social protection programmes). This 
section provides a short overview of the strengths and gaps of existing frame-
works to analyse youth employment, and proposes a new policy framework to 
better address youth employment focusing on rural areas. It later presents the 
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3.3.1 Existing Frameworks for Employment Policy Analysis
Several frameworks have been recently proposed to analyse labour issues giving 
importance to different policy areas. The World Bank’s MILES framework for 
employment stresses the importance of placing labour markets at the centre of 
the structural adjustment policy agenda (WB  2007). This multisectoral frame-
work focuses on five areas: 1) Macroeconomic policies; 2) Investment climate, 
institutions, and infrastructure; 3) Labour market regulations and institutions; 
4) Education and skills; and 5) Social Protection. It is based on the fact that 
successful policies must concentrate on key constraints to growth and job creation 
in each area. Its implementation can be examined in the evaluation report of the 
World Bank’s Youth Employment Programmes. The portfolio review found that 
most youth employment projects focus on interventions in skills development 
(82 per cent), school-to-work transition (79 per cent), and interventions to foster 
job creation and work opportunities for youth (54 per cent) (IEG 2012).
Another policy framework focused on youth employment is the one pro-
posed during the 2012 International Labour Conference (ILC), expressing the 
need for a multi-pronged, coherent, and context-specific approach (ILO 2012a). 
The policy responses included five policy areas: 1) employment and economic 
policies for youth employment; 2) employability—education, training, and 
skills, and the school-to-work transition; 3) labour market policies; 4) youth 
entrepreneurship and self-employment; and 5) rights for young people. In both 
the ILO and WB frameworks, there are several overlaps in the focus areas for 
employment creation.
Other useful tools to identify policies and programmes related to youth 
employment are the policy inventories and databases. For example, YouthPOL 
eAnalysis, ILO’s database on youth employment policies, includes 65 countries with 
a total of 486 policy documents as of October 2016 divided into six policy areas: 
1) Macroeconomic and sectoral policy; 2) Enterprise development; 3) Education 
and training; 4) Labour demand; 5) Labour law and legislation; and 6) Labour 
market policy. The policy area most addressed is education and training, showing 
a clear focus on labour supply. The database includes policies affecting youth 
employment in general, without a particular focus on rural youth.
Another relevant database is the Youth Employment Inventory (YEI), which 
provides comparative information of more than 750 projects to support young 
workers in over 90 countries. Although it covers some rural development pro-
grammes, it does not include a specific category on agriculture and rural develop-
ment. In contrast, FAO’s employment and decent work in rural areas policy 
database gives a comprehensive overview of agricultural and rural development 
policy and institutional frameworks. This database is an online inventory of cur-
rent national, regional, and global policies, programs, and studies that are relevant 
to the promotion of more and better jobs in the rural areas of developing 
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countries. Although the database does not focus exclusively on rural youth, it is a 
useful tool to identify and find information on policies that directly affect rural 
employment and different groups of workers, including rural youth.
The calls to develop policies focused on youth had a positive impact at the 
national level. According to the report on the State of Youth Policy 2014, from a 
total of 198 countries, 122 countries (62 per cent) had a national youth policy, a 
considerable increase from 99 countries in 2013. Another 37 countries (19 per cent) 
are currently developing or revising their youth policy, 31 countries (16 per cent) 
have no youth policy, and 8 countries (4 per cent) have unclear or unknown 
information (youthpolicy.org 2014). The report identified common issues on 
youth policies across countries including: education, training, employment, labour 
market access, health, and youth civic involvement. But again, the report does not 
explicitly assess aspects related specifically to rural youth or agriculture as a 
source of youth employment.
Few policy frameworks and inventories include rural youth as a target group 
since policies themselves seldom devote particular objectives to promote rural 
youth employment. Rural youth rarely participate in the policymaking process 
and therefore their voices are not heard, causing limited inclusion of their par-
ticular needs and constraints to find decent jobs. Policies also often fail to reflect 
the heterogeneity of young people given the lack of comprehensive data on rural 
youth as a distinct group (FAO, IFAD, and CTA 2014). As a result, policies are 
many times not implementable and/or sustainable in rural areas since they are 
designed by policymakers who are often unaware of the situation of rural youth 
(MIJARC, IFAD, and FAO  2012). Against this background, the AU has raised 
awareness in its African Youth Charter on the need to include the African youth 
in political processes by promoting measures to facilitate youth participation in 
the design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of national development 
plans, policies, and poverty reduction strategies (AU Commission  2006). It is 
therefore crucial to develop a comprehensive framework to analyse policies that 
affect rural employment from a youth perspective, especially in SSA.
3.3.2 Policy Framework for Rural Youth Employment Analysis
The proposed framework for policy analysis integrates the main constraints to 
rural youth employment into five policy areas: 1) sectoral development; 2) 
self-employment, employability, and skills development; 3) labour market institu-
tions and regulations; 4) social protection; and 5) social and policy dialogue. The 
five areas were selected to develop a multipronged framework that covers the 
main issues that have an impact on youth labour supply and demand as well as on 
the job quality dimension. Within the policy areas, nine constraints were ana-
























Table 3.2. Policy framework for rural youth employment analysis







in agriculture and 
rural development
Investments in infrastructure and services, 
including business development services, make 
rural markets work better and provide more job 
opportunities for rural youth. Investments in 
value addition facilitate value chain development 
(VCD) and job creation.
-  Agricultural policy: investments in agricultural diversification, 
sustainable intensification, micro, small, and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs), and VCD.
-  Rural development policy: investments in infrastructure, access to 
energy and water, quality education, and health.
Weak labour 
demand
Innovative mechanisms for youth employment 
creation in rural areas, including nonfarm and 
agricultural wage employment. Food systems can 
be supported through different strategies which 
might be more or less employment-enhancing.
-  Prioritization of employment-intensive sectors/technologies/
practices or sectors where most of the rural poor live and work.






To develop agribusinesses rural youth need access 
to key productive resources such as land, labour, 
water, financial services, and infrastructure. Rural 
youth can also engage in existing agribusiness and 
agricultural value chains as wage workers, 
contract farmers, and suppliers.
-  Dedicated action to address youth constraints to engage in 
agribusiness (for example, access to credit, land, markets, and  
so on).
-  Specific fora established on youth involvement in specific value 
chains
- Priority on youth intergenerational land and farm transfer.







lack of adequate 
education
Rural skills development, including extension 
services, and relevant youth training to the needs 
of rural labour markets can raise youth 
productivity and employability. Better educated 
youth are more likely to make good use of 
resources and adopt agricultural technologies.
-  Formal and non-formal agricultural technical and vocation 
education and training/extension services
- Basic education to develop literacy and numeracy skills.
- Tertiary agricultural education.
- Youth apprenticeship mechanisms.
- Skills development programmes.






Employment services expanded to rural areas 
provide job search assistance and information for 
rural youth. Young farmers need resources and 
information to start an agribusiness. Partnerships 
established with the private sector to facilitate 
school to work transitions.
-  Inclusion of youth kits, microfinance mechanisms and saving 
groups, and so on.
-  Increase awareness of self-employment and wage employment 
opportunities, especially for young women.







Young rural workers need to improve in the terms 
and conditions of employment (for example, 
occupational safety and health (OSH), wages, 
minimum working age, and so on). ILS should be 
enforced in rural areas.
- Review regulatory framework to capture youth as a target group.
- Ensure enforcement of decent work standards.
-  Institutional capacity for monitoring OSH standards in enterprises 
employing youth
Social constraints Remove cultural and systematic discrimination 
(for example, gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, 
and so on) for vulnerable youth groups to access 
decent jobs.
-  Mainstream gender in all youth development approaches and 
interventions.
-  Special attention given to vulnerable rural youth groups, including 
indigenous, migrant, and poor youth.
Social protection Limited social 
protection
Extend social protection coverage to rural areas to 
protect rural youth, promote their livelihoods and 
productivity, and overcome socioeconomic 
exclusion.
- Social support programmes that target youth.
- Tax exemptions on agricultural inputs for youth.
- Cash transfers include young beneficiaries.
- Promote youth-friendly health services.






Facilitate engagement of rural youth in 
governance mechanisms, including producer 
associations and cooperatives to defend their 
interests.
- Promote youth participation in the decision-making processes.
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opportunities for rural youth. Investments in 
value addition facilitate value chain development 
(VCD) and job creation.
-  Agricultural policy: investments in agricultural diversification, 
sustainable intensification, micro, small, and medium enterprises 
(MSMEs), and VCD.
-  Rural development policy: investments in infrastructure, access to 
energy and water, quality education, and health.
Weak labour 
demand
Innovative mechanisms for youth employment 
creation in rural areas, including nonfarm and 
agricultural wage employment. Food systems can 
be supported through different strategies which 
might be more or less employment-enhancing.
-  Prioritization of employment-intensive sectors/technologies/
practices or sectors where most of the rural poor live and work.
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agribusiness (for example, access to credit, land, markets, and  
so on).
-  Specific fora established on youth involvement in specific value 
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- Priority on youth intergenerational land and farm transfer.







lack of adequate 
education
Rural skills development, including extension 
services, and relevant youth training to the needs 
of rural labour markets can raise youth 
productivity and employability. Better educated 
youth are more likely to make good use of 
resources and adopt agricultural technologies.
-  Formal and non-formal agricultural technical and vocation 
education and training/extension services
- Basic education to develop literacy and numeracy skills.
- Tertiary agricultural education.
- Youth apprenticeship mechanisms.
- Skills development programmes.






Employment services expanded to rural areas 
provide job search assistance and information for 
rural youth. Young farmers need resources and 
information to start an agribusiness. Partnerships 
established with the private sector to facilitate 
school to work transitions.
-  Inclusion of youth kits, microfinance mechanisms and saving 
groups, and so on.
-  Increase awareness of self-employment and wage employment 
opportunities, especially for young women.







Young rural workers need to improve in the terms 
and conditions of employment (for example, 
occupational safety and health (OSH), wages, 
minimum working age, and so on). ILS should be 
enforced in rural areas.
- Review regulatory framework to capture youth as a target group.
- Ensure enforcement of decent work standards.
-  Institutional capacity for monitoring OSH standards in enterprises 
employing youth
Social constraints Remove cultural and systematic discrimination 
(for example, gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, 
and so on) for vulnerable youth groups to access 
decent jobs.
-  Mainstream gender in all youth development approaches and 
interventions.
-  Special attention given to vulnerable rural youth groups, including 
indigenous, migrant, and poor youth.
Social protection Limited social 
protection
Extend social protection coverage to rural areas to 
protect rural youth, promote their livelihoods and 
productivity, and overcome socioeconomic 
exclusion.
- Social support programmes that target youth.
- Tax exemptions on agricultural inputs for youth.
- Cash transfers include young beneficiaries.
- Promote youth-friendly health services.






Facilitate engagement of rural youth in 
governance mechanisms, including producer 
associations and cooperatives to defend their 
interests.
- Promote youth participation in the decision-making processes.
-  Encourage rural youth to join or form associations and cooperatives.
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of the policy areas is based on existing frameworks adapted to the reality of rural 
labour markets. In particular, they reflect the pillars of the Decent Work Agenda 
emphasizing the key role that the development of the agricultural sector plays in 
rural areas as it still occupies the vast majority of the labour force, reaching 75 per 
cent or above in certain Sahel and East African countries (Losch 2017). Within 
each of the policy areas, the selected constraints reflect the main bottlenecks that 
prevent young people from accessing decent jobs in rural areas.
The policy framework was used to analyse the content of 47 policies from 
13 countries of SSA (see Table 3.A1 for complete list of policies per country). Its main 
purpose was to determine whether or not key constraints to rural youth employ-
ment were addressed in the policy documents. Depending on availability, four 
types of policy were taken by country: 1) development policy, vision, or strategy 
to reduce poverty; 2) employment policy; 3) youth policy; and 4) agricultural or 
rural development policy. The rationale for selecting these four types was to assess 
the consistency of interventions across policies and policy coherence towards 
rural youth employment promotion.
3.3.3 Policy Discourse Analysis
It is important to begin by explaining what is meant by policy analysis as well as 
the selected theoretical background and methodology. Policy analysis emerged as 
a technique to better understand the policymaking process and provide decision 
makers with reliable knowledge and information on pressing economic and social 
problems (Fischer, Miller, and Sidney 2007). There are multiple quantitative and 
qualitative methods that can be used to analyse policies depending on the area of 
interest and purpose of the analysis. The methodology could also vary depending 
on the stage in the policy cycle being observed: either the formulation, imple-
mentation, or evaluation of a policy.2 As the purpose of the current policy analysis 
is to examine if the constraints to rural youth employment are addressed in 
selected policies, we focus on the formulation stage of the policymaking process.
During the policy formulation, the objectives are defined based on the priorities 
of a government and the development needs of a country. At this stage, it is essen-
tial to conduct a thorough analysis of the socioeconomic challenges faced in a 
country and engage all key stakeholders in order to define the actual priorities 
and needs (ILO 2012b). There are however vulnerable groups that are sometimes 
not included in the consultations, as often happens with rural youth. It is there-
fore crucial to assess if policies are considering rural youth and their employment 
needs. To carry out an assessment of this type a sound methodology is needed to 
clearly analyse the content of a policy.
2 Although policies are developed in several standard steps, there is no universal model of the policy 
cycle and variations might emerge depending on particular contexts and institutional arrangements.
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The applied methodology to conduct this comparative policy analysis was 
based on the discourse theory for policy analysis. A discourse analysis focuses 
on the use of language in a speech or text (here it will be policies) within a 
 specific context. An important component of policy analysis is the examination 
of the discourse, in this case policy statements, from a qualitative or quantita-
tive perspective. We therefore consider the discourse as an integral part of the 
 policymaking process. In particular, we focus on the poststructuralist3 inter-
pretation of the discourse theory that emphasizes the ways in which language 
materializes in practices (Paul 2009). In other words, we analyse how govern-
mental institutions state in their policy objectives how they will pursue specific 
actions that will translate into institutional practices. Due to limited availability 
of information, this analysis focuses on the language throughout the policy 
design without reaching the point of corroborating if the discourse is actually 
translated into practice.
The rationale behind selecting discourse theory over other methods for policy 
analysis is that the main goal of this assessment is to clearly identify if the lan-
guage being used in the policy statements properly addresses the main con-
straints to rural youth employment. The main unit of analysis is thus the full text 
of the policies in which specific words were searched. Then, the linguistic mean-
ings of the policy statements were assessed to see if they appropriately reflected 
the selected constraints. It is assumed that if the policy statements address the 
constraints, they will eventually be transformed into a political discourse and 
consecutively into actions, in this case, to promote rural youth employment. A caveat 
in the present analysis is that it is confined to the assessment of the explicit 
wording of the respective policy documents, and thus does not interpret the 
wording in terms of policy change induced by the policy or overall country per-
formance on rural youth employment. Being a qualitative methodology, policy 
analysis inevitably entails a certain risk of subjectivity, mainly with regards to the 
interpretation of words. Hence, in order to mitigate related errors and biases, a 
methodological approach was applied to the systematic and structured review of 
the policy documents in relation to how main constraints to rural youth employ-
ment are or are not addressed.
3.3.4 Scoring Methodology
A scoring methodology was adopted to conduct desk review of policy docu-
ments for all countries and policy areas under consideration. A review of differ-
ent scoring systems was carried out in order to choose the appropriate method 
3 Poststructuralist Discourse Analysis has been instrumental in developing a more dynamic and 
historically-sensitive mode of critical inquiry claiming that texts are multiply implicated in their social 
contexts and, thereby, come to shape various forms of knowledge and identity (Chouliaraki 2008).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
58 David Schwebel ET al.
to assess how rural youth employment is addressed in the policy statements. 
One system is constructing a discourse quality index based on particular indi-
cators that measure different dimensions of a political discourse (Steenbergen 
et al. 2003). Another method is using different scales to measure the quality of 
the discourse, for example a five-point scale ranging from ‘very favourable’ to 
‘very unfavourable’ for a specific policy issue (Stromer-Galley  2007). A third 
system is to develop a binary indicator to capture the positive or negative qual-
ity of discourse within a policy. In this case it was decided to use the binary 
measurement system (1 or 0) in order to appreciate in a simple and clear way if 
the policies did or did not address the main constraints to rural youth employ-
ment. The binary criterion to qualify policy statements stems from the fact that 
general interventions to improve labour market outcomes for rural workers 
could also contribute to address particular constraints that rural youth face. As 
they are the predominant cohort facing underemployment, especially in rural 
areas in SSA, it would be expected that policies addressing employment issues 
will inadvertently be also covering or targeting the rural youth. However, given 
the aim of our analysis, our approach gives more weight when rural youth are 
explicitly mentioned.
The following describes the steps taken to perform the policy discourse analysis. 
A desk review was first conducted to identify key policies by country. The con-
sulted sources to collect the policies included websites of government ministries, 
as well as policy inventories and databases. The most recent policies were selected, 
including the ones that are still under approval in national parliaments. The 
structure, length, and content of each one varied considerably depending on the 
country and type of policy. To facilitate comparison, policy statements were 
selected that expressed the aim or objective of addressing any of the identified 
constraints. Within the policies, keywords were searched and subsequently 
assessed consistently. The criterion was assigning 1 on each policy statement if it 
explicitly mentioned a constraint or 0 if it did not. After scoring the nine con-
straints per policy, weighted averages were calculated for each policy area per 
country. It was decided to calculate weighted means to avoid skewness, as some 
policy areas have one constraint while others have multiple. Since the highest 
score a country can get is 100, each of the five policy areas has a weight of 
20 divided by the number of constraints.
An illustrative example is the analysis of Tanzania’s policies. In the case of 
Tanzania’s National Agricultural Policy (2013), looking at the sectoral development 
policy area, specific words were searched linked to the constraint of unfavourable 
agribusiness environment for youth. The related policy statement found was: ‘The 
Government in collaboration with private sector shall create conducive environ-
ment for youth to settle in rural areas through improvement of social services, 
infrastructure, and promote rural development.’ As can be seen, it clearly makes 
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reference on how a favourable environment is necessary to attract rural youth to 
agriculture. Therefore a value of 1 was assigned to this particular constraint.
The same process was followed for Tanzania’s four policies, assigning 1 or 0 for 
each constraint depending on whether they were addressed or not based on the 
keyword search (see Table  3.3). Once the four policies had binary scores, the 
weighted averages for each constraint were calculated within each policy area. For 
example, for the policy area Sectoral Development the three constraints were scored 
in each of the four policies. The constraint unfavourable agribusiness environment 
for youth was addressed in three out of the four policies, its weighted average is 
therefore 5.00. Once the weighted averages were calculated, they were summed to 
obtain the overall policy score for Tanzania, which is 73.
The scoring of the policies was not carried out arbitrarily as all policy docu-
ments were systematically reviewed based on the proposed framework in order to 
assess to what extent the main constraints on rural youth employment were being 
addressed. There are however some limitations in this analysis. First of all, it 
focuses on the policy design and discourse, and thus not on the implementation 
of the policies. On the latter, it was only verified that the policy was available 
online, that it was complemented with an action plan, and that it mentioned specific 
programmes and projects. However, we did not get to the step of corroborating 
whether the policies were actually translated into particular actions, nor on their 
ultimate impacts. The policy analysis was mainly based on a desk review and 
expert assessment from FAO’s Decent Rural Employment Team, as well as building 
on expertise generated through FAO’s field programme on the subject matter. 
Moreover, we did not look at the interactions and policy coherence among different 
government ministries and sectors due to limited availability of information. Finally, 
the policies under consideration covered the period between 1996 and 2016.
3.3.5 Context Indicators for Selected SSA Countries
Before turning into the results of the policy analysis, it is relevant to have a general 
idea of the socioeconomic and political context in each of the countries. Thirteen 
countries from SSA were selected based on the availability of data and policies at 
the national level. The selection captures diversity in terms of social and economic 
conditions as well as income, geographic area, size, and population. It should be 
noted that cross-country comparisons can sometimes be misleading as many of 
the indicators are measured based on national definitions that may vary from 
country to country. Also, South Africa does not generally follow the trends of 
other SSA countries due to particular socioeconomic conditions.
Table 3.4 presents eleven key indicators that have an impact on rural labour 
























Table 3.3. Policy scoring example of Tanzania
Policies Sectoral development Self-employment  
capacity, employability, 
and skills development
Labour market  










































National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction 
of Poverty II
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1  
National Employment 
Policy
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0  
National Youth 
Development Policy
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1  
National Agriculture 
Policy
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
























Table 3.4. Key indicators of selected countries






















Benin 2,272 33.9 53.2 39.7 43.2 8.1 88.9 87.7 5.2 0.05 46
Ethiopia 1,899 36.3 79.7 30.4 68.2 10.0 89.5 88.8 7.4 −1.24 63
Ghana 4,492 34.8 44.6 37.9 40.7 18.2 81.7 76.8 4.9 −0.13 53
Kenya 3,285 36.1 73.4 49.1 38.0 33.4 63.4 77.7 26.2 −1.27 64
Liberia 1,283 33.8 49.3 67.7 43.0 18.1 81.7 78.7 3.3 −0.63 69
Malawi 1,202 35.8 83.3 56.6 84.7 16.1 83.9 83.9 7.8 0.12 52
Nigeria 5,875 32.9 50.5 52.8 36.6 N/A N/A N/A 13.4 −2.11 44
Senegal 3,450 34.3 53.3 57.1 53.4 22.3 58.3 58.0 5.5 −0.13 40
South Africa 13,498 35.9 34.2 77.0 5.6 85.9 13.6 9.3 53.5 −0.08 51
Tanzania 2,946 33.2 66.9 33.3 66.7 16.2 75.9 74.0 3.9 −0.54 73
Togo 1,660 34.1 58.8 73.4 37.8 10.9 89.1 89.1 2.8 −0.16 59
Uganda 1,864 34.0 76.8 22.4 69.0 19.6 80.2 78.9 2.9 −0.93 72
Zambia 4,024 35.0 57.0 77.9 53.3 20.4 79.3 79.0 15.94 0.21 55
Sources:
1 WB WDI. 2017. Gross domestic product per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP).
2 UNDESA, World Population Prospects. 2017. The African Union’s definition of youth covers the age range 15–34.
3 UN World Urbanization Prospects. 2018. Rural population refers to people living in rural areas as defined by national statistical offices.
4 WB WDI. Latest available year. Rural poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of the rural population living below the national poverty lines.
5 ILOSTAT 2017. Status in employment distinguishes between two categories of the employed—(a) wage and salaried workers and (b) self-employed workers. The vulnerable employment 
rate is calculated as the sum of contributing family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of total employment.
6 ILOSTAT 2017. The unemployment rate indicates the proportion of the labour force that does not have a job and is actively looking and available for work covering persons aged 
15 to 24.
7 WB WGI. 2014. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including 
terrorism. Units range from –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance.
8 Own calculations based on rural youth employment policy framework; units range from 0 to 100.
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data on rural employment, general employment data was included. The policy 
score obtained from the discourse analysis was also added to appreciate its 
 relationship with the other indicators. As can be observed in the socioeconomic 
indicators, the GDP per capita varies between countries: eight are low-income 
economies, four are lower-middle-income economies, and only South Africa is 
an upper-middle-income economy. In all countries, young people (aged 15–34) 
comprise between 30 and 40 per cent of the total population. In 10 out of 13 of the 
countries more than half of the population lives in rural areas; on the one side 
Ethiopia has 80 per cent of its population living in rural areas, on the other side 
South Africa has only 34 per cent (UN DESA 2018). Likewise, rural poverty pre-
vails in many of the countries reflecting low agricultural incomes, with Zambia 
having around 78 per cent of the rural population living below the poverty line 
and Uganda with around 22 per cent.
With respect to labour market indicators, agriculture remains the main sector 
of employment in most countries, employing more than half of the population in 
7 out of 13 of the countries. For example, in Ethiopia around 73 per cent of the 
population works in agriculture against only 4.6 per cent in South Africa. Most of 
the economically active population is self-employed, including employers, own-
account workers, members of producers’ cooperatives, and contributing family 
workers. Also, most of the employment is considered to be vulnerable as the 
majority of the employed population includes own-account workers and contrib-
uting family workers, who are less likely to have formal work arrangements, and 
are therefore more likely to lack decent working conditions (ILO  2013). Youth 
unemployment rates also vary considerably between countries; on the one 
hand Benin has a youth unemployment rate of only 2 per cent, on the other 
hand 50.7 per cent of South Africa’s youth is unemployed.
With regard to the political context, some countries have a low score in political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism, which can considerably affect the 
policy and institutional environment in a country. For example, Nigeria has the 
lowest score given the current political instability and terrorism in the country, 
which could hamper the implementation of policies. Finally, the policy score is 
the result of the analysis carried out with the proposed policy framework 
reflecting the average of the scored constraints per country. The country that 
received the highest score is Tanzania with 73, while the one with the lowest 
is Senegal with 33. As can be seen, the policy scores do not necessarily correspond 
with the other indicators presented; for example, a low policy score does not 
translate into a high rural poverty headcount. The reason for this is that the 
policy assessment only focuses on the policy design without checking whether 
the policy statements were indeed transformed into concrete actions that have 
an impact on the economic performance and on rural youth employment in a 
given country.
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3.4 Main Findings of the Comparative Policy Analysis
This section presents the main results of the comparative policy analysis  conducted 
with the rural youth employment policy framework in the selected SSA countries. 
The implementation of the methodology through the proposed policy framework 
provided revealing findings which require an in-depth discussion. The results of 
scoring policy statements within the four types of policies are presented at the 
policy area, constraint, and country level. The discussion of the findings high-
lights the issues with lower scores, interprets the results, and proposes strategies 
to overcome these challenges.
3.4.1 Policy Area Analysis
The scores for the five policy areas let us appreciate the differences between coun-
tries in addressing the constraints to rural youth employment within the policies. 
In Figure 3.1, we can see which policy areas received the highest and the lowest 
scores on average, and the performance of each country across the five policy 
areas. In each policy area the scores for the thirteen countries range from 0 to 100, 
with the average marked with a line. As previously explained, the score for each 
country within a policy area is the average that resulted in the binary assessment 
of the nine constraints that were grouped into the five policy areas for each of the 
analysed policies.
The policy area that received the highest score is self-employment, employability, 
and skills development (74), supporting the argument that most policies focus on 
labour supply. Liberia and Benin had the lowest score (33) while South Africa 
obtained the highest (100). South Africa received the highest possible score because 
the three analysed policies explicitly addressed the two main constraints on labour 
supply for rural youth, namely: lack of skills and education, as well as inadequate 
job matching services, information, and business start-up resources. For example, 
South Africa’s National Youth Policy (2015) states that training young people in 
skills relevant to agriculture and the agricultural value chain will also help to 
attract young people to the sector and promote agriculture and agroprocessing.
The second policy area is sectoral development (56), linked with labour 
demand, which includes ARD investments, rural labour demand, and agribusi-
ness environment for youth. Although many policies include this type of inter-
vention, they do it at a lesser extent than labour supply interventions. Tanzania 
received the highest score in this policy area (92), while Nigeria and Malawi 
had the lowest score (33). Kenya has a score in sectoral development on the 
average (56) given that the three analysed policies addressed only some of the 
constraints to the labour demand of rural youth. For instance, Kenya’s Agricultural 
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Sector Development Policy (2010) commits to empower the rural youth by sen-
sitizing them on lucrative ventures in the agricultural sector and establishing 
processing plants for value addition in rural areas to provide employment 
opportunities for youth.
The third policy area is labour market institutions and regulations (53), indi-
cating that labour standards and social constraints is an issue that needs to be 
better addressed. Uganda received the highest score (88), while Senegal had the 
lowest (17). Social constraints are a major challenge for rural youth. Local tradi-
tions and social norms prevent young people, and especially young women, from 
accessing the necessary productive resources. Particularly young women have 
lower incomes since they are less likely than their male counterparts to own land. 
Malawi’s Youth National Policy (2013) addresses this constraint with the goal of 
providing access to productive agricultural land in adequate proportion and other 
factors of production for the youth who fail to access these resources due to 
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Figure 3.1. Total compliance by policy area
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In third place is also the social protection policy area (53), showing that  policies 
partially cover social security schemes such as cash transfers, minimum wages, 
tax exemptions, health services, and so on. All of Liberia’s policies adequately 
addressed the access to social protection for rural youth, it thus received the high-
est score (100). In contrast, only one out of four of Nigeria’s policies addressed 
social protection issues for vulnerable groups, so it received the lowest score (25). 
One of the policies that explicitly mentioned young people is the National Youth 
Policy of Ghana (2010) which commits to provide social protection for the 
 vulnerable and excluded youth.
Finally, the least addressed policy area is social and policy dialogue (51) as pro-
moting the organization of rural young workers to increase their bargaining 
power was only included in around half of the policies. Some policies did commit 
to promote social dialogue and tripartism, however few explicitly mentioned the 
importance of engaging rural youth in decision-making processes. For example, 
the Second National Youth Policy Document of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(2009) declares that governments should always lend support to and be willing to 
engage in dialogue with youth-led organizations and work with a broad range of 
the youth population. In contrast, none of Senegal’s policies mentioned the 
importance of involving excluded young people in social dialogue.
As can be seen, the systematic review of policies shows a clear trend to address 
one policy area, that is, promoting self-employment, employability, and skills 
development, over the other four policy areas. This finding indicates in turn that 
policies would focus more on the supply side of the labour market, paying less 
attention to other constraints that also affect the access of rural youth to decent 
employment. It is also noteworthy that the other four policy areas had a similar 
score of just over 50, showing that around half of the policies would be addressing 
in rather similar ways these policy areas.
3.4.2 Constraint Analysis
The analysis at the constraint level adds further elements to our comparative pol-
icy analysis to examine how the policies across 13 SSA countries addressed the 
main challenges to rural youth employment. Table  3.5 presents the constraints 
with the lowest scores per country. To capture the binding character of the con-
straints, countries were bound by the lowest score. As can be seen, the constraint 
with the lowest score in most countries is unfavourable agribusiness environment 
for youth within the sectoral development policy area. This shows that most policies 
do not explicitly focus on creating an enabling environment for youth agribusiness 
development. Many policies did mention the intention to enhance a conducive 
business environment to promote private sector growth, but they neither focus on 
the agricultural sector nor on rural youth.
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3.4.3 Country Analysis
The scores can also be analysed by country to better grasp how national policy 
documents address issues related to rural youth employment. Such additional 
level of detail is also useful to compare policy performance on the five policy 
areas simultaneously within and between the thirteen countries. The disaggre-
gated scores by policy area per country are presented in Table 3.A2. As mentioned 
before, Senegal received the lowest score (40) and Tanzania the highest (73). 
Figure 3.2 clearly shows significant differences between these two countries in the 
scores across the five policy areas. Due to limited space, only the policy context 
of these two countries will be discussed here. Given the aim of our analysis, it is 
relevant to look at potential reasons behind these contrasting scores.
The main reason for Senegal’s low scores is explained by the lack of main-
streaming youth in the analysed national policies. It is therefore necessary to 
look further into the content and to discuss main gaps of these policy docu-
ments regarding rural youth employment. The Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Orientation 
Act (LOASP) adopted in 2004 is Senegal’s legal framework for the development 
of agriculture and the reduction of poverty in rural areas. Its main objectives 
are to reduce the impact of external shocks to the agricultural sector, increase 
agricultural exports, improve farmers’ social and economic conditions, and 
establish a system incentivizing private investment in agriculture and rural 
Table 3.5. Main constraint and score per country
Country Main binding constraint Score per 
constraint
Benin - Weak regulations, standards and rights at work 0
Ethiopia - Unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth 0
Ghana - Unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth 50
Kenya - Unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth 0
Liberia - Job search, information, and business start-up constraints
- Weak regulations, standards, and rights at work
0
Malawi - Unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth 0
Nigeria - Unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth 0
Senegal - Limited social dialogue and youth representation
- Weak regulations, standards, and rights at work
0
South Africa - Weak regulations, standards, and rights at work 0
Tanzania - Limited social dialogue and youth representation
- Limited social protection
50
Togo - Social constraints
- Limited social protection
- Job search, information, and business start-up constraints
- Unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth
33
Uganda - Unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth 0
Zambia - Unfavourable agribusiness environment for youth 25
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areas (Seck 2016). The LOASP includes a priority to integrate young people in 
all activities related to agricultural businesses through access to land and credit, 
as well as to establish an aid system for young farmers who received agricultural 
training. It however does not make reference to the particular needs of the rural 
youth in the areas of labour market institutions and regulations, social protection, 
and social and policy dialogue.
The Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE) was launched in 2013 as a reference for eco-
nomic and social policy in the medium and long term, with the aim of making 
Senegal an emerging economy by 2035. Job creation is a key priority for the PSE 
and the plan envisages increasing the decent work opportunities (productive and 
remunerative) at the rate of 100,000 to 150,000 new jobs per year. This policy lacks 
specific references to the promotion of labour regulations that favour rural youth 
as well as organizations to encourage their participation in social dialogue. The PSE 
was supplemented with the Employment and Promotion of Youth Employment 
Policy. However, at the time of the analysis, the latter document was only a thematic 
note that delineated the main strategies to promote employment in Senegal and 
thus would need further development into a more comprehensive employment 
policy. The main reason for Senegal’s low policy scoring was therefore that the 
available policy documents include objectives with a fairly limited scope with 
regard to rural youth employment promotion, even though it has to be recognized 
that more extended policies are under development.4
In contrast, Tanzania is well equipped in terms of national pro-poor growth 
policies, particularly in addressing the challenges to rural youth employment. The 
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II (NSGRP II) is oriented 
towards growth and enhancement of productivity, focused on wealth creation as a 
4 Senegal is developing its new National Employment Policy as of 2017, which according to initial 

















































Figure 3.2. Radar chart comparison between Tanzania and Senegal
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way out of poverty. It includes a particular goal on ensuring the creation and 
 sustenance of productive and decent employment, especially for women and youth. 
On the labour demand side, it addresses underemployment in rural areas through 
establishing production clusters and promoting nonfarm income generating pro-
grammes. On the labour supply side, it promotes the development of skills for 
productivity enhancing employment and self-employment especially for women 
and youth.
Furthermore, most of Tanzania’s youth or employment related policies and 
strategies include specific rural and agricultural focus. The National Employment 
Policy commits to accelerate skills development of the rural labour force for 
enhancing labour productivity and their income growth giving priority to the 
youth. Similarly, the National Youth Development Policy promotes the equitable 
access to land and other resource allocations putting emphasis on rural youth and 
gender. The National Agriculture Policy is also quite conducive to promote rural 
youth employment. It has a dedicated section on youth involvement in agricul-
ture with a concrete objective to create an enabling environment to attract youth 
in agricultural production. One of its goals is to support group cooperation and 
rural entrepreneurial skills development particularly to women and youths 
through Junior Farmer Field and Life Schools (JFFLS) and young farmers’ asso-
ciations. As can be seen, Tanzania’s policies were the most inclusive from the 
selected countries with regards to the analysed constraints to rural youth employ-
ment. These policies are illustrative of how rural youth can be considered at the 
policy level in an integrated manner. While beyond the scope of our analysis, it is 
also acknowledged that bringing these political statements a step forward is 
equally important, including by complementing them first with an action plan 
and subsequently with programmes that have the necessary resources to support 
rural youth, as well as with adequate M&E systems in place to enable measuring 
their ultimate impacts on rural youth employment.
3.5 Conclusion
The rural youth population in SSA is expected to continue to grow and will gradually 
join the labour force. This offers both an opportunity and a challenge for rural 
livelihoods in SSA. Great economic benefits could come from this demographic 
dividend provided the right policies are developed and implemented. This chap-
ter contributed to achieve this goal by shedding light on the main strengths and 
weaknesses among policies of SSA from a rural youth employment perspective. It 
focused on reviewing policy documents based on the proposed policy framework 
to assess if the main constraints to rural youth employment were being addressed 
or not at the formulation stage, in order to suggest areas for improvement.
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The scores presented in the chapter helped to identify key policy gaps per 
country across the five policy areas. The policy area that received the lowest 
scores was social and policy dialogue. A likely reason for that is that the interests 
and needs of rural youth are often not adequately taken into account in policy 
processes. The lack of participation of rural youth in the policy dialogue leads 
to an insufficient attention to their needs and to constant difficulties in finding 
productive and quality jobs in rural areas (Leavy and Smith 2010, Protcor and 
Lucchesi 2012). Policies should therefore promote the creation of institutional-
ized channels for the inclusion of rural youth in the decision-making process. 
Rural youth can create organizations or join existing ones, for example cooperatives, 
producers’ organizations, youth associations, or NGOs. These organizations can 
provide efficient channels to make their voices heard and facilitate their inclu-
sion in the policy dialogue.
Similarly, social protection as well as labour market institutions and regulations 
were insufficiently addressed in the policies analysed. Although many policies 
pledged to expand the social protection system, only some explicitly mentioned 
particular social security schemes that targeted rural youth. Policies should pro-
mote social protection interventions that address the particular vulnerabilities 
and risks faced by rural youth, including education and training, conditional cash 
transfer programmes, public works programmes, social insurance, and youth 
employment programmes, among others. Likewise, some policies did not mention 
the importance of promoting labour market institutions and regulations in rural 
areas. Yet, most of the rural youth are employed in the informal economy and not 
protected by labour institutions or regulations. The application of International 
Labour Standards (ILS) in rural areas is essential in improving working condi-
tions, support the transition of the informal economy into formality and progres-
sively improve the quality of jobs undertaken by rural youth.
The second most addressed policy area was sectoral development, which is 
related to labour demand. It is essential to unlock the labour demand in rural areas 
in order to provide quality jobs for the youth. Policy interventions focused on cre-
ating jobs both in agriculture and nonfarm activities can contribute to solve SSA’s 
youth employment challenge. The policies should create a favourable agribusiness 
environment that attracts rural youth and provides access to credit, technology, 
skills, land, markets, and infrastructure. It is particularly important to facilitate the 
engagement of youth across inclusive agrifood value chains by linking youth farms 
to markets and provide them with the necessary technical support.
Finally, the most addressed policy area was self-employment, employability, 
and skills development, which is linked to labour supply. Most of the policies 
included actions to improve the skills and education of rural youth as well as 
measures to improve their access of information and business start-up resources. 
Further research would still be needed to assess how these actions are being 
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Appendix
 tailored to the skill requirements in rural labour markets, and thus analysis on 
how these labour supply measures are matching labour demand needs in rural 
areas would be desirable.
As was observed, policies of SSA still need to integrate additional thematic 
areas in order to achieve full and productive employment for rural youth. 
Redesigning policies to stimulate youth employment in both agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors is an essential first step to both economic growth and 
poverty reduction. More evidence is still needed though, especially regarding the 
translation of policies into concrete actions, as well as to ultimate impact and 
results of policy interventions on rural youth employment. More integrated policy 
frameworks with inclusive policies and targeted investments and programmes will 
create the enabling environment for rural youth to reach their potential.
Table 3.A1. List of reviewed policies and scores per country
 Policy Year Policy 
Score
Benin Stratégie de Croissance pour la Réduction 
de la Pauvreté (SCRP)
2011–2015 47
Politique Nationale de l’Emploi 2012–2016 27
Politique Nationale de la Jeunesse 2002 73
Plan Stratégique de Relance du Secteur 
Agricole (PSRSA)
2010–2015 37
Ethiopia Second Growth and Transformation  
Plan (GTP II)
2015/16–2019/20 47
National Employment Policy and Strategy 
of Ethiopia
2009 93
National Youth Policy 2004 30
Rural Development Policies and  
Strategies
2003 83
Ghana Ghana Shared Growth and Development 
Agenda (GSGDA II)
2014–2017 63
National Employment Policy 2014 63
National Youth Policy of Ghana 2010 60
Food and Agriculture Sector Development 
Policy (FASDEP II)
2007 27
Kenya Vision 2030 2008–2030 73
Kenya National Youth Policy 2006 67
Agricultural Sector Development Policy 2010–2020 53
Liberia Agenda for Transformation: Steps towards 
Liberia Rising 2030
2012–2030 80
Employment Policy 2009 73
Food Agriculture Policy and Strategy 
(FAPS)
2009 53
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Malawi Malawi Growth and Development  
Strategy
2011–2016 67
National Employment and Labor Policy 
(Pending approval)
2011 53
Youth National Policy 2013 67
National Agricultural Policy 2010 17
Nigeria Nigeria Vision 20:2020 2009 73
National Employment Policy 1998 37
Second National Youth Policy Document 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria
2009 50
The New Nigerian Agricultural Policy 2001 17
Senegal Plan Sénégal Émergent 2014–2018 63
Politique de l’Emploi et Promotion de 
l’Emploi des Jeunes
2014 23
Loi d’orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastorale 
(LOASP)
2004 33
South Africa National Development Plan 2030: Our 
future—make it work
2012–2030 63
National Youth Policy 2015–2020 63
Integrated Growth and Development  
Plan (IGDP) for Agriculture, Forestry  
and Fisheries
2012 27
Tanzania National Strategy for Growth and 
Reduction of Poverty II
2010–2015 53
National Employment Policy 2008 50
National Youth Development Policy 2007 90
National Agriculture Policy 2013 100
Togo Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de 
Promotion de l’Emploi (SCAPE)
2013–2017 47
Politique Nationale de l’Emploi (PNE) 2013–2017 27
Plan Stratégique National pour l’Emploi 
des Jeunes (PSNEJ)
2013–2022 73
Uganda Second National Development  
Plan (NDPII)
2015/16–2019/20 37
The National Employment Policy for 
Uganda
2011 77
The National Action Plan for Youth 
Employment
2015/16–2019/20 73
National Agricultural Policy 2013 43
Zambia Zambia Vision 2030 2006–2030 53
National Employment and Labour  
Market Policy
2004 93
2015 Youth National Policy 2015 40
























Table 3.A2. Scores for constraints per country
Country Sectoral development Self-employment capacity, 
employability, and skills development
Labour market  





































Benin 25 75 25 75 25 0 75 50 50
Ethiopia 0 75 50 100 50 25 75 75 75
Ghana 0 75 50 25 100 50 75 75 25
Kenya 0 67 100 67 100 67 100 33 67
Liberia 33 100 100 100 0 0 100 100 67
Malawi 0 75 0 75 50 25 50 75 50
Nigeria 0 75 25 100 50 50 75 25 25
Senegal 33 67 100 100 67 0 33 33 0
South Africa 67 33 67 100 100 0 67 33 33
Tanzania 75 100 100 75 100 75 50 50 75
Togo 33 100 100 100 33 67 33 33 67
Uganda 0 100 75 100 75 100 75 50 75
Zambia 25 50 75 100 50 50 50 50 50
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Troublemakers, Bystanders,  
and Pathbreakers
The Political Participation of African Youth
Danielle Resnick
4.1 Introduction
Creating decent jobs for African youth not only is critical for improving their 
economic welfare but also has political salience given the historic ability of this 
constituency to disrupt established governance structures. On the one hand, 
African youth have been viewed as progressive and pro-democratic. African 
youth, consisting of secondary school and university students, played a signifi-
cant role in the anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s (Allman  1990, 
Burgess 2005). Initially motivated by teaching shortages, high food prices, and 
poor study facilities, they were similarly at the vanguard of protests in the late 
1980s and 1990s in more than a dozen African countries, which heralded a wave 
of transitions from one-party to democratic rule (Bratton and van de Walle 1992). 
In more recent years, youth groups in countries as diverse as Angola, Burkina 
Faso, Senegal, South Africa, and Sudan have proved important actors in protest-
ing against violations of the constitution and the rule of law by leaders in those 
countries (Alexander 2010, Hamilton 2010, Wonacott 2012).
On the other hand, there has been concern that unemployed youth are espe-
cially prone to radicalization and anti-government behaviour, particularly if they 
are unemployed. Kaplan (1996) famously suggested that African youth are ‘out of 
school, unemployed, loose molecules in an unstable social fluid that threatened to 
ignite’. More generally, some research suggests that countries with youth bulges 
have a higher likelihood of experiencing political violence since high unemploy-
ment creates low opportunity costs for this group (Collier 2007, Leahy et al. 2007, 
Urdal 2006). The role of youth militias at the forefront of some of Africa’s civil wars 
in the 1990s, ranging from Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, bolstered this alarmist 
view. More recently, the enduring presence of youth vigilante groups, such as 
Nigeria’s Bakassi Boys or Côte d’Ivoire’s ‘microbe’ criminal gangs in Abidjan, further 
creates a sense of urgency about the social implications of youth unemployment.
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Whether peaceful or violent, inspirational or exploitative, these contrasting 
narratives have played an important role in placing youth and youth employment 
back on the agenda of African governments, epitomized by the African Union’s 
2006 Youth Charter (AU 2006) and the more than two dozen African countries 
that drafted youth policies during the 2000s onwards.1 Since particularly urban 
youth are seen as potentially more disruptive, and rural youth are perceived as 
more deprived, practical policy responses have included efforts to improve the 
attractiveness of agriculture to encourage young people to either stay in rural areas 
or return to them (Sumberg et al. 2015). Examples include the ‘Return to Agriculture’ 
Plan launched by former President Wade of Senegal, and the block farm pro-
grammes in countries such as Ghana and Zambia (Benin et al. 2013, Sall 2012).2
Yet, do African youth actually mobilize for change through extra-institutional 
channels, such as protest, more than their older counterparts? Is unemployment 
their main policy preoccupation, or do other concerns take precedence? Are 
these behaviours and preferences consistent over time or dependent on the wider 
economic and political context in which young people are embedded? This chapter 
addresses these questions in detail by first discussing the literature on youth and 
protest as well as developments in Africa more recently. In doing so, I look at 
whether African youth are more likely to protest today than in the past by using 
the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), which spans the 1997–2015 
period and includes all Sub-Saharan African countries. While this analysis pro-
vides a macro perspective on trends over time, the chapter subsequently provides 
a more microanalysis by employing Afrobarometer public opinion data for 16 
countries. Focusing on six age cohorts between 2003 and 2014, the analysis probes 
rural and urban youth’s socioeconomic status, policy preferences, political aware-
ness and trust in institutions, and their political participation, including in protest 
activities. This is followed by a multivariate analysis of the micro-level drivers of 
protest behaviour.
The findings reveal that while slightly higher among the youth, protesting is a 
form of political participation engaged in by older Africans as well. However, 
results from surveys conducted in 2014 show that the drivers of youth protest vary 
from a decade earlier. Specifically, the more recent findings indicate that among 
the youth, protesters can be characterized as ‘frustrated activists’ who have higher 
levels of education and who are more engaged in their communities than non-
protesters but who are also unemployed, experience higher levels of de priv ation, 
and have less trust in political institutions. This suggests that for governments 
intent on minimizing protests, one pathway is to ensure that employment creation 
projects match young people’s skills and aspirations. Moreover, governments 
1 See: http://www.youthpolicy.org/nationalyouthpolicies/.
2 On Zambia, see: http://agrf.org/agrf2015/zambia-targets-one-million-hectares-of-farm-block-irrigation- 
for-youth-led-agriculture-development/.
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need to generate greater trust that youth policies and initiatives are aimed at 
enhancing this constituency’s long-term potential rather than simply mobilizing 
their short-term political support.
4.2 Macro Trends in Protest Activity in Africa
Political participation consists of an array of ‘actions by citizens which are aimed 
at influencing decisions which are, in most cases, ultimately taken by public rep-
resentatives and officials’ (Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992). Globally, young people 
are associated with certain trends in political participation. On average, younger 
people are less likely to vote than older ones (Franklin 2004, Wattenberg 2008), 
but considered more likely to protest. Historically, one reason that they are more 
likely to protest is because of a lack of career or familial responsibilities (Parry, 
Moyser, and Day 1992). More recently, others have noted that with the spread of 
new technologies and shifts in political ideologies, young people are more likely 
to view themselves as ‘self-actualizing’ or ‘engaged’ citizens rather than ‘dutiful’ 
citizens (Bennett 2008, Dalton 2008a). While the latter favours conventional 
forms of participation and the ‘politics of loyalties’, including voting, the former 
emphasizes more direct actions and the ‘politics of choice’ (Norris 2002), which 
manifests via protests, demonstrations, and boycotts.
Since the late 2000s, and especially from 2011 onwards, Africanists have observed 
a wave of protests across the continent, particularly in urban areas (Branch and 
Mampilly 2015). However, the trend is not specific to Africa. Economic crisis 
and de-alignment with traditional political parties have renewed the salience of 
protests globally as a major form of political participation (Rüdig and Karyotis 
2013). In developing countries, Valenzuela, Arriagada, and Scherman (2012) observe 
that three key elements have characterized these protests: organization by the masses 
rather than by political parties, the central role of social media, and the dominant 
role played by youth.
Consequently, two patterns have been suggested. One is that protests are 
generally on the rise again and secondly, that protests disproportionately are a 
modality of participation pursued by the youth. The first idea, but not necessarily 
the second, appears to be borne out by aggregate data for the African region. 
Specifically, Figure  4.1 utilizes data on protest events available from ACLED to 
analyse trends over time.3 This coding involved first isolating media reports on 
protest events that mentioned involvement of ‘youth’, ‘young people’, ‘students’, 
and/or ‘teenagers’. Subsequently, I examined the full description of the event to 
3 Protest events are not equivalent to outright violence and Raleigh (2015) has found that the locus 
of violent conflict in Africa has increased considerably over the last 20 years from rural to urban areas.
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ensure that it was coding the intended outcome correctly, and I excluded events 
that mentioned youth being a victim of a crime rather than youth participating in 
a protest movement. Duplicate events being reported by the same source were 
removed. However, duplicates were retained if they were referring to events that 
occurred on the same day but in different locations or if they were the same event 
dispersed over multiple days (for example, student strike).
Importantly, Figure 4.1 demonstrates that the total number of youth protests 
has increased dramatically between 1997 and 2015, largely supporting Branch 
and Mampilly’s (2015) observation of a new wave of protest activities in the 
region. A  series of major mobilizing events partially accounts for this trend. 
For instance, rising costs of electricity, fuel, and schooling motivated Nigeria’s 
Occupy Movement, South Africa’s ‘Fees Must Fall’ campaign, Ghana’s Red 
Friday protests, and Uganda’s ‘Walk to Work’ protests. Electoral malfeasance 
and attempts to change constitutions were major precipitators in Senegal’s Fed Up 
movement, and in anti-government protests in Burkina Faso and Democratic 
Republic of Congo.
At the same time, however, as a share of total protests, youth protests tend to 
wax and wane and have never constituted more than 32 per cent of total protests. 
Key spikes in activity have occurred in 1999, 2003, 2010, and 2015. This observa-
tion suggests that protest is not just a modality of political participation that is 
intrinsically tied to age; rather, youth protests may simply coincide with broader 
periods of social and economic discontent. In other words, protest activity may 
not simply be a life cycle event whereby younger people are more inclined to go into 
the streets, but a form of political participation that is more (or less) pronounced 























































































Figure 4.1. Youth protests over time in sub-Saharan Africa
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4.3 Identifying Age Cohorts Over Time
The latter observation suggests that three potential effects are relevant for research 
on youth in Africa and elsewhere: life-cycle, generational, and period effects. Life-
cycle, or age, effects imply that individuals’ behaviours and characteristics change 
and mirror those of their older peers as they age (Nie, Verba, and Kim 1974). With 
the accumulation of more experience, individuals always alter their behaviours 
over time. Examples of period effects would include if a survey is taken during an 
election, a food crisis, or a drought (Neundorf and Niemi 2014, Yang and Land 
2013). The events affect all age groups at the same time but, the level of impact may 
differ depending on where one is located in the life-cycle (Neundorf and Niemi 
2014). Generational effects imply that period effects disproportionately affect those 
at a certain stage of life, particularly during late adolescence and early adulthood 
(Dalton 1988, Markus 1983, Ryder 1965). In other words, while all age groups may 
be exposed to a civil war, it may leave a deeper impression on younger people that 
continues to affect their behaviours and outlook as they age. Given the range of 
political transformations and shifts in economic ideology in Africa since inde-
pendence, taking all these effects into account is essential for better understanding 
whether African youth are distinctly different depending on their birth cohort.
The Afrobarometer public opinion data help analyse distinctions between 
life-cycle, period, and generational effects and their attendant implications for 
pol it ical participation. The Afrobarometer project includes six rounds of data 
collection.4 The analysis here employs survey Rounds 2 and 6, which were taken 
in 2002–4 and 2014–15, respectively. Consequently, the data spans at least a 
 decade. This is necessary since if repeated cross-sectional data is less than 10 years 
apart, cohort and age effects become increasingly correlated (Smets and Neundorf 
2014). The Afrobarometer dataset used here includes sixteen countries with a 
range of political regimes and economic development: Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Collectively, the data 
captures 24,301 observations in Round 2 and 29,972 observations in Round 6.
Cohorts refer to a set of individuals who have shared experiences of socializa-
tion (Glenn 2005), and they often are operationalized by individuals’ birth years 
(Neundorf and Niemi 2014). In creating cohorts, six age groups were considered. 
These include three ‘youth’ groups that span ages 18–24, 25–29, and 30–34. Doing 
so allows for including both the United Nations’ upper youth threshold of 24 and 
the African Union’s more expansive upper threshold of 34. At the same time, 
25–29 year olds sandwiched between these two decadal cut-offs may have finished 
4 See http://www.afrobarometer.org/.
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school but not yet established families, potentially resulting in distinct priorities 
and modalities of participation.
Table 4.1 presents the classification of the age cohorts across the two survey 
rounds, their respective birth years, and the broader political and economic con-
text facing the continent at the time each cohort reached early adulthood, which 
in this case is symbolized by being 18 years or older. Late adolescence or early 
adulthood is considered to be a highly impressionable period when behaviours 
and preferences begin to crystallize and may persist throughout one’s life (Jennings 
1996, Markus 1983). In this case, 18 years old also is the minimum voting age in 
most African countries and therefore the time when individuals become most 
aware of their political environments.
Notwithstanding the diversity of countries in the region, some common trends 
were occurring as each of these cohorts reached early adulthood. For those born 
in 1948 or prior to that year, they came of age at a time of transition from colonial 
Table 4.1. Description of age cohorts from Afrobarometer
2003 Surveys (Round 2)






Political era Economic era
18–24 1979–1985 1997–2003 Democratic consolidation HIPC and PRSPs
25–29 1978–1974 1992–1996 Democratic transitions SAPs
30–34 1969–1973 1987–1991 Democratic liberalization SAPs
35–44 1959–1968 1977–1986 One party regimes Stabilization
45–54 1949–1958 1967–1976 One party regimes ISI
55+ 1948 and 
earlier
1966 Colonial transition Extractive 
economies
2014 Surveys (Round 6)
18–24 1990–1996 2008–2014 Born frees Resurgence
25–29 1985–1989 2003–2007 Democratic consolidation MDGs
30–34 1980–1984 1998–2002 Democratic consolidation HIPC and PRSPs
35–44 1970–1979 1988–1997 Democratic liberalization 
and transition
SAPs
45–54 1960–1969 1978–1987 One party states Stabilization
55+ 1959 and 
earlier
1977 One party states ISI
Notes: HIPC = Highly Indebted Poor Countries; ISI = Import Substitution Industrialization; MDGs = 
Millennium Development Goals; PRSPs = Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers; SAPs = Structural 
Adjustment Programmes. For ease of explication, the Round 2 and Round 6 surveys refer to a base 
year of 2003 and 2014, respectively since those are the survey years of a majority of the countries 
in the sample.
Source: Author’s compilation
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administrations to independent states and from extractive economic policies 
aimed at benefiting European countries to more inwardly-focused import substi-
tution industrialization (ISI) policies.5 They were followed by a cohort that, with 
the exception of a few Southern African countries, largely matured under inde-
pendent and increasingly autocratic, one-party regimes that sought to solidify 
their ISI strategies. Those born in the 1960s and early 1970s reached 18 when one-
party states were overwhelmingly the norm, but the flaws of ISI were leading 
to massive debt and macroeconomic contraction. Starting with Ghana in 1982, 
this period heralded the beginning of stabilization policies under international 
financial institutions (IFIs). A tumultuous period followed for those born mostly 
in the 1970s and who reached maturity as IFIs sought not only to stabilize but 
to actually ‘structurally adjust’ economies. The resultant austerity measures and 
privatizations prompted a wave of pro-democracy protests and political lib er al-
iza tion, starting with Benin in 1989 and Zambia in 1991 (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1992).
The successive cohort, born in the late 1970s to mid-1980s, were often voting in 
their country’s first democratic elections.6 Around the same time, IFIs and NGOs 
launched the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative and generated a 
renewed focus on tackling poverty via the poverty reduction strategy papers 
(PRSPs). Those born in the late 1980s faced similar political circumstances, but 
matured at the time of major global and regional initiatives, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the Comprehensive African Agriculture 
Development Program (CAADP), which prompted large investments in education, 
health, and agriculture. Youth of this generation therefore began seeing a big 
improvement in educational access compared to youth of prior generations 
(Resnick and Thurlow 2015).
Finally, those born between 1990–6 are often referred to as the ‘born free’ gen-
eration (Mattes 2012) in that they largely escaped living under purely authoritar-
ian regimes. This cohort matured under a period of relative economic resurgence, 
bolstered by high commodity prices. This often resulted in dual perspectives, 
including optimism about Africa’s growing middle class (McKinsey 2010, Ncube 
and Lufumpa 2015) and pessimism that this resurgence did not ameliorate pov-
erty or inequality (World Bank 2016). Beyond political and economic variations, 
these cohorts obviously have also lived through very different communications, 
technology, and media environments.
5 See Nugent (2004) for more details on these periodicizations, especially prior to 2000.
6 Within the Afrobarometer sample, there are some important caveats to this characterization. 
Uganda finally allowed multi-party competition in 2005 and Zimbabwe allowed multi-party competi-
tion starting with the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections. In both cases, elections 
have not been deemed ‘free and fair’, with an uneven playing field for the incumbent presidents.
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4.4 Socioeconomic Profiles, Perceptions and Preferences
Taking into account these variations across time, this section presents descriptive 
trends to analyse whether young people have distinct socioeconomic profiles, 
perceptions, and policy preferences than their older compatriots.7 Table  4.2 
indicates that one of the trends in education over the last decade has been an 
improvement in the highest level of schooling achieved. Indeed, among all three 
youth age groups, there has been an increase in the share of secondary school 
completion and tertiary schooling. This has been a trend noted in some individual 
country case studies (Resnick and Thurlow 2016) and a reflection of the emphasis 
placed on education by both the international donor community as well as national 
governments. At the same time, when turning to occupations, there is a notable 
decrease in the share of young people who are employed as professionals com-
pared to the equivalent age groups from a decade ago. A significant share of this 
shift in employment appears to be into unskilled work. Noticeably, agricultural 
work has declined significantly among all age groups, with a decrease ran ging 
from approximately 10 to 14 per cent among the youth age groups. While the share 
of those who have no work but are looking has increased marginally across all age 
groups between surveys, a more notable increase exists with regards to those who 
are employed part-time and looking for work. Again, this shift is not necessarily 
just limited to young people but occurs across all age groups, suggesting the 
consequences of a general lack of structural transformation rather than one that 
disproportionately hurts the youth.
While Afrobarometer lacks the refined expenditure data contained in household 
living standards surveys, it does allow for assessments of economic well-being. 
One measure is the Lived Poverty Index (LPI), which captures how often an indi-
vidual had to forego the following five basic needs during the year preceding the 
survey: food, clean water, medicines or medical treatment, cooking fuel, or cash 
income. Following Mattes (2008), a composite index integrating all five components 
was constructed that ranges from 0, indicating that the respondent has never 
gone without these basic needs, to 4, indicating that the respondent always goes 
without these basic needs. Table 4.3 below captures the share of each age group that 
obtains a 2 or higher on the index, suggesting that the respondent had to forego 
one or more of the five basic needs several or more times in the previous year.
In addition, three measures of subjective deprivation are included. In some ways, 
this is more directly relevant to understanding linkages with protest behaviour 
because subjective perceptions of deprivation or marginalization can be more likely 
7 Since Afrobarometer samples are designed to be nationally representative, all data is weighted by 
survey weights The sample design is a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample. The 
sampling frame is stratified by gender. Afrobarometer samples yield a sampling error of +/ –2 percent 
























Table 4.2. Education and employment (per cent of age groups)
Indicator 2003 2014
 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+ 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+
Schooling achieved
No school 6.3 10.1 11.6 15.4 21.9 34.9 4.5 6.9 9.1 12.1 18.2 26.8
Some primary 17.7 19.2 23.3 25.2 29.9 34.8 14.9 15.6 20.6 22.2 28.1 34.6
Primary completed 13.5 18.5 18.9 21.5 19.8 13.9 12.0 13.5 15.7 16.1 17.6 14.2
Some secondary 30.5 21.0 20.2 15.8 12.1 7.9 27.3 21.1 18.2 18.7 14.5 10.7
Secondary completed 23.3 18.5 13.8 11.3 7.5 4.4 27.1 22.6 19.1 16.6 10.9 6.7
Some tertiary 8.1 10.2 9.2 8.1 6.7 3.0 12.4 14.2 11.6 9.9 6.4 4.8
Tertiary completed 0.7 2.5 3.1 2.7 2.2 1.2 1.7 6.2 5.6 4.5 4.3 2.2
Occupations a
Agricultural worker 20.3 28.2 35.4 36.3 43.0 48.5 11.7 16.5 21.1 23.8 28.3 28.6
Hawker 4.5 7.8 7.1 7.3 5.4 4.6 5.1 9.3 9.2 10.6 9.4 6.1
Student 22.4 3.9 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 32.0 8.1 2.3 1.3 0.7 0.4
Professional 10.3 21.5 23.2 23.9 20.5 11.8 7.8 16.6 18.3 17.2 15.9 11.3
Skilled work 4.3 6.1 5.8 4.4 3.8 3.3 5.0 8.4 7.5 8.5 7.6 5.9
Unskilled work 3.8 4.2 3.9 3.8 4.0 3.9 8.6 12.2 14.1 13.4 13.3 15.8
Never had a job 22.9 12.9 8.8 7.9 6.8 9.1 19.6 14.5 12.6 10.5 11.1 14.8
Housewife 5.7 7.3 6.6 7.3 6.0 6.0 7.5 9.0 9.3 9.1 8.4 10.7
Other 2.0 4.5 3.9 5.1 6.0 8.9 2.9 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.5 6.3
Employment status
No work but looking 36.8 31.0 26.1 20.5 20.0 13.6 37.6 32.7 27.1 22.5 18.8 14.0
Part-time and looking 8.2 9.5 9.2 8.3 5.7 3.1 10.1 14.9 15.9 14.8 13.2 9.0
Total observations 5,701 3,926 3,215 4,857 2,912 3,087 6,240 5,059 4,308 6,240 3,773 4,137
Notes: a For the occupation categories, a ‘professional’ refers to someone in retail or clerical work, business, teacher, government worker, a supervisor, doctor, or lawyer. 
Both skilled and unskilled workers are in textiles, manual work, or are artisans. The ‘other category’ includes those in security services, clergy people, drivers, and 
traditional healers. ‘Agricultural worker’ includes farmers producing for both own consumption and for sale, farm workers, and those involved in fisheries.
























Table 4.3. Perspectives on socioeconomic conditions (per cent of age groups)
Indicator 2003 2014
 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+ 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+
Moderate to severe deprivation a 22.0 24.3 26.7 27.3 28.7 33.7 14.9 18.1 19.3 20.8 21.6 23.7
Present living conditions
Bad 41.8 47.5 50.7 50.8 55.2 60.7 39.1 45.6 49.3 50.7 53.6 56.3
Neutral 21.5 22.4 21.0 20.1 19.6 15.7 22.4 21.4 19.8 18.9 18.5 16.3
Good 36.7 30.2 28.3 29.2 25.2 23.7 38.6 33.1 30.9 30.4 28.0 27.4
Your living conditions over time
Worse 33.0 36.7 41.0 36.7 40.9 43.9 31.1 36.4 38.9 40.3 41.6 43.2
Same 30.5 30.0 27.5 29.5 28.2 27.9 33.1 31.2 29.7 28.8 29.9 28.6
Better 36.5 33.3 31.6 33.8 30.9 28.2 35.9 32.4 31.4 30.9 28.5 28.2
Your conditions vs. others
Worse 36.8 38.6 42.4 40.6 42.6 45.7 31.1 36.4 38.9 40.3 41.6 43.2
Same 12.3 13.2 13.2 12.6 11.5 11.3 33.1 31.2 29.7 28.8 29.9 28.6
Better 50.9 48.2 44.5 46.9 45.8 43.0 35.9 32.4 31.4 30.9 28.5 28.2
Total observations 5,701 3,926 3,215 4,857 2,912 3,087 6,240 5,059 4,308 6,240 3,773 4,137
Note: a Moderate deprivation refers to those who receive a 2 or higher on the Lived Poverty Index. See text for details.
Source: Calculated from Afrobarometer, Rounds 2 and 6. All descriptives are weighted by cross-country survey sample weights.
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to mobilize action than objective conditions (Klandermans, Van Steklenburg, and 
Van der Toorn 2008). Sociotropic views capture one’s views on the present eco-
nomic conditions within his/her respective country. Afrobarometer provides five 
response categories that were collapsed here into three: bad, neutral, and good. 
Egotropic views reflect one’s assessment of individual conditions over time, and 
the responses were similarly collapsed into categories of worse, same, and better.8 
Relative views capture one’s assessment of personal conditions vis-à-vis other 
citizens in the same country.
Three key observations emerge from the table. First, a larger share of the older 
age groups experiences moderate or higher levels of deprivation, but this trend 
seems to have diminished in level over time. Secondly, regardless of time period, 
younger age groups are marginally more optimistic than their older compatriots 
regarding sociotropic conditions. This reflects findings from research in developed 
countries that younger people generally have a more positive outlook on their 
futures (Pew Research Center 2010). Thirdly, in terms of relative conditions, there 
is a notable change over the decade encompassed by the surveys. While 50 per cent 
of 18–24 year olds felt that their own conditions were better than their compatriots 
in the 2003 survey period, less than one-third of this sample cohort approximately 
ten years later, which was now in either the 25–29 or 30–34 age group, viewed that 
they were relatively better off. Encouragingly though, across all age groups, this shift 
was due more to individuals across all age groups feeling that their conditions 
were relatively equal to compatriots than to perceptions that personal conditions 
had worsened.
More leverage can be gained on the specific concerns of different age groups by 
probing what topic is considered to be the main priority for the government in a 
respondent’s respective country.9 As seen in Table  4.4, unemployment over-
whelmingly was the priority for young people in 2003, especially those in the 
18–24 and 25–29 age groups who are the groups that are likeliest to be searching 
for employment. While also a concern for older age groups, issues of poverty and 
famine were almost equally important. Ten years later, unemployment was still 
the top issue but the share of respondents identifying it as a concern had declined. 
Instead, infrastructure, which encompasses transportation, communications, roads, 
housing, electricity, and water supply, was increasingly becoming more of an issue 
across all age groups, reflecting a generational shift. Across time, a generally lack-
lustre assessment of government performance in creating jobs persisted across all 
age groups, with one-third or less agreeing that job creation was going well.
8 More specifically, the options for these questions include: very bad (much worse), fairly bad 
(worse), neither good nor bad (same), fairly good (better), and very good (much better).
9 Specifically, the Afrobarometer question is worded as follows: ‘In your opinion, what are the most 
important problems facing this country that government should address?’ Respondents then can give 
























Table 4.4. Identification of priority problem for national government (per cent of age group agreeing)
Most important problem 2003 2014
 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+ 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+
No problems 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4
Economy 6.8 5.4 7.7 6.4 6.1 5.6 6.7 6.3 7.0 6.9 6.2 5.3
Unemployment, wages, and salaries 37.2 38.7 34.6 32.5 29.5 25.9 30.0 32.2 28.6 26.7 24.9 21.1
Agriculture and farming 4.3 5.4 7.0 7.1 9.1 9.7 3.0 4.0 5.2 6.1 7.1 8.3
Poverty and famine 18.9 19.8 20.8 22.0 21.9 25.3 12.5 13.2 13.6 13.7 15.6 18.4
Infrastructure 9.5 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.4 11.1 16.4 14.9 17.4 16.0 17.3 18.1
Education 5.5 4.5 4.2 4.5 5.6 4.2 7.7 5.8 5.1 6.5 5.7 4.4
Health 5.6 6.2 6.5 7.2 7.4 6.3 6.4 6.1 7.3 7.4 6.9 7.3
Social services 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.0
Weather 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.2
Land 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.9
Financial inputs (loans, taxes, credit) 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 0.9
Crime and security 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 5.8 6.1 4.1 4.7 4.8 4.7
Corruption 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 5.1 5.3 4.8 4.6 3.9 3.5
Violence and war 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.8 2.3 2.1
Rights and democracy 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.5 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.2
Other 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5
Agree that government is handling  
job creation well
32.2 30.9 31.5 31.9 32.2 33.0 30.7 26.8 26.5 28.1 28.9 30.2
Total observations 5,701 3,926 3,215 4,857 2,912 3,087 6,240 5,059 4,308 6,240 3,773 4,137
Source: Calculated from Afrobarometer, Rounds 2 and 6. All descriptives are weighted by cross-country survey sample weights.
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These aggregate averages obscure important variation across and within 
countries. In 2003, unemployment was seen as a problem by one-third or more 
young people in the three youth age groups in most of Southern Africa (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) as well as in 
Kenya and a handful of West African countries (Cape Verde, Ghana, and Nigeria). 
A little over a decade later, these patterns mostly persisted, except for un employ-
ment becoming less of a concern in Ghana and Kenya. Youth concerns with 
unemployment were less pronounced in more agrarian countries, including 
Malawi, Mali, and Uganda.10
Even within countries, there are notable distinctions between rural and 
urban youth preferences on employment. Figure 4.2 illustrates those identifying 
unemployment as their primary concern by birth cohort, survey round, and by rural 
and urban residence. The graphic emphasizes that concerns with un employ ment 
are higher in urban areas than in rural ones. It also illustrates that there are indeed 
life-cycle effects, such that the 25–29 age group in both survey rounds are most 
concerned with the lack of jobs and the slopes of the lines generally decrease 
thereafter, However, urban members of the 1969–73 cohort notably are more con-
cerned with this issue in 2014 than their life-cycle would suggest. As this was the 
generation that transitioned into young adulthood at the onset of the first round 
of structural adjustment programmes (SAP) and democratic transitions, this 
pattern may suggest lasting effects of the disconnect between high expectations 
10 Notably, Zambia was the only country in the whole sample where more than 10 per cent of youth 
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Figure 4.2. Unemployment identified as primary problem by approximate birth 
cohort and rural–urban
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
88 Danielle Resnick
for the future and the reality of far fewer job opportunities as economies 
contracted under SAP conditions.
4.5 Political Perspectives and Modes of Participation
As noted earlier, today’s African youth have not only experienced different eras of 
economic policy, contraction, and growth but also distinctly different political 
environments that might condition their modalities of political participation. Two 
key concepts are probed here. The first reflects respect for the political status quo, 
which is measured here by both closeness to the incumbent party in government 
and trust in political institutions. Closeness to the incumbent is captured by first 
identifying the share of respondents who note that they are close to a pol it ical 
party. Among those who are, Afrobarometer subsequently asks for which specific 
political party the respondent feels the greatest affinity. If the party chosen was 
the incumbent party at the time the survey was conducted, then the respondent is 
coded as being close to the incumbent; otherwise, if any other party is selected 
instead, the respondent is close to the opposition.
Political trust refers to an orientation towards government based on ‘how 
well the government is operating according to people’s normative expectations’ 
(Hetherington 1998). Some argue that the erosion in trust of political institutions 
can have long term negative consequences for social and political stability (Newton 
and Norris 2000, Scholz and Lubell 1998). Political trust is operationalized here 
through an index that encompasses nine different formal political institutions: 
the president, parliament, electoral commission, local government, ruling party, 
opposition parties, police, army, and the courts.11 The index runs from 0, denot-
ing ‘not at all’, to 3, conveying ‘a lot’ of trust. Table  4.5 suggests that life-cycle 
effects are fairly pronounced with a higher share of older age groups across both 
survey rounds likely to express that they trust institutions a lot and that they feel 
close to the incumbent party. Notably, though, there is a fairly dramatic increase 
in trust for institutions across all age groups in rural areas between 2003 and 2014, 
but this is specifically true amongst the youngest age group. This trend suggests 
important period effects, including that over the decade in question, there was a 
noticeable reversal of urban bias as African governments try to allocate more dis-
tributive goods in rural areas so as to mobilize rural voters for elections (Bates 
and Block 2013, Boone and Wahman 2015).
The exact source of increased rural trust is difficult to pinpoint but some trends 
are suggestive from Table  4.6, which disaggregates trust levels by country and 
11 Trust in informal institutions, such as religious or traditional authorities, was excluded. In addition, 
trust in the tax revenue authorities was excluded from the index because the question was omitted 
























Table 4.5. Respect for political status quo (per cent of age group)
Variable 2003 2014
 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+ 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+
Trust institutions a lot
Total 31.6 33.2 35.7 39.3 41.5 48.1 36.7 34.9 38.1 39.8 43.9 51.1
Rural 34.7 35.1 37.6 43.5 44.6 50.4 42.7 40.1 42.7 45.4 47.8 54.4
Urban 27.8 30.2 32.3 31.3 35.0 42.2 29.5 28.6 31.9 31.7 37.5 44.5
Close to incumbent party
Total 31.0 34.8 34.9 37.3 39.3 40.1 28.6 30.0 31.4 35.5 37.4 38.4
Rural 35.7 39.5 40.1 41.5 44.0 41.9 32.0 33.0 36.1 38.0 40.1 39.4
Urban 25.1 27.6 25.2 29.0 29.3 35.6 24.5 26.3 25.0 31.9 32.9 36.3
Total observations 5,701 3,926 3,215 4,857 2,912 3,087 6,240 5,059 4,308 6,240 3,773 4,137
Source: Calculated from Afrobarometer, Rounds 2 and 6. All descriptives are weighted by cross-country survey sample weights.
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averages across all youth groups (that is, 18–34). For instance, some of the biggest 
increases in trust over the 2003–14 period were in countries such as Uganda, 
where many new districts have been purposely created in rural areas (Grossman 
and Lewis 2014) and in countries that have had sustained targeted input subsidy 
programmes that began in 2003 or soon thereafter, including in Kenya, Malawi, 
Tanzania, and Zambia (Jayne and Rashid 2013). By contrast, the large declines in 
rural trust observed in Mali and Senegal coincide, respectively, with government 
collapse and the onset of civil war in 2012 (Bleck, Dembele, and Guindo 2016) and 
to perceptions of growing government corruption (Sall 2015).12
Beyond their perspectives on political institutions and parties, the second con-
cept focuses distinctly on political participation, which manifests in a variety of 
ways. If aligned along a spectrum, the most basic measure is an intrinsic interest 
in current events and efforts to stay informed of such events. Those who are more 
informed may be more likely to pursue protest activities as they become aware of 
perceived injustices or of events that could serve as rallying points for mobilization 
(Tufekci and Wilson 2012, Valenzuela, Arriagada, and Scherman 2014). To examine 
these dynamics, I examine young people’s degree of interest in public affairs and 
12 The Lesotho Round 6 survey occurred in May 2014, prior to the unexpected August 2014 coup, 
which may partially explain the relatively high trust in government at that time.
Table 4.6. Trust in government institutions by country and rural 
youth (per cent trusting a lot)
Country 2003 2014 Difference
 18–34 18–34  
Botswana 29.7 38.9 9.2
Cape Verde 28.2 33.8 5.6
Ghana 33.4 28.1 −5.4
Kenya 25.8 37.1 11.3
Lesotho 28.6 52.0 23.4
Malawi 29.4 41.9 12.5
Mali 61.4 35.9 −25.5
Mozambique 49.4 48.4 −1.0
Namibia 60.4 58.4 −2.0
Nigeria 14.3 12.0 −2.2
Senegal 77.8 60.6 −17.2
South Africa 30.0 32.2 2.2
Tanzania 37.3 51.4 14.1
Uganda 19.6 49.6 30.0
Zambia 31.9 43.1 11.2
Zimbabwe 42.8 44.4 1.6
Sources: Calculated from Afrobarometer, Rounds 2 and 6. All descriptives are 
weighted by country-specific survey sample weights.
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how often they access the news. For the former, I focus on those survey respondents 
who note that they are ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ interested in public affairs. For the 
latter, an index is created that combines degree of access to the news via various 
sources, including radio, television, newspaper, internet, and social media. The index 
runs from 0 to 4 with the former referring to never accessing the news through 
any media outlet and the latter indicating daily access to the news. For simplicity, 
Table 4.7 indicates the share of respondents who access the news ‘many times a 
week’ or on a daily basis, which is equivalent to 3 and 4 on the index.
In addition to just being informed, there are more proactive modes of engage-
ment. When disgruntled about public policy at either the national or local level, 
there are various courses of action available. One includes actively contacting 
the relevant authorities. To capture this, I create an index reflecting whether a 
respondent has contacted any of the following four authorities either a ‘few times’ 
or ‘often’ over the previous year: local government, member of parliament, an 
official of a government agency, and/or a political party.13 Another course of 
action is to get together with others to raise an issue, and Table 4.7 focuses on the 
share of those who answered that they have done this at least once during the year 
preceding the survey. Central to this paper’s focus, the most extreme form of 
political participation is to be involved in a protest march or demonstration dur-
ing the previous year.14
Table 4.7 reveals that interest in public affairs appears to have increased over 
time among all age groups, with more than 50 per cent of young people in all 
youth groups expressing their interest. Despite technological advances over the 
last decade, there is not a massive change in the share of individuals accessing the 
news on a frequent basis, and access remains relatively low on average. This may 
reflect that internet and social media in particular continue to have very little 
penetration across the region due to electricity outages and other infrastructure 
constraints. There do, however, appear to be some life-cycle dynamics such that 
regardless of time period, the two oldest age groups are less likely to access the 
news. In terms of active participation, contacting an authority, or joining others 
to raise an issue are more common modalities of youth participation than protests. 
Moreover, while the former two modalities of participation appear to become 
more pronounced as individuals age, the latter is not especially the reserve of a 
particular age group, especially in the Round 6 surveys. Indeed, while for example, 
21 per cent of all protesters fall into the 18–24 year-old group, only about 9 per cent 
of that age group claims to have actually participated in a protest.
13 For Malawi, the index does not include contacting local authorities since this option was not 
included in the country questionnaire.
14 Whether one voted in the last elections in his/her country is an obvious measure of political 
participation. Unfortunately, however, this question was not asked in Round 2 of Afrobarometer so 
























Table 4.7. Level of political engagement and participation by age group (percentages)
Variable 2003 2014
 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+ 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54 55+
Interest in public affairs 42.0 39.4 40.1 42.0 43.7 43.5 55.9 59.4 59.7 62.2 62.0 59.3
Access news many times a week or everyday 29.3 18.4 13.9 20.0 10.8 7.8 30.5 24.4 16.6 18.3 6.8 3.5
Contact authority (once or few times) 31.5 38.3 40.8 42.6 43.4 41.3 22.0 31.1 35.6 38.9 39.9 39.4
Join others to raise an issue 46.5 51.2 53.0 55.1 54.8 54.3 33.4 39.4 42.9 46.8 49.8 49.3
Protest 16.6 15.7 14.6 14.2 12.4 9.4 8.7 9.8 9.5 9.4 8.6 6.3
Total observations 5,701 3,926 3,215 4,857 2,912 3,087 6,240 5,059 4,308 6,240 3,773 4,137
Source: Calculated from Afrobarometer, Rounds 2 and 6. All descriptives are weighted by cross-country survey sample weights.
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Figure 4.3 further disaggregates these protest trends with a specific focus on 
rural and urban respondents and their corresponding birth cohorts. Protest is 
an activity that a higher share of urban than rural respondents claim to engage in, 
which is true across all age groups. In addition, the figure suggests that while 
older birth cohorts no longer protest as much as they did in the past, their levels 
of protest are not necessarily significantly below those of today’s younger age 
groups. This implies that some lingering generational effects persist, especially for 
urban members of the 1974–8 generation, which came of age during the onset of 
‘third wave’ democratic transitions in the early to mid-1990s, often due to protests.
Although protest remains relatively low on average among the various age 
groups in the Round 6 surveys, Table 4.8 examines country-specific dynamics with 
a focus on urban areas where protest is generally higher. Malian youth between 
18–24 were particularly mobilized, followed by their counterparts in Senegal. 
While South Africa also has relatively high levels of youth protest, it was concen-
trated more among 25–34 year olds. In Nigeria, protest activity was actually 
highest among older age groups, perhaps reflecting the concerns with civil service 
salaries and fuel subsidies that were more specific to those older age groups.
4.6 Drivers of Youth Protest
In order to determine in a more rigorous manner what individual-level characteris-
tics are associated with protest activity and whether these have changed over time, 
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Table 4.8. Protest by age groups in urban areas from Round 6 Afrobarometer (percentages)
Country Age groups Total Total urban 
observations
 18–24 25–29 30–34 35–44 45–54  55+  
Botswana 10.34 7.77 8.03 13.11 11.31 6.46 9.54 760
Cape Verde 10.23 18.7 11.01 14.24 19.63 11.92 13.86 776
Ghana 9.28 7.83 8.14 8.84 4.84 4.82 7.54 1,304
Kenya 9.59 10.18 9.47 12.37 1.02 1.84 8.96 872
Lesotho 7.07 7.2 6.09 4.55 0.0 4.87 5.13 360
Malawi 8.56 16.34 9.35 10.57 0.0 5.11 9.46 448
Mali 34.26 20.36 27.54 23.2 18.84 7.88 23.48 304
Mozambique 9.68 9.51 7.79 12.26 4.24 9.4 9.33 840
Namibia 8.79 12.77 14.72 14.36 13.49 14.98 12.56 584
Nigeria 11.75 11.71 16.09 16.78 22.79 19.02 14.68 1,048
Senegal 19.36 16.98 20.85 19.23 11.79 2.72 15.63 592
South Africa 13.27 20.63 19.78 19.14 14.59 11.15 16.61 1,627
Tanzania 1.23 5.65 2.71 7.1 6.73 4.53 4.83 836
Uganda 6.46 13.78 9.6 4.21 7.11 3.06 7.72 448
Zambia 5.87 11.36 1.51 2.72 6.71 3.4 5.31 520
Zimbabwe 2.65 1.83 2.54 4.07 3.53 1.22 2.76 888
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Round 6 data to estimate whether one has engaged in a protest or demonstration. 
Three basic demographic control variables are included, which are age, gender, 
and whether one lives in a rural area. In addition, consideration is given to testing 
four alternative hypotheses that may underlie one’s propensity to protest.
First, relative deprivation is considered a strong incentive to protest. Grievance 
theories of protest long ago stressed that poverty, unemployment, and inequality 
were likely to provide the substantive incentive to engage in non-formal modes of 
political participation (Gurr 1970). The primary driver is the psychological and 
emotional stress created by economic deprivation, which prompts individuals to 
challenge the prevailing political order (Buechler 2004, Opp 1988). More recent 
studies of the relationship between economic crises and protests in Greece (Rüdig 
and Karyotis 2013) and Iceland (Bernburg 2015) have again uncovered that per-
ceived economic deprivation is an important predicator of who goes to the streets. 
Key variables to test this hypothesis include the LPI, relative perceptions of socio-
economic status vis-à-vis other compatriots, and those who are not employed 
but looking.
Secondly, and in contrast to the deprivation hypothesis, the resource mobilization 
school has placed greater emphasis on the need for resources in order to organize 
protests, including skilled and educated protest leaders (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 
McVeigh and Smith 1999). Furthermore, individuals with a broad social network, 
who are well-informed with the capacity to process complex political information 
and recognize its consequences, and who have a greater sense of civic responsibil-
ity may be more likely to protest (Dalton 2008b, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).15 
Relevant variables to test this hypothesis include respondents’ education levels, 
access to the news, interest in public affairs, contacting an authority, and joining 
with others to raise an issue.
Thirdly, partisanship and trust in government may mitigate how one views his/
her economic circumstances. Those who are close to a party, and particularly those 
who are close to the ruling party, may be less critical of the party and avoid pursu-
ing activities that question the government’s legitimacy. Relatedly, those with higher 
levels of trust in the government are less likely to resort to extra-institutional 
modalities, such as protest, in order to convey their preferences. By contrast, 
those with lower levels of trust are more likely to view the status quo as unrespon-
sive and unrepresentative and to challenge political elites (Gamson 1968, Inglehart 
and Catterberg 2002). Labelled ‘disaffected radicalism’ by Norris, Walgrave, and 
15 In addition, some argue that those who are more involved in civic associations or who are 
embedded in social networks, such as those found through trade unions or religious organizations, 
have a greater propensity to be mobilized for protest activities (Putnam 1993, Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995). While Afrobarometer does ask about membership in such associations, the associations 
included varied substantially across the two rounds. In addition, the question was not asked in 
Zimbabwe. As such, the variable is not included in the analyses here.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
96 Danielle Resnick
Aelst (2005), this view has more recently been challenged by those who argue 
that protest behaviour may actually be driven more by trust in government if 
protesters believe their voices will be heard by politicians and their concerns will 
be addressed accordingly (Dubrow, Slomczynski, and Tomescu-Dubrow  2008). 
Including the measure of incumbent closeness and trust in political institutions 
allows for testing these arguments.
Finally, positions on policy could very likely be the proximate driver of 
protest activities. Indeed, individuals are not likely to go into the streets to protest 
if there is not a policy lever that they intend to change. Bermeo and Bartels 
(2014) stress this point in their work on developed countries recently facing 
economic crisis whereby protesters were more likely to oppose austerity policies 
rather than to feel economically deprived per se. Consequently, the analysis 
here draws on Table  4.4 and includes a dummy variable capturing whether a 
respondent feels that unemployment is the most important policy priority for 
their country and whether s/he believes that that the government is handling 
job creation well.
The findings in Table  4.9 show the results for the full sample for both the 
Round 2 and Round 6 surveys (models 1 and 4) as well as for sub-groups of the 
sample. For ease of explication and presentation, the three separate youth and non-
youth groups were collapsed into one youth group (models 2 and 5) and one 
non-youth group (models 3 and 6). The results suggest that there are common 
profiles of protesters across age groups and survey rounds as well as important 
period and cohort effects.
In terms of demographics, age demonstrates a strong effect in general, indicat-
ing that the likelihood of protest is lower as one becomes older, and this is even 
true among those in the non-youth group. In other words, there are indeed some 
strong life-cycle effects to protest. By contrast, there is no clear pattern to other 
demographic variables. Despite the patterns from the descriptive statistics, rural 
youth are not more likely to protest than their urban counterparts over time at a 
statistically significant level. However, today’s older rural residents are signifi-
cantly less likely to protest. Similarly, young women may have been more likely to 
stay away from protest ten years ago but this pattern is insignificant at the time of 
the Round 6 surveys. These findings counter the perception that protests in Africa 
are purely the reserve of young men.
More broadly, the findings suggest that the deprivation and resource mobiliza-
tion hypotheses are equally relevant in the African context. Particularly, protest 
likelihood is highest among those who are worse off on the LPI, and this trend 
persists across the two rounds of surveys. At the same time, those with higher 
levels of education, who are intrinsically interested in public affairs, who frequently 
access the news, and who engage in other forms of participation, such as contacting 
























Table 4.9. Logit analysis of protest likelihood across survey rounds and youth/non-youth age groups
Independent variables Round 2 survey (2003) Round 6 survey (2014)
 Full sample 18–34 35 and older Full sample 18–34 35 and older









































































































































































Independent variables Round 2 survey (2003) Round 6 survey (2014)
 Full sample 18–34 35 and older Full sample 18–34 35 and older
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)






































N 15,612 8776 6836 23,960 12,773 11,187
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; Standard errors in parentheses.
Source: Logit fixed effects estimation across 16 countries based on Afrobarometer surveys.
Table 4.9. Continued
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with protest activity. This suggests that protesters are most likely among those with 
frustrated aspirations but who are proactive in pursuing other forms of mobiliza-
tion to register discontent. Across surveys, education has become important for 
not only the youth groups but also the non-youth groups, which reflects that 
education has expanded over time, often facilitated by government programmes 
aimed at subsidizing education (Stasavage 2005).
These effects become even more pronounced by looking at the youth and 
non-youth cohorts. In the Round 6 survey, young people who are unemployed 
are significantly more likely to protest while their older, unemployed counterparts 
are not. This is particularly notable given that the same dynamic is not apparent 
ten years earlier, suggesting strong period and generational effects. At the same time, 
however, those who felt that unemployment was their country’s most important 
policy priority were more likely to protest in the 2002 survey period, in both age 
groups, with the effects greatest among the older age groups. As seen in Figure 4.2, 
this had been a more pressing issue in that period than ten years later, especially 
in urban areas. For the more recent period, the employment policy variables 
demonstrate little significant association with protest activity.16 This may not mean 
that employment is less substantively significant but that the distance in policy 
priorities between employment and other issues, such as infrastructure, has 
shrunk over time.
While partisan affinity with the ruling incumbent party appears insignificant 
over time and age group, a lack of trust in formal political institutions has become 
more significantly associated with protest among young people in the more recent 
survey period. In other words, even though today’s younger generations are not 
necessarily more distrustful of political institutions than their historical counter-
parts and even though rural youth are even more trustful, those who are disen-
chanted with their institutions are likely to uphold the expectations of the 
disaffected radicalism hypothesis. As many of Africa’s leaders, including those in 
the sample, are sexagenarians or older, the sense that political leaders do not 
genu ine ly understand or care about youth issues could quite conceivably underlie 
some of this distrust.
In sum, the results reveal that rather than there being a dichotomy between 
protesters driven by grievances and desperation on the one hand and by resources 
and networks on the other, these two dynamics can be mutually reinforcing. This 
results in a set of ‘frustrated activists’, who do not let their circumstances result 
in a sense of apathy and detachment. At the same time, they are not necessarily 
opportunistic troublemakers; rather, their protest activities are a natural extension 
of their generally higher levels of political participation in less dramatic contexts, 
such as contacting an authority or joining others to raise an issue.
16 Although the results are not shown, this pattern is also true if variables are included for other 
policy issues, such as infrastructure, health, agriculture, and education.
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In addition, while some variables appear relatively time invariant and im port-
ant regardless of cohort (for example, age, LPI, contacting authorities, joining 
others to raise issues), others are much more sensitive to the period in which the 
surveys occurred. This is particularly true for employment status, perspectives on 
employment policies, and trust in political institutions.
4.7 Conclusions
One of the key reasons for tackling youth unemployment is because it is both the 
overarching policy priority for the young and historically, young people have 
effectively mobilized against sitting governments over jobs, as well as social services 
and the cost of living. By taking into account temporal and spatial dynamics, this 
chapter has examined whether and how the preferences and behaviours of young 
Africans have shifted over the last decade and whether they vary significantly 
from their older compatriots. Following much of the recent literature on youth 
participation and socialization (Grasso 2014, Smets and Neundorf 2014), efforts 
were made to interrogate both macro- and micro-level data and to spe cifi c al ly take 
into account life-cycle, generational, and period effects. Although there are clear 
life-cycle effects underlying protest behaviour such that younger individuals are 
more likely to protest than older ones, protest activity is a form of mobilization used 
by all age groups. For both young and old, being better educated and informed as 
well as engaging in other forms of activism are strong predictors of protest regard-
less of time period. Similarly, deprivation of basic goods is a strong motivator for 
protest. More recently, however, young people in particular are also more likely to 
protest if they are unemployed and if they lack trust in political institutions.
These findings have parallels in the conflict literature. For instance, Watts (2009) 
finds that youth violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria is linked to perceptions of 
relative deprivation and frustration with a perceived gerontocratic and authori-
tarian local political setting. More generally, Raleigh (2015) uncovers support for 
the ‘fragile city’ thesis in Africa, which is that especially in urban areas, poor con-
ditions motivate violence, including by the youth, in states viewed as incapable of 
providing adequate public goods and opportunities.
At least one caveat of the present research is, however, worth noting. Due to 
the data availability, the analysis only examined street protests rather than online 
protests. In some ways then, the levels of protest by the youth are therefore prob-
ably understated in the analysis here. However, given that street protests are much 
more visible, the results are probably more substantively meaningful since they 
identify the characteristics of a smaller group of youth who would risk revealing 
their discontent in public.
Notwithstanding this caveat, this chapter clearly highlights the linkages between 
demographics, employment, and political participation. Although not all protests 
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are tied to employment or economic issues, the fact that more recent protests have 
a significant association with those who are unemployed and dismissive of their 
political institutions is revealing. Identifying and implementing employment 
initiatives that match the aspirations of today’s better-educated and informed youth 
is pivotal and may require reconsideration of whether explicitly youth-focused 
policies, and those that attempt to re-locate youth into rural areas or farming careers, 
are the most effective way forward.
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5.1 Introduction
The economic growth literature argues that as an economy grows, the location and 
structure of labour transitions from primarily rural, agriculture-focused activities 
to more urbanized activities in the industry and service sectors. This structural 
transformation improves the livelihood of those who earn higher wages outside 
of agriculture, as well as increases land to labour ratios of those who remain in 
agriculture. Increases in household income (via diversified labour portfolios) 
often provide capital to spur innovation and agricultural productivity growth in 
rural areas. Over the last few decades, Ethiopia’s economic development strategy, 
the Agricultural Development Led Industrialization (ADLI) strategy, aimed to 
increase agricultural productivity, and in doing so, encouraged labour diversifica-
tion via the development of rural nonfarm activities. This mode of development 
is supported by a large body of research literature which suggests that growth in 
the rural nonfarm sector is driven by agricultural productivity growth (Haggblade, 
Hazell, and Reardon 2002, Haggblade, Hazell, and Dorosh 2006, Mellor 1976).
Given Ethiopia’s focus on ADLI, agricultural production has increased substan-
tially and the country has experienced impressive economic growth over the last 
decade of approximately 11 per cent per year. However, macroeconomic trends 
suggest that Ethiopia’s economy remains at a very early stage in its structural trans-
formation. A puzzle presents itself as to how such growth can be maintained given 
that Ethiopia is one of the least urbanized countries in Africa south of the Sahara 
(84 per cent of the total population lives in rural areas) with ap proxi mate ly three 
quarters of the population engaged in agricultural activities (FDRE Population 
Census Commission 2008, Central Statistical Agency 2013). From a policy point 
of view, understanding how youth can take advantage of employment opportunities, 
both in the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors, will inform future economic 
growth potential in years to come.
Slow urbanization paired with vibrant economic growth suggests that rural 
youth will remain an important component of the agricultural labour force, while 
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also seeking to diversify into non-agricultural, higher-value labour opportunities. 
Within the agricultural sector, transformation includes moving from low-value 
cereal production, which is characteristic of current Ethiopian agricultural produc-
tion patterns, to high-value crops, such as fruit and vegetables. Rural youth may 
seek to modernize agricultural practices and utilize new technologies to enhance 
agricultural growth in the medium term. Regarding the overall economic land-
scape, as structural transformation progresses in Ethiopia, youth may drive labour 
diversification trends from predominantly rural agricultural ac tiv ities to more 
urban focused manufacturing and service sector activities.
This chapter examines current trends in labour diversification in Ethiopia, 
focusing on youth employment activities, and explores the structure of livelihood 
decisions given underlying agricultural endowments. Although the majority of 
rural youth work exclusively on their own family farm, it is not clear that focusing 
on agriculture is a strategy that will provide a sufficient livelihood for future gen-
erations. Recent data collected by the Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS) 
suggest that youth in particular may have less access to important agricultural 
assets than do their elders. In response to these constraints, one might expect 
youth to implement more intensive farming. However, the same data show that 
households headed by youth are not more likely to use agricultural production 
en han cing technologies than are mature-headed farming households.
Given that youth face constraints in the agricultural sector, we examine youth 
nonfarm labour engagement in rural and small town areas. We find that youth 
(those aged 25 to 34 years) have a greater probability of working in nonfarm 
enterprises (NFE) compared to mature individuals (ages 35–64). The majority 
of individuals working in nonfarm employment are engaged in small-scale trade 
activities, such as street and market vending, while there exists limited demand 
for more skilled labour in the construction and manufacturing sectors. Our ana-
lysis suggests that push factors are at play with regards to nonfarm diversification, 
whereby those that live in areas with less favourable agricultural potential, who 
possess few assets, like livestock, and have less access to agricultural credit are 
more likely to seek off-farm work.
This chapter provides evidence that youth are currently driving the limited 
structural changes observed in employment patterns in Ethiopia’s economy via 
employment diversification into nonfarm enterprises. However, low demand for 
higher-skilled labour, including in the rural nonfarm sector, remains a major 
obstacle to achieving structural transformation in the near to medium term. The 
remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the second section reports 
employment trends in Ethiopia with a focus on youth activities in rural, small 
town, and urban areas. The third explores the difference in agricultural production 
practices between mature-headed households and youth-headed households. 
The fourth section focuses on youth nonfarm activities using a multinomial logit 
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model to explore correlates of youth decisions to work in the nonfarm sector. The 
fifth discusses results of the multinomial logit, and then the chapter concludes.
5.2 Employment in Ethiopia
5.2.1 Employment Trends
We utilize two nationally representative survey datasets to explore overall labour 
activity in Ethiopia: the National Labour Force Surveys (NLFS) of Ethiopia and 
the Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS). Although the NLFS data provide nation-
ally representative data on labour trends in the country, it restricts data collection 
to ‘main occupation’. Thus, we are unable to assess the portfolio of economic 
activities individuals pursue, in particular rural nonfarm work by members of 
farming households. In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of labour 
participation, we complement the NLFS evaluation with a detailed labour decom-
position in rural, small town, and large cities using the ESS. The ESS requests that 
each individual household records the amount of time worked on agriculture 
(own-farm), wage, and nonfarm enterprises over a 12-month period. Given that 
82 per cent of Ethiopia’s population reside in rural areas, where a majority of indi-
viduals define their primary occupation as agriculture, the ESS supports a more 
diversified analysis of individual work portfolios.
5.2.2 National Labour Force Surveys, 2005 and 2013
When analysing the NLFS data, we adopt the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) 
definition of the active labour force. Labour force participants include individuals 
who are at least 10 years old (Ethiopia does not limit the labour force to retire-
ment at 64 years old). Within the working age population, individuals who are 
not engaged in work and would not be available to take up work if it was offered, 
as well as individuals who are students, handicapped, or have long-term illnesses, 
are not considered a part of the active labour force.1
Although we follow CSA definitions for active labour force, we adjust the 2013 
definition of economically active to provide a more accurate comparison with the 
2005 NLFS data. In 2005, data collected on occupation and industry concentrated 
on individuals who worked at least four hours per day, while in 2013, individuals 
1 The CSA does not include ‘seeking work’ as a criterion for being considered economically active. 
This is due to local conditions of inadequate labour absorption, a large share of labour force being 
self-employed, and inconsistencies in time accounting of individuals who work in the informal labour 
market.
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who reported working at least one hour were provided an industry classification. 
This modification in the questionnaire resulted in a large share of household 
unpaid family labour (firewood and water collectors) being classified as working 
in the household services sector in 2013. We adjust for this discrepancy by 
reclassifying individuals who stated their main occupation as ‘wood and water 
collection’ into ‘not in the labour force’ in order to provide comparable estimates of 
employment shares within sectors between the two survey years. We report labour 
shares using NLFS 2013 official definitions (including wood and water collectors 
in the economically active population) as well as our adjusted 2013 statistics.2
Between 2005 and 2013, while official definitions suggest a greater transition 
out of agriculture from 80 to 73 per cent of economically active population, we 
find that, after adjusting the data for water and firewood collectors, the share of 
people working in agriculture decreased by only 3 percentage points from 80 to 
77 per cent over this period (Table 5.1). Overall employment shares in the services 
sector also reflect the reallocation of water and firewood collectors. Official statis-
tics reported the overall services sector to encompass 20 per cent of the eco nom-
ic al ly active population in 2013, of which private household work increased from 
6 to 36 per cent of service employment. Adjusting for the discrepancies between 
the 2005 and 2013 surveys in the definition of those employed, we find that the 
service sector employed 16 per cent of the economically active population in 2013. 
Finally, the industry sector has not experienced significant growth over the last 
decade in terms of job creation, with employment shares increasing by only about 
one percentage point between 2005 and 2013.
Although the government of Ethiopia has made significant investments in 
education with an emphasis on increasing access to secondary education 
2 In 2013, 88 per cent of individuals who reported water and wood collecting as their primary 
occupation reported that this activity was classified as unpaid family worker. The majority of these 
workers were female (89 per cent) and rural (94 per cent). This category was not present or accounted 
for in 2005. For more information on these individuals see Appendix 5.A1.
Table 5.1. Employment shares by industry of the economically active 
population (ages 10 years and older), per cent
Industry 2005 2013 unadjusted 2013 adjusted
Agriculture 80.2 72.7 76.6
Industry 6.7 7.3 7.7
Services 13.2 20.0 15.7
Private households 6.0 36.4 10.2
Source: National Labour Force Survey (2005, 2013). ‘2013 unadjusted’ represents 
the national CSA-based definition of sectors. ‘2013 adjusted’ reclassifies water and 
firewood collectors as ‘not economically active’—this sort of work is not taken 
into account in the figures in this column.
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op por tun ities, non-agricultural workers are predominantly engaged in low-skill 
sectors. Sales workers make up 29 per cent of non-agricultural work, of which 
street and local market vendors comprise 42 per cent (Table 5.2). Formal shop-
keepers and informal home-brewed alcohol sellers comprise almost equivalent 
shares of 22 and 21 per cent of sales workers, respectively. These employment 
trends suggest a mode of development that is moving, albeit slowly, towards a ser-
vice sector focused economy. However, the specific service activities that individ-
uals are engaged in reflect a low level of development with limited labour demand.
In order to better understand employment activities within the Ethiopian 
economy, we disaggregate employment numbers by geographic area (rural, small 
town, and urban areas) and by age group. Focusing on youth, the data suggest that 
rural youth are primarily engaged in agriculture, while a greater share of youth 
living in ‘other urban’ locations and in large cities are engaged in non-agricultural 
work. As per the CSA definition of ‘other urban’, we can assume that these centres 
represent secondary cities that are urban centres with populations of less than 
100,000 people and are not considered regional capitals. When comparing the 
percentage share of individuals working in agriculture between rural areas and 
these secondary cities, diversification is primarily occurring in the secondary 
cities whereby 22 and 12 per cent of youth aged 15 to 24 years and 25 to 34 years, 
respectively, report their primary occupation is in agriculture (Table 5.3). However, it 
is important to note that ‘other urban’ represents only 12 per cent of the economically 
active population, both overall and for youth.
Evaluating employment transitions between 2005 and 2013 disaggregated by 
age and spatial domain, the NLFS results presented in Table 5.3 suggest very little 
Table 5.2. Share of non-agricultural employment in Ethiopia 
by occupational group, 2013, present
Occupational group Share of non-agricultural 
employment
Sales workers 30.2




Construction and mining 10.6




Personal service worker 5.9
Other 32.2
Source: National Labour Force Survey (2013).
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movement out of agriculture. Almost equivalent shares of youth aged 15–24 and 
youth aged 25–34 worked in agriculture in 2013 as there were in 2005. The share 
of youth working in agriculture in secondary cities shifted slightly down by 
3  percentage points (from 22 to 19 per cent) for those aged 15–24. However, 
 individuals in secondary cities aged 25–34 and over 35 years experienced slight 
increases in the overall share of the economically active engaged in agriculture. 
As expected, individuals living in major urban cities, who represent 10 per cent of the 
eco nom ic al ly active population, predominantly work in the non-agriculture sector. 
Given that the NLFS restricts data collection to the main occupation of individuals, 
we now turn to the ESS, which comprises a comprehensive account of time spent 
on specific activities in order to evaluate the portfolio of rural youth activities.
5.2.3 Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey
The Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS) 2013/14 was implemented in 433 
 enumeration areas and comprises 5,262 sample households.3 Sampling of 
rural, small town (population with less than 10,000 people) and urban areas 
3 ESS began as the Ethiopia Rural Socioeconomic Survey (ERSS) in 2011/12. The first wave of data 
collected in 2011/12 included only rural and small town areas. The 2013/14 ESS (wave 2), which we use 
in this chapter, was expanded to include all urban areas.
Table 5.3. Per cent of employed population whose primary occupation is in 
agriculture, 2005 and 2013, by age cohort and spatial domain
Spatial domain Age 10–14 Age 15–24 Age 25–34 Age over 35 Total
Ethiopia          
2005 92.0 77.6 74.8 80.7 80.2
2013* 93.4 75.4 66.3 77.3 76.6
Rural      
2005 94.2 85.8 85.6 89.7 88.5
2013* 95.3 86.9 83.9 90.1 88.9
Other urban1      
2005 48.5 21.6 11.5 18.5 19.9
2013* 54.1 19.1 14.5 23.0 21.0
Major urban2      
2005 17.9 3.6 2.1 4.3 3.8
2013* 22.9 3.6 2.5 5.4 4.2
Notes: * 2013 data are based on reclassification of individuals that reported their primary occupation 
as ‘wood and water collectors’ into ‘not in the labour force’.
1 Other urban centres are urban centres with populations of less than 100,000 people in 2007 and 
which are not considered regional capitals.
2 Major urban centres include all regional capitals and the 15 other major urban centres that had 
a population size of 100,000 or more in 2007.
Source: Ethiopia National Labour Force Surveys (2005, 2013).
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(greater than 10,000 people) was implemented to allow representative sampling 
of the population in order to estimate regional and national level data.4
The ESS requested information on the amount of time worked on specific 
activities for each individual in the household. The post-planting and post-
harvesting modules of the questionnaire recorded the activity and number of 
hours, days, and weeks enumerated individuals worked on the household farm 
during the last 12 months. Similarly, the time use and labour module recorded the 
occupation and industry of wage employment of the respondent, as well as the 
number of days and weeks worked during the last 12 months for primary and 
secondary occupations. Finally, a nonfarm enterprise module asked the house-
hold to report any nonfarm enterprise that was operating in the last 12 months, its 
primary activity, the number of months (and days in the month) that the enter-
prise was active, and finally the household members that worked in the nonfarm 
enterprise. We use data from these four modules to create a portfolio of in di vid-
uals’ labour activities based on time worked in a specific sector.
Based on the ESS data, Ethiopia comprises 93.5 million people, of which 
51 per cent are aged between 15 and 64 years (inclusive). Within this age group, 
ap proxi mate ly 76 per cent (36.4 million) reported that they worked on their own 
farm, for wages, or within a nonfarm enterprise. Of this working population, the 
majority of individuals (78 per cent) are engaged solely in own-family farm activities, 
while only 12 per cent report having a secondary job outside of their own farm. 
Similar results were found by Bachewe et al. (2016) using a large-scale house-
hold survey dataset in high potential agricultural areas (Agricultural Growth 
Programme survey). They report that total off-farm income comprised 18 per cent 
of total rural income. Although the ESS data are instructive in understanding labour 
portfolios, they do not allow an accurate estimation of unemployment. Rather, 
the ‘not working’ population are those who do not report working in any labour 
activity and are not currently students. Under these definitions, ap proxi mate ly 
19 per cent of the working age population is not working.5
5.2.4 Labour Diversification Can Be Viewed from Two Levels
At the household level, diversification is used as a way to augment overall income 
and/or increase income during the slack agricultural season. Given that Ethiopia 
is characterized by rainfed agriculture, households may also diversify their 
income to smooth consumption when the household is faced with exogenous 
shocks. At the individual level, there is a division of labour within the household 
of who is asked to diversify. For example, some members of the household may be 
4 Regional strata include: Addis Ababa; Amhara; Oromiya; Southern Nations, Nationalities, and 
Peoples (SNNP); Tigray; and ‘Other regions’.
5 According to the CSA (2013), approximately 20 per cent of age eligible (10–64 years) individuals 
were considered to be not economically active, and 4.5 per cent of the economically active population 
was unemployed.
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better students or more entrepreneurial, while others are more equipped, mean-
ing, physically or in terms of skills, to remain working on the farm. In addition, 
cultural norms characterize specific individual activities. For example, women 
in Ethiopia are discouraged to plow agricultural land and engage in other specific 
agricultural activities. We assess both household- and individual-level labour 
diversification in order to assess how youth are taking advantage of employment 
opportunities outside of their own-family farm work. We first evaluate labour 
portfolios at the household-level to understand how diversification of income 
differs by the age of the household head. Then, we investigate individual-level 
labour activities to understand who diversifies within the household.
5.2.5 Household-level Labour Diversification
In order to evaluate labour diversification within households, we split the sample 
by youth and mature households based on the age of the household head. We 
compare mature-headed households to three youth categories (overall youth ages 
15–34 years; young youth ages 15–24; and experienced youth ages 25–34). The 
data suggest that a significantly lower proportion of workers in youth-headed 
households, in all youth age cohorts, work exclusively on their own agricultural 
land (Table 5.4). Whereas 84 per cent of mature-headed households dedicate all 
of their household labour to their own agricultural production, approximately 
8 percentage points less, 76 per cent, of youth-headed households focus their 
available labour solely on own family farm agricultural activities (Table 5.4).
More youth-headed households have diversified labour portfolios compared to 
mature-headed households. A greater share (16 per cent) of youth-headed house-
holds between the ages of 25 and 34 years have a mix of own family farm and 
nonfarm labour compared to mature households (13 per cent), while younger 
households (age 15–24) show less diversification compared to mature households 
(Table 5.4). This may be because older youth (age 25–34) have gained the neces-
sary experience and have expanded their social network to search out nonfarm 
opportunities, while the younger households are still reliant on parental support, 
have fewer household members, and lack the necessary resources to diversify 
their household labour portfolio. Finally, a greater share of youth-headed house-
holds in all age cohorts are engaged exclusively in the nonfarm sector. Within the 
nonfarm category, most individuals are working in the non-agricultural sector. 
This follows agricultural practices in Ethiopia, where limited labour demand for 
agricultural work exists due to labour–sharing customs in rural areas (debbo and 
wonfel systems).6
6 For more information on debbo and wonfel systems, see Krishnan and Sciubba (2009).
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5.2.6 Individual-level Labour Diversification
Given that the majority of agricultural production in Ethiopia involves a single 
harvest annually, on-farm work is a highly seasonal activity. Individuals may seek 
out other income-earning opportunities off the farm during the slack agricultural 
season. In order to compare individual engagement in nonfarm labour op por tun-
ities, we split the sample of individual workers between youth aged 15 to 34 years 
and mature individuals aged 35 to 64 years. In addition, we disaggregate in di vid uals 
over geographic space to explore the supply of nonfarm labour opportunities in 
rural, small town (centres with a population of less than 10,000 people), and 
urban areas (centres with more than 10,000 people).
Focusing on rural areas, and taking into account only those individuals who 
report working on at least one activity (on-farm or off-farm) approximately the 
same amount of youth work exclusively on own-farm activities (83 per cent) 
compared to mature rural individuals (85 per cent). The data suggest that there is 
little demand for nonfarm work in rural Ethiopia, with only 11 per cent of youth 
and mature individuals having a mixed on-farm and nonfarm work portfolio 
(Table 5.5). When splitting the youth cohort between young youth (those aged 
15–24) and experienced youth (aged 25–34), data suggests that a greater share of 
the young youth (87 per cent) in rural areas are engaged exclusively in own-farm 
activities while 77 per cent of experienced youth are exclusively working on their 
own farm. Almost one-fifth (19 per cent) of experienced youth in rural areas have 
a mix of on-farm and off-farm employment (Appendix 5.A2).
Table 5.4. Allocation of household labour to own farm, other farms, or off-farm, by 











youth-headed HHs  
(aged 25–34)
Own family farm 83.8 75.5 *** 74.9 *** 75.6 ***
Mixed own farm 
and nonfarm
12.9 16.3 *** 11.4 16.9 ***
Off own-farm 
(agriculture)
9.1 10.3 12.6 10.1
Off own-farm 
(non-agriculture)
90.9 89.7 87.4 89.9
Off-farm 3.4 8.1 *** 13.7 *** 7.5 ***
Off own-farm 
(agriculture)
7.5 7.0 7.9 6.9
Off own-farm 
(non-agriculture)
92.5 93.0 92.1 93.1
Note: t-tests are relative to mature households; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (2013/14).
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Given the limited nonfarm activity reported in rural areas, one would expect 
that small towns play an important role in providing light manufacturing, trade, 
and other services. Small towns do provide greater opportunities for nonfarm 
labour compared to rural Ethiopia. Almost 60 per cent of youth in small towns 
report working exclusively in off-farm activities, while 52 per cent of mature in di-
vid uals work in off-farm activities. A greater share of mature individuals in small 
towns (26 per cent) work in a mix of own- and off-farm work, while 17 per cent of 
youth work in a mix of own- and off-farm work. Among the youth population, 
small towns are important hubs for education (approximately 17 per cent of youth 
in small towns are students). However, it is unclear how potential higher educa-
tional attainment is translated into higher paying nonfarm wage employment 
(Table 5.5). Nonfarm enterprise work is the predominant nonfarm labour oppor-
tunity for youth in small towns, encompassing more than double the number of 
youth engaged exclusively in wage work.
Finally, working individuals living in urban areas (cities of 10,000 people or 
more) are predominantly engaged in nonfarm work. Wage labour is the primary 
income earning activity in urban areas, encompassing 53 per cent of youth and 
49 per cent of mature individuals’ activities. Nonfarm enterprise work remains 
an  important share of nonfarm work in urban areas—35 per cent of youth and 
mature individuals (Table 5.5).
The youth workforce that focuses solely on own-farm activities reports 
working for only 21 weeks of the year on average (Table  5.6). Mature workers 
Table 5.5. Labour type, by location and age cohort, 2013
  Percentage share of youth
(age 15–34)
Percentage share of mature  
(age 35–64)
 Rural Small 
town
Urban Rural Small 
town
Urban
Own farm only 83.0 24.2 6.3 84.7 23.0 5.7
Own farm and off-farm 13.6 16.7 4.0 13.3 25.5 5.8
Own farm & NFE 11.2 12.6 2.6 10.5 15.3 3.6
Own farm & wage 2.2 3.3 1.4 2.4 8.4 1.9
Own farm & NFE & wage 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.4 1.8 0.3
Off-farm1 3.4 59.1 89.7 2.0 51.5 88.6
NFE 2.3 37.5 34.7 1.3 36.1 35.6
Wage 1.0 17.8 52.6 0.6 9.9 49.2
NFE & wage 0.1 3.7 2.4 0.2 5.5 3.8
Working population 
(thousands)
19,791.0 135.1 2,241.1 12,840.4 98.8 1,331.1
Notes: 1 Off-farm work comprises individuals who work in off-farm enterprise and/or wage work.
2 Students are defined as those who do not report time working in own-farm, wage, or off-farm 
enterprise activities and report activity as ‘student’.
Source: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (2013/14).
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engaged exclusively in farming report working for 27 weeks of the year. These 
data suggest that the majority of the workforce in Ethiopia (68 per cent of rural 
workers and 58 per cent of the overall workforce) are not economically active for 
more than half of the year. Individuals who have a mixed portfolio of own-farm 
and nonfarm labour are engaged in work for more than double the time—46 and 
49 weeks for youth and mature workers, respectively—spent at work by those 
who work exclusively on their own farm (Table 5.6). However, workers who mix 
farm and nonfarm work make up only about 10 per cent of the total workforce 
regardless of age. Similarly, youth and older workers exclusively engaged in wage 
or nonfarm enterprise activities report working for 46 and 48 weeks, respectively, 
but these also represent a small share of the overall workforce. We find similar 
results when splitting the youth sample into young youth (15–24) and experi-
enced youth (25–34) (Appendix 5.A3).
5.3 Youth and Agricultural Productivity
The labour trends discussed above suggest that agriculture remains an important 
livelihood for the majority of rural youth (63 per cent) and the overall population. 
However, limited nonfarm labour opportunities are constraining a large share of 













27.7 21.6 45.7 45.7
Farming own-farm 18.1 21.6 – 15.3
Off-farm work1 9.5 – 45.7 30.4
Wage 3.9 – 25.5 5.9
Nonfarm enterprise2 5.6 – 20.2 24.4
Working mature 
(35–64 years)
       
Average time 
worked per year
32.2 27.2 48.2 49.1
Farming own-farm 23.2 27.2 – 18.2
Off-farm work1 8.9 – 48.2 30.9
Wage 3.7 – 26.8 7.4
Nonfarm enterprise2 5.2 – 21.4 23.5
Notes: 1 Off-farm work consists of off-farm enterprise and wage work.
2 Individual time worked in a nonfarm enterprise was not collected, thus we allocate the full 
amount of time that the nonfarm enterprise was in operation (total weeks) to each person that 
is reported working in the nonfarm enterprise.
Source: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (2013/14).
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individuals from reaching their full working potential. Those who are solely 
engaged in own-farm activities, 78 per cent of the overall working population, 
report being economically active for only about half of the year. Given limited 
nonfarm labour demand, as well as the large share of rural youth that work exclu-
sively in agriculture, we now assess to what degree youth are leading any agricultural 
transformation processes in Ethiopia, particularly those that involve specialization 
in high-value crops or the utilization of modern technologies.
The goal of education policy in Ethiopia has been, in part, to produce educated 
farmers who would then be able to effectively adopt new agricultural technologies 
(MOE 2005). These objectives continue to underpin the national education policy. 
This would suggest that as rural youth create their own, independent households 
and acquire their own agricultural land, they may seek solutions to increase agri-
cultural productivity and overall welfare via agricultural intensification, diversifi-
cation, and modernization.
Table  5.7 compares the characteristics of agricultural households located in 
rural and small towns (less than 10,000 people), disaggregated by the age of the 
household head.7 Several differences stand out. First, youth-headed households 
have access to significantly less agricultural land compared to mature-headed 
households. Youth-headed households own and operate approximately 0.8 and 
1.4 hectares, respectively, compared to mature-headed households that own and 
operate 1.5 and 1.7 hectares, respectively. Limited data suggest that the young 
youth-headed households (aged 15–24 years) have greater difficulty accessing 
land than the experienced youth-headed households (between the ages of 25 and 
34 years), however this result should be read with caution given the small sample 
size of young youth-headed households.
Landlessness is also greater among youth-headed households. For example, 
7 per cent of mature-headed households living in rural and small town areas are 
landless, compared to 14 per cent of youth-headed households. Similarly, the 
share of landlessness among the youngest households (15–24 years old) reaches 
21 per cent, while 13 per cent of experienced youth-headed households are landless 
(Table 5.7). This follows recent research by Bezu and Holden (2014) who found 
that youth in the rural south of Ethiopia have limited access to agricultural land 
due to land scarcity and land market restrictions. Headey, Dereje, and Taffesse 
(2014) also report declining farm sizes over time, with younger rural households 
facing larger constraints in obtaining agricultural land.
Finally, youth are not more likely to implement agricultural enhancing tech-
nologies (improved seed, cash crop production, and row planting) compared to 
7 Research shows that a variety of factors affect household uptake of agricultural technologies. 
Extensive literature has analysed specific issues including: physical and human capital endowments 
(Pender and Fafchamps 2006); access to agricultural extension (Abrar, Morrissey, and Rayner 2004); 
supply of seeds (Dercon and Hill 2009); heterogeneity of fertilizer success (Suri 2011); risks of negative 
shocks (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011); and access to credit (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2011).
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mature-headed households. However, compared to mature households, youth use 
more technologies that are labour-reducing, such as herbicides and tractors. This 
is in line with recent work by Bachewe et al. (2015) and Minten et al. (2013) who 
found that substitution of labour with labour-saving modern inputs, in particular 
herbicides, is increasing in lieu of time spent on weeding. This may be due to the 
smaller household size of youth-headed households which creates a labour-
constrained environment in which such households will seek technologies to 
decrease labour demands in agricultural work. Overall, these figures suggest that 
agriculture may not be the optimal or first choice of employment among youth-
headed households, given the current environment.
Table 5.7. Agricultural household-level characteristics in rural and small  













Land characteristics        
Operated area, ha 1.74 1.38 * 0.75 ** 1.46
Owned area, ha 1.49 0.82 *** 0.59 * 0.85 ***
Landless, % 7.2 14.0 *** 20.6 *** 13.2 ***
Good agricultural 
potential, %
26.4 24.1 16.5 ** 25.0
Agricultural inputs       
Inorganic fertilizer, % 59.9 57.7 44.5 *** 59.3
Organic fertilizer, % 67.7 59.8 *** 53.0 *** 60.7 ***
Irrigation, % 09.8 10.8 14.5 10.4
Herbicide, % 33.9 39.3 *** 33.9 40.0 ***
Tractor, % 4.2 6.6 *** 08.9 ** 06.3 **
Improved seed, % 30.1 29.0 26.5 29.3
Row planting, % 50.0 45.1 *** 51.2 44.4 ***
Grow cash crop, % a 82.3 78.3 *** 75.6 ** 78.7 **
Receive agricultural 
credit, %
23.8 20.5 ** 08.4 *** 21.9
Receive agricultural 
extension, %
45.8 40.2 *** 26.2 *** 41.8 **
Household  
characteristics
       
Household size,  
number
6.18 4.85 *** 3.82 *** 4.97 ***
Number of  
observations
2,752 1,024 135 889
Note: t-tests are relative to mature households; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
a Cash crops include beans, nuts, sesame and other seeds, spices, fruit, vegetables, coffee, chat, cotton, 
sugar cane, and tobacco.
Source: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (2013/14).
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5.4 Correlates of Youth Engagement  
in Nonfarm Employment
A rich literature has evaluated the determinants of nonfarm labour engagement 
including disaggregated analysis of individuals’ decisions to seek out skilled versus 
unskilled nonfarm labour opportunities (Reardon, Berdegue, and Escobar 2001, 
Winters et al. 2009, Mduma and Wobst 2005, Bezu, Holden, and Barrett 2009); 
market access and nonfarm participation (Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999, 
Renkow  2006, Henderson, Shalizi, and Venables  2001, Fafchamps and Shilpi 
2003, Deichmann, Shilpi, and Vakis  2009); and effects of income or wealth on 
nonfarm labour choices (Bezu, Barrett, and Holden  2012, de Janvry and 
Sadoulet  2001, Woldehanna and Oskam  2001, Dercon and Krishnan  1996). 
However, largely missing from the literature on Ethiopia is an in-depth evaluation 
of the transition of youth from employment on-farm into the nonfarm sectors. A 
recent report by the World Bank outlines the opportunities and challenges for 
youth employment in Africa and provides a comprehensive overview of potential 
growth sectors, including agriculture. However, the discussion in this overview is 
limited to country and regional levels (Filmer and Fox 2014). Bezu and Holden 
(2014) evaluated the determinants of youth aspirations to pursue nonfarm 
employment in Ethiopia. However, they did not examine the experience of youth 
that already are in the nonfarm work force. This section addresses some of these 
knowledge gaps by evaluating the determinants of youth employment in the 
nonfarm sector.
Appendix 5.A4 provides the average values for key variables used in the empirical 
analysis. The profiles of rural and small town workers in Ethiopia differ in terms 
of individual, household, and location characteristics. Youth between the ages of 
25 and 34 years are generally more active in the nonfarm sector (wage or nonfarm 
enterprise), while youth between the ages of 15 and 24 tend to work more on 
own-farm labour. Those that diversify into wage labour activities have completed 
more schooling (36 per cent completed primary school). Primary school completion 
rates of about 10 per cent are approximately the same for in di vid uals that diversify 
into a nonfarm enterprise activity and those that work solely on own-farm activities, 
suggesting that nonfarm enterprise activities do not require a significantly different 
skill set or greater experience level than does own-farm work. Compared to 
own-farm workers, wage and nonfarm enterprise workers report higher annual 
expenditure per capita, which may be associated with higher potential profitability 
of off-farm work.
In this analysis, nonfarm labour activities refer to any labour that is conducted 
off the own-family farm. We limit our sample to individuals living in rural or 
small town areas. We are interested in assessing workers that choose to diversify 
into nonfarm labour activities, meaning wage or nonfarm enterprise activities, in 
addition to working on their own-family farm in either planting or harvesting. 
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The sample is split into three categories: individuals who work solely on their own 
family farm (omitted); individuals who report working in a mix of own-family 
farm and NFE; and individuals who report working in a mix of own-family farm 













 = +  
where πwi  is the odds of seeking off-farm work w, πni  is the odds of remaining on 
the family farm and working solely in agriculture, and parameter αwr is the base-
line hazard of work in region r for the specific work type w. βw is a vector of 
parameter estimates. X is a vector that denotes the factors that influence labour 
choice. In order to take into account unobserved variables within districts that 
affect employment, such as access to infrastructure, information, or agroecologi-
cal zone, standard errors are clustered at woreda level. Finally, the coefficients in a 
multinomial logit model are calculated in relation to a base outcome and thus are 
difficult to interpret directly. However, average marginal effects can be predicted, 
so we focus the discussion on the reported marginal effects. We set our base out-
come as individuals who work exclusively on their own-farm.
We estimate three models to assess correlations between youth and livelihood 
choice. The first model pools the rural and small town working samples ages 15 to 
64 years old to test if youth (aged 15–34) are more likely to enter off-farm labour 
opportunities compared to mature individuals (aged 35–64). The second model is 
limited to youth aged 15–24 to evaluate how individual, household and location 
variables are correlated with nonfarm labour. The third model is limited to youth 
aged 25–34 and follows the same methodology of the second model to evaluate 
how more established youth are engaged in the labour market. We split youth 
categories assuming that young youth and experienced youth differ by the 
amount of work experience they have attained and the social network they have 
built, which may affect an individual’s ability to secure off-farm work.
5.4.1 Potential Determinants of Engaging in  
Off-farm Employment in Rural Ethiopia
Diversification into nonfarm employment is shaped by a variety of conditioning 
factors. Individuals may be pushed from agricultural work into nonfarm activities 
8 Estimation of the multinomial logit model assumes that probabilities of alternative choices are 
independent of each other, referred to as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). In order to 
test for this independence, we use the Small-Hsiao test, and find we are unable to reject the IIA 
assumption for the multinomial logit model presented in this analysis (Small and Hsaio 1985).
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in order to seek out sufficient sources of income, alternatively individuals may be 
pulled into nonfarm activities given higher returns to labour and capital compared 
to agriculture. 9 Lucas (2015) focuses on rural–urban migration issues and argues 
that these decisions are driven by differentials in opportunities across locations. 
Focusing specifically on the choice of diversifying labour portfolios, in di vid uals 
differ in their ability to take advantage of nonfarm opportunities based on their 
human, physical, and financial capital. For example, some individuals are more 
educated, with better access to savings for start-up capital and greater options for 
nonfarm work due to proximity to a market or transportation network.
We include a variety of explanatory variables in our multinomial logit analysis 
in order to account for differences across individuals and households. At the indi-
vidual level, we include a variable that disaggregates odds of employment by age 
in the regression that pools all age groups: youth aged 15–24, youth aged 25–34, 
and mature aged 35–64 (omitted category). Including these variables in a multi-
variation regression allows us to adjust for inherent differences across age groups 
which may mask the interpretation of the descriptive statistics discussed above. 
These age variables attempt to capture experience level and potential life-cycle 
effects, as well as to explicitly evaluate youth participation in nonfarm activities. 
We also include whether or not the individual is a household head, female, or 
married. If an individual is the household head, she or he may be more inclined 
to stay working on the farm in order to insure sufficient agricultural output. In 
addition, Ethiopia’s land tenure system requires residency on the farm to main-
tain usufruct rights to farmland which may create greater disincentives for house-
hold heads to seek alternative employment. Education—measured by whether an 
individual completed primary school—is also an important factor, given that it 
improves the value of labour, raises the opportunity costs for an educated individ-
ual to stay at home and engage in lower paying agricultural work, and potentially 
enhances the individual’s social network to facilitate access to nonfarm jobs.
At the household level, we include a variety of variables that take into account 
household assets. For example, owning a relatively large agricultural land area 
may indicate better farming potential and food self-sufficiency, which may incen-
tivize individuals to remain in agriculture. Alternatively, larger land holdings may 
be associated with higher crop incomes, which could provide start-up capital for 
work in the nonfarm sector.10 Due to restrictions on land ownership in Ethiopia, 
land rental markets are very active, thus we include both total agricultural land 
owned and total agricultural land operated to account for these factors. Given that 
9 Moretti (2004) and Ciccone and Peri (2006) examine pull factors of migration and their links to 
agglomeration economies.
10 See Reardon et al. (2007) and Bezu and Barrett (2012) for a greater discussion on land holdings 
and nonfarm labour diversification.
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we are limited to cross-sectional data, it is possible that we introduce simultaneity 
bias in our regression framework by including household assets. For example, not 
only does land holding size potentially affect diversification but diversification could 
affect land holding size. This is particularly accute when using contemporraneous 
explanatory variables. Thus, we discuss the results in terms of correlates of diver-
sification rather than addressing causation.
We also include livestock ownership in the form of Tropical Livestock Units 
owned by the household, per capita expenditure of the household, and whether a 
household is located in an area with good agricultural potential. We hypothesize 
that youth who have access to land with good agricultural potential are less likely 
to seek nonfarm employment. In addition, we include whether a household has 
experienced a flood or drought during the last year in order to take into account 
potential fluctuations in agricultural productivity. Such fluctuations may incen-
tivize individuals to seek other forms of employment as a means of insurance 
against agricultural uncertainty.
In addition to physical endowments at the household level, individuals coming 
from larger households with greater potential labour resources may exhibit a 
greater probability of working in the nonfarm sector because their labour would 
not be as critical for agricultural production within such households. In order to 
account for differences in female and male labour roles in rural Ethiopia (for 
example, it is rare for females to cultivate land in Ethiopia—see Deininger, Ali, and 
Tekie 2008), we include the number of working age (ages 15–64) females and the 
number working age males within the household, as well as total household size.
Household variables are included to differentiate between households that 
have received agricultural credit or agricultural extension. These variables represent 
incentive factors to stay working on-farm because they are targeted to augment 
agricultural productivity.11 Finally, distance to a market or trafficked road cap-
tures a household’s locational potential for nonfarm labour opportunities, as well 
as assessing the effect on transaction costs, and thus, an individual’s willingness to 
seek nonfarm labour. Job search costs would be lower for those that live closer to 
markets or key transportation corridors, while at the same time they may be better 
informed of potential job opportunities.
11 Recent work evaluated credit via microfinance programmes aimed at nonfarm activities and 
found mixed results with regards to such credit inducing greater engagement in non-agricultural 
income earning opportunities. Hagos (2003) found a positive effect of microfinance credit pro-
grammes on income level changes derived from self-employment. However, no effect was found on 
participation in wage employment. Bezu and Holden (2014) reported that access to savings and credit 
are significant factors for transitioning into high-return rural nonfarm activities. Tarozzi, Desai, and 
Johnson (2015) evaluated access to microfinance credit in Amhara and Oromiya on a variety of 
outcomes and found no significant effects on nonfarm enterprise creation.
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5.4.2 Results and Discussion
The coefficients in a multinomial logit model are calculated in relation to a base 
outcome and are difficult to interpret directly. However, average marginal effects 
can be predicted, so we focus the discussion on the reported marginal effects. 
Model 1 evaluates whether youth are more likely to diversify into wage or non-
farm enterprise opportunities in addition to working on own-family farm, by 
testing whether the coefficients on the age indicators are statistically different 
than zero. Analysis suggests that older youth (age 25–34) have a greater probabil-
ity of diversifying into nonfarm enterprise activities compared to mature in di vid-
uals, however this does not hold true for youth ages 15–24 (Table 5.8). It may be 
that the younger cohort of youth have not built up sufficient work experience or 
developed an appropriate social network to successfully engage in a nonfarm 
enterprise. Although older youth are more engaged in nonfarm enterprise labour, 
wage labour is less accessible to Ethiopia’s youth. According to Model 1, youth 
(regardless of their age) are no more active in the wage labour market than are 
mature individuals (aged 35–64).
Focusing specifically on youth (Models 2 and 3), those who are located in areas 
with good agricultural potential have a greater probability of diversifying into 
nonfarm enterprises, especially older youth aged 25–34 years old (Table  5.8, 
Model 3). This supports the findings of previous research that contended that 
local nonfarm income is greater in better agroclimatic areas, whereas migration is 
a more common strategy in unfavourable climatic areas (Reardon 1997, Reardon 
et al. 2007). Woldehanna and Oskam (2001) reported that households in Tigray 
during good production seasons prefer nonfarm enterprise work over wage 
employment, suggesting that a good production season gives farmers the finan-
cial capacity to start a nonfarm enterprise. Youth aged 15–24 that are located in 
good agricultural productivity areas are also more likely to mix farm and non-
farm enterprise work (Table  5.8, Model 2). Research conducted by Bezu and 
Holden (2014) found that a lack of access to land was driving youth migration 
from agriculture. Our analysis suggests that youth (age 25–34) with greater land 
ownership have a 3 per cent lower probability of diversifying into wage labour 
compared to working exclusively on their own family farm. Overall, assets and 
capital are associated with mature youth employment decisions. Greater owner-
ship of land, livestock, and access to agricultural credit decrease the probability 
that mature youth diversify out of farming into wage labour activities (Table 5.8, 
Model 3). We do not witness the effects of asset ownership in the young youth 
sample due to lack of variation among variables; young youth have less asset 
accumulation across all categories.
Similar to agricultural endowments, agricultural shocks can have an effect on 
an individual’s choice to seek alternative income sources outside of agriculture. 
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Continued
Table 5.8. Multinomial models of determinants of type of labour engagement for rural 
workers in Ethiopia, by age cohort
Explanatory 
variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
  Working population:  
age 15–64
































Age 15–24, 0/1 –0.016 0.013 – – – –
  (0.010) (0.019)        
Age 25–34, 0/1 0.000 0.049 *** – – – –
  (0.006) (0.015)        
Household 
head, 0/1
0.002 0.037 ** 0.019 ** 0.030 –0.014 0.049
(0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.035) (0.016) (0.033)
Female, 0/1 –0.036 *** 0.037 ** –0.004 0.034 –0.061 ** 0.079 ***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.009) (0.021) (0.025) (0.028)
Married, 0/1 0.005 0.011 –0.001 0.039 –0.006 0.016




0.045 *** 0.001 0.030 *** 0.018 0.055 *** –0.032
(0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.020) (0.011) (0.035)
Adult (age 15 
to 64) males in 
household, 
number
–0.006 ** –0.022 *** 0.000 –0.009 –0.015 –0.003
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.021)
Adult (age 15 
to 64) females 
in household, 
number
0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.018




0.005 *** 0.025 *** 0.003 *** 0.016 *** 0.006 *** 0.031 ***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.011)
Agricultural 
area owned, ha
–0.002 –0.006 0.007 –0.003 –0.026 ** 0.001




0.002 0.004 –0.017 0.006 0.004 –0.010




–0.016 ** –0.003 –0.007 –0.012 –0.018 0.013




–0.006 –0.021 0.001 –0.004 –0.068 ** –0.051
(0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.024) (0.027) (0.033)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
  Working population:  
age 15–64




































–0.002 * –0.004 0.000 –0.005 –0.006 * 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Experienced 
drought, 0/1
0.005 ** –0.079 ** 0.005 –0.054 * 0.013 –0.095
(0.007) (0.036) (0.009) (0.050) (0.017) (0.070)
Experienced 
flood, 0/1
–0.031 -0.005 –0.007 0.028 –0.366 *** –0.028





–0.010 0.052 * –0.020 * 0.042 * –0.011 0.086 ***




–0.001 0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.003 0.002




0.001 0.002 –0.004 0.005 0.004 0.000
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.010)
Observations 7,567 2,526 1,754
Note: The base outcome for all three models are individuals that work exclusively on their own-farm. 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (2013/14).
We find this particularly true for youth aged 25–34 years. In this case, those who 
experienced a flood during the last year had a 37 per cent less probability of 
expanding into a wage labour job, however this effect may be temporary and 
reflect a post-shock necessity of rehabilitating own agricultural land rather than an 
overall trend of off-farm labour activity. Alternatively, this analysis does not capture 
wage or nonfarm employment at alternative locations, thus a reduction in wage 
labour may coincide with an increase in wage labour outside of the sample woreda. 
Research on the impact of shocks on labour diversification suggests a greater 
propensity to diversify. Bezu and Barrett (2012) assessed employment transitions 
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out of agriculture between 2004 and 2009 and found that shocks that reduced 
 agricultural income motivated individuals to seek out high-return rural nonfarm 
employment. Similar results of agricultural shocks increasing longer term non-
agricultural earnings were reported by Porter (2012) using data from 1994–2004.
While good agricultural potential and greater access to capital and assets 
(agricultural credit and livestock) decrease the likelihood of diversifying into 
nonfarm labour, distance to a market or road does not affect the probability of 
youth finding nonfarm employment. This may be due to several reasons. First, a 
large share of the rural population in this sample live relatively far from a market 
(on average about 55 km). Second, thin labour markets in small towns and rural 
areas may limit youth’s ability to take advantage of off-farm wage opportunities 
simply because there is not enough off-farm labour demand. These relationships 
suggest that in Ethiopia the rural and small town nonfarm sector is influenced 
primarily by push factors (lack of land, agricultural services, and assets) rather 
than driven by urban or small town labour demand.
When comparing youth labour decisions to diversify into nonfarm employ-
ment, it becomes apparent that experienced youth (ages 25–34) have a greater 
likelihood of engaging in nonfarm work (in addition to own-family farm labour) 
compared to mature individuals (age 35–64). Although difficult to determine 
from cross-sectional data, the analysis presented in this chapter suggests that 
youth—in particular, experienced youth—may be driving the small share of 
labour diversification in rural and small towns. Moving forward, understanding 
if labour diversification occurs step-wise—meaning, individuals move from 
working exclusively on their own-farm activities to diversifying into nonfarm in 
add ition to own-farm activities, and then finally transitioning fully into nonfarm 
labour activities—will provide greater insight into Ethiopia’s likely economic 
trajectory over the next few decades. If this is the mode of labour transition within 
Ethiopia, we may be witnessing the initial transition of an economy moving towards 
greater structural transformation.
5.5 Conclusion
Over the last several decades, Ethiopia has focused its public investments in 
economic growth according to its ADLI strategy. This led to large increases in 
agricultural output. Simultaneously, the country has experienced impressive 
economic growth at approximately 11 per cent per year during the last decade. 
Although these trends point to structural transformation as a major driver of 
economic growth, labour force survey data suggest that Ethiopia remains at a 
very early stage in its structural transformation. Whereas one would expect to 
see a transition out of agriculture into higher value nonfarm employment, we find 
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that the share of economically active people working in agriculture only decreased 
by approximately 3.6 percentage points (from 80.2 to 76.6 per cent) between 
2005 and 2013.
Focusing on youth employment, the data suggest that few rural and small town 
youth (13 per cent) engage in nonfarm economic activities. However, individuals 
who are exclusively engaged in own-farm activities are underemployed, working 
approximately for half of the year given the seasonality inherent to crop agricul-
ture in Ethiopia. Given the large share of rural youth that have remained working 
exclusively in agriculture, we assess if youth are taking a lead role in agricultural 
transformation processes in Ethiopia. Comparing youth- versus mature-headed 
households, we find that on average youth-headed households have less agricul-
tural land, less access to services (credit and extension) and are less likely to 
implement agricultural enhancing technologies (inorganic fertilizer, improved 
seeds, row planting, and so on) compared to mature-headed households. Although, 
compared to more established households headed by older adults, youth-headed 
households face greater constraints in the agricultural sector, the analyses do not 
show that youth are leading the adoption of agricultural en han cing technologies, 
such as improved seed, cash crop production, or row planting. However, we do 
see a greater share of youth using technologies that are labour-reducing, such as 
herbicides and tractors.
Given the constraints faced by Ethiopian youth to access land and agricultural 
services, we evaluate whether youth are turning towards nonfarm employment as 
an alternative livelihood strategy. The econometric results suggest that youth aged 
25–34 have a higher probability of engaging in nonfarm enterprise activities. 
However, neither youth age cohort is more likely to work in wage labour com-
pared to exclusively working on own-farm activities. The analysis suggests that 
wage labour opportunities are few, and those who obtain wage employment tend 
to be male, with a higher education, and have fewer agricultural resources than 
those who do not engage in wage labour. This last factor suggests that push fac-
tors have a large influence on youth nonfarm employment decisions.
Although diversification out of agriculture reaps potentially higher wage 
opportunities in the nonfarm sector, our analysis suggests that employment 
opportunities outside of agriculture are limited in rural Ethiopia. This finding 
parallels that of recent research by Diao and McMillan (2015) in which they suggest 
from their results that proactive policies or foreign investment may be needed to 
spark structural transformation. Given that the majority of Ethiopia’s population 
lives in rural areas and works in agriculture, investments in agriculture-enhancing 
technology and services remains important to increase prod uct iv ity, and ultimately 
to spark greater nonfarm demand for goods and services. Continuing to evaluate 
constraints and ameliorate conditions for youth to be productively employed in 
agriculture and in the nonfarm sector as the economy continues to grow is crucial 
to ensuring healthy, sustainable economic growth moving forward.
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Appendix
Table 5.A1. Water and wood collectors, numbers (in thousands) and percentage 
of the economically active population, by age cohort, sex, and rural/urban, 2013
Age category Male Female Urban Rural
10 to 14 years 311.7 1,072.7 89.1 1,295.3
 (22.5) (77.5) (6.4) (93.6)
15 to 24 178.6 1,254.6 88.9 1,344.3
 (12.5) (87.5) (6.2) (93.8)
25 to 35 30.3 933.3 42.2 921.3
 (3.1) (96.9) (4.4) (95.6)
36 to 55 22.8 842.8 38.2 827.4
 (2.6) (97.4) (4.4) (95.6)
Over 55 12.3 208.1 12.1 208.3
 (5.6) (94.4) (5.5) (94.5)
Total 555.7 4,311.5 270.5 4,596.7
 (11.4) (88.6) (5.6) (94.4)
Note: Percentage shares are reported in parentheses.
Source: National Labour Force Survey (2013).
Table 5.A2. Youth labour type, by location and age cohort, 2013, present






 Rural Small 
town
Urban Rural Small 
town
Urban
Own-farm only 87.1 32.9 10.3 77.4 15.6 3.3
Own-farm and off-farm 9.9 12.2 3.3 18.7 21.2 4.5
Own-farm & nonfarm 
enterprise
8.2 9.4 2.3 15.3 15.8 2.8
Own-farm & wage 1.5 2.8 1.0 3.1 3.8 1.7
Own-farm & nonfarm 
enterprise & wage
0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.0
Off-farm1 3.0 54.8 86.3 3.9 63.3 92.2
Nonfarm enterprise 2.3 42.3 36.5 2.3 32.7 33.3
Wage 0.6 10.2 47.7 1.5 25.5 56.2
Nonfarm enterprise & wage 0.1 2.4 2.1 0.1 5.1 2.7
Working population 
(thousands)
11,367.6 67.4 959.4 8,423.4 67.6 1,281.7
Notes: 1 Off-farm work comprises individuals who work in off-farm enterprise and/or wage work.
2 Students are defined as those who do not report time working in own-farm, wage, or off-farm 
enterprise activities and report activity as ‘student’.
Source: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (2013/14).
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Table 5.A3. Average time worked per year by type of work, by youth age cohort, weeks








Mixed farm and 
off-farm workers
Average time worked 
per year
24.7 20.2 43.5 44.2
Farming own farm 17.6 20.2 0 13.9
Off-farm work1 7.1 0 43.5 30.3
Wage 2.7 0 21.9 5.8
Off-farm enterprise2 4.4 0 21.7 24.6
Working experienced 
youth (age 25–34)
       
Average time worked 
per year
31.4 23.8 47.4 46.7
Farming own farm 18.8 23.8 0 16.3
Off-farm work1 12.6 0 47.4 30.4
Wage 5.5 0 28.3 6.1
Off-farm enterprise2 7.1 0 19.1 24.4
Notes: 1 Off-farm work consists of off-farm enterprise and wage work.
2 Individual time worked in a nonfarm enterprise was not collected, thus we allocate the full amount 
of time that the nonfarm enterprise was in operation (total weeks) to each person that is reported 
working in the nonfarm enterprise.
Source: Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (2013/14).
Table 5.A4. Profile of rural and small town workers (ages 15–64) by employment type, 
mean characteristics
  Own-farm Wage Nonfarm 
enterprise
Age 15–24, proportion 0.36 0.24 *** 0.29 ***
Age 25–34, proportion 0.24 0.35 *** 0.35 ***
Age 35–64, proportion 0.40 0.41 0.37
Household head, proportion 0.33 0.60 *** 0.39 ***
Female, proportion 0.49 0.20 *** 0.54 **
Married, proportion 0.59 0.69 ** 0.67 ***
Completed primary school, proportion 0.10 0.36 *** 0.10
Student, proportion 0.13 0.05 *** 0.09 ***
Household size, number 6.64 5.89 *** 6.50
Adult males (age 15 to 64 years), number in household 1.82 1.52 *** 1.55 ***
Adult females (age 15 to 64 years), number in 
household
1.71 1.56 * 1.69
Expenditure, ‘000 birr/capita/year 1.38 2.95 *** 2.25 ***
Agricultural area owned, ha 1.62 1.24 1.22 *
Agricultural area operated, ha 1.94 2.23 1.60
Receive agricultural extension, proportion 0.52 0.34 *** 0.48
Receive agricultural credit, proportion 0.27 0.18 *** 0.22 ***
Livestock ownership, Tropical Livestock Units 4.24 2.87 *** 3.64 ***
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Change and Rigidity in Youth  
Employment Patterns in Malawi
Todd Benson, Alvina Erman, and Bob Baulch
6.1 Introduction
In the over fifty years since attaining independence, Malawi’s population has 
 continued to grow strongly, increasing from just over 4 million in 1966 to 17.6 
million in 2018. Yet, most of the population continues to reside in rural areas 
 pursuing agricultural livelihoods—at the last census in 2018, only 16 per cent of 
the population lived in cities or towns. Due to high fertility rates, Malawi has one 
of the youngest age structures in the world with 43.9 per cent of its population 
being under the age of 15, and 34.3 per cent being between 15 and 34 years of age 
(NSO 2018). In 2017, the agriculture sector contributed 26 per cent of the total 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Malawi’s economy (World Bank 2019). While 
the significance of agriculture has dropped from 50 years ago when the sector 
provided one-half of total economic output, Malawi’s economy remains among 
the 15 national economies globally that are most dependent upon agriculture. 
Although the service sector has grown significantly over the past 20 years, with a 
small manufacturing sector and limited non-agricultural natural resources to exploit 
economically, agricultural production remains at the centre of most economic 
production and household livelihoods. This is most evident in how the workforce 
of the country is allocated across sectors. Estimates from the 2013 Malawi 
Integrated Household Panel Survey (IHPS) are that 87.0 per cent of those of 
working age (15 to 64 years) are employed in agriculture.1
The factors that might push Malawians out of agriculture and into employment 
in other sectors have only intensified with time. Although dropping fertility rates 
may result in the population growth rate starting to decline soon, the annual 
population growth rate has been above 2.8 per cent for the last two decades. The 
2008 to 2018 intercensal annual growth rate was 2.9 per cent (NSO 2018). With 
1 Estimate based on author analysis of 2013 IHPS. Using a stricter definition of employment—those 
engaged exclusively in subsistence agricultural production for less than 48 hours a week were not 
considered employed, an employed individual could work only in a single sector, and a strict one week 
recall period was used—estimates from the 2013 Malawi Labour Force Survey are that 64.1 per cent of 
those who are of working age and are employed worked in agriculture (NSO 2014).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
138 Todd Benson, Alvina Erman, and Bob Baulch
this continued significant growth in the population and a large share of the 
 population remaining in agriculture, there is increasing land pressure: the average 
farm size in Malawi now is around 1.0 ha per household, with a median value close 
to 0.8 ha (Ricker-Gilbert, Jumbe, and Chamberlin 2014, NSO 2010). The low-input, 
low-output smallholder farming systems that dominate agriculture in Malawi 
result in many observers today echoing concerns expressed by observers since the 
colonial period as to whether most Malawians will be able to obtain sustainable 
livelihoods primarily from agriculture for much longer.
In parallel, some factors that might attract Malawians in the labour force to seek 
employment outside of agriculture have also intensified. Growth in the economy 
of Malawi since 2000 has been slowly positive overall, if erratic from year to year. 
Average annual growth in GDP between 2000 and 2017 was 4.3 per cent. The ser-
vices sector has expanded significantly over this period rising from a 43 per cent 
share of the economy in 2000 to 52 per cent in 2017, while the industrial sector 
has remained relatively stable to declining slightly, contributing 14 per cent of 
Malawi’s economic output in 2017 (World Bank 2019). At the same time, stocks of 
human capital have improved since the introduction of free primary education in 
1994. While problems related to the quality of instruction and of available facilities 
continue to plague education in Malawi, the improved access to schooling since 
has resulted in sharp increases in educational attainment among younger youth 
(ages 15 to 24 years), particularly for females (World Bank 2010).
The government of Malawi has also invested significant resources to enhance 
agricultural productivity over the past 10 years, particularly through the Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). The increased maize production resulting from 
FISP has contributed to agricultural sector growth. There is also evidence that 
reasonably significant second-round benefits have been achieved through FISP 
that are linked to the increased economic activity, lower food prices, and increased 
demand for labour the programme fostered (Arndt, Pauw, and Thurlow  2016). 
Although all independent assessments conclude that the programme could be 
implemented more efficiently and achieve significantly broader impact, particularly 
at farm level (Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013), FISP has the potential to 
propel the sector towards sustained improvements in agricultural productivity. 
This in turn should allow for increased investment in other areas of the economy 
and release considerable labour, including that of youth, from farming house-
holds to work elsewhere other than in agriculture.
In this chapter, we seek to better understand how the changes in and interplay 
of these factors affect the employment choices of Malawians in the workforce. 
Might we now see some movement of labour out of agriculture into other sectors, 
particularly services, even if slight and in its earliest stages? We also seek to deter-
mine whether the youth of Malawi are central to any changes occurring in 
employment patterns in the country, possibly drawing upon their increased levels 
of training, benefitting from higher agricultural production levels overall linked 
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to FISP, and responding to increased pressures to obtain a livelihood elsewhere 
than on increasingly small agriculture landholdings. Are Malawi’s youth entering 
the workforce in a different manner than previous generations?
Through analysis primarily of data from the Malawi Integrated Household 
Survey (IHS) series, in this chapter we examine changes in employment among 
those of working age in Malawi. First, using data from three IHS surveys—2004, 
2010, and 2013—we examine how strong are movements of labour, if any, out of 
agriculture and into industry and services. In making this assessment, we disag-
gregate our analysis by whether the workers are younger youth (ages 15 to 24 
years), older youth (25 to 34 years), or non-youth (35 to 64 years); resident in 
rural or urban areas; and female or male. This first analysis is based on categoriz-
ing each working age individual in our analytical data sets into a single employ-
ment category in the manner that the National Statistical Office of Malawi uses to 
analyse the data it collects on labour force participation.
We then extend this analysis to investigate the factors associated with the type 
of employment an individual has using the 2010 IHS-3 survey data. The analysis, 
based on an econometric multinomial logit model, permits a multivariate assess-
ment of the factors associated with an individual choosing a particular pattern of 
employment, including working in several sectors simultaneously, for example, 
working in both farming and petty trading (services). Here too, the analysis con-
siders the age of the individual to determine whether the correlates of youth 
engagement in the workforce are comparable to those of their elders.
To summarize the results of our analysis, we find little evidence of any signifi-
cant processes of transformation in the structure of Malawi’s economy or of youth 
being in the vanguard of any changes in cross-sectoral patterns of employment. 
While there has been some increase in employment in the services sector between 
2004 and 2013, it is older youth and non-youth, particularly males, who are 
engaging in such work. In contrast, younger youth are extending the length of 
their schooling. Although we find that higher educational attainment is strongly 
associated with nonfarm employment, agriculture remains the sector into which 
most youth first obtain employment. There are still few high-quality jobs in 
Malawi in which well-trained Malawians can use their skills productively.
6.2 Economic, Demographic, and Educational  
Trends in Malawi
Malawi has experienced moderate, if erratic economic growth over the past 15 years. 
While between 2000 and 2015 the economy contracted only in one year (2001), 
economic growth was lower than population growth in six years (Figure 6.1). 
Given the significance of agriculture in the economy, overall annual economic 
growth broadly tracks the annual growth of the agriculture sector—the correlation 
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coefficient between the two time series over this period is 0.63. Growth trends in 
the agricultural sector are more volatile than those of the economy as a whole, 
reflecting the exposure of the sector to adverse weather-related production 
shocks. Total value added in the agriculture sector fell from year to year five times 
between 2000 and 2015, primarily because of droughts or erratic rainfall, exacer-
bated in 2012 by weak economic conditions in Malawi’s economy more broadly.
Greater economic growth is needed. Malawi has one of the fastest growing 
populations in the world, with a population of 17.6 million in 2018, a more than 
four-fold increase in fifty years from just over 4 million when Malawi conducted 
its first post-independence Census in 1966. Projections from the 2008 Census 
estimate that the population will be about 45 million by 2050. Although popula-
tion growth rates should begin declining in coming decades, nonetheless the 
share of the population that is made up by youth aged 15 to 34 years will increase 
slightly from 34.2 per cent at the last census in 2018 to a peak of just over 35 per cent 
in around 2043, before beginning to decline. However, the youth population of 
Malawi will continue to grow for many decades thereafter. Currently, the number 
of youth is growing by about 170,000 persons per year. Projection estimates are 
that by 2050 this number will rise to 370,000 (NSO 2011a).
The principal investments that the government of Malawi have made to enable 
youth to obtain good jobs so that they are able to meet the needs of their house-
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Figure 6.1. Malawi’s agriculture sector, economy, and population, annual growth, 
2000 to 2015
Source: World Bank, 2019.
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proven extremely popular, the programme has been subject to continual criticism 
since its launch for the poor quality of education provided using existing facilities 
to teach the large numbers of new students enrolling. The government and its 
development partners have invested heavily in teacher training and in building 
classrooms over the past 20 years. However, due to large numbers of primary stu-
dents repeating classes or dropping out, it was found that in 2007 the system pro-
vided 23 student-years of instruction for every student successfully completing 
the eight years of primary education (World Bank 2010).
Despite the inefficiencies in implementation, the free primary education pro-
gramme has resulted in improved educational outcomes. The years of education 
successfully completed for the 15 to 24 years age-cohort increased by 1.2 years 
between the 1998 and 2008 Censuses from 5.0 to 6.2 years (analysis by authors). 
Tracer studies done as part of the World Bank 2010 study demonstrated strong 
social returns (for example, improvements in social behaviours and health out-
comes), particularly for primary education. Private financial returns to education 
in Malawi obtained through the labour market also were found to be significant 
at all levels of education, but being especially large at higher levels of educational 
attainment (World Bank  2010). As has been recognized for many generations, 
education remains a powerful means to achieving economic well-being in Malawi.
However, despite continuing public investment to improve the education  system, 
coupled with significant resources allocated to efforts to increase the prod uct iv ity 
of the agriculture sector, and in context of fair, although not stellar, economic 
growth over the past 15 years, there is as yet little evidence to show that there has 
been any growth in employment in higher productivity jobs. We now examine 
more closely the evolution in the structure of employment over this period and 
how Malawi’s youth choose to engage in the workforce using three rounds of data 
from the Malawi IHS series for individuals of working age—ages 15 to 64 years.
6.3 Structure of and Trends in Employment  
in Malawi, 2004 to 2013
6.3.1 Data
We rely on the last three IHS surveys for our analysis—2004, 2010, and 2013.2 
These three multitopic household surveys have very similar questionnaires so 
2 Malawi has several nationally representative data sets that include information on employment. 
These include the 1998 and 2008 Malawi Population and Housing Censuses, the 2013 Labour Force 
Survey, and four rounds of the IHS survey series, starting in 1998 with the IHS-1 and continuing with 
the IHS-2 in 2004, IHS-3 in 2010, and the Integrated Household Panel Survey (IHPS) in 2013, the last 
involving a repeat enumeration of a large sub-set of the IHS-3 sample. These data sets were created by 
the National Statistical Office (NSO) of the government of Malawi.
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that we were able to categorize individuals of working age in the survey samples 
into comparable employment categories. Moreover, the fact that the third round 
of the IHPS in 2013 was a panel survey of a subset of the sample for the second 
round in 2010 allowed us to trace changes in how individuals enumerated in both 
surveys engaged in the workforce over time.
The IHS surveys are the principal living standard measurement surveys for 
Malawi. The nationally representative samples for the surveys are selected using a 
two-stage cluster sampling approach. Using the districts of Malawi and the four 
major urban centers as strata, enumeration areas (EA) within each stratum are 
randomly selected with the probability of selection being proportional to the 
population of the EA. Either 16 or 20 households, depending on the survey round, 
were then randomly selected in each selected EA to make up a survey sample. 
The IHS-2 and IHS-3 surveys were administered over 12 to 13 months to capture 
annual seasonal variation in household consumption and expenditures, while the 
IHPS was administered over a nine-month period. Table  6.1 provides selected 
descriptive statistics on the three IHS surveys.
The employment categorization scheme used in our analysis is that of the 
International Labour Organization, which was used for the analysis by NSO of 
the 2013 Malawi Labour Force Survey. The working age population is defined as 
those aged 15 to 64 years. Within the working age population, we further distin-
guish younger youth aged 15 to 24 years, older youth aged 25 to 34 years, and 
non-youth aged 35 to 64 years. These individuals are categorized as being either 
economically active or not economically active depending on whether they are 
To characterize the structure of employment in Malawi, given their universal coverage, our prefer-
ence was to use the censuses, together with the Labour Force Survey. However, the questionnaires for 
the two censuses were sufficiently different that we were unable to categorize the working age popula-
tion enumerated in each into similarly defined employment groups. Similar problems were observed 
in trying to combine either census with the 2013 Labour Force Survey to further assess trends in 
employment. The 1998 IHS-1 questionnaire differs significantly from those of the other IHS survey 
rounds, so it also was excluded from our analysis.
Table 6.1. Sample size and period of administration of Malawi Integrated Household 
Surveys used
  IHS-2 IHS-3 IHPS
Sample size, households 11,280 12,271 4,000
Working age (15 to 64 years  
of age) sample size, individuals
25,144 27,842 10,349
Survey administration period March 2004 to 
March 2005
March 2010 to 
March 2011
April 2013 to 
December 2013
Source: Analysis by authors of IHS-2, IHS-3, and IHPS.
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engaged in economic activities or actively seeking employment in such activities. 
The economically active are further disaggregated into employed and unemployed, 
depending upon whether they are working or not working, but actively seeking 
work, respectively. The employed can be further disaggregated into the economic 
sector of employment—agriculture, industry, or services. Similarly, the not eco-
nom ic al ly active can be further disaggregated into students, homemakers, retired 
or ill individuals, or otherwise not economically active. In the analysis here, for 
the not economically active category we focus on students and all other not eco-
nom ic al ly active.
As the IHS surveys are not specifically designed to examine questions of 
employment, the specific criteria used to assign an individual to one category or 
another differed from those used in the analysis of the 2013 Labour Force Survey. 
Information was used from both the household and the agricultural questionnaires 
of the IHS surveys. In doing so, we privileged certain information in assigning an 
individual to an employment category. Individuals who had stated that they were 
students; were not working, but actively seeking work; or were formally employed 
(primarily for a wage) were assigned to the student, unemployed, and employed 
categories, respectively, even if the individual also reported that they had also 
engaged, most commonly, in agricultural production. Similarly, individuals who 
worked on a non-agricultural household enterprise, even if also engaged in farm-
ing, were considered to be employed in either the industrial or services sector, 
depending on the nature of the household enterprise. However, in our analytical 
data set, we compiled information on individuals who reported working in more 
than one sector, as this information on employment in multiple sectors is among 
the information used to create the dependent variable for the multinomial logit 
analysis discussed later.
In addition, employment surveys typically involve strict recall periods of the 
previous one week to determine the employment status of survey respondents. 
The data used from the IHS surveys for our analysis, however, involved vary-
ing recall periods—for farming activities, this typically was for the previous 
twelve months. As working age individuals are much more likely to report hav-
ing worked sometime over the past year than over the past week, our approach 
results in a larger share of individuals being categorized as employed, rather 
than ‘not economically active’ (if not students), than is found in employment 
surveys. Given these differences, we emphasize that the results of our employment 
cat egor iza tion should not be considered comparable to, for example, seem-
ingly similar results from the 2013 Labour Force Survey or the most recent 
population censuses for Malawi. However, we are confident that our approach 
to assigning working age members of the IHS survey samples to employment 
categories allows for valid comparisons to be made over the three rounds of 
the IHS examined.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
144 Todd Benson, Alvina Erman, and Bob Baulch
6.3.2 Results
6.3.2.1 Structure of Employment in Malawi in 2013
The share of the population by working age population age group (younger 
youth, older youth, and non-youth) assigned to each employment category esti-
mated from a weighted analysis of the 2013 IHPS data is presented in Figure 6.2 
as a 100 per cent bar chart. The continued dominance of agricultural employ-
ment in Malawi is apparent. Among the older youth and non-youth, over 70 per cent 
of all individuals are working in agriculture, and 87 per cent of those who are 
employed work in agriculture. Even among the younger youth, while students 
are the largest employment category for this age group, most younger youth who 
are not students work in agriculture. Across all age groups, females are more 
likely than men to work on the farm. Given the customary land tenure system 
that provides access to land for almost all Malawians, agriculture is observed to be 
the default employment category for all, including for many individuals residing 
in urban centres.
The shares of each population group employed in industry and services are 
relatively small compared to agriculture. In urban areas, shares of those employed 
in the nonfarm sectors are higher, particularly for services.3 Moreover, of those 
employed, the share of older youth and non-youth working in industry and ser-
vices is somewhat higher than it is for the younger youth. This suggests that 
younger youth immediately upon entering the workforce are unable to readily 
obtain work outside of agriculture.
3 Urban areas include the four major cities of Malawi, district headquarters (bomas), and other gaz-
etted towns. In the 2008 Census, 15.3 per cent of the population were enumerated as residents of urban 
areas, of which 78 per cent lived in the four major cities– Lilongwe, Blantyre, Zomba, and Mzuzu.
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Figure 6.2. Malawi 2013, size of employment categories by age cohort, disaggregated 
by rural and urban and by male and female, percentage share of population
Source: Analysis by authors of 2013 Malawi Integrated Household Panel Survey. Weighted analysis.
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Unemployment is not common in Malawi. Following the statistical definition 
of unemployment used in the analysis of the 2013 Labour Force Survey for 
Malawi, any individual of working age in the survey sample who reported not 
having worked over the past four weeks, but who was actively looking for work, 
was categorized as unemployed. Such individuals in the sample were categorized 
as unemployed for the analysis here regardless of whether they indicated else-
where in the survey that they had worked in some capacity before the four-week 
recall period used to assess unemployment. However, few individuals were 
 cat egor ized as such.
In the report on the 2013 Labour Force Survey, it is asserted that this strict def-
in ition of unemployment is not useful in the Malawi context, since the country’s 
underdeveloped labour markets make it quite difficult to actively seek work 
(NSO 2014). More importantly, with broad access to small plots of agricultural 
land through the dominant customary land tenure system, most individuals can 
engage in farming to provide for some of their basic subsistence. However, given 
the small agricultural landholdings and the strongly seasonal pattern of rainfed 
agricultural production, they are unable to farm fulltime at a scale sufficient to 
meet all their welfare needs. In consequence, there is significant underemployment. 
Many working Malawians are unable to use their abilities sufficiently productively 
to meet their own needs or those of their households, or to expand Malawi’s 
economy. The low unemployment figure obtained in our analysis masks this 
deficiency in the quantity and quality of employment available for both youth and 
older workers.
Over a quarter of Malawi’s working age population are economically inactive. 
However, there are strong age-specific patterns to those who fall into this cat-
egory. More than half of younger youth are economically inactive, given that so 
many are students. However, most students end their education by age 20, so the 
proportion of students in older age categories is very small. For older youth and 
non-youth, the share of the not economically active is relatively small, reflecting 
in part the long recall period used to flexibly define employment in this analysis. 
Nonetheless, in these age groups, women are more likely than men to be not 
eco nom ic al ly active, as are those residing in urban areas relative to those in rural 
areas. For women, this may reflect maternal responsibilities, particularly for older 
youth. For urban dwellers, the higher rates of individuals not being economically 
active relative to rural residents likely reflects the greater barriers to employment 
in towns and cities, where opportunities for obtaining work, particularly formal 
employment, remain quite restricted, particularly in industry.
Many younger youth are continuing their education. This results in significant 
differences in cross-sectional employment patterns between younger and older 
youth. However, comparing older youth to non-youth, the patterns of employment 
in Figure 6.2 do not show that older youth participate in the workforce in Malawi 
in any qualitatively different manner than do non-youth. The only exception to 
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this is for women, in that, relative to non-youth women, those in the older youth 
age category are more likely to be not economically active, likely due to their 
increased maternal responsibilities at this point in their life-cycle.
6.3.2.2 Evidence of Structural Shifts in Employment  
in Malawi, 2004 to 2013
While Figure 6.2 provides a static, cross-sectoral overview of employment among 
the working age in Malawi in 2013, the details presented in Table 6.2 sketch out 
what changes, if any, have occurred in employment patterns between 2004, 2010, 
and 2013. While information is presented for the three years for which we have 
data from the IHS series, our examination here primarily focuses on differences 
in the compound annual growth rate between 2004 and 2013 in the number of 
individuals who fall in each employment category reported.
Growth in the number of employed is less than growth in the working age 
population for all age groups. This is primarily due to higher growth over this 
period in the share of the population that is not economically active and, within this 
category, particularly due to growth in the number of students among young adults.
For those employed, the share working in the agriculture sector, by far the lar-
gest sector of employment, is relatively stable across the three points in time over-
all and when disaggregated by sex—around 94 per cent of all women employed 
consistently worked in agriculture over this period, while around 80 per cent of 
men did so. There is little evidence in these data sets that any movement of labour 
out of agriculture is occurring in Malawi. While we can point to small changes 
that might encourage one to see the start of such a process, particularly with the 
modest growth of employment in services, these changes are not sufficiently large 
as yet to convince any observer that a process of structural change in Malawi’s 
economy is now gaining momentum.
This tabular analysis does not provide evidence that the substantial public 
investment in agricultural productivity in Malawi since 2005 through the Farm 
Input Subsidy Programme has resulted in any obvious changes in how people 
allocate their labour, whether into or out of agriculture. While more detailed, 
multivariate econometric analyses may more clearly link FISP impacts on farm 
household productivity with employment choices, particularly among working 
age members, these links are unlikely to be especially strong.
The sector in which growth in employment is seen is in services, and this 
growth is primarily among the older youth and the non-youth. For the younger 
youth, there has been a reduction in employment across all sectors, as increasing 
numbers maintain their student status. Growth rates for all sectors of employ-
ment for younger youth are lower than the rate of growth in the working age 
population for this age group, reflecting increasing delays in their entering the 
workforce. Nationally, agriculture is the dominant sector for those younger youth 
























Table 6.2. Malawi, change in size of employment categories by age cohort, disaggregated by rural and urban and by male and female
  Ages 15 to 64 years Younger youth, ages 15 to 24 Older youth, ages 25 to 34 Non-youth, ages 35 to 64

















Working age  
population, ‘000s
5,975 6,871 7,207 2.1 2,338 2,556 2,771 1.9 1,603 1,980 2,024 2.6 2,034 2,335 2,412 1.9
Employed, % share  
of working age  
population
76.7 72.8 69.2 0.9 53.7 46.6 43.0 −0.6 90.0 85.6 83.4 1.8 92.7 90.6 87.5 1.2
Agriculture, % share  
of employed
85.3 87.1 87.0 1.0 89.8 93.1 92.4 −0.3 82.0 83.8 85.6 2.1 84.7 86.3 85.0 1.1
Industry, % share of  
employed
5.8 3.2 2.4 −8.6 4.0 1.6 1.8 −9.1 7.3 4.3 2.6 −9.5 5.9 3.4 2.6 −7.6
Services, % share of  
employed
8.9 9.7 10.6 2.8 6.1 5.3 5.8 −1.2 10.7 11.9 11.9 2.8 9.4 10.3 12.4 4.2
Unemployed, %  
share of working  
age pop.
0.7 1.3 2.6 18.1 0.9 1.4 2.0 11.0 0.9 2.0 3.5 19.9 0.4 0.8 2.6 27.2
Not economically  
active, % share of  
working age pop.
22.6 25.9 28.2 4.7 45.4 52.0 55.1 4.1 9.1 12.4 13.1 6.8 6.9 8.6 9.9 6.1
Students, % share of  
not economically  
active




























4,804 5,683 5,925 2.4 1,855 2,118 2,316 2.5 1,249 1,570 1,587 2.7 1,700 1,995 2,022 1.9
Employed, % share 
of working age 
population
80.4 75.9 70.6 0.9 58.8 50.4 45.6 −0.4 93.4 89.6 85.2 1.6 94.3 92.4 87.8 1.1
Agriculture, % share 
of employed
89.9 92.3 91.8 1.1 93.3 96.3 95.0 −0.2 88.1 90.3 91.9 2.1 89.0 91.4 89.7 1.2
Industry, % share of  
employed
5.1 2.3 1.5 −12.2 3.4 1.0 0.9 −13.6 6.4 3.1 1.7 −12.6 5.2 2.3 1.6 −11.4
Services, % share of 
employed
5.0 5.5 6.8 4.3 3.3 2.7 4.0 1.8 5.5 6.7 6.4 3.3 5.8 6.2 8.7 5.7
Not economically 
active, % share of 
working age pop.
19.4 23.2 27.0 6.2 40.9 48.9 52.8 5.5 6.4 9.3 11.6 9.7 5.5 6.9 9.5 8.4
Students, % share of 
not economically  
active




1,171 1,187 1,282 1.0 483 438 455 −0.7 354 410 436 2.4 334 339 390 1.7
Employed, % share 
of working age 
population
61.8 57.8 62.7 1.2 34.1 28.6 29.5 −2.2 77.8 70.4 76.8 2.2 84.6 80.2 85.8 1.9
  Ages 15 to 64 years Younger youth, ages 15 to 24 Older youth, ages 25 to 34 Non-youth, ages 35 to 64







































Agriculture, % share 
of employed
57.0 49.1 57.1 0.6 63.7 61.7 67.4 -2.1 51.2 46.6 54.5 2.6 58.4 45.9 55.6 0.4
Industry, % share of 
employed
10.2 10.5 8.3 −1.7 8.7 7.0 9.9 −1.2 11.8 11.2 7.0 −3.8 9.8 11.4 9.0 0.0
Services, % share of 
employed
32.8 40.4 34.5 1.2 27.6 31.3 22.7 −4.8 37.1 42.2 38.6 2.4 31.8 42.7 35.4 2.1
Not economically 
active, % share of 
working age pop.
35.6 38.5 33.8 0.4 62.8 66.9 66.8 0.0 18.9 24.5 18.7 2.2 14.1 18.8 12.1 0.1
Students, % share of 
not economically 
active




3,039 3,550 3,688 2.2 1,221 1,349 1,379 1.4 785 1,039 1,101 3.8 1,033 1,162 1,208 1.8
Employed, % share 
of working age 
population
75.4 71.7 69.2 1.2 57.8 50.8 46.8 −1.0 84.9 81.2 79.7 3.1 89.1 87.6 85.1 1.2
Agriculture, % share 
of employed
93.3 94.6 93.6 1.0 93.8 96.4 95.6 −0.9 91.5 92.7 92.8 3.0 94.0 95.0 92.9 0.9
Services, % share of 
employed
4.7 4.6 5.8 3.3 4.7 3.3 3.9 −3.1 5.8 6.0 6.3 3.8 4.0 4.3 6.5 6.8
Not economically 
active, % share of 
working age pop.
24.0 27.0 28.2 4.0 41.5 48.0 50.9 3.7 14.4 16.8 16.7 5.5 10.7 11.8 12.7 3.7
Students, % share of 
not economically  
active




























2,936 3,321 3,519 2.0 1,117 1,206 1,392 2.5 818 942 922 1.3 1,001 1,173 1,204 2.1
Employed, % share 
of working age 
population
78.1 74.0 69.2 0.7 49.2 42.0 39.2 −0.1 94.9 90.4 87.8 0.5 96.5 93.6 89.8 1.3
Agriculture, % share 
of employed
77.2 79.2 80.1 1.1 84.6 88.6 88.6 0.5 73.6 74.9 77.8 1.1 75.8 78.2 77.5 1.3
Services, % share of 
employed
13.2 15.0 15.7 2.6 8.1 8.1 8.0 0.0 15.1 17.8 17.8 2.4 14.7 15.9 17.9 3.4
Not economically 
active, % share of 
working age pop.
21.0 24.7 28.2 5.4 49.6 56.6 59.2 4.5 4.1 7.6 8.8 10.4 3.0 5.5 7.2 12.4
Students, % share of 
not economically  
active
17.4 18.3 20.9 4.2 44.6 48.4 50.7 3.9 1.4 2.2 2.6 8.6 0.1 0.4 0.5 27.5
Observations 
(national)
25,144 27,842 10,349 – 9,844 10,427 4,214 – 6,772 8,026 2,847 – 8,528 9,389 3,288 –
Note: Weighted analysis. ‘Annual growth’ is the compound annual growth rate in the number of individuals who fall in the employment category in question between 2004 
and 2013. Sample design corrected standard errors are not reported here, but are available upon request.
Source: Analysis by authors of data from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS) series for 2004 (IHS-2), 2010 (IHS-3), and 2013 (IHPS).
  Ages 15 to 64 years Younger youth, ages 15 to 24 Older youth, ages 25 to 34 Non-youth, ages 35 to 64
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younger youth, particularly males, are still dependents in their households—ana lysis 
of the IHS-3 shows that 56 per cent of females and 80 per cent of males in this age 
category are dependents, meaning, not household head or spouse of the house-
hold head. These dependent household members will be obligated to provide 
farm labour to the household. Secondly, most younger youth will not have suffi-
cient capital to engage in petty trading, in particular, in the service sector. For 
younger youth in Malawi, the nonfarm employment sectors are not absorbing 
their labour. If they are not students, most younger youth work in agriculture.
It is among the older youth that one observes growth in employment in ser-
vices, even if the absolute numbers involved remain dwarfed by those working in 
agriculture. The national growth rate for employment of older youth in services, 
but not agriculture and industry, is higher than the rate of population growth for 
this age group. Older youth tend to live independently—87 per cent are either a 
household head or the spouse of a household head—and many will have achieved 
higher educational levels than did their elders in the non-youth age cohort, pro-
viding them with skills that can be used effectively in employment in the services 
sector. Growth in employment in services for older youth is most notable in rural 
areas and among men.
Nonetheless, the largest growth in employment in the services sector is among 
the non-youth. This higher growth in employment in services applies across the 
board to rural and urban and male and female non-youth, suggesting that broad 
capital accumulation over time may be a more important factor than education in 
enabling individuals to find employment in the services sector.
In contrast to growing employment in services and a relatively constant large 
share of the employed in agriculture, employment in the industrial sector in 
Malawi declined between 2004 and 2013. This is particularly the case in rural areas, 
though urban employment in industry has also declined. Malawi’s national 
accounts indicate that the recent performance of the industrial sector has been 
positive but erratic, with a mean annual growth rate between 2000 and 2014 of 
4.0 per cent. However, we may be seeing a reduction in labour-intensive operations 
in manufacturing being replaced by more capital-intensive operations.
Outside of the employed categories, younger youth in both rural and urban 
areas increasingly are delaying their entry into employment by extending their 
education. This is an outcome of the increased access to education for all offered 
by the free primary education programme. The positive trends in educational 
attainment between 2004 and 2013 for all working age individuals and by age 
group are detailed in Table 6.3.
Over this period, the share of younger youth who are students rose from 35 to 
44 per cent (Table 6.2). The highest growth rates are seen among women and in 
rural areas. Although males in the younger youth age category remain more likely 
to be students, the number of females in this age category who are students is 
























Table 6.3. Changes in educational attainment among working age individuals in Malawi, 2004 to 2013
  Ages 15 to 64 years Younger youth, ages 
15 to 24




  2004 2010 2013 2004 2010 2013 2004 2010 2013 2004 2010 2013
NATIONAL—Years schooling completed, avg. 5.0 5.8 6.1 6.1 6.7 6.9 5.2 6.3 6.6 3.7 4.5 4.7
Completed primary school, per cent 23.2 27.3 29.1 27.1 30.4 32.2 26.3 32.7 33.5 16.3 19.5 21.8
Completed secondary school, per cent 4.4 7.1 7.8 3.1 4.9 5.8 6.8 10.5 10.9 4.1 6.8 7.3
Rural—Years schooling completed, avg. 4.4 5.3 5.5 5.6 6.3 6.5 4.5 5.7 5.9 3.2 3.9 4.1
Urban—Years schooling completed, avg. 7.5 8.6 8.7 8.0 8.9 9.2 7.9 8.8 8.8 6.4 8.0 7.9
Female—Years schooling completed, avg. 4.1 5.1 5.4 5.6 6.5 6.7 4.0 5.4 5.9 2.5 3.2 3.5
Male—Years schooling completed, avg. 6.0 6.6 6.8 6.6 6.9 7.1 6.4 7.3 7.4 5.0 5.8 5.9
Observations (national) 25,098 27,736 10,296 9,839 10,370 4,193 6,762 7,998 2,835 8,497 9,368 3,268
Note: Weighted analysis. Sample design corrected standard errors are not reported here, but are available upon request.
Source: Analysis by authors of data from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS) series for 2004 (IHS-2), 2010 (IHS-3), and 2013 (IHPS).
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levels differ between rural and urban younger youth. In rural areas, two-thirds of 
younger youth students are still in primary school, albeit at upper levels. Only 
one-third of rural younger youth students attend secondary school and almost 
none attend university or training colleges. In contrast, for urban younger youth 
who are students, one-third attend primary school, 60 per cent attend secondary 
school, and 7 per cent are in university or training colleges.
The highest growth rates for the student category are seen among older youth 
and non-youth. However, note that the number of students in these older groups 
remains very small. The increase in student numbers in these categories likely 
reflects the recent expansion in tertiary education opportunities from about 8,400 
places nationally in 2008 to 11,600 in 2011 (Mambo et al. 2016). Nonetheless, the 
student category is unlikely to ever be a significant employment category among 
these older workers.
We also see high growth rates in the share of the working age population that is 
unemployed. However, as discussed earlier, the absolute numbers of individuals 
in this category are few, and the category as narrowly defined here does not reflect 
the widespread nature of underemployment in Malawi.
Finally, the growth rates computed for the base working population pose a few 
puzzles. Overall the working age population is growing at 2.1 per cent per year, 
about one per cent lower than the growth of the population as a whole over the 
period examined. Emigration out of Malawi may be a factor in this, as emigration 
for wage labour, whether temporary or permanent, has been an important economic 
strategy for many Malawians since the colonial period (Coleman 1979, Vail 1983). 
In the 2008 census, heads of household were asked about household members 
who had left Malawi in the past ten years. Of the almost 130,000 emigrants enu-
merated, 61 per cent were men aged 20 to 39 years of age (NSO 2011b). This pat-
tern of age-specific male emigration is consonant with the pattern of working age 
population growth seen in Table 6.2, which shows that male older youth have the 
second lowest rate of growth in population among the groups examined. The lowest 
rate of population growth is among younger youth in urban areas, which shows 
an absolute decline in numbers between 2004 and 2010. While this may reflect 
increased educational choices in rural areas, given significant public investment 
in rural education since 1994, reducing the traditional flow of secondary and 
post-secondary students of rural origin to urban schools, the determinants of 
population growth among younger youth in urban centres of Malawi requires 
additional study.
6.3.2.3 Change Over Time in Employment Categories for Individuals 
of Working Age
The panel nature of the IHS-3 of 2010 and the IHPS of 2013 allow the tracing of 
changes in employment category for individuals enumerated in both surveys. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.4. The dominance of agriculture in 
























Table 6.4. Change in category of employment between 2010 and 2013 for working age individuals in Malawi, row totals in per cent
Category of employment in 2010 Working age, 15 to 64 years in 2010 Younger youth, 15 to 24 years in 2010
  Category of employment in 2013
Agric Ind Serv Un-empl Not actv Stdnt Agric Ind Serv Un-empl Not actv Stdnt
Agriculture 75 1 3 3 11 6 68 0 2 2 13 15
Industry 46 27 13 2 9 2 59 5 30 0 0 6
Services 32 4 52 3 4 5 43 7 31 3 4 12
Unemployed 55 2 6 3 27 8 38 6 3 3 36 14
Not economically active, not student 57 1 6 4 21 11 46 0 4 3 25 21
Student 24 1 4 2 11 59 25 1 2 1 11 60
Total 61 2 7 3 12 15 47 1 3 2 14 33
observations 5,887 2,228
  Older youth, 25 to 34 years in 2010 Non- youth, 35 to 64 years in 2010
Agriculture 76 2 4 4 10 5 79 1 3 3 11 2
Industry 39 33 7 0 19 2 49 27 14 5 3 2
Services 28 3 52 5 5 7 32 4 57 1 4 2
Unemployed 52 0 10 4 27 7 86 0 0 0 14 0
Not economically active, not student 62 0 8 5 19 7 66 1 6 3 20 4
Student 20 9 26 8 2 36 5 0 88 0 0 7
Total 66 3 10 4 11 6 71 2 10 3 11 2
observations 1,643 2,016
Note: Age ranges based on age at the time of enumeration in 2010 for the earlier IHS-3 survey. Table presents row totals, for example, upper left cell in top-left sub-table 
indicates that 75 per cent of all working age individuals who were employed in agriculture in 2010 were still employed in agriculture in 2013, while the upper right cell in 
the same sub-table indicates that 6 per cent of those who were employed in agriculture in 2010 were reported in 2013 to be students.
Source: Analysis by authors of data from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS) series for working age individuals that can be identified in both the 2010 (IHS-3) 
and 2013 (IHPS). Weighted estimates.
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individual who changed their category of employment between 2010 and 2013, 
employment in the agriculture sector is the most common employment category 
destination. The only exceptions to this pattern are for older youth and non-youth 
students, who were more likely to have obtained employment in the services sec-
tor than in agriculture in 2013. However, the numbers of individuals involved in 
these exceptional categories are few.
Moreover, there is considerable stability in the sector of employment for those 
employed in agriculture or in the services sector—75 per cent of those in agricul-
ture in 2010 were still in agriculture three years later, and 52 per cent of those in 
services were still in services. The proportion of those still working in the same 
sector for agriculture and services goes up with age—non-youth are more likely 
than older youth to be in the same employment sector and, in turn, older youth 
are more likely than younger youth to remain in the same sector of employment 
over the three years. Stability in employment, however, is not seen in the indus-
trial sector, where almost three-quarters of those who were working in the sector 
in 2010 were no longer doing so in 2013. However, note that the changes for the 
industrial sector are based on very small numbers overall.
Quite a bit of movement out of the ‘not economically active, not student’ cat-
egory is seen, primarily into agriculture, reflecting the insight repeatedly observed 
earlier in this analysis of agricultural employment being the dominant employ-
ment choice for most working age Malawians. Two-thirds of those who move into 
or out of the ‘not economically active, not student’ category are female, suggesting 
that membership in this category may be driven primarily by life cycle stage con-
siderations, notably pregnancy and child care.4
The key finding from this analysis is that there is no evidence of a substantial 
movement of labour out of the agricultural sector of Malawi’s economy and 
into the industry or services sectors between 2004 and 2013. The share of those of 
working age who are employed who are working in agriculture has remained 
quite stable over this period at around 87 per cent. However, there has been some 
growth in employment in the services sector, particularly among older youth 
and the non-youth. Younger youth aged 15 to 24 years are seen to be extending 
their period of schooling, but, nonetheless, generally enter into employment in 
the agriculture sector after they complete their schooling. That older workers are 
more likely to be employed in the services sector suggests that broad capital accu-
mulation, work experience, or the development of personal social and economic 
networks over time may be more important factors than education in enabling 
individuals to find employment outside of agriculture.
4 Seasonal factors related to agriculture could also account for some of the movement of in di vid-
uals between employment categories. However, an analysis was done of the IHS-3 data to determine if 
there was any association between younger youth reporting that they are students and the month in 
which their household was interviewed. Only those interviewed in April and August showed a signifi-
cantly higher propensity to be categorized as students, a finding that would appear unrelated to sea-
sonal cropping cycles.
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6.4 Analysis of the Determinants of Category of Employment
In this section, a multivariate analysis is used to identify factors potentially 
associated with the decision by an individual to participate in a specific pattern of 
employment. We use a multinomial logit (MNL) regression model (Amemiya 1985, 
Greene 2012) with data for sample members of working age from the 2010 IHS-3 
survey.
This analysis involves splitting our sample of working age individuals into six 
employment categories, including those who are not economically active, and 
then estimating relative risk ratios for a particular characteristic of a working age 
individual being associated with that individual being a member of a specific 
employment category. To gain insights through this analysis into how youth 
engage in employment in Malawi, we include age range dummy variables in our 
MNL model.
6.4.1 Data
We use the IHS-3 data from 2010–11 for this analysis. Although this dataset is not 
as recent as the 2013 IHPS, it has a much larger sample. As our MNL analysis 
involves examining six categories of working age individuals, some of which are 
quite small, it is important to have sufficient observations to draw inferences from 
the covariates of employment choice made by individuals in the smaller categories.
The employment categories that we use as the dependent variable for the MNL 
model are different from those which were used in the analyses presented earlier. 
The statistical employment categories used for the earlier analysis, based on def-
in itions of the International Labour Organization, rely upon a relatively restricted 
understanding of the economic engagements individuals of working age in 
Malawi might pursue. In particular, that categorization scheme does not allow 
for individuals to work in more than a single sector, for example, working in both 
agriculture and services. Such diversification of livelihoods within households 
and by individuals is relatively common in Malawi. In consequence, for the 
MNL analysis to identify factors associated with the employment choice of an 
individual, we developed six broad employment categories consisting of individuals 
who are
 i. employed in agricultural sector only, which is our reference category in the 
MNL analysis;
 ii. employed both in agricultural sector and in household enterprise(s) in the 
industry or services sectors;
 iii. employed both in agricultural sector and in wage employment in the 
industry or services sectors;
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 iv. only employed in household enterprise(s) in the industry or services sectors;
 v. only employed for wages in the industry or services sector; or
 vi. not economically active.
In this employment categorization scheme, we maintain a distinction between 
informal (categories ii and iv above) and formal (iii and v) employment in the 
industry and services sectors (see, e.g. Hart 1973, Fox, Senbet, and Simbanegavi 
2016). Informal employment is centred on the operations of generally small-scale, 
minimally-capitalized enterprises within the household that make use primarily 
of household labour. In contrast, formal employment generally involves an indi-
vidual having some type of working agreement with an employer with salary and 
benefits, a specific work location outside the household residence, and regular 
hours, with payroll taxes and social security payments being made to government 
agencies as part of the formal working arrangement. Obtaining informal employ-
ment is generally easier than obtaining formal wage employment, but the nature 
of informal employment is less stable. The returns to informal employment are 
also generally lower than what can be obtained from formal employment. In most 
developing countries, including Malawi, youth have the greatest opportunities 
for entering the non-agricultural workforce through informal employment, some-
thing they do generally with ambitions to obtain formal employment as soon as 
possible (ILO 2015).
Note that we exclude from the categorization scheme for our analysis the small 
number of formally unemployed. Moreover, sample size considerations dictate 
that we cannot differentiate employment in the industrial sector from employ-
ment in the services sector, or single out students from others who are not eco-
nom ic al ly active.
The Venn diagrams in Figure  6.3 provide a graphical representation of how 
these categories are organized for the working age sample of the IHS-3 as a whole 
and by youth and non-youth sub-samples. The diagrams, however, do not differ-
entiate those who are employed for wages in the industry or services sectors 
(formal employment) from those employed in household enterprises (informal 
employment) in these sectors. The dominance of exclusive agricultural sector 
employment is apparent in the diagrams, as is the large share of younger youth 
who are not economically active.
The potential factors associated with an individual being a member of a par-
ticular employment category that we consider include demographic characteris-
tics, educational attainment, household assets, physical access to markets, and 
recent experiences of economic shocks.5 These are described in Table 6.5 for the 
entire working age sample.
5 This analysis is based on a cross-sectional data set and involves at least one choice variable (that 
on FISP) among the explanatory variables. Consequently, while the analysis enables the identification 
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The explanatory variables included in the model have been selected based on 
research literature assessing determinants of participation in non-agricultural 
activities, including being not economically active in rural areas in developing 
countries. Broadly, individuals may choose to engage in nonfarm activities because 
of the potential benefits, such as high returns or to diversify risk (Lucas and 
Stark 1985). External shocks and risks associated with agricultural production may 
also lead to individuals being forced to move away from agriculture and into other 
sectors. Factors associated with these two distinct scenarios are referred to  as 
‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors. In both scenarios, an individual’s labour allocation (both 
in amount and across sectors) is a function of variables related to incentives—the 
returns to labour and the relative risks to attaining those returns; and to capacity—
human, social, financial, and other assets that make possible one’s engagement in a 
particular type of employment (Reardon et al.  2007). The explanatory variables 
used in the analysis here are primarily related to capacity, reflecting various assets 
upon which individuals might draw in pursuing particular forms of employment. 
Although the distinction is not exact, only the access to markets and the shock-
related explanatory variables reflect incentives in any significant manner.
Specifically, the demographic variables included in the MNL model are linked 
to the broader question of how youth in Malawi enter the workforce. However, 
we also include two factors that may be associated with an individual not being 
economically active: whether an individual is a dependent within the household 
or is a woman who gave birth in the past two years. As gender plays a key role in 
employment status, being an important determinant of access to land, labour, 
of associations between specific factors and the nature of one’s employment, it does not permit one to 
claim any cause-and-effect relationships.
Working age sample Younger youth sub-sample Older youth sub-sample Non-youth sub-sample
n = 27,257 n = 10,184 n = 7,801 n = 9,272
1 - Employed in agricultural sector only;
2 - Employed in agricultural sector and in the industry or services sectors (not dierentiated between 
     employment in household enterprise or for wages);   
3 -Employed only in the industry or services sectors (not dierentiated between employment in household
     enterprise or for wages); 












Figure 6.3. Venn diagrams of the relative sizes of the employment categories, for full 
working age sample and age-based sub-samples
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Table 6.5. Dependent and explanatory variables for multinomial logit analysis of 
determinants of an individual being a member of a particular employment category, 
working age sample
  Variable Variable definition Mean (s.e.)
Dependent categorical variable components:  




  farm_NFent Employed both in agricultural sector 
and in household enterprise(s) in the 
industry or services sectors, 0/1
0.077
(0.0026)
  farm_NFwage Employed both in agricultural sector 
and in wage employment in the 
industry or services sectors, 0/1
0.084
(0.0036)
  NFent_only Only employed in household 




  NFwage_only Only employed for wages in the 
industry or services sector, 0/1
0.033
(0.0022)
  not_econ_active Not economically active, 0/1 0.264
(0.0049)
Explanatory variables:  
Demographic male male, 0/1 0.482
(0.0024)
  youth15_19 age 15 to 19 years, 0/1 0.206
(0.0030)
  youth20_24 age 20 to 24 years, 0/1 0.165
(0.0031)
  youth25_29 age 25 to 29 years, 0/1 0.158
(0.0029)
  youth30_34 age 30 to 34 years, 0/1 0.128
(0.0031)
  dependent Individual is a dependent within 








Ethnicity Chewa_Nyanja Chewa or Nyanja ethnicity, 0/1 0.632
(0.0089)
  Yao_Lomwe Yao or Lomwe ethnicity, 0/1 0.157
(0.0075)




  Other_north Other northern ethnic groups, 0/1 0.017
(0.0023)
  Other_ethnicity Other ethnic groups, 0/1 0.045
(0.0033)
Education ed_not_fin_prmry Did not complete primary school, 0/1 0.730
(0.0070)
  ed_prmry_cmplt Completed primary school, 0/1 0.201
(0.0050)
Continued
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technology, and other productive assets that will affect the propensity of an 
individual to obtain employment within a specific category (Andersson Djurfeldt, 
Djurfeldt, and Bergman Lodin  2013), the model’s covariates include the sex of 
the individual.
We include several dummy variables on ethnicity (based on language spoken 
in the household). Ethnicity tends to overlap and therefore be highly correlated 
with other economic and social disadvantages that impact on the employment 
choices that an individual might exercise. As has been shown in other countries, 
ethnic disadvantage tends to be both a multidimensional factor and to increase 
cumulatively over the life course because of the complex interplay of several over-
lapping layers of disadvantage, which start from conception and continue through 
adult life (Hall and Patrinos 2014).
Table 6.5. Continued
  Variable Variable definition Mean (s.e.)
Dependent categorical variable components:  
  ed_scndry_cmplt Completed secondary school, 0/1 0.053
(0.0025)
  ed_tertiary Received tertiary level education—





house_perm_mtrl Individual lives in house constructed 
with some permanent materials, for 




Agriculture land_cap_ha Household landholding per capita, ha 0.179
(0.0302)
  FISP_hh Member of Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme beneficiary household, 0/1
0.431
(0.0083)
  mid_alt_plt Resident in Mid-altitude Plateau and 
Highlands agroecological zone, 0/1
0.757
(0.0122)




  Lakeshore Resident in Lakeshore and Upper 





trvl_5k_town_hr Travel time to nearest urban centre 
with population above 5,000, hours
0.970
(0.025)
  trvl_50k_town_hr Travel time to nearest urban centre 
with population above 50,000, hrs
1.790
(0.031)
Shocks shock_idiosync Household experienced idiosyncratic 
shock in past 12 months, 0/1
0.273
(0.0060)





Source: Analysis by authors of IHS-3 data. Weighted estimates. Standard errors corrected to reflect 
clustered design of survey sample reported in parentheses.
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We include a range of educational attainment variables to assess the im port ance 
of human capital accumulation by an individual on the type of employment 
obtained. Education is expressed in terms of education levels, as credentialism 
plays an important role in screening for formal wage jobs in Malawi and many 
other African countries (Lewin 2009). To capture the effect of household capital 
stocks on employment choice, we include a dummy variable of whether the indi-
vidual lived in a house that was at least partly constructed of modern, permanent 
building materials as a proxy identifier of households that are likely to be able to 
offer a member financial resources to establish a business. Several dimensions of 
agricultural production that might affect employment choice are also included, 
such as agricultural landholding size and whether an individual was a member of 
a FISP beneficiary household, as well as the broad agroecological potential of the 
area in which an individual was resident.
Physical access to markets may be expected to influence the extent to which 
individuals work outside of agriculture (Jonasson and Helfand 2010, Deichmann, 
Shilpi, and Vakis 2009). We include travel time to the nearest populated area with 
greater than 5,000 persons and greater than 50,000 persons respectively, as prox-
ies for access to markets at different ends of the market size distribution.
Important factors affecting incentives to diversify away from agriculture 
include volatile variables such as exogenous shocks (Ellis 2000). We include vari-
ables indicating if the household of which the individual is a member experienced 
an idiosyncratic shock (illness, child birth, death, and so on) in the last year and 
whether the community in which an individual resides has experienced drought 
over the past five years.
6.4.2 Multinomial logit results
The results of the MNL model for the six employment categories with the full 
working age population in the IHS-3 sample are presented in Table  6.6. The 
results are presented as relative risk ratios (RRRs), which show how a one unit 
change in an explanatory variable will change the relative probability of an indi-
vidual being in one employment category relative to the base category. RRRs are 
analogous to odds-ratios used in bivariate logit models (Long and Freese 2014), 
with an RRR>1.0 showing an increase in the relative probability of being in a par-
ticular employment category and a RRR<1.0 indicating the reverse. The base or 
reference category for the MNL model is being employed in the agriculture sector 
only, so all the relative risk ratios are expressed relative to this. For example, in the 
first row of Table 6.6, an individual being male increases their probability of being 
employed in both agriculture and a nonfarm enterprise (column 3) by 55.1 per cent, 
that is, 1.551—1.000, and in a wage job in industry or services by a factor of over 
three (3.192). In contrast, being a youth aged between 15 and 19 years (row  2) 
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decreases the relative probability of being employed in all categories except for 
the not economically active one.
It should be noted that, although the MNL is regarded as the ‘work horse’ of 
categorical variable models, it is predicated on the assumption of the independ-
ence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The IIA assumption states that the odds 
ratios in the MNL model are independent of the other states (Greene 2012). The 
validity of the IIA assumption is often questionable in the application of an MNL 
model to discrete choice issues as in the analysis of employment category choice 
here. However, we are unable to reject the IIA assumption for our preferred 
MNL model in Table 6.6, using the Small-Hsaio post-estimation test (Small and 
Hsaio 1985).
Examining the results of our MNL analysis, we find that the sex of the individual 
is an important component of employment choice. Males dominate employment 
outside of agriculture. Women are remaining in agriculture to a much greater 
extent than men, while also experiencing periods of not being eco nom ic al ly 
active more commonly than men.
While the MNL analysis permits a clearer interpretation of employment patterns 
across age groups than does the earlier tabular analysis, examining the youth 
components of our model, our MNL results simply confirm the findings from 
our tabular analysis that younger youth, ages 15 to 24, are either in agriculture or 
are not economically active. This is seen by the relative risk ratios for in di vid uals 
of these ages all being significantly less than 1.0 for any employment categories 
that include nonfarm work. In contrast, the statistically insignificant relative risk 
ratios across all categories for those aged 25 to 29 years suggest that these some-
what older youth are in something of a transitional period in terms of the nature 
of their employment, with a clearer pattern being established in the following 
five years, ages 30 to 35, during which we find these oldest youth more likely to be 
employed both in agriculture and in the nonfarm sectors, whether informally in 
household enterprises (more strongly) or formally in wage employment (to a lesser 
extent). Across all youth age ranges, however, none have a significant probability 
of obtaining work exclusively in the nonfarm sectors. The youth are not in the 
vanguard of those Malawians taking up employment, whether informal or for-
mal, in the services and industrial sectors and abandoning agriculture.
The hypothesis from our tabular analysis that women likely move into the cat-
egory of not being economically active due to recurring maternal responsibilities 
is not confirmed by the MNL results—having given birth in the last two years is 
not positively associated with being in this category. We see, however, that women 
who have recently given birth are also not likely to engage in nonfarm employ-
ment of any sort—all relative risk ratios are below 1.0 for this explanatory variable. 
In contrast, infant care seemingly does not draw a mother away from engaging in 
farm work, our base employment category for the MNL. However, our ex pect ation 


















































Demographic male 1.551*** (0.1010) 4.865*** (0.4143) 2.327*** (0.3061) 3.192*** (0.3477) 0.727*** (0.0384)
  youth15_19 0.498** (0.1271) 0.597* (0.1282) 0.193** (0.0984) 0.815 (0.2728) 8.342*** (0.7989)
  youth20_24 0.788* (0.0770) 0.682** (0.0848) 0.522** (0.1172) 0.789 (0.1527) 1.718*** (0.1527)
  youth25_29 1.139 (0.0928) 0.924 (0.0843) 0.890 (0.1506) 1.213 (0.1663) 1.127 (0.1062)
  youth30_34 1.433*** (0.1121) 1.208* (0.0999) 1.092 (0.1874) 1.205 (0.1532) 1.310* (0.1439)
  dependent 0.250*** (0.0645) 0.369*** (0.0584) 0.173*** (0.0541) 0.665* (0.1143) 4.240*** (0.313)
  recent_birth 0.788* (0.0726) 0.435*** (0.0712) 0.720 (0.1787) 0.369*** (0.097) 0.654*** (0.055)
Ethnicity Yao_Lomwe 0.726** (0.0803) 0.784* (0.0865) 0.868 (0.2076) 0.673 (0.1469) 0.884 (0.0788)
  Tmbka_Ngoni_Tnga 0.841 (0.0885) 0.623*** (0.0729) 0.412*** (0.102) 0.515*** (0.0898) 0.971 (0.0968)
  Other_north 1.781* (0.4061) 1.194 (0.3058) 2.655 (1.6851) 0.512 (0.2803) 2.615*** (0.4833)
  Other_ethnicity 1.170 (0.1749) 0.804 (0.1606) 1.324 (0.5004) 1.212 (0.3073) 1.524* (0.2733)
Education ed_prmry_cmplt 1.607*** (0.1232) 2.302*** (0.1771) 2.119*** (0.3025) 3.156*** (0.488) 2.232*** (0.1433)
  ed_scndry_cmplt 1.909*** (0.3205) 8.413*** (1.0385) 3.808*** (0.9809) 14.104*** (2.4966) 2.857*** (0.3941)
  ed_tertiary 7.716*** (2.6866) 76.257*** (26.7075) 26.987*** (13.277) 200.232*** (79.1474) 24.251*** (9.3287)
Household wealth house_perm_mtrl 1.402*** (0.1011) 1.479*** (0.1674) 2.433*** (0.5836) 2.970*** (0.5276) 1.634*** (0.1163)
Agriculture land_cap_ha 0.883 (0.1049) 0.230*** (0.0895) 0.000*** (0.0000) 0.000*** (0.0000) 1.055* (0.0275)
  FISP_hh 0.955 (0.0649) 0.603*** (0.0489) 0.000*** (0.0000) 0.170*** (0.0376) 0.616*** (0.0400)
  Lower_Shire_Valley 0.728 (0.1302) 0.704 (0.2832) 0.415 (0.2400) 0.610 (0.2190) 0.582** (0.1014)
  Lakeshore 1.120 (0.0990) 0.874 (0.0962) 0.908 (0.2971) 0.822 (0.1861) 0.955 (0.0872)
Access to markets trvl_5k_town_hr 0.854 (0.0750) 0.825 (0.0824) 0.975 (0.1825) 0.817 (0.1401) 1.021 (0.0771)


















































Shocks shock_idiosync 1.111 (0.0927) 1.223 (0.1551) 1.082 (0.3611) 0.712 (0.1268) 0.840* (0.0726)
  drought 1.561*** (0.1154) 1.364** (0.1522) 1.751** (0.3393) 1.392* (0.2019) 0.920 (0.0638)
  Constant 0.125* (0.0166) 0.101* (0.0143) 0.184* (0.0056) 0.090* (0.0252) 0.231* (0.0287)
Employment category observations 2,175 2,297 465 984 7,434
Total observations in analytical data set: 27,257; Employed in agricultural sector only (base category): 13,902. pseudo R2: 0.3110; F(115,623) = 334.50, Prob > F = 0.0000 
Note: The reference employment category is ‘Agricultural sector employment only’. For the categorical explanatory variables, the base case for ethnicity is ‘Chewa or Nyanja’; for 
educational attainment, ‘Did not complete primary school’; and for agroecological zones, ‘Mid-altitude Plateau and Highlands’. Statistical significance of relative risk ratios denoted  
by * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001.
Source: Analysis by authors of IHS-3 data. Weighted estimates. Standard errors corrected to reflect clustered design of survey sample reported in parentheses.
Table 6.6. Continued
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are likely not to be economically active is seen in the model results. Dependent 
household members of working age are also shown to be unlikely to engage in 
employment outside of the agricultural sector.
With regards to employment patterns and ethnicity, the Yao and Lomwe, 
primarily found in the south of the country, and the Tumbuka, Ngoni, and 
Tonga, primarily in the north (and centre for the Ngoni), are less likely than 
the Chewa and Nyanja, our base category for ethnicity, to engage in nonfarm 
activities, whether informal or formal or in combination with farming or not. 
Identifying the constraints that restrict individuals in these ethnic groups from 
engagement in work outside of agriculture merits further investigation. These 
constraints may include lower demand for nonfarm workers in the north and 
lower educational attainment among the Yao and Lomwe relative to the Chewa 
and Nyanja.
The important role for education in moving people out of farming and into 
the nonfarm sectors is consistently and strongly seen in the association between 
educational attainment and the employment category of an individual—greater edu-
cational attainment results in much higher probabilities of working outside of 
agriculture and in formal, wage-based employment.6
There is a strong association between the level of household wealth, as proxied 
by the quality of housing for an individual, and engagement in any nonfarm 
employment, with somewhat stronger associations for purely nonfarm employ-
ment. This suggests that there are capital or other financial hurdles that may 
restrict working age individuals from poorer households engaging in nonfarm 
employment.
Turning to the results for the agriculture-related determinants, larger land-
holdings are associated with a lower propensity to be in nonfarm wage employ-
ment.7 The significant relative risk ratio in the third column of results in Table 6.6 
shows that wage employment is quite strongly associated with smaller landhold-
ings. The results from separate MNL models for the age-defined sub-samples 
(not presented here) show that this is particularly the case for older youth and 
non-youth workers, rather than for younger youth, many of whom are depend-
ents within their households. This is evidence that declining landholding size, 
driven in large part by population pressure, potentially is a significant push factor 
propelling heads of farming households and their spouses to seek a portion of the 
livelihoods for their households in wage labour off-farm.
6 We also find that higher educational attainment is associated with a greater likelihood of not 
being economically active. However, this result primarily reflects current students at higher grade 
levels in the IHS-3 sample.
7 The results on the landholding size variable for the two exclusively nonfarm employment cat egor-
ies (columns 5 and 6 in Table 6.6) should be disregarded, as these individuals principally will come 
from non-agricultural households.
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Our MNL results provide no evidence that the receipt of Farm Input Subsidy 
Programme (FISP) benefits by a household in the cropping season prior to the 
IHS-3 survey resulted in individuals in that household being more likely to obtain 
work outside of agriculture. The significant association between a household hav-
ing received FISP benefits and working age individuals in such households being 
unlikely to be employed both in agriculture and in nonfarm wage labour (column 4 
in Table 6.6) can be interpreted in two ways: first, as the receipt of FISP benefits 
forestalling the need for an individual to engage in wage labour off-farm or, sec-
ondly, as simply reflecting the targeting of FISP, the eligibility criteria for which 
include the requirement that beneficiary households be fulltime farmers with no 
formal employment off-farm.
We do not find any effect of broad agroecological potential on employment 
choice. The base category is the relatively productive Mid-altitude Plateau and 
Highland agroecological zone. However, residence in the Lower Shire Valley 
zone or the Lakeshore (which here includes the Upper Shire Valley) zones, both of 
which experience more erratic or lower rainfall and are subject to more weather-
related shocks than is seen in the Mid-altitude Plateau and Highland zone, does 
not result in a significantly different pattern of employment choice among those 
of working age.
The variables on market access (travel time) to small (5,000 population and up) 
and large (over 50,000 population) urban centres provide contrasting results. 
While the overall pattern for small population centres is that the longer it takes 
for an individual to travel to a small centre, the less likely they are to engage in 
nonfarm activities, this relationship is weak, with the relative risk ratios for most 
categories not being statistically significant. In contrast, poor access to large 
urban centres is strongly negatively associated with nonfarm employment. Given 
that larger urban centres are where most formal nonfarm employment op por tun-
ities are concentrated, this result is not surprising—improved access to a greater 
number of nonfarm employment opportunities will pull people out of exclusive 
agricultural employment. However, the limited impact of smaller population 
 centres in rural areas on the employment choices of individuals located close to 
them calls into question whether these smaller towns have much of a role to play 
in changing labour patterns in Malawi and contributing to a structural trans-
form ation of the economy.
Finally, with regards to an individual experiencing a recent economic shock, 
we find that idiosyncratic shocks are not strongly associated with a propensity to 
engage in nonfarm employment, but are negatively associated with being not eco-
nom ic al ly active. This may be a result of important variability in the economic 
significance of the shocks households reported experiencing, with this variability 
not being captured in the dummy variable used in the model, or through social 
community and kin networks effectively assisting households to cope with such 
shocks, minimizing the need for any workers in the household to seek out new 
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employment. In contrast, individuals residing in communities that experienced 
drought are shown to be much more likely to engage in nonfarm employment 
either exclusively or in combination with farming. The shocks to agriculture-based 
livelihoods brought about by droughts provide incentives for individuals and 
households to diversify their economic activities beyond agriculture alone. As such, 
this result implies that if droughts in Malawi increase either in frequency or severity 
under climate change, they are likely to constitute an important push factor that 
encourages people to diversify their employment beyond agriculture.
To summarize the findings from our multinomial logit modelling of employ-
ment choice in Malawi, we find further confirmation that younger youth are not 
implicated in any shift in the sectoral composition of employment in Malawi. 
Older youth and non-youth, particularly males, are more central to such shifts. 
Educational attainment is strongly associated with employment outside of agri-
culture. This suggests that there are incentives associated with employment in 
the industry services and sectors operating to ‘pull’ people out of agriculture. 
However, the model results also show that small agricultural landholdings and 
experience of drought are factors ‘pushing’ people out of agriculture to seek 
nonfarm employment, whether on a part-time or exclusive basis or under formal 
(wage-labour) or informal (household enterprise) arrangements.
6.5 Discussion
This close analysis of patterns and trends in employment in Malawi does not pro-
vide evidence that the youth of Malawi are central to the slight shift in employ-
ment into the services sector observed over the period 2004 to 2013. The largest 
increase in share of those employed working in the services sector is among the 
non-youth group aged 35 to 64 years. Over this period, younger youth aged 15 to 
24 are seen to increasingly choose to stay out of employment and extend their 
period of education. Those younger youth who are in the labour force, meaning, 
no longer in education, are much more likely to be working in agriculture than in 
the nonfarm sectors. This employment pattern reflects the fact that most of these 
younger youth remain dependents within their households and, for those coming 
from farming households, are expected to contribute their labour to family farm 
operations. Youth that are increasingly engaging in nonfarm employment are 
older males, those between 30 and 34 years of age. However, the sectoral share of 
employment of older youth is very similar to the share of the non-youth. In con-
sequence, we find little evidence that there has been much change in how youth 
enter the workforce in Malawi.
The historical pattern of agriculture being the principal sector of engagement 
for those entering the workforce remains in place. Although we see some small 
movements of labour into the services sector, particularly by older workers, 
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there is scant evidence of structural transformation in Malawi’s economy. The 
share of those employed who work in agriculture remained relatively stable from 
2004 to 2013, while a significant decline in the share of those who work in the 
industrial sector is observed. This decline balances to a large degree any increase 
in the share of workers in services, leaving the share in the agricultural sector 
comparatively fixed. Our analysis of employment in Malawi dampens hopeful 
thoughts that we might be seeing the start of a transformation in the structure of 
Malawi’s economy. The structure remains dominated by agriculture, as it has 
been for generations.
Working in the nonfarm sectors is a step that increasing numbers of workers, 
but still relatively few, will take later in their work lives after they have built the 
financial capital, experience, and social networks needed to succeed outside of 
agriculture. The factors that push Malawians out of agriculture, some of which we 
have identified in our analysis, will continue to intensify due to rapid population 
growth. The government should take actions and undertake public investments 
that increasingly will pull people out of farming.
These include continued investments in education to improve access and qual-
ity. The strong association between educational attainment and engagement in 
remunerative formal nonfarm employment is clear and has been recognized for 
generations. In consequence, the free primary education programme of govern-
ment over the past 20 years has played a role in the increasing share of older 
youth employed outside of agriculture. Maintaining high levels of investment in 
education is likely to be a factor in turning the small trickle of older youth seeking 
employment in the nonfarm sectors into a much more substantial flow.
However, while we see that younger youth are delaying their entry into employ-
ment in order to study further and higher educational attainment is strongly 
associated with improved chances for young people to find non-agricultural sec-
tor jobs, still agriculture remains the entry point for most Malawians entering 
employment. While better training may equip young farmers to adopt improved 
agricultural technologies and be more productive, we find mixed, if somewhat 
encouraging evidence in analysis of the IHS-3 of this being the case. Thirteen 
per cent of farming households headed by younger youth (ages 15 to 24 years) 
received a visit from an agricultural extension agent in the previous year and 
21 per cent used inorganic fertilizer, compared to 17 and 29 per cent, respectively, 
of farming households headed by those aged 25 to 64 years of age. However, when 
the youth category is expanded to include those up to age 34 years, the pattern is 
reversed—households headed by youth ages 15 to 34 years are more likely than 
households headed by non-youth to receive visits from extension agents (20 per cent 
for youth-headed households, as against 15 per cent for non-youth headed house-
holds) and to use inorganic fertilizer (33 per cent, as against 25 per cent). This 
pattern is consistent with younger youth engaged in agricultural employment, as 
they become heads of their own households, having a greater propensity than 
their parents’ generation to seek out and use improved farming techniques.
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But for those Malawian youth who seek work outside of farming, it remains the 
case that for most education alone is not sufficient to enable them to obtain non-
farm employment. There are relatively few high-quality jobs in Malawi in which 
well-trained Malawians can use their skills productively. Designing programmes 
and incentives to supply such jobs should be as pressing a public policy concern 
for the government of Malawi as improving the skills of the population through 
improved education services. Many of the jobs which are being created in the non-
farm sectors today are relatively low productivity and offer little more in terms of 
economic output than can be achieved in smallholder farming. There is a foreign 
direct investment element to creating higher productivity jobs, as investors can 
provide the technology and access to markets upon which such jobs often will be 
based. Government can facilitate such increased investment from outside of 
Malawi. Government will also need to continue its efforts to upgrade energy and 
transport infrastructure and significantly increase its investments in urban devel-
opment, as most of these new jobs will be located in the cities of Malawi and will 
require reliable power and better connections to regional and global markets.
Finally, while government needs to act in a manner that puts in place adequate 
incentives for all Malawians to find and engage in sufficiently remunerative work 
in any of the three sectors of the economy, agriculture will remain the sector in 
which most Malawians are employed for the foreseeable future. Consequently, 
it is important that public investments made to support growth and to promote 
change in the structure of the economy of Malawi do not neglect agriculture, par-
ticularly investments that strengthen its linkages with the industry and services 
sectors. Increased value-addition activities on agricultural products that involve 
more complex processing techniques and an expansion in the range of com mod-
ities used and products manufactured are likely to be central components in any 
structural transformation of the economy that results in significant expansion in 
employment in both the industry and services sectors. In consequence, we should 
expect that any growth in employment in the nonfarm sectors will primarily find 
its origins in a more vibrant, diverse, and productive agriculture sector. While 
balancing public investments across the three economic sectors is necessary, the 
level of effort being made to improve the productivity, linkages, and commercial 
prospects of Malawian agriculture should be increased.
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Cities and Rural Transformation
A Spatial Analysis of Rural Youth  
Livelihoods in Ghana
Xinshen Diao, Peixun Fang, Eduardo Magalhaes,  
Stefan Pahl, and Jed Silver
7.1 Introduction
Ghana has been rapidly urbanizing in the past two decades. The 2010 Population 
and Housing Census revealed that for the first time more than half of the population 
lived in the country’s urban areas. However, urbanization and economic structural 
change in Ghana has not followed the normal historical pathway for the economic 
transformation of an agrarian country (Osei and Jedwab  2016). In China, and 
much of Asia, urbanization typically followed a period of substantial growth in 
agricultural productivity (the Green Revolution) that, amongst other things, freed 
up labour to move into the urban sectors. At the same time, rapid growth in 
labour-intensive industries, especially export manufacturing, offered productive 
jobs to workers leaving agriculture (Timmer  1988, Mellor  1976, Rosegrant and 
Hazell 2000). The pattern of transformation in Ghana is quite different. Ghana 
has neither undergone a Green Revolution (Nin-Pratt and McBride 2014) nor an 
industrial revolution (Jedwab 2013), yet urbanization has nonetheless been rapid 
without industrialization, which typically leads to the rise of ‘consumption cities’ 
dominated by employment in nontradable services (Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath 
2013). A similar phenomenon has been observed for many African countries 
(Headey, Bezemer and Hazell 2010, McMillan and Rodrik 2011, Diao, McMillan, 
and Rodrik 2017).
Ghana is one of the many African countries that have experienced recent youth 
bulges coupled with increasing concerns from policymakers about youth employ-
ment. With manufacturing share of GDP falling from 15 per cent in the early 
1980s to less than 5 per cent in recent years (The World Bank 2018), the slow creation 
of manufacturing jobs has particularly strong implications for youth entering the 
Authors of this chapter would like to dedicate the chapter to the memory of Eduardo Magalhaes who 
sadly and prematurely passed away in August 2017.
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labour force. Moreover, youth are entering the workforce with higher educational 
attainment, leading them to demand a different type of job. As is the case 
throughout the world, the aspirations of most youth in Ghana lie in urban areas 
and away from rural lifestyles, especially farming (Anyidoho, Leavy, and Asenso-
Okyere 2012). However, not only are jobs scarce, but even many highly educated 
youth lack the necessary skills for them (Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng 2015). Rapid 
urbanization has also raised concerns among policymakers about the potential 
effects of the exit of youth from agriculture and an aging agricultural labour force 
on production and productivity. As youth leave farming and rural areas with 
rapid ur ban iza tion as a backdrop, this chapter assesses the level of the exit from 
agricultural employment, to what extent youth are leading this process, and if it is 
true, what are the effects on the structure of rural economy and livelihoods.
It is important to situate the youth employment discussion within the broader 
context of urbanization. Much of the literature surrounding urbanization and its 
effects on the rural nonfarm economy (RNFE) builds off the classic Harris and 
Todaro (1970) framework, in which higher potential returns encourage labour to 
move from less productive rural agriculture to more productive urban sectors. 
According to this theory, increases in agricultural productivity also create a push 
effect that complements the pull of urban manufacturing in influencing rural–urban 
migration. The RNFE also develops as a result of agriculture–consumption linkages 
driven by rising farm incomes—particularly through increases in informal trade and 
local food processing (Haggblade, Hazell, and Brown 1989). Such linkages may con-
tribute to urbanization by releasing labour from agriculture or result from it as urban 
sectors absorb excess rural employment and open up land for the remaining 
farmers. As all of these changes take place, the induced tech nical change theory 
developed by Hayami and Ruttan (1970, 1985) predicts that farmers would shift their 
production practices towards more intensive technologies such as fertilizers, hired 
labour, and other modern inputs to meet rising market demand while also adopting 
labour-saving technologies such as mechanization as labour becomes more scarce. 
Through all these factors working together, it can be expected that urbanization 
would lead to poverty reduction and a more vibrant economy in rural areas. 
Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2007) show that this has occurred on aggregate in 
all regions except for Sub-Saharan Africa, where there is no evidence of a strong 
association between urbanization and rural poverty reduction overall. However, 
such trends may have recently developed in many African countries, potentially 
those with strong economic growth performance and at relatively more advanced 
stages of economic transformation, including Ghana (Kolavalli et al. 2012).
Ghana has always been relatively urbanized compared to other African 
 countries. This is partially due to the post-independence expansion of the cocoa 
sector (Jedwab,  2013) and the promotion of state-owned industry in the later 
1960s and early 1970s (Ackah, Adjasi, and Turkson  2014). By 2010, Ghana’s 
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urban population—defined as people living in settlements of more than 5,000 
people—surpassed 50 per cent of total population for the first time (GSS 2013). 
While Accra and Kumasi, Ghana’s two megacities, continue to attract migrants, 
the growth of secondary cities and rural towns has also contributed to Ghana’s 
urbanization in recent years.
Although Ghana has become a low middle-income country and has been 
 considered an African success story, urbanization in Ghana appears not to be 
associated with the development of labour-intensive manufacturing as observed 
in much of Asia. Cocoa, gold, and oil accounted for about 80 per cent of Ghana’s 
exports in 2013, while manufacturing growth has been minimal (Aryeetey and 
Baah-Boateng 2015). Such a case of urbanization without industrialization typ ic al ly 
leads to the rise of ‘consumption cities’ dominated by employment in nontradable 
services (Gollin, Jedwab, and Vollrath  2016). Therefore, urbanization in Ghana 
may not be able to generate sufficient manufacturing jobs although en gaging in 
urban informal economy could still be an alternative to the rural poor. As such, 
development of the RNFE, which can also be driven by urbanization, may be 
especially important for growth and poverty reduction in Ghana. In a previous 
study in Northern Ghana, Owusu, Abdulai, and Abdul-Rahman (2011) show that 
diversification of farm households into nonfarm work is associated with higher 
income and greater food security.
Therefore, rather than focusing on the rural to urban migration in under-
standing the impact of urbanization on Ghana’s economic transformation, we 
focus on the proximity of rural areas to different sizes of cities to assess the link-
ages between urbanization and rural economic structural change. Similar to 
Berdegue et al. (2015) in Latin America, we group districts in Ghana by the size 
of their largest city into four categories; those with no city, small (3rd tier) cities, 
medium (2nd tier) cities, and metropolises (big cities). This is because other 
studies have found a population threshold below which cities do not have a 
major impact on the RNFE while large metropolises exert much larger impacts 
(Berdegue et al. 2015, Deichmann, Shilpi, and Vakis 2008). An alternative method 
of capturing the effect of proximity to cities on rural areas would be to measure 
urban gravity by the light intensity emanating from urban areas reaching rural 
villages as Binswanger et al. (2016) do for Kenya; however, the required panel 
data is not available for Ghana.
Ghana has a well-defined south–north divide, which, amongst other things, 
reflects spatial differences in agroecological conditions, population density, 
rural infrastructure, and levels of urbanization. We therefore need to take this 
south–north divide into consideration when analysing spatial heterogeneity 
associated with cities of different sizes. Focusing on the geographical divide 
and spatial heterogeneity associated with cities of different sizes, we analyze 
recent trends in rural household livelihoods in Ghana with a focus on youth. 
We use data from the two rounds of Ghana’s Population and Housing Census 
in 2000 and 2010 (GSS 2003, 2013) and the two rounds of Ghana Living 
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Standards Surveys conducted in 2005–6 and 2012–13 [GLSS5 (GSS 2008) and 
GLSS6 (GSS 2014)] in our analysis.
We focus on four broad questions in the analysis. First, are patterns of rural 
employment changing with urbanization and do these changes have any spatial 
patterns that are associated with proximity to cities of different sizes? Secondly, 
what are the impacts of rural transformation on the youth in rural areas? 
Thirdly, what are the impacts of urbanization on agricultural intensification for 
youth and non-youth? Finally, what are the welfare or income implications of the 
rural transformation that has created heterogeneous livelihood opportunities? 
In the next section we address the first two questions together. The third section 
turns to the third question and analyses the relationship of urbanization and agri-
cultural intensification. The following section addresses the fourth question and 
discusses the heterogeneous outcomes of poverty reduction and rising middle-class 
associated with patterns of rural livelihoods. The final section concludes with a few 
key policy implications.
7.2 Changing Patterns of Rural Employment and  
Economic Activities with Urbanization
In Ghana, a steady rise in the share of urban population has been accompanied 
by a rapid exit from agriculture. As shown in Figure 7.1a, the urban population 
growth rate is consistently more than triple the rural population growth rate, 
except during the period of poor economic growth under the import substitution 
strategy between 1970 and 1984. Meanwhile, the share of agriculture in total 
employment also drops, down to 41.6 per cent in 2010 according to the 2010 census. 
In 2000–10, the growth rate of agricultural employment falls to below 1 per cent, 
or about half the rural population growth rate, while the growth rate of non- 
agricultural employment rises from 3 per cent to above 5 per cent in the same 
period (Figure 7.1b). This indicates that a rapid expansion of RNFE in the recent 
years could be a reason for the larger discrepancy between growth rates in agri-
cultural and non-agricultural employment than that between growth rates in 
rural and urban population.
We classify rural households into three types based on members’ reported 
primary occupations in both the Census and GLSS data: (1) rural households 
whose members’ primary employment is in agriculture and no family members 
primarily engaged in non-agriculture, for which we call ‘agriculture only’ house-
holds; (2) rural households of which all members’ primary employment is in 
non-agriculture, which are called ‘non-agriculture only’ households; and (3) 
households that have members with primary employment in both agriculture 
and non-agriculture, called ‘mixed’ households. There is also a small percentage 
of rural households that do not report any primary employment (classified as 
‘no-job’ households) that are not covered in the analysis.
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Figure 7.1a. Inter-census population annual growth rate and urban population share 
in census years
Note: Urban population share is for the census years, which is the ending year of each period in x-axis.
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Figure 7.1b. Inter-census employment annual growth rate and agricultural share 
of total employment in census years
Note: Urban population share is for the census years, which is the ending year of each period in x-axis.
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from the five rounds of censuses (GSS 2013).
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The groups of households are based on household members’ primary 
employment, which does not imply that agricultural or non-agricultural households 
do not have incomes created outside their primary jobs. In fact, it is common that 
some agricultural households have nonfarm income from secondary employment 
or household enterprises while many rural non-agricultural households also farm. 
The secondary employment in rural nonfarm activities and nonfarm household 
enterprises are highly seasonal and unlikely to be households’ main income sources. 
70 per cent of non-agricultural households who farm have cultivated land less 
than 2ha, indicating that farming is a part-time activity for most of them. Based 
on the two rounds of the Census and two rounds of GLSS, Table 7.1 provides the 
distribution of agricultural and non-agricultural households in the four different 
survey years. Using data from GLSS5 and GLSS6, the last two columns of Table 7.1 
also provide percentages of agricultural and non-agricultural households that 
have income outside their primary jobs.
Table 7.1 shows the increases in the proportion of non-agricultural households in 
total rural households alongside a declining share of agricultural households over 
time according to both the census and GLSS. Somewhat surprisingly, the share of 
mixed households increased modestly between the GLSS survey years and 
declined modestly between the two rounds of the census. Compared with the 
percentage of agriculture-only households in total rural households, shares of 
agricultural households with nonfarm enterprises are small and declined over 
time (14.6 per cent versus 11.6 per cent of total rural households in GLSS5 and 
GLSS6, respectively, see column (5) of Table 7.1). On the other hand, the share of 
non-agricultural households with cultivated farmland is significant in 2005–6, 
that is, 9.6 percentage points out of the 19.7 per cent of rural households classified 
as non-agricultural households do farm. However, in 2012–13, when the share of 
non-agricultural households increased to 24.8 per cent, the percentage of such 
households with farmland actually fell (to 8.6 per cent, column (6) of Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 seems to suggest a trend in which rural households in Ghana tend to be 
exiting agriculture altogether rather than diversifying within households. This 
finding is somewhat puzzling given the extensive literature on intra-household 
diversification (Owusu, Abdulai, and Abdul-Rahman 2013).
7.2.1 Spatial heterogeneity of rural employment patterns
We now turn to the spatial heterogeneity of rural employment patterns. Ghana 
has a well-defined south–north divide, which, amongst other things, reflects spatial 
differences in agroecological conditions, population density, rural infrastructure, 
and levels of urbanization. We therefore first differentiate between two major 
regions based on both the north–south divide and agroecological conditions. We 






































with nonfarm  
enterprise
Non- agricultural  
with cultivated  
farmland
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Census 2000 56.9 15.9 18.3 8.9    
GLSS5 2005/06 58.3 19.7 15.7 6.3 14.6 9.6
Census 2010 51.1 25.0 17.2 6.7    
GLSS6 2012/13 54.2 24.8 16.6 4.5 11.6 8.6
Notes: The type of households is defined according to the household members’ primary employment status; column (5) is part of column (1) and 
column (6) is part of column (2).
Sources: Authors calculation using data of Census 2000 and Census 2010 (GSS 2003, 2013) and GLSS5 and GLSS6 (GSS 2008, 2014).
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Ahafo, Northern, Upper East, and Upper West, as the ‘North’. The North has a 
low population density, is relatively far from large cities, and most of its rural 
households are predominantly engaged in farming. The North also corresponds 
closely to the Savanna and Transition agroecological zones. The remaining six 
regions: Ashanti, Central, Eastern, Greater Accra, Volta, and Western, are then 
grouped into the ‘South’, which is less reliant on agriculture, is more urbanized, 
has a higher population density, and has a more developed RNFE. The South cor-
responds closely to the Forest and Coastal agroecological zones.
Like cities, most rural non-agricultural households are also concentrated in 
the six southern regions of Ghana. For the South as a whole, 30 per cent of rural 
households are non-agricultural in 2010, increasing from 18 per cent in 2000. 
While the North is much more agriculture dominant, the share of non-agricultural 
households also increases, but more slowly, from a lower base of 10 per cent in 
2000 to 13 per cent in 2010.
Combining the north–south divide with the proximity to different sized cities 
that are considered at district level, we further define types of districts in both 
regions: (a) ‘big city districts’ that contain cities of more than 500,000 people; 
these districts correspond to the cities of Accra and Kumasi and are therefore all 
located in the South; (b) ‘2nd-tier city districts’ whose largest cities have popula-
tions between 100,000 and 500,000; (c) ‘3rd-tier city districts’ whose largest cities 
have populations between 40,000 and 100,000; and (d) ‘no city districts’ groups in 
which there are no cities or towns with populations over 40,000. In summary, 
there are three district groups in the North (in which there are no big city dis-
tricts) and four in the South.
Figure 7.2 combines 2010 Census data and spatial data for cities to display the 
geographic locations of these seven groups of districts.
Although the South covers a much smaller land area than the North, the 2010 
census shows that 73 per cent of the total population and 63 per cent of the rural 
population lives in the South. Moreover, the majority of the total population lives 
in districts with cities of at least 40,000 people in both types of regions, while 
about 40 per cent of the rural population lives in such districts. Table 7.2 displays 
the distribution of rural households by the three groups among the seven types of 
districts for all households versus youth-headed households. We ignore the small 
‘no-job’ group in the table.
Comparing with the employment patterns for all rural households, the pat-
terns for the youth-headed households in the North are similar but quite different 
in the South in 2000. This is particularly true for the proportion of rural house-
holds engaging in agriculture. In 2000, 60.9 per cent northern rural households 
could be defined as agriculture only, and the share is even higher, at 62.2 per cent, 
for the youth-headed in the region. In the same year on the other hand, 55.3 per cent 
southern rural households are agricultural only, and the share for the youth-
headed households in the South is 51.1 per cent. Between the rural total and 
youth-headed households, the differences in the proportion engaging in 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
180 Xinshen Diao et al.
non-agriculture are larger than that engaging in agriculture. In 2000, only 9.7 per 
cent northern rural households engaged in non-agriculture, while the share 
was 12.7 per cent for youth-headed in the North. In the South, the discrepancy in 
this share is as high as 7.5 percentage points for all rural households (18.4 per cent) 
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3rd-tier city districts, North
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Ho
Figure 7.2. Ghana map showing the different types of districts
Source: This map was created by Mekamu Kedir Jemal (IFPRI), combining 2010 Census data with other spatial 
data including cities and road networks. Spatial data of cities, towns and road network are from University of 
Ghana—Remote Sensing and Geographic InfoSystems website (accessed on 25 March 2016 and retrieved from  
http://www.ug.edu.gh/rsgislab/rs-gis-geonode-app.html).
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Between 2000 and 2010, the share of ‘non-agriculture only’ rural households 
increased in all district groups in both South and North for all households as well 
as for youth-headed, though most rapidly in the South and especially in the big 
city and 2nd tier city district groups, and more so among youth-headed households. 
This was mirrored by an almost equivalent pattern of decline in the shares of 
‘agriculture only’ rural households in the South and in the district group with 2nd 
tier cities in the North for all households, while for youth-headed households, it 
happened almost everywhere. For the North as a whole or in its districts that 
Table 7.2. Distribution of rural households by agricultural, non-agricultural, and 















2000       
Big city districts       27.7 50.3 12.3
2nd tier city districts 53.8 18.2 20.3 38.3 32.4 14.9
3rd tier city districts 58.2 11.2 19.1 50.1 21.1 18.8
No city districts 62.6 8.2 19.0 61.5 13.9 17.9
Total 60.9 9.7 19.1 55.3 18.4 18.0
2010       
Big city districts       9.0 74.1 6.6
2nd tier city districts 37.7 34.9 20.4 14.9 59.7 10.2
3rd tier city districts 63.7 14.5 17.8 39.4 34.1 17.4
No city districts 67.5 10.5 18.6 53.4 23.0 17.0
Regional total 64.7 13.0 18.5 45.6 29.7 16.7
Rural youth-headed households
2000         
Big city districts       25.1 53.9 9.5
2nd tier city districts 55.4 22.5 12.1 30.4 38.2 11.3
3rd tier city districts 58.5 14.9 14.7 45.2 30.0 14.4
No city districts 64.3 10.7 15.3 58.1 20.4 13.7
Total 62.2 12.7 14.9 51.1 25.9 13.7
2010       
Big city districts       6.3 76.5 4.3
2nd tier city districts 30.6 45.4 9.5 9.1 64.1 4.3
3rd tier city districts 57.0 23.1 12.2 28.8 48.9 11.0
No city districts 64.9 15.9 14.8 45.4 34.3 11.6
Regional total 60.3 20.0 13.7 36.4 42.5 10.9
Note: the households that did not report any primary job are not reported in the table; therefore, the 
sum of the three groups of households does not equal 100.
Source: Understanding the Role of Rural Non-Farm Enterprises in Africa’s Economic Transformation: 
Evidence from Tanzania, Xinshen Diao, Eduardo Magalhaes, et al, Journal of Development Studies, 
May 4 2018, Taylor and Francis, reprinted by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd, 
http://www.tandfonline.com).
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either have small cities or no cities, the shares of agriculture only households 
increased in this period for all households but declined for youth-headed (and only 
in the no-city district group did it keep almost constant). Thus, there has been a 
sizeable shift from agriculture to RNFE in the South for all rural households but 
mainly for youth-headed households in the North. In both South and North, the 
agriculture exits of rural households including youth-headed ones are highly correl-
ated with proximity to cities. Despite this exit, the share of ‘agriculture only’ youth-
headed households remains high in the North mainly in its districts without cities. 
On the other hand, ‘non-agriculture only’ households constitute the majority of 
southern youth-headed households in 2010 even in the district group without cities.
There has been a modest but surprising decline in the shares of mixed employ-
ment rural households across district groups in both North and South both for 
youth-headed and all households (Table 7.2). These are households where some 
members have diversified into primary non-agricultural occupations while other 
members continue to work primarily in agriculture. Thus, while many rural 
households have switched their primary occupation entirely from agriculture to 
non-agriculture, a declining share of rural households are straddling the two sec-
tors through their primary occupations. However, Table 7.2 is based on the cen-
sus data, which does not capture secondary or part time occupations. So it is 
possible that many more rural households have mixed livelihoods than shown in 
Table 7.2, although on a part time basis.
7.2.2 Factors Determining the Patterns of Rural Livelihoods
We next try to understand factors associated with the determinants of being a 
non-agricultural household in the rural areas as well as the changes that have taken 
place between two rounds of surveys. We pool the two most recent rounds of GLSS 
together for the analysis. Given the binary nature of the employment outcomes, 
we estimate a series of probit regressions to investigate the effects of covariates of 
interest on the probability of household being a non-agricultural household.




k k= + +∑ =α β ε1  (1)
where y takes the value of 1 if the household is non-agricultural, and zero otherwise. 
The estimation of y is conditional on observables. In equation (1), α is a constant, 
xk and βk refer to each covariate of interest and its corresponding parameter, and ε 
is an identically identified and distributed error term assumed to be distributed 
normally with mean zero and variance Ω.
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We consider individual (household), spatial and community characteristics in 
the analysis. For the individual characteristic variables, the covariates are as fol-
lows: whether the household is headed by a young member (15 to 34 years old), 
by female, and the three levels of education of the household head. The spatial 
factors are a set of dummies for the seven district types representing the levels 
of urbanization, while the community factors are a set of public-good variables 
including accesses to electricity, public transport, and market. Since we have 
pooled two years of survey data, we also include a year dummy (2012–13) for 
GLSS6 and two interaction terms: a year dummy interacted with whether the 
household head is young, and a year dummy interacted with whether the house-
hold head is female. We also stratify regressions by the sample of i) youth-headed 
rural households, and ii) other adult households separately. In all the regressions 
for the three types of household (all, youth-headed, other-adult-headed), we com-
pare non-agriculture-only households with the rest of rural households (Table 7.3, 
columns (a)–(c)) as well as with agriculture/non-agriculture mixed households 
(Table 7.3, columns (d)–(f)). The similar exercise was done also for pooling two 
rounds of census data for 2000 and 2010, of which the results are provided in the 
(see Tables 7.A1 and 7.A2).
Starting with Columns (a)–(c) of Table  7.3, we observe an increase in 
the  prob abil ity of being a non-agricultural household over time. Yet, mainly 
youth-headed rural households lead the transition from agricultural to non-
agricultural-dom in ated activities in 2005–12. The finding that youth households 
have left agriculture more than other adult households is consistent with the 
descriptive analysis in the previous section.
Being a female-headed rural household also increases the probability of being a 
non-agricultural household. However, the interaction between the year and gender 
dummies is negative, implying that, over time, gender becomes a less important 
factor in the explanation of being a non-agricultural household.
The sign and magnitude of the marginal effects of education on the prob abil ities 
of being a non-agricultural household are expected, that is, the more educated a 
head of household is, the higher the probability for this household to be non-
agricultural, regardless of whether the head is young.
The estimation results for district group dummies are more consistent across 
districts in the South than in the North, that is, the marginal effect on the prob-
abil ity of being a non-agricultural household (relative to northern rural areas 
without city) is 27.2 per cent in the southern district group with big cities, while 
the probability is 7.75 per cent and 7.40 per cent, respectively, in the southern 
districts groups with 2nd tier or 3rd tier cities, and it reduces further to 2.55 per cent 
for the group of southern districts without a city. On the other hand, in the North, 
the coefficient is not significant for the 2nd tier city district group and is only 
























Table 7.3. Marginal effects of probit model regressions on factors affecting being a non-agricultural household, pooled data of GLSS5 
and GLSS6
Independent variable Comparing with the rest of households (agricultural 
households and mixed households)
Comparing with mixed households only










  (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Year dummy for 2012–13 0.0232** 0.0677*** 0.00870 0.0205 0.0628** 0.000740
  (0.00921) (0.0186) (0.0102) (0.0175) (0.0250) (0.0228)
Youth-headed households 0.123***     0.216***    
  (0.00908)     (0.0166)    
Female-headed households 0.150*** 0.232*** 0.132*** 0.291*** 0.349*** 0.296***
  (0.00984) (0.0215) (0.0111) (0.0182) (0.0326) (0.0231)
Year dummy * Youth 0.0487*     0.0552    
  (0.0209)     (0.0552)    
Year dummy * Gender –0.0548***     –0.1038***    
  (0.0232)     (0.0355)    
Education level (‘no education’ omitted)          
Primary completed 0.0802*** 0.0720*** 0.0780*** 0.0545*** 0.00719 0.0704***
  (0.0102) (0.0204) (0.0115) (0.0196) (0.0284) (0.0256)
Secondary completed 0.213*** 0.198*** 0.214*** 0.154*** 0.0303 0.215***
  (0.0156) (0.0283) (0.0187) (0.0287) (0.0395) (0.0371)
University and above 0.411*** 0.560*** 0.353*** 0.385*** 0.455*** 0.396***
























Type of district group (base is no-city district, North)        
2nd-tier-city districts, North 0.0205 –0.0241 0.0382 0.0637 0.0845 0.0308
  (0.0417) (0.0733) (0.0458) (0.0763) (0.117) (0.0929)
3rd-tier-city districts, North 0.0290* 0.0398 0.0194 0.0649** 0.0373 0.0790**
  (0.0161) (0.0347) (0.0170) (0.0329) (0.0509) (0.0389)
Big-city districts, South 0.272*** 0.470*** 0.176*** 0.261*** 0.396*** 0.180*
  (0.0428) (0.0855) (0.0494) (0.0815) (0.0928) (0.108)
2nd-tier-city districts, South 0.0775* 0.254*** 0.0145 –0.0353 0.130 -0.116
  (0.0409) (0.0772) (0.0482) (0.0729) (0.101) (0.0980)
3rd-tier-city districts, South 0.0740*** 0.143*** 0.0462*** 0.0367 0.0901*** 0.0108
  (0.0129) (0.0262) (0.0140) (0.0248) (0.0344) (0.0310)
No-city districts, South 0.0255** 0.0954*** –0.00721 0.00189 0.111*** –0.0577*
  (0.0117) (0.0232) (0.0130) (0.0235) (0.0326) (0.0297)
Community variable            
Access to markets 0.0675*** 0.0745*** 0.0603*** 0.0837*** 0.0576** 0.0949***
  (0.0107) (0.0218) (0.0119) (0.0198) (0.0291) (0.0255)














Access to electricity 0.0665*** 0.112*** 0.0434*** 0.0538*** 0.0687** 0.0403
  (0.0101) (0.0196) (0.0113) (0.0199) (0.0284) (0.0260)
Observations 11,245 3,255 7,990 4,202 1,357 2,845
Notes: Only rural households are included in the regressions. Number of the pooled sample obs. is 12,515. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The regressions include only rural households. Number of the pooled sample obs. is 12,515. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors’ own estimation using GLSS5 and GLSS6.
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cities seems to be less important for determining northern rural households to be 
non-agricultural. In the South, the consistent patterns persist among youth-
headed households, with the magnitude of the marginal effect being even larger, 
but only hold for the big city districts and 3rd tier city districts for the other adult 
households. Again, in the North, the coefficients of district group dummies for 
youth or other adult-headed households are all insignificant. The estimation 
results for district group dummies seem to indicate that it is the combination of 
north–south divide and proximity to different sized cities that determines the 
likelihood of being non-agricultural households in the rural areas. Only in the 
more urbanized South that proximity to larger sized cities could further increase 
the likelihood of being non-agricultural households.
The sign and magnitude of the marginal effects for a set of variables representing 
the infrastructural conditions at the rural community level are also as expected. 
Better access to market, public transportation or electricity seems to positively 
contribute to the likelihood of a rural household to be non-agricultural, regardless 
of whether the household head is young.
In the second panel of Table 7.3 (columns (d)–(f)), non-agricultural house-
holds are compared with the mixed group instead of the rest of the households. 
The purpose for this comparison is that households in the mixed group have 
also had nonfarm activities. Since some non-agricultural households also farm 
(not as primary employment), this comparison can help us to see whether these 
two groups are indeed different or just a way households report their primary 
employment. The marginal effects of some of the selected variables change in 
this comparison (in columns (d)–(f)) from those in columns (a)–(c). First, the 
significance of the coefficients on the year dummy and its interaction with the 
youth dummy disappear. Second, there are only a few cases in which the signs 
for the district group dummies are fully consistent. However, the likelihood of 
being a rural non-agricultural household still increases in southern districts 
with proximity to cities when it is compared with a mixed household, at least in 
the big-city and third-tier-city district groups (but not in the second-tier-city 
districts in the South).
7.2.3 Structure of the RNFE
With rural youth increasingly being engaged in the RNFE, it is important to fur-
ther examine the patterns of rural non-agricultural employment. It is well known 
that recent non-agricultural employment growth in many African countries has 
occurred predominantly in the informal economy (McMillan and Rodrik 2011). 
This is also the case for Ghana, both in its rural and urban areas, in which 76 per cent 
and 69 per cent of employment was informal according to the 2010 Census. 
We  define the formal economy as the combination of public sector (including 
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international organizations and NGOs) and the formal private sector (including 
foreign companies) and is characterized by formal wage earnings. We define the 
informal economy as those working on their own businesses or as self-employed. 
The growth of nonfarm employment in rural areas may support the theory that 
as the influence of cities spreads to rural areas, their employment structures 
begin to more closely resemble those of urban areas. As in urban areas, formal 
employment could also provide better and more reliable livelihood opportunities 
for rural workers, especially youth.
We consider non-agricultural only household in this sub-section (that is, do 
not include the mixed group), and classify these households into different non-
agricultural employment categories according to all household members’ engage-
ment in the formal and informal economies. We classify a rural household 
as  ‘formal only’ if all the employed household members are in the formal non-
agricultural economy. For a household with family members working in both 
the formal and informal nonfarm economies, we classify it as ‘formal/informal 
combined’. Households with all employed members working in the informal 
nonfarm economy are classified as ‘informal only’, which is further grouped as 
‘informal manufacturing’ and ‘informal trade’ (see Table 7.4).
We focus on a comparison between youth and all rural households first. As can 
be seen from Table 7.4, while the rural nonfarm sector is largely informal, youth-
headed households seem to have fewer chances to be either in the formal only cat-
egory or in the formal/informal combined category than other adults. This holds 
in both years, at the national level, as well as in the North and the South. With few 
exceptions, this is also true across district groups in both years. This is an alarming 
finding, indicating that while youth are more likely to leave agriculture than 
other adults, they have much fewer opportunities than other adults to get formal 
employment jobs. The fact that a majority of youth who exit from agriculture are 
engaging in the informal sector seems to call a different type of policy emphasizing 
the improvement of labour productivity and hence income gen er ation for youth in 
the informal sector rather than focusing on job creation in the formal sector.
For the rural non-agricultural households that engage in the rural informal 
economy, it seems that the majority of them engage in only one type of informal 
activity—either informal manufacturing or trade. This is also true for youth-
headed households. For rural non-agricultural households as a whole, informal 
trade is more prevalent than informal manufacturing at the national level, par-
ticularly in the South, and more so in 2010 than in 2000. For youth-headed 
non-agricultural households, there seems to be little difference between these 
two types of activities at the national level and in the South, while for the north-
ern young households, they are actually engaging more in manufacturing. 
Essentially, rural manufacturing seems to be dominant in areas that are less 
urbanized and thus more isolated from the national market, likely because rural 
























Table 7.4. Types of different non-agricultural households according to family members’ employment

















2000         
North         
2nd tier city districts 30.1 10.5 21.6 23.7 28.1 15.7 23.3 16.7
3rd tier city districts 16.1 27.5 14.0 19.3 11.7 31.7 19.7 7.8
No city districts 21.7 25.6 18.7 15.7 20.8 30.0 23.5 5.5
North total 21.0 24.4 17.6 17.8 19.4 28.3 22.4 7.8
South         
Big city districts 27.7 6.3 15.5 34.5 30.7 10.6 21.2 19.8
2nd tier city districts 24.8 10.1 22.7 27.1 22.8 15.1 28.8 14.2
3rd tier city districts 19.4 16.2 23.6 22.1 16.2 24.0 26.4 9.2
No city districts 23.6 16.8 22.1 20.9 21.1 24.6 25.7 9.9
South total 22.1 15.3 22.2 22.9 19.7 23.1 26.0 10.3
National total 21.9 16.9 21.4 22.0 19.6 24.0 25.4 9.9
2010         
North         
2nd tier city districts 29.2 5.4 20.8 30.0 30.1 17.9 23.6 9.8
3rd tier city districts 24.0 14.7 21.2 21.5 12.5 30.0 22.9 5.4
No city districts 22.9 19.0 22.0 20.4 19.3 29.8 23.3 3.8
North total 24.3 15.6 21.6 22.3 19.0 28.1 23.2 5.1
South         
Big city districts 24.0 6.0 19.5 36.6 26.4 11.3 25.8 17.0
2nd tier city districts 25.4 8.8 20.0 31.9 22.3 16.7 31.7 10.1
3rd tier city districts 20.5 14.5 24.1 24.5 16.0 25.5 24.6 7.4
No city districts 23.6 13.3 25.3 22.4 20.6 26.2 25.8 7.3
South total 22.3 13.2 24.1 24.8 19.2 24.7 25.7 7.9
National total 22.6 13.5 23.7 24.4 19.1 25.3 25.3 7.4
Note: We skip the households that report both manufacturing and trade informal employments or any other informal employment (without formal 
employment) from the table; therefore, the sum of the four groups of households does not equal 100.
Source: Authors’ calculation using data of Census 2000 and 2010 (GSS 2003, 2013).
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market, which can take place at the household level. For example, in the northern 
district group with small cities or without a city, 30 per cent or more youth-
headed non-agricultural households fall into ‘informal manufacturing only’ 
category in both 2000 and 2010. Meanwhile informal trade may signify the 
opposite, given that trade ac tiv ities are associated with both agricultural and 
non-agricultural commodities to meet local demand in rural areas, reflecting 
greater connectivity with the broader economy. This pattern of non-agricultural 
activities can be found in the more urbanized South and is particularly true in 
southern district groups with big and secondary cities both for youth-headed 
households and rural non-agricultural households in general. This reflects the 
findings of Haggblade, Hazell, and Brown (1989) and the literature on urban–
rural linkages in general.
7.3 Urbanization and Agricultural Intensification
Drawing on the Boserup (1965)–Ruthenberg (1980) theories of farming systems 
evolution, impact of urbanization on technology adoption in agriculture is mainly 
through increases in population density and market access, which is expected to 
lead to more intensive farming practices and adoption of modern technology for 
improving land and labour productivity (Binswanger and Ruttan  1978, Ruttan 
2002, Diao et al. 2014). We examine these relationships in this section.
We use a probit model to test how the probability of using different types of 
modern inputs is associated with urbanization, while controlling for a number of 
household and locational characteristics. These characteristics include farm size 
thresholds, household head characteristics (youth, gender, level of education), the 
degree of urbanization of the districts in which the households live (using our 
district typology), and a set of infrastructural variables such as access to markets, 
public transportation, and electricity at the rural community level. In the regres-
sion, we only include the rural households of which agriculture is the primary 
occupation for all or some family members, since for most households defined as 
‘non-agriculture only’ in the section above, agricultural activity, if there is any, 
appears to be part-time.
As in the second section, we have pooled data together from the two rounds 
of  surveys—GLSS5 and GLSS6 in the regression, and hence we also include a 
dummy for 2012–13 (GLSS6), as well as the interaction terms for year and youth, 
and year and gender in the regression. In spite of the limitations of using repeated 
cross-sections for this analysis, for example, omitted variable bias, the regressions 
reveal some interesting associations.
In Table 7.5, the regression estimates illustrate that urbanization, as captured 
through our typology, has significant yet complex links with agricultural intensi-
fication. Rural households in all the three district groups in the agriculturally 
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Table 7.5. Marginal effect of probit model regressions on factors affecting agricultural 
input use, pooled data of GLSS5 and GLSS6






Farm size     
Less than 2 ha –0.278*** –0.147*** –0.223*** –0.286***
 (0.0461) (0.0449) (0.0501) (0.0389)
2–5 ha –0.140*** –0.0236 –0.116** –0.187***
 (0.0463) (0.0447) (0.0503) (0.0388)
5–20 ha –0.0842* 0.0709 –0.00961 –0.0869**
 (0.0475) (0.0462) (0.0519) (0.0399)
Base is > 20 ha     
Types of district groups     
2nd tier city districts, North 0.250*** 0.174*** 0.177*** 0.0803**
 (0.0452) (0.0522) (0.0508) (0.0383)
3rd tier city districts, North 0.187*** –0.172*** –0.0150 –0.000881
 (0.0184) (0.0181) (0.0205) (0.0172)
No city districts, North 0.139*** –0.0827*** 0.0103 –0.00338
 (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0128)
Big city districts, South 0.0217 –0.0730 0.180* 0.175**
 (0.107) (0.109) (0.103) (0.0857)
2nd tier city districts, South –0.00633 –0.159*** 0.0604 –0.0807
 (0.0621) (0.0587) (0.0669) (0.0630)
3rd tier city districts, South –0.0693*** –0.0404*** –0.0254 –0.00712
 (0.0156) (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0140)
Base is no city districts, South     
Year dummy for 2013 0.156*** 0.346*** –0.0743*** 0.149***
  (0.0108) (0.00876) (0.0124) (0.00993)
Youth headed household 0.00104 0.0234* –0.0433*** 0.00602
 (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0147) (0.0123)
Female headed household –0.0695*** –0.0842*** 0.0612*** –0.0385***
 (0.0159) (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0144)
Year dummy * Youth 0.0596** –0.0663** –0.0200 0.0295
 (0.0266) (0.0269) (0.02904) (0.0245)
Year dummy * Female –0.00362 –0.0440 –0.0184 –0.0773**
  0.02845 (0.0286) (0.0303) (0.0261)
Education level     
Primary completed 0.0265** 0.0647*** 0.0609*** 0.0601***
 (0.0134) (0.0131) (0.0144) (0.0121)
Secondary completed 0.0828*** 0.0961*** 0.0833*** 0.0863***
 (0.0267) (0.0276) (0.0303) (0.0241)
University and above 0.0130 0.352** 0.184 0.136
 (0.0894) (0.148) (0.142) (0.143)
Base is no education     
Access to markets –0.0335** –0.0276* 0.0314* –0.0278**
 (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0161) (0.0126)
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important North have a higher predicted probability of using fertilizers than 
households in the South, which may be driven by poorer soil fertility in the North 
(Houssou et al. 2016). However, besides this agroecological factor for the North, the 
probit estimation shows that in the North, the higher the urbanization level 
(measured by the size of cities in different district groups), the higher the pre-
dicted probability of using fertilizer. For example, compared with households in 
the Southern districts without cities, the predicted probability of using fertilizer 
increases by 25 per cent in the Northern districts with secondary cities, while the 
marginal effects are smaller in Northern districts with 3rd tier cities or without 
cities, at 18.7 per cent and 13.9 per cent, respectively. There is no such systematical 
relationship between the use of fertilizer and proximity to different sized cities in 
the South.
The marginal effect of urbanization on the use of other inputs is not always 
consistent with that for fertilizer use. Compared with no city districts in the 
South, only in the districts with 2nd tier cities in the North or with big cities in 
the South, the marginal effect of using other inputs is mostly positive and signifi-
cant. The sign of marginal effect tends to be negative, if significant, for the other 
types of district groups in both North and South.
In terms of education, the probit analysis shows that for the farm households 
whose heads are more educated, particularly for those completing secondary 
education, the probability of use fertilizer increases compared with the less 
 educated ones. On the other hand, the dummy variable for youth headed 
households only significantly affects the probability of fertilizer use through its 
interaction with the year dummy; this suggests that youth headed households 
only started having a higher probability of using fertilizer in recent years. The 
sign of the marginal effect for the youth dummy is not consistent and often 
insignificant in the other regressions. This result is somewhat surprising, since 
younger farmers might be expected to be more open to new technologies and 
knowledge than older adults.
Access to public transportation 0.0418*** 0.103*** 0.0769*** 0.0904***
 (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.0116)
Access to electricity –0.00848 –0.0381*** 0.0284** –0.00746
 (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0134) (0.0116)
Observations 13,388 13,340 13,340 13,340
Notes: Farm size is based on cultivated area. Rural households defined as agricultural only or 
agricultural and non-agricultural mixed households in GLSS5 are included in the regressions. 
Number of pooled sample obs. is 9,877. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Agricultural only or agricultural and non-agricultural mixed rural households in GLSS5 are 
included in the regressions. Number of pooled sample obs. is 9,877. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors own estimation using GLSS5 and GLSS6 data.
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Among the three variables related to market access or public infrastructure, the 
marginal effect of input use is positive only for the access to public transportation 
variable. The probability for any modern input use or labour hiring increases by 
4.18–10.3 per cent in the communities with easy access to public transportation, 
while market access seems to be only positively associated with hiring labour and 
the sign is negative for the use of other inputs. Market access is measured by 
whether a rural community has a daily or periodic market. It is also possible that 
better access to public transportation allows farmers to get access to market through 
traders who can come to villages directly.
In summary for the focus of youth, while the regression results are unexpected, 
they at least seem to indicate that the constraints against modern input adoption 
could be binding for all farmers including youth, and farmers in more urbanized 
locations. Moreover, the results support the patterns of agricultural productivity 
growth observed from the macro data. As shown in Figure 7.3, Ghana’s agricultural 
labour productivity has grown much faster than its land productivity. This tells us 
that recent agricultural growth in Ghana has been accompanied by more efficient 







































Figure 7.3. Trends in land and labour productivity in Ghana, 1991–2011
Note: In index form with 1991 = 1.0. Each dot in the chart represents an individual year, blue dots are for 1991–2000 
and red dots for 2001–2012.
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from GGDC for agricultural value added and agricultural employment 
(Timmer et al. 2015) and data from FAO (2016) for cultivated agricultural land.
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exit of youth from agriculture could further enhance this trend, indicating the 
importance of labour saving technologies for agricultural intensification in Ghana.
7.4 Welfare Outcomes of Changing Rural Livelihoods
Structural change in the rural economy often leads to rural poverty reduction. 
Indeed, the data shows that rural youth households appear to be in a better 
 pos ition to benefit from proximity to cities with more engagement in the non-
agricultural economy. While the development of a vibrant RNFE can serve as an 
alternative to migration to major cities, it depends on whether the changes in 
rural livelihoods can provide positive welfare outcomes. We therefore focus on 
the effects of the exit from agriculture associated with the proximity to cities and 
rural nonfarm employment on the level of and change in poverty reduction. We 
analyse welfare outcomes using both poverty and middle-class measures calcu-
lated from the two rounds of GLSS.
Measured by the national poverty line of US$1.90 per day, the data shows that 
the rural poverty rate is generally higher among agricultural households than 
non-agricultural households. This holds for the country as a whole and for both 
the North and South. While the poverty rate is much higher in the North than in 
the South, within the North the difference in poverty rate between these two 
groups of rural households is still considerably visible (Figure 7.4).
The national poverty rate for rural agricultural households is 48 per cent in 
2005, compared to 26 per cent for rural non-agricultural households. While the 
poverty rate falls between 2005 and 2012 for both rural agricultural and non-
agricultural households, the gap between them seems to be stable in the South 
but even wider in the North (Figure 7.4). This result displays the important role of 
the RNFE, particularly in the North, has played in reducing rural poverty. 
Moreover, the number of rural non-agricultural households increased while the 
number of rural agricultural households fell between the two rounds of GLSS, 
which seems to further confirm this important role of RNFE in reducing rural 
poverty in 2005–12.
We also want to examine whether rural non-agricultural households are 
ascending to the middle-class at a faster rate than their agricultural counter-
parts. For this purpose, we calculated the proportion of rural households whose 
income (proxied by expenditures) is above US$3.10 day, a level of income that is 
often used to define middle-class in Africa (Banerjee and Duflo  2008, Ncube 
and Shimeles 20131). Figure 7.5 presents the result. The difference in the share of 
1 The definition of middle-class is for individuals earning between 2$ and 10$ per day. 2$ is 
based on 2005 international prices, and has been adjusted by the World Bank to 3.1$ based on 2011 
international prices (World Bank 2016). In this chapter, given that we focus only on rural house-
holds, we did not limit middle-class by an upper income threshold.
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Figure 7.4. Rural poverty rates for agricultural and non-agricultural households
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Figure 7.5. Shares of middle-class population (with per capita income more than 
US$3.10 per day) in total population for rural agricultural and non-agricultural 
household groups
Source: Authors’ calculation using data of GLSS5 and GLSS6 (GSS 2015).
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middle-class households between agricultural and non-agricultural households 
is large throughout Ghana but more so in the South than in the North. In the 
North, fewer rural households belong to middle-class both for agricultural and 
non-agricultural households, which is expected given that the North is less 
developed and generally poorer than the South. However, as seen from Figure 7.4, 
the proportion of Northern non-agricultural households’ population that belongs 
to middle-class is similar to the proportion for Southern agricultural households. 
This share rapidly increases from a low base for Northern non-agricultural 
households, from 17 per cent in 2005 to almost one-third in 2012, while the share 
for Southern non-agricultural households increases slowly from a relatively high 
base (from 55.5 per cent to 59.4 per cent).
However, the absolute population of rural middle-class agricultural households 
is still more than the population of rural non-agricultural households in both the 
North and South, even in 2012. This is because agricultural households are still 
prevalent in rural Ghana, although the middle-class population is disproportionately 
higher among non-agricultural households than among agricultural households.
Both Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 can only display bivariate relationships between 
nonfarm engagements and level of poverty rate or proportion of middle-class at 
the regional level. Again, further insights can be obtained by using regression tech-
niques to unravel more complex multivariate relationships. Similarly, as in the 
third section, a probit model is used to test how the probability of being a nonpoor 
or a middle-class household is associated with being a non-agricultural household 
and some other factors. In addition to use being a non-agricultural household as 
a dummy, in the regression we include dummies for youth as head of households, 
female-headed household, level of education, the degree of ur ban iza tion of the 
districts in which the households live (using our district typology), and a set of 
infrastructural variables such as access to markets, public transportation, or elec-
tricity at the rural community level as a set of independent variables, which are all 
similar to those in the probit model applied in the third section. Again, we pool 
together GLSS5 and GLSS6 and hence a year dummy for 2012–13 and interactions 
of the year dummy with being a non-agricultural household, headed by youth 
and by female are included in the regression. The nonpoor is defined as a house-
hold whose per capita expenditure is more than the national poverty line of 
US$1.90 per day, while a middle-class household is the one whose per capita 
expenditure is US$3.10 and more per day. We focus only on the marginal effect of 
the regression and Table 7.6 reports the result of the regression.
We first need to note that the data used in the regression for identifying factors 
of being a middle-class household is a subset of the full sample, containing data 
for nonpoor rural households only. By excluding poor households from the 
regression, the data in the second regression should be more homogenous than 
the full dataset; hence, we may expect the magnitude of the marginal effects of 
























Table 7.6. Marginal effects of probit model regressions on factors affecting being a nonpoor or a middle-class household in rural Ghana, pooled 
data of GLSS5 and GLSS6
Variable Nonpoor vs. Middle-class vs. other Variable Nonpoor vs. Middle-class vs. other
poor nonpoor poor nonpoor
 (1a) (2a)  (1b) (2b)
Non-agriculture only household 0.0681*** 0.118*** Education level   
 (0.0134) (0.0167) Primary completed 0.0671*** 0.0351**
Year dummy for 2013 0.0163* 0.0525***  (0.0105) (0.0149)
 (0.00925) (0.0134) Secondary completed 0.206*** 0.167***
Youth headed household 0.102*** 0.0608***  (0.0219) (0.0244)
 (0.0102) (0.0139) University and above 0.424*** 0.337***
Female-headed households 0.0612*** 0.0694***  (0.0638) (0.0798)
 (0.0118) (0.0160) Base is no education    
Year dummy × youth –0.0353* -0.0356 Community level variable   
 (0.1914) (0.02758) Access to markets −0.0109 -0.00991
Year dummy × gender –0.0577*** −0.02413  (0.0118) (0.0168)
 (0.0217) (0.0302) Access to public transportation 0.0782*** 0.0455***
Year dummy × non-agricultural household –0.0530** 0.02474   (0.0101) (0.0160)
  (0.02447) (0.03140) Access to electricity 0.0660***
(0.0101)
0.0298**
Types of district groups (base is non city districts, North)   
2nd tier city districts, North 0.115*** 0.0671 Access to markets –0.0109 –0.00991
 (0.0378) (0.0509)  (0.0118) (0.0168)
3rd tier city districts, North 0.0236 0.00773    
 (0.0149) (0.0278) Number of observation 11,245 7,030
Big city districts, South 0.209*** 0.0473 F 78.82 35.98
 (0.0565) (0.0741)      
2nd tier city districts, South 0.169*** 0.0666    
 (0.0538) (0.0662)    
3rd tier city districts, South 0.175*** 0.0459**    
 (0.0127) (0.0199)    
No city districts, South 0.168*** 0.0498***    
  (0.0108) (0.0182)      
Notes: The regressions include only rural households. Number of the pooled sample obs. is 12,515. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Authors own estimation using GLSS5 and GLSS6 data.
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affecting being a nonpoor household. Keeping this in mind, we actually find that 
the marginal effect of the probability of being a non-agriculture only household 
on being a middle-class household is considerably stronger (11.8 per cent) than 
that of being a nonpoor household (6.55 per cent), suggesting that not only is 
nonfarm employment important in reducing rural poverty, but it also is im port ant 
in ascending to the middle-class. However, the sign of the coefficient is negative 
when the variable of being non-agricultural interacted with the year dummy 
in comparison of nonpoor versus poor and not significant in the case of middle-
class versus other nonpoor, indicating that the positive strong relationship of 
being a non-agricultural household and being nonpoor is possibly weakened over 
time and being non-agricultural is less time relevant for belonging to the middle-
class when more rural households become non-agricultural.
We already saw from Table  7.3 that the marginal effect of youth or female 
household head is positive for the probability of being a non-agricultural house-
hold. Table 7.6 further tells us that this effect is also positive on the probability of 
being nonpoor and middle-class. However, in both cases and similar as being 
non-agricultural, the sign of the coefficient is negative when these two variables 
are interacted with the year dummy in the comparison of nonpoor versus poor 
and not significant in the case of middle-class versus other nonpoor, which again 
seems to imply that the youth or gender factor is less time relevant, or at least not 
further strengthened over time.
The findings that female-headed households are positively associated with the 
probability of being nonpoor or middle-class requires more attention, since this 
contradicts conventional perceptions that female-headed households are more 
susceptible to poverty. Since our regressions control for variables such as liveli-
hood source, education levels, and proximity to cities, this result may be driven 
by other factors not captured in our regressions. While identifying these factors is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, more research is important for fully understand-
ing these factors.
We now turn to the location factor. As expected, the location factor matters in 
the probability of being a nonpoor household. Compared with the no-city district 
group in the North, the marginal effect of the probability of being nonpoor 
increases in the 2nd tier city Northern districts and everywhere in the South; the 
coefficient is largest for the big city district group in the South. However, the dif-
ference in probability of being nonpoor is insignificant between being in no-city 
or small city districts in Northern Ghana. For being a middle-class household, we 
only see significance for the coefficient of 3rd tier city and no city district groups 
in the South, while for all other district groups, the coefficients are not significant. 
It is possible that among the nonpoor households in these districts, the nonpoor 
households are more homogenous when their number (sample size) is small. 
Therefore, there is less variation among the households in such district groups, 
which leads to a lower level of significance.
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The significant positive marginal effect for the level of education on the 
 prob abil ity of being nonpoor or becoming middle-class is also expected, as well 
as the order of the magnitude of the marginal effect. Moreover, it is seen as an 
exponential increase in the value of the marginal effect when the level of education 
moves from primary to secondary and then to university. Compared with no 
education, having primary education only increases the probability of being non-
poor by 6.73 per cent and 3.49 per cent for being middle-class, while the probability 
of being nonpoor increases by 20.6 per cent and 42.2 per cent for secondary and 
college education, respectively. The probability of being middle-class increases by 
16.7 per cent and 33.7 per cent for these two levels of education, respectively.
Community-level infrastructure (but not market access) also plays a role in 
increasing the probability of being nonpoor and becoming middle-class. The mar-
ginal effect of access to public transportation and electricity on the prob abil ity of 
being nonpoor is similar, 7.78 per cent versus 6.53 per cent, and the magnitude 
of  these marginal effects is smaller but still similar for being middle-class, 
which is possibly due to a more homogenous sample set in the latter case, as we 
explained before.
In summary, urbanization and city expansion seem to have important effects 
not only on poverty reduction but also for further moving up the income ladder 
for rural households that remain in the rural areas and enter the rural nonfarm 
sector. These effects are stronger in the more urbanized South, for the youth-
headed households and especially for households whose heads have higher levels 
of education.
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter examines the impact of urbanization—measured by a typology 
of districts according to proximity to cities—on rural livelihoods in Ghana. We 
classify the country’s districts into seven spatial groups according to the size of 
the largest city in each district in Southern and Northern Ghana. The chapter 
does not address rural–urban migration but instead focuses on the livelihoods of 
rural households in each of these seven district groups. We find that proximity to 
cities affects the patterns of rural livelihoods. Many rural households have shifted 
from solely agricultural to solely non-agricultural. While these trends are observed 
across Ghana, they appear to be much stronger among the youth and in the more 
urbanized South that already had relatively higher shares of non-agricultural 
households than in the poorer, more agrarian North. Proximity to cities has a 
strong effect on the exit of rural households from agriculture, and this trend is 
stronger with increases in the size of the city. This trend holds for both youth-
headed and other type of households but more so for the youth. Essentially, diver-
sification in rural livelihood among youth and other adult headed households 
appears predominantly inter-household, rather than intra-household in which 
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some members are primarily employed in agriculture and others in non-agriculture. 
The proportion of this latter type of household in both total and youth-headed 
rural households has changed little (between the two rounds of GLSS) or fallen 
(between the two rounds of Census).
While the non-agricultural economy is becoming increasingly important for 
rural households, informality dominates the rural non-agricultural economy as 
it does in urban areas. This is alarmingly true particularly among rural youth 
households. Informal trade and informal manufacturing (mainly agro-processing) 
are the two most important sectors for rural nonfarm activities. Only in the rural 
areas close to Accra and Kumasi as well as the mining boom areas in Western 
Region, do more employment opportunities in the formal non-agricultural sector 
exist to the rural households. Still, in these areas, youth headed rural house-
holds have fewer opportunities of working in the formal sector than other type 
of households. These results provide a number of policy implications. First, 
informal non-agricultural activities often have a closer tie with agriculture than 
the formal ones, and their products and services are also mainly for satisfying 
local rural demand. In addition to rural–urban linkages that will create op por-
tun ities for agricultural growth and for rural employment through migration, it 
would be worthwhile to further explore agricultural growth opportunities 
through agricultural and non-agricultural geographic linkages in the areas 
dom in ated by rural. Second, given the fact that youth are more likely to exit 
from agriculture but less likely to engage in the formal sector than other adults, 
it is important for policies to focus on the improvement of labour productivity 
and hence income generation for youth in the informal sector (including the 
RNFE) rather than focusing too much on an unrealistic target of job creation in 
the formal sector.
While more youth appear to be exiting agriculture, the majority of youth in 
the  North without big and second tier cities still work in agriculture. However 
 contrary to expectations, the results of the probit model did not show greater agri-
cultural technology adoption among the youth particularly in the more urbanized 
locations. Making agriculture attractive to the youth requires increasing its profit-
ability, which depends on modern technology adoption and agricultural intensifi-
cation and commercialization. With more rural youth becoming more educated, 
and more rural households being expected to switch from agriculture to the RNFE 
in the near future, a different range of technologies would be required from what 
has been done in the past. Additionally, deepening ur ban iza tion means that labour, 
land, and other capital markets are likely to become more integrated between rural 
and urban areas. Many non-agricultural policies that would indirectly affect agri-
cultural performance could directly affect the at tract ive ness of agriculture to the 
youth. A territorial approach and related policies that integrate secondary  cities and 
small towns with the rural economy deserve more attention such that the diversifi-
cation of rural livelihoods can become a viable alternative or complement to rural–

























Table 7.A1. Marginal effects in the probit estimations on the determinants of being a non-agricultural household, pooled data of Census 
2000 and 2010
Independent variable  Comparing with the rest HH Comparing with mixed HH 








Year dummy for 2010 0.0123 0.0243 0.00867 0.0154 0.0310** 0.0114
  –0.0144 –0.0151 –0.0144 –0.0172 –0.0146 –0.0194
Youth-headed households 0.0746***     0.170***    
  –0.00489     –0.0064    
Female-headed households 0.126*** 0.151*** 0.107*** 0.196*** 0.224*** 0.194***
  –0.00747 –0.00796 –0.00665 –0.00894 –0.00873 –0.0104
Year dummy * Youth 0.0250***     0.0418***    
  –0.0057743     –0.00557    
Year dummy * Gender 0.0353***     0.0435***    
  –0.00736     –0.00897    
Types of district groups (base is no city district, North)      
2nd tier city districts, North 0.0933** 0.0867*** 0.0901* 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.110***
  –0.0472 –0.0305 –0.0465 –0.0366 –0.0231 –0.0414
3rd tier city districts, North 0.0375 0.0431 0.0358 0.0726 0.0700* 0.0678
  –0.0419 –0.0438 –0.0401 –0.0567 –0.0405 –0.0623
Big city districts, South 0.279*** 0.230*** 0.234*** 0.286*** 0.223*** 0.341***
  –0.0424 –0.037 –0.0331 –0.0343 –0.026 –0.0408
2nd tier city districts, South 0.137*** 0.0958*** 0.143*** 0.199*** 0.159*** 0.219***
  –0.038 –0.0325 –0.0436 –0.0469 –0.0354 –0.0571
3rd tier city districts, South 0.0698** 0.107*** 0.0518* 0.0866** 0.0977*** 0.0780*
  –0.0276 –0.0261 –0.0283 –0.0355 –0.0226 –0.0403
No city districts, South 0.0144 0.0475** 0.000859 0.0335 0.0603*** 0.0177
























Education level (no education omitted)            
Primary completed 0.112*** 0.137*** 0.0988*** 0.109*** 0.0895*** 0.109***
  –0.00548 –0.00575 –0.00541 –0.00745 –0.00715 –0.00788
Secondary completed 0.318*** 0.267*** 0.268*** 0.250*** 0.197*** 0.270***
  –0.00918 –0.0105 –0.00699 –0.00883 –0.00966 –0.0091
Tertiary and above 0.470*** 0.386*** 0.350*** 0.293*** 0.210*** 0.330***
  –0.0122 –0.0151 –0.0114 –0.0122 –0.0185 –0.0153
Community variable            
Electricity 0.267*** 0.333*** 0.239*** 0.335*** 0.328*** 0.334***
  –0.0529 –0.0526 –0.0547 –0.0632 –0.0482 –0.0751
Observations 374,568 116,965 257,603 150,066 50,514 99,552
Notes: The regressions include only rural households. Number of the pooled sample obs. is 403,938. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Authors’ own estimation using Census 2000 and Census 2010 data.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
202 Xinshen Diao et al.
References
Ackah, C., C. Adjasi, and F. Turkson. 2014. Scoping study on the evolution of industry in 
Ghana. Washington, DC, U.S.A.: Learning to Compete Working Paper No. 18 Africa 
Growth Initiative (AGI) at Brookings.
Anyidoho, N., J.  Leavy, and K.  Asenso-Okyere. 2012. Perceptions and aspirations: 
A case study of young people in Ghana’s cocoa sector. IDS Bulletin 43 (6).
Aryeetey, E., and W. Baah-Boateng. 2015. Understanding Ghana’s growth success story 
and job creation challenges. WIDER Working Paper 2015/140.
Banerjee, A., and E. Duflo. 2008. What is middle class about the middle class around 
the world? Journal of Economic Perspectives 22 (2): 3–28.
Berdegue, J., F. Carriazo, B. Jara, F. Modrego, and I. Soloaga. 2015. Cities, territories 
and inclusive growth: Unraveling urban–rural linkages in Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico. World Development 73: 56–71.
Binswanger-Mkhize, H., T.  Johnson, P.  Samboko, and L.  You. 2016. The impact of 
urban growth on agricultural and rural nonfarm growth in Kenya. International 
Fund for Agricultural Development.
Binswanger, H., and V.  W.  Ruttan. 1978. Induced innovation. Baltimore, U.S.A.  and 
London, U.K.: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Boserup, E. 1965. The conditions of agricultural growth: The economics of agrarian 
change under population pressure. London, U.K.: George Allen and Unwin.
Deichmann, U., F. Shilpi, and R. Vakis. 2008. Urban proximity, agricultural potential 
and rural nonfarm employment: Evidence from Bangladesh. World Development 
37 (3): 645–60.
Diao, X., M. McMillan, and D. Rodrik. 2017. The recent growth boom in developing 
economies: A structural change perspective. NBER Working Paper No. 23132. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Diao, X., F.  Cossar, N.  Houssou, and S.  Kolavalli. 2014. Mechanization in Ghana: 
Emerging demand, and the search for alternative supply models. Food Policy 48 
(October): 168–81.
Gollin, D., R. Jedwab, and D. Vollrath. 2016. Urbanization with and without industri-
alization. Journal of Economic Growth 21 (1): 35–70.
GSS (Ghana Statistical Service). 2003. Population and Housing Census 2000. Census 
data. Accra, Ghana.
GSS (Ghana Statistical Service). 2008. Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 5 (GLSS 5). 
Survey Data. Accra, Ghana.
GSS (Ghana Statistical Service). 2013. Population and Housing Census 2010. Accra, 
Ghana.
GSS (Ghana Statistical Service). 2014. Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 6 (GLSS 6). 
Survey data. Accra, Ghana.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
Cities and Rural Transformation 203
Haggblade, S., P. Hazell, and J. Brown. 1989. Farm-nonfarm linkages in rural Sub-Saharan 
Africa. World Development 17 (8): 1173–201.
Harris, J.  R., and M.  P.  Todaro. 1970. Migration, unemployment and development: 
A two-sector analysis. American Economic Review 60 (1): 126–42.
Hayami, Y., and V.  Ruttan. 1970. Factor prices and technical change in agricultural 
development: The United States and Japan. Journal of Political Economy 78 (5): 1115–41.
Hayami, Y., and V. Ruttan. 1985. Agricultural development: An international perspective. 
Baltimore, MD, U.S.A.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Headey, D., D. Bezemer, and P. Hazell. 2010. Agricultural employment trends in Asia 
and Africa. Too fast or too slow? World Bank Research Observer 25 (1): 57–89.
Houssou, N., M. Johnson, S. Kolavalli, and C. Asante-Addo. 2016. Changes in Ghanaian 
farming systems: Stagnation or a quiet transformation? IFPRI Discussion Paper 
01504. International Food Policy Research Institute.
Jedwab, R. 2013. Urbanization without structural transformation: Evidence from con-
sumption cities in Africa. George Washington University (mimeograph).
Kolavalli, S., E. Robinson, X. Diao, A. Apluerto, R. Folledo, M. Slavova, and F. Asante. 
2012. Economic transformation in Ghana: Where will the path lead? IFPRI Discussion 
Paper 1161. Washington, DC, U.S.A.: International Food Policy Research Institute.
McMillan, M., and D. Rodrik. 2011. Globalization, structural change and productivity 
growth. NBER Working Paper 17,143.
Mellor, J. 1976. New economics of growth. Ithaca, NY, U.S.A.: Cornell University Press.
Ncube, M., and A.  Shimeles. 2013. The making of middle-class in Africa: Evidence 
from DHS data. IZA DP No. 7352. Forschingsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit—
Institute for the Study of Labor.
Nin-Pratt, A., and L. McBride. 2014. Agricultural intensification in Ghana: Evaluating 
the optimist’s case for a Green Revolution. Food Policy 48: 153–67.
Osei, R.D., and R.  Jedwab. 2016. Structural change in a poor african country: New 
historical evidence from Ghana. In M.  MacMillan, D.  Rodrik, and C.  Sepúlveda 
(eds.). 2016. Structural Change, Fundamentals, And Growth: A Framework and Case 
Studies. Washington DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, pp. 161–94.
Owusu, V., A. Abdulai, and S. Abdul-Rahman. 2011. Non-farm work and food se cur ity 
among farm households in Northern Ghana. Food Policy 36: 108–18.
Ravallion, M., S. Chen, and P. Sangraula. 2007. New evidence on the urbanization of 
global poverty. Population and Development Review 102 (1): 504–23.
Rosegrant, M., and P. Hazell. 2000. Transforming the rural Asian economy: The unfin-
ished revolution. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
Ruthenberg, H. 1980. Farming systems in the tropics. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University 
Press.
Ruttan, V. W. 2002. Productivity growth in world agriculture: Sources and constraints. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (4): 161–84.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
204 Xinshen Diao et al.
Timmer, C.  P. 1988. The agricultural transformation. Handbook of Development 
Economics 1: 275–331.
Timmer, M. P., G. J. de Vries, and K. de Vries. 2015. Patterns of structural change in 
developing countries’. In J. Weiss and M. Tribe (Eds.), Handbook of Industry and 
Development. (pp. 65–83). Routledge.
World Bank. 2016. PovcalNet: An online analysis tool for global poverty monitoring. 
The World Bank. http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
Xinshen Diao, Eduardo Magalhaes, and Margaret McMillan, Rural Nonfarm Enterprises in Tanzania’s Economic 
Transformation: The Role of the Youth In: Youth and Jobs in Rural Africa: Beyond Stylized Facts. Edited by: Valerie 
Mueller and James Thurlow, Oxford University Press (2019). © International Food Policy Research Institute. 
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198848059.003.0008
8
Rural Nonfarm Enterprises in  
Tanzania’s Economic Transformation
The Role of the Youth
Xinshen Diao, Eduardo Magalhaes, and Margaret McMillan1
8.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Tanzania’s economy has grown 
more rapidly than at any other point in recent history. Between 2000 and 2015 
average annual GDP growth was 6.8 per cent and average annual labour prod uct-
iv ity growth was more than 4 per cent. This is quite impressive when considering 
the 2.7–3.0 per cent annual population growth rate and a similar growth rate in 
the labour force during this period. Moreover, between 2002 and 2012 more than 
three quarters of this labour productivity growth was accounted for by structural 
change; the remainder of the growth is largely attributable to within sector 
prod uct iv ity growth in agriculture. The growth attributable to structural change 
is almost entirely explained by a rapid decline in the agricultural employment 
share and an increase in the non-agricultural private sector employment share 
(Diao, Kweka, and McMillan 2017).
In spite of these changes, Tanzania remains heavily rural; between 2002 and 
2012, the share of the population living in rural areas declined by only 6.5 percentage 
points from 76.9 to 70.4 per cent (Table 8.1). The share of youth living in rural 
areas undergoes a slightly greater decrease. However, as shown in Table 8.1, more 
than 60 per cent of youth still live in the rural areas in 2012. Living in rural areas 
is typically associated with farming, including for youth. But the statistics also 
show that between 2002 and 2012, the share of the rural population engaged in 
agricultural activities decreased by almost 10 percentage points (Table 8.1). This is 
also true for the youth cohort at the national level. While the absolute number of 
rural agricultural employment continues to increase, the growth rate of rural 
non-agricultural employment is much faster as shown in Table 8.1.
1 We thank Hak Lim Lee and Peixun Fang for their contribution of the HBS data analysis in the 
chapter.
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In this chapter, we explore the nature of these rural nonfarm activities to better 
understand their contribution to the economic development and diversification 
of rural areas or ‘rural transformation’. We pay particular attention to the youth in 
the analysis when the data allows.
The first part of our analysis uses data from Tanzania’s 2012 Household Budget 
Survey to classify rural households based on their participation in the nonfarm 
economy. We identify the following three types of households: (1) households 
which do not participate in agriculture; (2) households which participate only in 
farming; and (3) mixed households, which both participate in the farm and 
nonfarm economy. We find that 11.2 per cent of households participate only in the 
nonfarm economy and that the heads of these households tend to be more edu-
cated. The share of households headed by youth that participate only in the non-
farm economy is higher, at 17.9 per cent (Table 8.3). We then explain the 
differences between households with and without rural nonfarm activities using a 
probit model. We find that being a youth-headed household increases the prob-
abil ity of specializing in rural nonfarm activities by 2–6 per cent, but they do not 
seem very different from other households when agriculture is still part of their 
household’s livelihood. The most important determinant of whether a household 
engages in nonfarm activities is the education of the household head. For house-
holds whose heads have secondary or more education, the increase in the prob-
abil ity of engaging in nonfarm activities is between 8 and 38 per cent. This could 
be a major factor to explain a higher participation rate of nonfarm economy 
among youth-headed households.
The second part of our analysis uses data from Tanzania’s first nationally repre-
sentative survey of micro, small, and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs) to study 
the nature of rural businesses. This survey covers roughly 3 million businesses 
and 5 million people; around 75 per cent of these businesses are in rural areas. 
Diao, Kweka, and McMillan (2017) have shown that Tanzania’s MSMEs are geo-
graphically disbursed throughout the country and that these enterprises generally 
operate in manufacturing and services. In rural areas, 20 per cent of these busi-
nesses are in the manufacturing sector while the remainder is in the services 
sector. The heart of our analysis begins with a description of the characteristics of 
the owners of these businesses in rural areas paying attention to young owners. 
Next, we examine the productivity of these businesses and show an enormous 
degree of productive heterogeneity in both rural and urban enterprises. We then 
examine employment growth among rural enterprises and find that only 10 per 
cent of rural enterprises experience any employment growth. Finally, we use the 
heterogeneity of the rural nonfarm enterprises to identify a group of firms with 
the potential to contribute to rural transformation. Using a probit analysis, we 
examine the characteristics of firms that make them more likely to fall into the 
category of ‘high potential’ firms in order to better understand the correlates of 
enterprise success in rural areas.
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Our chapter contributes to the large and growing literature on the rural nonfarm 
economy in Africa. One strand of this literature focuses on farm/nonfarm 
linkages and the estimation of multipliers (see for example Haggblade, Hazell, 
and Brown 1989). This work is based on the idea that agricultural productivity 
growth can generate income and employment multipliers via production and 
consumption linkages. A second strand of this literature focuses on rural–urban 
linkages and stresses the importance of reducing barriers to the movement of 
labour and products from rural to urban areas. Research in this area tends to 
focus on migration and transportation costs. See for example de Brauw, Mueller, 
and Lee (2014) on migration and Gollin and Rogerson (2009) on transportation 
costs. A third strand of this literature studies the effects of farm/nonfarm linkages 
and rural/urban linkages simultaneously. A nice example of this type of work is 
the paper by Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon (2010) that explores both internal 
processes of rural growth as well as the impact of globalization and urbanization 
on rural nonfarm activity.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the work on the rural nonfarm economy 
uses nationally representative firm level data to compare the characteristics of 
rural enterprises to those of urban enterprises.2 Unlike most enterprise surveys 
conducted in Africa which are small in sample size (for example, most World 
Bank business environment surveys), the data we use is based on a nationally 
representative survey which covers roughly 5 million employees and 3 million 
small businesses in both rural and urban areas. Tanzania has one of the few com-
prehensive nationally representative surveys of small, micro, and medium sized 
enterprises (MSMEs) available in Sub-Saharan Africa.3 More than 70 per cent of 
small businesses surveyed by MSME are in the rural areas and the rest are in 
urban areas (which in Tanzania are identified by local officials in consultation 
with the National Bureau of Statistics). This allows us to compare enterprises in 
rural and urban areas using the same dataset.4
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 8.2, we dem-
onstrate the growing importance of rural nonfarm enterprises in the context of 
the Tanzanian economy. In Section 8.3, we describe the data and methods we use 
in our analyses. Section 8.4 describes our typology of households and examines 
the characteristics of households with and without rural nonfarm enterprises. 
In Section 8.5, we use the firm level survey to describe the characteristics of rural 
entrepreneurs and their businesses and identify a group of firms with the 
2 Jin and Deininger (2008) study rural nonfarm enterprises but not in comparison to urban 
enterprises.
3 The government of Rwanda did carry out a survey of MSMEs recently but the survey does not 
include information on employment and productivity. Uganda has a similar nationally representative 
MSME survey in which the successfully interviewed firm number is less than 2,000 while Tanzania’s 
survey interviewed more than 6,000 business owners.
4 The survey used in Jin and Deininger (2008) covers only enterprises (1,239) and households 
(1,610) in Tanzanian rural areas.
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potential to stimulate rural transformation; we call these firms the ‘in-between’ 
firms. In Section 8.6, we study the characteristics of the ‘in-between’ firms in 
order to better understand how policymakers might target these firms. Section 
8.7 concludes with a summary of the main points and a brief discussion of policy 
implications.
8.2 The Role of Rural Nonfarm Enterprises  
in Tanzania’s Economy
Three nationally representative surveys are used to describe the changes in shares 
of rural population and rural employment. These are the 2000–1 and 2011–12 
rounds of the Household Budget Survey (HBS), the 2002 and 2012 Population 
Censuses, and the 2006 and 2014 Integrated Labour Force Surveys (ILFS). 
According to the two rounds of the census, which more accurately captures 
the  change in population structure, the share of the population living in rural 
areas declined from 76.9 per cent in 2002 to 70.4 per cent in 2012, compared to 
71.5 per cent in 2002 and 63.5 per cent in 2012 for youth (Table 8.1, first panel). 
Thus, Tanzania is urbanizing, but is still heavily rural.
The second panel of Table 8.1 contains agricultural employment shares from 
the three different surveys. While different surveys cannot be directly compared 
because of differences in the definition for agricultural employment, there is a 
clear trend of the share of agricultural employment declining more rapidly than 
the share of rural population.5 Between the two rounds of the Census in the 
period of 10 years (2002–12), the agricultural share of employment declined by 
15.3 percentage points overall and by 11 percentage points for youth, while 
between the two rounds of ILFS in 2006–14, the declines are 9.6 percentage points 
and 8.2 percentage points for the total population and youth, respectively. This 
trend holds also for rural total and youth employment, indicating the growth in 
rural nonfarm employment outpaced the growth in agricultural employment.
The third panel of Table 8.1 reports annualized employment growth rates in the 
recent 15 years computed from each two rounds of the three surveys. In general, 
employment in agriculture has been growing at a slower pace than total employ-
ment nationwide and in rural areas. In fact, according to the census data, the 
growth rate of agricultural employment is almost zero in 2000–12 for the rural 
total and negative for the rural youth. By contrast, non-agricultural employment 
has grown rapidly for the rural population and the rural youth, both with double-
digit growth rates (see the bottom of Table 8.1).
5 We noticed that the agricultural employment share did not fall between the two rounds of the 
HBS. We discussed possible data problems in the table’s note, that is, the definition of agricultural 
employment for the early round of HBS seems to cause share of agriculture in total employment to be 
unrealistically low in 2000–1. This is further confirmed when the number from 2000–1 HBS is com-
pared to the number of the 2002 Census.
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To help better understand the changing structure of Tanzania’s employment, in 
Table 8.2 we compute net employment growth in detail among different economic 
sectors. While the agricultural sector still accounts for two-thirds of total 
 employment in Tanzania, it has played a relatively minor role in net job increases 
Table 8.1. Rural population and agricultural employment shares and annual 
growth rates




Share of rural population (per cent)     
2002 76.9 71.5   
2012 70.4 63.5   
Agricultural employment shares (per cent)     
2000/01 (HBS) 86.3 87.1 76.7 76.1
2002 (Census) 93.2 93.4 81.1 74.2
2006 (ILFS)   76.5 74.4
2011–2012 (HBS) 89.0 87.6 74.8 72.2
2012 (Census) 79.5 81.4 65.8 63.2
2014 (ILFS)   66.9 66.2
Annualized growth rate (per cent)     
Population (2002–12, Census) 1.8 1.1 2.7 2.4
Total employment     
2000–11 (HBS) 1.2 0.9 2.2 1.9
2002–12 (Census) 1.6 0.2 2.5 1.6
2006–14 (ILFS) 0.3 0.4 2.4 1.9
Employment in agriculture     
2000–11 (HBS) 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.4
2002–12 (Census) 0.1 –1.2 0.4 0.0
2006–14 (ILFS)   0.7 0.4
Employment in non-agriculture     
2000–11 (HBS) 1.4 0.6 4.4 3.3
2002–12 (Census) 13.5 11.1 8.8 5.3
2006–14 (ILFS)   6.8 5.5
Notes: For the Census employment, data for current employees aged 10 years and above is used. 
Agricultural employment is based on the industry classification. For the Household Budget Survey 
(HBS), employees are for aged 15 years and above. Definition of agricultural employment differs 
between the two rounds of HBS. In HBS 2000–1, agricultural employees are defined as ‘farming’, while 
‘unpaid family helper’ is considered as non-agricultural employment. In HBS 2011–12, agricultural 
employees are those ‘working on farm’. Given that the number of ‘non-agricultural unpaid family 
helper’ in HBS 2000–1 is much larger than that in HBS 2011–12, agricultural employment in HBS 
2000–1 is possibly underestimated, which leads to an unrealistically high growth rate in agricultural 
employment using HBS, as shown in the table. Employees in the Integrated Labour Force Survey 
(ILFS) are for age 15 years and above.
Sources: Most numbers are calculated by authors using the government official documents for Census 
2002 and 2012, HBS 2000–1 and 2011–12, and ILFS 2006 and 2014 published by NBS (NBS 2006, 2011a, 
2011b, 2014a, 2014b, and 2015). The numbers of Census 2002 agricultural employment share in rural 
total and rural youth and growth rates in agricultural and non-agricultural employment are calculated 















































Table 8.2. Contribution to new employment by sector, formal and informal, 2002–2012
 Total Formal Informal
 Number of Share in total Number of Share in total Number of Share in total
 net increase net increase net increase net increase net increase net increase
Agriculture 446,677 11.2 –3,865 –0.1 450,542 11.3
Mining 404,212 10.1 9,021 0.2 395,192 9.9
Manufacturing 313,882 7.8 103,049 2.6 210,833 5.3
Utilities 194,960 4.9 194,960 4.9 – –
Construction 281,864 7.0 21,185 0.5 260,679 6.5
Trade services 966,807 24.2 1,304 0.0 965,503 24.1
Transport services 182,383 4.6 18,497 0.5 163,886 4.1
Business services 105,635 2.6 56,924 1.4 48,711 1.2
Public sector 224,579 5.6 224,579 5.6 – –
Personal services 881,289 22.0 – – 881,289 22.0
Total private non-agriculture 3,331,032 83.2 404,940 10.1 2,926,093 73.1
Total private economy 3,777,709 94.4 401,075 10.0 3,376,635 84.4
Total non-agriculture 3,555,611 88.8 629,519 15.7 2,926,093 73.1
Note: Employment is defined by the current employment status with age 10 or more years old.
Source: Authors calculation based on data from the Formal Employment and Earnings Survey and the Census 2002 and 2012 (NBS, 2006, 2007, 2014b, 2014c, 
2014d, and 2014e).
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as shown in Table 8.1. In fact, almost 90 percent of the net increase in jobs between 
the two census periods occurred in the non-agricultural sector. Considering that 
agricultural employment made up more than 80 per cent of total employment in 
2002 (Table 8.1), this rapid non-agricultural employment growth is remarkable.
However, as is evident from Table 8.2, about 83 per cent of the increase in the 
private sector non-agricultural employment has taken place in the informal 
sector. We do not have access to detailed employment data at the sector level 
disaggregated by rural and urban. However, we know from Table 8.1 that nonfarm 
employment increased significantly in rural areas. If we assume that formal 
non-agricultural employment is more likely to take place in urban than in rural 
areas, then we can take the 88 per cent of growth in national informal employment 
as the lower bound for informal employment growth in rural areas. In the fourth 
section of this chapter, we will use the MSME data to further investigate the 
nature of this rural nonfarm employment.
Tanzania’s rural economy is also evolving along another very important 
dimension. As shown in Figure  8.1, the gap between the share of agricultural 
employment and the share of agricultural GDP has started to narrow modestly in 
recent years (narrowing about 7.5 percentage points in 2001–11). This implies that 
not only has labour productivity in agriculture been growing but so too has its’ 
prod uct iv ity relative to other sectors of the economy. This is important because as 
shown by Diao, Kweka, and McMillan (2017), the declining agricultural employment 

































































Ag employment share Ag GDP share Relative Lprody in ag
Figure 8.1. Shares of Tanzania’s agriculture in labour force and GDP and relative 
labour productivity in agriculture
Note: Agricultural GDP share is measured in constant 2005 price.
Source: Authors, calculation using data of GGDC 2015 version.
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through structural change. This is because measured labour productivity in 
agriculture has been lower than in many non-agricultural activities.
8.3 Data and Methods
We begin this section with a brief description of the two datasets used for the 
micro analysis in this chapter. We then describe the methodologies employed to 
analyse the characteristics of households which participate solely in the rural 
nonfarm economy compared to other types of households. Lastly we describe our 
methods for assessing the characteristics and potential of rural enterprises in 
comparison with those in urban areas.
8.3.1 Household Survey Data
The 2011–12 Household Budget Survey (HBS) is used for the micro analysis, 
which is discussed in detail in the Section 8.4. As we mentioned in the beginning 
of the chapter, HBS is a nationally representative survey, which is designed to pro-
vide estimates of household income and expenditure. However, it only covers 
mainland Tanzania and excludes Zanzibar. Like the MSME survey to be discussed 
below, the sampling framework used to conduct the HBS survey is based on the 
2002 Census, which could possibly oversample rural households given that, as we 
discussed in the first section, the 2012 Census has shown a decline of 6.5 percent-
age points in the share of rural population from the 2002 Census. A set of 
summary statistics based on the 2011–12 HBS for the variables used in our analysis 
is presented in Appendix Table 8.A1.
8.3.2 Description of the MSME Data
The Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise (MSME) survey is Tanzania’s first 
nationally representative survey for small businesses. For this reason, we provide 
a description in detail based on a set of summary statistics of the data reported in 
Tables 8.3(a)–3(c) in this subsection. The discussion pays attention to the youth 
when the data allows. Table 8.3(a) reports the summary statistics of the total sam-
ple including youth for the three areas separately: rural, other urban areas, and 
Dar es Salaam, while Tables 8.3(b) and 8.3(c) reports statistics for youth and other 
adult owners of MSMEs respectively.
Among the 6,134 sampled firms, a total of 5,609 firms have all the information 
that we use in our analysis. Based on the information that is available, we have no 
reason to believe that the firms with missing information are ‘select’ in a particu-

























Table 8.3(a). Rural and urban MSME summary statistics
Names of variables Value unit 
or range
Observations Mean S.D. Observations Mean S.D. Observations Mean S.D.
Business characteristics   Rural  Other urban Dar es Salaam
Number of employees per firm Person 4,163 1.50 0.03 1,093 1.65 0.07 353 1.70 0.09
Number of full-time employees per firm Person 4,163 1.28 0.02 1,093 1.41 0.06 353 1.48 0.07
Annual employment growth [–.09, .25] 4,163 0.10 0.01 1,093 0.10 0.02 353 0.09 0.02
Per cent of firms registered with Brella [0,1] 4,163 0.04 0.01 1,093 0.03 0.01 353 0.04 0.01
Per cent of firms with tax ID [0,1] 4,163 0.03 0.00 1,093 0.08 0.01 353 0.08 0.02
Per cent of firms with business run out  
of home
[0,1] 4,163 0.49 0.01 1,093 0.45 0.02 353 0.52 0.03
Average monthly value added per firm 1,000 TZS 4,163 320 20.94 1,093 404 36.98 353 461 112.90
Average monthly sales per firm 1,000 TZS 4,163 557 71.64 1,093 722 133.12 353 686 123.05
Firm’s age Year 4,163 6.90 0.15 1,093 6.11 0.24 353 5.45 0.47
Per cent of firms with business as  
full-time
[0,1] 4,163 0.77 0.01 1,093 0.82 0.02 353 0.87 0.02
Keeps accounts in ledger [0,1] 4,163 0.31 0.01 1,093 0.36 0.02 353 0.33 0.03
Hires paid workers [0,1] 4,163 0.18 0.02 1,093 0.37 0.05 353 0.37 0.07
>20 customers per day [0,1] 4,163 0.26 0.01 1,093 0.30 0.02 353 0.33 0.03
Firms powers business with electricity [0,1] 4,163 0.08 0.01 1,093 0.30 0.02 353 0.39 0.03
Owner saves in formal bank account [0,1] 4,163 0.04 0.00 1,093 0.13 0.01 353 0.12 0.02
Owner/household characteristics           
Age of owner Year 4,163 36.97 0.25 1,093 35.96 0.43 353 35.90 0.77
Whether owner is female [0,1] 4,163 0.48 0.01 1,093 0.68 0.02 353 0.64 0.03
Per cent of firms with business as main 
source of income

























Names of variables Value unit 
or range
Observations Mean S.D. Observations Mean S.D. Observations Mean S.D.
Business characteristics   Rural  Other urban Dar es Salaam
Per cent of firms with farming as main 
source of income
[0,1] 4,163 0.26 0.01 1,093 0.06 0.01 353 0.00 0.00
Per cent of firms with business as only 
source of income
[0,1] 4,163 0.28 0.01 1,093 0.44 0.02 353 0.51 0.03
Per cent of firms’ households that are 
not poor
[0,1] 4,163 0.45 0.01 1,093 0.54 0.02 353 0.62 0.03
Per cent of firms’ households that are 
moderately poor
[0,1] 4,163 0.35 0.01 1,093 0.32 0.02 353 0.26 0.03
Per cent of firms’ households that are 
very poor
[0,1] 4,163 0.20 0.01 1,093 0.14 0.01 353 0.12 0.02
Notes: Brella is Tanzania’s Business Registration and Licensing Agency which opened in 1999. Household poverty was reported in the survey by an indicator variable equal 
to 0 if the household is not poor, 1 if the household is moderately poor and 2 if the household is very poor. The measure of poverty was computed using monthly household 
income as reported by survey respondents. TZS denote Tanzanian Shillings.















































Table 8.3(b). Rural and urban MSME summary statistics: youth
Names of variables Value unit 
or range
Observations Mean S.D. Observations Mean S.D. Observations Mean S.D.
Business characteristics  Rural Other urban Dar es Salaam
Number of employees per firm Person 1,853 1.39 0.04 493 1.43 0.05 167 1.59 0.11
Number of full-time employees per firm Person 1,853 1.23 0.03 493 1.28 0.06 167 1.39 0.06
Per cent of firms with tax ID [0,1] 1,853 0.02 0.00 493 0.06 0.01 167 0.06 0.02
Per cent of firms with business run out of home [0,1] 1,853 0.46 0.02 493 0.43 0.03 167 0.46 0.05
Firm’s age Year 1,853 4.67 0.13 492 4.11 0.22 166 4.04 0.32
Per cent of firms with business as full-time [0,1] 1,853 0.77 0.02 493 0.84 0.02 167 0.91 0.02
Keeps accounts in ledger [0,1] 1,853 0.30 0.02 493 0.37 0.03 167 0.29 0.04
Hires paid workers [0,1] 1,853 0.14 0.04 493 0.23 0.05 167 0.23 0.07
>20 customers per day [0,1] 1,853 0.28 0.01 493 0.29 0.03 167 0.38 0.05
Owner saves in formal bank account [0,1] 1,853 0.04 0.01 493 0.08 0.01 167 0.11 0.03
Owner/household characteristics           
Age of owner Year 1,853 27.92 0.15 493 27.29 0.26 167 27.77 0.43
Whether owner is female [0,1] 1,853 0.50 0.02 493 0.66 0.03 167 0.55 0.05
Per cent of firms with business as main source 
of income
[0,1] 1,853 0.39 0.02 493 0.32 0.03 167 0.33 0.05
Per cent of firms with farming as main source 
of income
[0,1] 1,853 0.24 0.02 493 0.04 0.01 167 0.00 0.00
Per cent of firms with business as only source 
of income
[0,1] 1,853 0.31 0.02 493 0.51 0.03 167 0.56 0.05
Per cent of firms’ households that are not poor [0,1] 1,853 0.44 0.02 493 0.56 0.03 167 0.69 0.04
Per cent of firms’ households that are very poor [0,1] 1,853 0.20 0.01 493 0.11 0.02 167 0.07 0.02
Notes: Brella is Tanzania’s Business Registration and Licensing Agency which opened in 1999. Household poverty was reported in the survey by an indicator variable equal 
to 0 if the household is not poor, 1 if the household is moderately poor and 2 if the household is very poor. The measure of poverty was computed using monthly household 
income as reported by survey respondents. TZS denote Tanzanian Shillings.
























Table 8.3(c). Rural and urban MSME summary statistics: other adults
Names of variables Value unit 
or range
Observations Mean S.D. Observations Mean S.D. Observations Mean S.D.
Business characteristics   Rural   Other 
urban
  Dar es 
Salaam
 
Number of employees per firm Person 2,310 1.59 0.05 600 1.85 0.12 186 1.83 0.15
Number of full-time employees per firm Person 2,310 1.33 0.02 600 1.54 0.10 186 1.58 0.14
Per cent of firms with tax ID [0,1] 2,310 0.04 0.01 600 0.10 0.01 186 0.10 0.03
Per cent of firms with business run out of home [0,1] 2,310 0.52 0.02 600 0.48 0.03 186 0.59 0.05
Firm’s age Year 2,310 8.77 0.23 600 8.07 0.39 186 7.10 0.90
Per cent of firms with business as full-time [0,1] 2,310 0.76 0.01 600 0.80 0.02 186 0.82 0.03
Keeps accounts in ledger [0,1] 2,310 0.32 0.01 600 0.34 0.02 186 0.39 0.05
Hires paid workers [0,1] 2,310 0.22 0.03 600 0.49 0.10 186 0.54 0.13
>20 customers per day [0,1] 2,310 0.25 0.01 600 0.31 0.03 186 0.26 0.04
Owner saves in formal bank account [0,1] 2,310 0.05 0.01 600 0.17 0.02 186 0.13 0.03
Owner/household characteristics           
Age of owner Year 2,310 44.47 0.27 600 44.29 0.41 186 45.32 0.71
Whether owner is female [0,1] 2,310 0.47 0.02 600 0.70 0.02 186 0.74 0.04
Per cent of firms with business as main source of 
income
[0,1] 2,310 0.43 0.01 600 0.38 0.03 186 0.26 0.04
Per cent of firms with farming as main source of 
income
[0,1] 2,310 0.27 0.01 600 0.09 0.02 186 0.00 0.00
Per cent of firms with business as only source of 
income
[0,1] 2,310 0.26 0.01 600 0.37 0.03 186 0.46 0.05
Per cent of firms’ households that are not poor [0,1] 2,310 0.46 0.02 600 0.53 0.03 186 0.55 0.05
Per cent of firms’ households that are very poor [0,1] 2,310 0.20 0.01 600 0.17 0.02 186 0.18 0.04
Notes: Brella is Tanzania’s Business Registration and Licensing Agency which opened in 1999. Household poverty was reported in the survey by an indicator variable equal 
to 0 if the household is not poor, 1 if the household is moderately poor and 2 if the household is very poor. The measure of poverty was computed using monthly household 
income as reported by survey respondents. TZS denote Tanzanian Shillings.
Source: Authors calculations using the MSME Survey 2010.
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As shown in the first row of Table 8.3(a), most MSMEs are extremely small: 
mean employment is 1.5 in rural areas, 1.65 in urban areas outside Dar es Salaam, 
and 1.7 in Dar es Salaam. The very small size of MSMEs is at least in part due to a 
sample selection bias. The sampling framework is household-based rather than 
enterprise based which means that the survey probably under-sampled busi-
nesses outside households, particularly relatively large-sized firms.
Only 4 per cent of firms in rural areas are registered with Tanzania’s Business 
Registration and Licensing Agency (BRELA), although this is similar to those in 
urban areas.6 By contrast, more urban enterprises (8 per cent) have tax identifi-
cation numbers than rural enterprises (3 per cent). While the MSME survey is a 
household-based survey, 49 per cent of rural firms report that their businesses 
are actually operating out of their homes and the number in urban areas is 
almost identical at 47 per cent. Therefore, the shares of nonfarm enterprises 
reported in Table  8.4 calculated from HBS 2011–12 data could significantly 
underestimate the importance of MSMEs in rural areas, given that HBS captures 
only home businesses.
Because there is no comprehensive registry of informal firms and because 
informal firms dominate the landscape in Tanzania, the sampling framework 
used to conduct the MSME survey is based on the 2002 Census. In addition, enu-
merators conducted interviews at the household level to identify enterprise 
 owners. Thus, the sample is possibly skewed towards rural businesses. We report in 
Table 8.3(a) average monthly value-added and average monthly sales per firm. Value 
added is computed as the firm’s average monthly sales minus the firms’ average 
monthly costs of production. The mean value-added of rural firms is very close to 
the average monthly gross income of a formal employee in Tanzania, which is close 
to 337,000 Tanzanian Shillings according to Tanzania’s Formal Employment and 
Earnings Survey (FEES) in 2010; the number is significantly higher for urban firms, 
especially for firms in Dar es Salaam. However, there is significant variation among 
surveyed firms in monthly value-added, indicated by the high value of the standard 
deviation (s.d.) in Table 8.3(a). This heterogeneity among small informal firms is 
a point to which we will return in detail later in the chapter.
Most MSME firms are young as indicated by the mean age of 6.9 years for 
rural firms, 6.1 years for urban firms outside Dar es Salaam, and 5.5 years for 
firms in Dar es Salaam. This is consistent with our findings in the first section 
that most nonfarm jobs created in Tanzania between 2002 and 2012 were created 
by small informal firms. Table 8.3(a) also indicates that 76 per cent of rural busi-
nesses operate full time, compared to 82 per cent in urban areas outside Dar es 
Salaam and 87 per cent in Dar es Salaam. More than 40 per cent of rural business 
6 BRELA is Tanzania’s Business Registrations and Licensing Agency. It is a Government Executive 
Agency and was established on 28 October 1999. The aim of the agency is to ensure that businesses 
operate in accordance with regulations and to ensure that businesses follow ‘sound principles’.
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owners report that the business is the owner’s main source of income with a sig-
nificantly lower share of rural business owners (28 per cent) reporting that 
the business is the owner’s only source of income. By contrast, 44 per cent and 
51  per cent of urban business owners report that the enterprise is their only 
source of income. Not surprisingly, 26 per cent of rural business owners report 
that farming is their main source of income while only 6 per cent of urban business 
 owners outside Dar es Salaam say that farming is their main source of income 
(none in Dar es Salaam).
Like their businesses, the owners of these small businesses are also relatively 
young. For the full sample the mean age of business owners is roughly 37 years 
in rural and 36 years in urban areas. Comparing the observation number in 
Table 8.3(a) for a full sample to that in Table 8.3(b) for young owners at age 
15–34, it shows that more than 40 per cent of business owners are young, and 
the average age for the young owners is less than 28 years in both rural and 
urban areas.
Table 8.3(a) shows slightly under half of all business owners are women in rural 
areas and the number jumps to 68 per cent and 64 per cent in other urban areas 
and Dar es Salaam, respectively. Among the young owners reported in Table 
8.3(b), the share of women owners is similar as the full sample in rural areas and 
in other urbans but is much lower (at 55 per cent) in Dar es Salaam.
Finally, we report at the bottom of Table 8.3(a) and Table 8.3(b) the three cat-
egor ies of income of the households in which the business owners reside for full 
samples and the young business owners, respectively. The measure of these three 
categories (very poor, modestly poor, and not poor7) was computed using 
monthly household income as reported by survey respondents. In general, house-
holds where the MSME owners reside are less poor: only 20 per cent of rural 
MSME owners live in households that can be described as very poor, and this is 
true also for the young owners. The proportions of MSME owners living in very 
poor urban households are lower than that in rural areas, 17 per cent for other 
urban and 18 per cent in in Dar es Salaam. The shares for young owners residing 
in the very poor urban households are even lower, 11 per cent for other urban and 
7 per cent in Dar es Salaam.
We also report a set of summary of statistics for MSMEs whose owners are not 
young in Table 8.3(c). A t-test is conducted for all the variables reported in Table 
8.3(a) between the young and other adult groups of MSMEs, and the six variables 
for which the t-test is insignificant are dropped from Tables 8.3(b) and 8.3(c). These 
six such variables include ‘percentage of firms registered with BRELA’, ‘average 
monthly value added’, and ‘average monthly sales’ per firm we discussed above.
7 See the definition in the notes of Table 8.3(a).
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We already know that most MSMEs are extremely small, while firms owned by 
younger owners are even smaller. As shown in Table 8.3(b), mean employment 
for such firms is 1.39 (instead of 1.59 for those owned by other adults) in rural 
areas, 1.43 (instead of 1.85) in urban areas outside Dar es Salaam, and 1.59 (instead 
of 1.83) in Dar es Salaam. Smaller size of MSMEs owned by youth could be due to 
relatively young firm age. The mean age for rural firms owned by youth is 4.67 
years, three years younger than rural firms owned by other adults, with mean age 
of 8.77 years. The firm age gap is similar in urban areas between these two groups 
of firms: average age of urban firms owned by youth is 4.11 years outside Dar es 
Salaam and 4.04 years in Dar es Salaam, versus 8.07 and 7.10 years, respectively, 
for urban firms owned by other adults in these two locations.
Forty-three per cent of rural business owners who are not young report that 
the business is their main source of income with a significantly lower share 
(26  per cent) reporting that the business is the owners’ only source of income. 
By contrast, among rural business owners who are young, only 39 per cent report 
that the business is their main source of income but 31 per cent report that the 
business is their only source of income. In the urban areas, there are more young 
owners, 51 per cent in other urban areas and 56 per cent in Dar es Salaam, who 
report that the enterprise is their only source of income, while for urban business 
owners who are not young the percentage is 37 per cent in other urban areas and 
46 per cent in Dar es Salaam. The comparison between youth and other adult 
owners seems to indicate that young owners tend to be more likely to make 
MSMEs their only business both in rural and urban areas. As expected fewer 
MSME owners see farming as their main income source, and the percentage is 
even lower for young owners (24 per cent) than other adult owners (27 per cent).
8.3.3 Methodologies
The empirical strategy employed in this chapter aims to answer two questions: 
(1) What determines whether households participate in the nonfarm economy? 
(2) What determines whether nonfarm enterprises have the potential to grow and 
look more like formal firms and thus belong in what Lewis (1979) dubbed the 
in-between sector? Answers to these questions will contribute to a growing 
literature that recognizes the heterogeneity of nonfarm enterprises (see for 
example Bezu and Barrett 2012, Nagler and Naudé 2016). Both questions require 
the use of descriptive and econometric analyses.
Descriptive statistics for the HBS and MSME data provide a glimpse of the 
heterogeneity that is observed across households and firms. The means and 
standard errors presented in all the descriptive tables of this chapter were generated 
using the sampling design of the two surveys (HBS and MSME).
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The econometric strategy employed in this chapter was motivated by the fact 
that we do not observe the levels of participation in the nonfarm economy, nor do 
we observe the potential of enterprises. We only observe whether these house-
holds and businesses fall within these categories. For the household data of HBS, 
we observe three types of households according to the engagements of household 
members’ primary employment: nonfarm only, farm only, and mixed. The ana-
lysis thus focuses on the comparison of nonfarm households and the other types 
of households. For the firm data analysis using MSME survey, the high potential 
businesses are identified based on whether labour productivity is greater than the 
economy-wide productivity in the trade sector and we call small firms with high 
potential as ‘in-between’ firms following Lewis (1979).8 In practice, this means 
that the left-hand side variable is binary in nature in the econometric analysis.
We use a probit model9 for the two analyses using data from the HBS and 
MSME surveys. The probit model assumes that the actual y (left-hand side variable) 
is latent, that is, it is not observable but is inferred from variables that are 
observed. Equation (1) shows this relationship.
 Pr Pry x y x= =1| * |( ) >( )0  (1)
Where y is an indicator variable for whether a certain household or business 
meets the criteria described above and y * is an unobserved variable that when 
greater than 0 causes y to be equal to 1 (for example, being a nonfarm only rural 
household in the HBS probit model or an in-between firm in the MSME model) 
and 0 otherwise.
The specifications of the probit models are provided in the Section 8.4 for the 
HBS survey and the Section 8.5 for the MSME survey. Marginal effects are 
reported. The marginal effects can be interpreted as the change in the predicted 
probability given a 1 unit change in the right-hand side in the case of continuous 
variables or a discrete change in the case of categorical variables. All estimations 
present robust standard errors in accordance to the sampling design. Since the 
survey was not in any way stratified and subnational units are not representative, 
we have not clustered the standard errors to any specific subnational location.
8 Labour productivity is measured by value-added per worker at the firm level. We only consider 
firms to be in-between if their labour productivity is higher than the economy-wide productivity of 
the trade sector.
9 Given the fact that the observed variable ranges between 0 and 1, traditional ordinary least 
squares regression analysis is not appropriate for two main reasons: First, some of the fitted values 
obtained from an OLS regression may and mostly likely will be outside the interval of 0 and 1 and 
hence yielding biased and non-valid inferences. Second, a probit model is more efficient if the error 
term follows a normal distribution.
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8.4 Characteristics of Households with Rural Nonfarm  
Activities—An Analysis at the Household  
Level Using HBS data
We begin this section for an analysis at the rural household level using the data of 
HBS 2011–12. The analysis focuses on assessing the size of rural nonfarm economy 
by number (or share) of rural households that participate in such nonfarm 
economy and the differences between households with and without rural 
 nonfarm participation.
8.4.1 How Large is the Rural Nonfarm Economy?
Using the HBS and according to the primary employment of households’ members 
we first classify rural households into three types: (a) agriculture-only households 
without engagement of rural nonfarm activity; (b) households engaged in both 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities (mixed type); and (c) households with 
non-agricultural activity only without engagement in agriculture. For the last 
two types we further disaggregate them by with and without nonfarm home 
businesses (enterprises). Table 8.4 reports the distribution of the three types of 
households by shares of household, population, and employment. We also con-
sider youth separately in this distribution either for youth as heads of households 
or as family members.
Table 8.4. Distribution of three types of rural households in Tanzania in 2012
 Agri. & non-agri. mixed Non-agriculture only












Share by household 
numbers
61.4 22.1 5.4 5.8 5.4
Share by youth-headed 
households
56.9 20.5 4.7 8.7 9.2
Share by population 58.4 25.8 6.3 5.1 4.4
Share by employment 59.4 26.6 6.6 3.9 3.5
Share by youth 
employment
58.1 24.1 5.3 6.1 6.4
Notes: The HBS asked individual households whether they have a home business and an ISIC rev4 code 
is used for assigning sectors to the business. We consider ISIC non-agricultural sectors only as 
nonfarm enterprises. The employment of non-agriculture is defined by the current primary 
employment that is not in agriculture.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data of HBS 2011–12 (NBS 2014a)
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Like other low income countries in Africa, most regions in Tanzania are pre-
dominantly rural (Davis, Di Guiseppe, and Zezza 2014). Farming activity dom in-
ates rural Tanzania—more than 60 per cent of rural households engage only in 
agricultural activities in 2012 (Table 8.4), and less than 40 per cent engage in non-
farm in different ways. More youth-headed rural households engage in nonfarm 
activities than the rural average, but still the majority of such households engage 
only in agricultural activities (Table 8.4). For many rural households with non-
farm activities, these activities are part of their livelihood side-by-side with farm-
ing, that is, they are agricultural and non-agricultural mixed households 
accounting for 27.5 per cent total rural households and 25.2 per cent youth-
headed rural households. Approximately 11 per cent of households specialized in 
rural nonfarm and the share is much higher (17.9 per cent) for youth-headed 
rural households. A small portion of rural households who participate in both 
farm and nonfarm economies have own nonfarm businesses, while about half of 
households who specialize in rural nonfarm have their own nonfarm business 
(and the other half are the employment participants of rural nonfarm, Table 8.4).
8.4.2 Characteristics of Households  
in the Rural Nonfarm Economy
We explain the differences between households with and without rural nonfarm 
activities using a probit model for a set of household characteristics and a set of 
community variables. The community variables were used to capture the pres-
ence of public goods. The equation below provides the specification of the model,
 y ai i j r i* = + ( ) + ( ) + ( ) +β β β ε1 2 3H C D  
where Hi is a vector of households’ characteristics, Cj is a vector of infrastructure 
or other community level factors, and Dr is a set of regional dummies. The vari-
ables in the vector Hi include a dummy for youth (age 15–34) as household heads, 
a dummy for female as heads of households, number of youth in households, 
dummies for the levels of education of the household heads (less than primary as 
comparable), dummies for farm size defined by cultivated areas that are cat egor-
ized into four groups: no-land, farms with land less than 2 ha, farms with land 
2–5 ha, and farms with land greater than 5 ha (farms with land less than 2 ha as 
comparable), and a dummy for households with paid loans to banks or family 
friends in the past 12 months. Vector Cj contains a set of variables related to access 
to infrastructure at the community level and other community level factors 
including daily public transformation to regional capital, electricity, mobile phone 
signal, internet, banks, informal finance, cooperatives, a major state employer (for 
























Table 8.5. The marginal effect of probit regression results using 2012 HBS data
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 HH with nonfarm 
compared with 
those without
Nonfarm HH only, 
compared with all 
others
HH with nonfarm 
enterprises,  
compared with all 
others
Nonfarm HH only, 
compared with the 
mixed
HH with nonfarm 
enterprises 
compared with 
HH with nonfarm 
job
Household variables      












Female-headed households –0.026 0.019 –0.033 0.071** –0.027
 (0.023) (0.012) (0.020) (0.025) (0.031)
Level of education (less than 
primary as the comparable)
     
Primary 0.099*** 0.056*** 0.075*** 0.081* –0.014
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.019) (0.032) (0.030)
Secondary 0.378*** 0.188*** 0.084* 0.286*** –0.217***
 (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040)












Cultivated land (with less than 2ha 
land as the comparable)
     
No cultivated land 0.470*** 0.236*** 0.117*** 0.360*** –0.160***
 (0.042) (0.018) (0.033) (0.028) (0.031)
2-5ha –0.002 –0.037** 0.027 –0.082*** 0.087**
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.021) (0.023) (0.034)
>5 ha 0.070 –0.028 0.062 –0.083 0.021
 (0.037) (0.024) (0.035) (0.056) (0.047)
HH paid loans to bank or family 




































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 HH with nonfarm 
compared with 
those without
Nonfarm HH only, 
compared with all 
others
HH with nonfarm 
enterprises,  
compared with all 
others
Nonfarm HH only, 
compared with the 
mixed
HH with nonfarm 
enterprises 
compared with 
HH with nonfarm 
job
Community variables      












Electricity in EA –0.030 –0.009 –0.038 0.008 –0.032
 (0.048) (0.019) (0.044) (0.036) (0.040)
Mobile signal in EA –0.058 0.035 –0.060 0.112** –0.029
 (0.047) (0.021) (0.037) (0.041) (0.042)
Internet in the EA 0.018 0.004 0.025 –0.022 0.026
 (0.059) (0.017) (0.057) (0.037) (0.069)
Bank in the EA 0.124 0.003 0.099 –0.048 0.044
 (0.148) (0.048) (0.152) (0.130) (0.145)
























Major employer (that is, business 











Weekly market in the EA 0.074 0.041** 0.048 0.064* –0.028
 (0.039) (0.014) (0.035) (0.031) (0.034)
Obs 4,011 4,011 4,011 1,569 1,569
Note: Only rural households are included in the regressions. Number of the sample obs. is 4,130. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Source: Probit regression results using 2012 Tanzania HBS data (NBS 2014a).
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We report the marginal effects of the probit regression results in Table  8.5. 
Different columns of Table 8.5 report the results when rural households who have 
nonfarm activities are compared to different groups of other households. In col-
umn (1), the rural households with nonfarm (including those either specializing 
in nonfarm or in the mixed group) are compared to those specializing in farming 
( yi* =1  for rural households with nonfarm). In column (2) rural households 
specializing in nonfarm (= 1) are compared to all others. In column (3) house-
holds with nonfarm enterprises (= 1) are compared to all others. In column (4) 
households specializing in nonfarm activities (= 1) are compared to agricultural/
non-agricultural mixed households. Finally, in column (5) households specializing 
in nonfarm with nonfarm enterprises (= 1) are compared to those specializing in 
nonfarm without nonfarm enterprises (that is, with only nonfarm jobs).
We start with the probit regression results associated with youth as household 
heads. The results of different regressions indicate that being a youth-headed 
household increases the probability of specializing in rural nonfarm activities by 
2 and 6 per cent (columns (2) and (4)), but they do not seem very different from 
other households when agriculture is still part of their household’s livelihood 
(columns (1) and (3)). Among households specializing in nonfarm activities, 
youth headed households with nonfarm enterprises are not different from other 
households only having nonfarm jobs (column (5)). In general, female-headed 
households in nonfarm households are not different from other households. Only 
when female headed households are compared to mixed households, do we 
observe a 7 per cent increase in the probability of specializing in nonfarm 
ac tiv ities (column (4)). Households with more young family members have a 
greater probability to engage in nonfarm activity, ranging from 2 to 4 per cent 
(columns (1) and (3)) when agriculture is still part of the household’s livelihood. 
However, when we focus on the households specializing in nonfarm, a higher 
number of young family members generate either no difference from other 
households (columns (2) and (5)) or decreased probability of specializing on 
nonfarm activities (by 2 per cent, column (4)). Households that have paid loans 
to banks or family friends in the past 12 months show an increase of 5 to 20 per cent 
in the likelihood of engaging in nonfarm activities depending on the comparison 
group. Thus, it may be because they specialize in nonfarm activities, they bor-
rowed in the past and have to pay back (and columns (2) and (3) might be used to 
support this argument).10, 11
The probit regression results show that the most important determinant 
of  whether a household engages in nonfarm activities is the education of the 
10 Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, we can rule out the possibility of simultaneity bias.
11 On the other hand, it is possible that past borrowing has nothing to do with nonfarm businesses 
and paying back such debt forces households to engage in rural nonfarm activities in addition to 
farming to earn some cash income (and column (1) might be used to support this argument). The lit-
erature suggests that both stories are plausible.
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household head. Households whose head has a primary education observe an 
increase of 5 to 10 per cent in the probability of engaging in nonfarm enterprises 
compared to without primary education (except for households with nonfarm 
jobs). For a household whose head has secondary or more education, the increase 
in the probability of engaging in nonfarm activities is between 8 and 38 per cent. 
However, we also note that more educated households are less likely to own their 
own businesses, which is consistent with the idea that higher levels of education 
are often the requirement for a regular nonfarm job in rural areas.
We also consider the relationship between participation in nonfarm activities, 
farm size, and whether a household has access to land. Households without 
farmland witness a greater increase in the probability of engaging in nonfarm 
businesses than households with farm land less than 2 hectares. Only when 
households specializing in nonfarm and having their own business are compared 
to households with nonfarm jobs, it shows that households without land are less 
likely to have their own business and more likely to have nonfarm jobs. Among 
the households with land, the impact of farm size is mixed. Households with 
farmland between 2 and 5 hectares often witness a decrease in the probability of 
engaging in nonfarm businesses than households with the smallest plots. This 
relationship disappears for households with more than 5 ha of land possibly 
because relatively few households have this much land.
In Table 8.5, we also explore whether community level variables such as public 
infrastructure, financial services, and market activity play a role in determining 
the prevalence of rural nonfarm activity. These variables are part of community 
questionnaires of HBS 2011–12. We use access to daily public transport to the 
regional capital as a proxy for road access. The result shows that households 
in  communities with access to daily public transportation observe increases of 
4–8 per cent in the probability of participating in nonfarm activities. While the 
use of electricity for doing business especially in the manufacturing sector is 
important, the variable is insignificant in all five specifications; this is also true for 
access to the internet. This may be because access to electricity and the internet 
access at the community level do not necessarily imply access at the household 
level. Alternatively, it could be a result of the fact that products produced in 
this manu fac tur ing are not very demanding in terms of electricity.12 Availability 
of a mobile phone signal increases the predicted probability of specializing in 
nonfarm ac tiv ities by 11 per cent relative to mixed households, but is insignificant 
in the other regressions. We also find no significance of the presence of formal 
banks. On the other hand, access to informal finance increases the predicted 
probability of participating in nonfarm activities and engaging in nonfarm 
businesses, but reduces the probability of specializing in nonfarm activities. 
Results for the access to formal and informal finance at the community level seem 
to indicate informal financing is the main channel to borrow money.
12 We thank our reviewer for pointing out this possibility.
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The presence of cooperatives in communities reduces the likelihood of nonfarm 
activities by a range of 4 to 11 per cent. This is perhaps because communities with 
cooperatives are more heavily agricultural. On the other hand, the existence of a 
major state employer such as a business or a factory in the community increases 
the probability of specializing in rural nonfarm activities by 6 to 16 per cent 
depending on the comparison group but reduces the probability of running 
household businesses relative to working in nonfarm jobs (column (5))—prob ably 
because in communities with such state-run businesses, nonfarm jobs are more 
plentiful and attractive. Finally, the existence of a weekly market increases the 
probability of a household specializing in rural nonfarm activities relative to all 
other households and relative to mixed households. The mixed results regarding 
the role of infrastructure are puzzling. As noted, this may be because the com-
munity level variables are too ‘rough’ a proxy for access at the household level. 
However, the lack of significance of these variables may also be associated with 
the small scale of rural nonfarm enterprises. According to Tybout (2000), low 
levels of economic density and interaction may lead to small, diffuse pockets of 
demand, which in turn result in small, localized production and services. We 
revisit this issue in the Section 8.5 using the MSME data.
8.5 Characteristics of Rural Nonfarm Enterprises  
and Their Owners—An Analysis at the  
Firm Level using MSME Survey Data
A vibrant rural nonfarm sector can play an important role in rural trans form ation. 
To get at the extent to which the rural nonfarm sector can play a role in labour 
productivity growth and poverty reduction in rural areas, we use the MSME 
survey data to examine the motivations of business owners in the rural nonfarm 
sector as well as the characteristics of their businesses. In previous work (Diao, 
Kweka, and McMillan 2017) we identified a group of MSMEs that belong in what 
Arthur Lewis (1979) referred to as the in-between sector. According to Lewis 
(1979) these firms play an important role in the transformation process. In that 
work, we showed that rural enterprises are on average slightly less productive 
than their urban counterparts (and this is confirmed again in Table 8.3(a) of the 
Section 8.3 in this chapter) but we did not explore in detail the characteristics of 
rural enterprises or rural entrepreneurs. We also did not compare characteristics 
of rural entrepreneurs and enterprises across geographic locations due to the 
limit ed observations in many geographic locations.
We begin with a description of location and industrial composition of MSMEs. 
We follow this with an exploration of the extent to which rural entrepreneurs are 
in business solely for the purposes of survival, for example, ‘reluctant entrepre-
neurs’, or whether they are in business because they can make a good living this 
way. To get at these issues, we examine the following: (i) self-reported mo tiv ations 
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for business ownership; (ii) the productive heterogeneity of MSMEs; and 
(iii) employment growth in MSMEs.
8.5.1 Locations and Industrial Composition of MSMEs
In Table 8.6, we report the distribution of employment and numbers of MSMEs by 
rural, other urban, and Dar es Salaam, and we also compare such distribution with 
the distribution of population. We also report the distributions for MSMEs owned 
by youth and by other adults separately. While more than 67 per cent of population 
live in rural areas, rural MSMEs account for 52 per cent of total MSME employ-
ment and number of firms. The percentages of employment and numbers of firms 
owned by youth in rural areas are slightly lower (49.8 per cent) than the MSMEs 
owned by other adults (52 per cent and 54 per cent respectively) in rural areas.
There seems to be a similar relationship between the distribution of MSME 
employment/firms and distribution of population in Dar es Salaam and in other 
urban areas. 15.8 per cent of MSME employment and 17.3 per cent of MSME firms 
are in Dar es Salaam, where 12.2 per cent of the national population resides. 
Likewise, 32.6 per cent of MSME employment and 30.7 per cent of MSME firms 
are in other urban areas, which contain 20.4 per cent of the population. The 
breakdown of MSMEs owned by youth and other adults also follows a similar 
proportion (Table 8.6).
In Table  8.7, we report the industrial distribution of MSMEs by rural, other 
urban, and Dar es Salaam. We further look at the distributions for the two sub-
groups: MSMEs owned by youth and by other adults in the table. Although the 
MSMEs operate in a wide range of activities, the bulk of these activities can be 
classified into trade services (80 per cent) and manufacturing (15 per cent). 
However, more rural firms (19.8 per cent) engage in manufacturing than the 
urban firms (10.1 per cent in other urban and 7.2 per cent in Dar es Salaam). This 
can also be seen from the second panel of Table 8.7, that is, 72 per cent of total 
manufacturing firms are in rural areas but 52 per cent of total trade service firms 
are in rural areas. This is an expected pattern, as manufacturing enterprises operate 
mainly in food processing, which has strong links to agriculture. Without further 
information, however, it is not possible to identify which ones and exactly how 
these linkages work. This is an important area for future research. Between the 
two urban locations, more trade service firms are in Dar es Salaam (87.6 per cent) 
than in other urban areas (83.0 per cent)—a clearly demand-driven pattern in 
small firms’ establishment in urban areas.
Comparing youth owners to other adult owners, youth seem to engage more in 
trade services than other adults, who engage more in manufacturing. The exception 
is in other urban locations where more MSMEs owned by other adults are in trade 
business and youth engage more in either manufacturing or other businesses.
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Table 8.6. Distribution of population and MSMEs (weighted, percentage)
 Population MSME employment Number of business
 All All MSMEs
Rural 67.4 51.6 52.1
Other urban 20.4 32.6 30.7
Dar Es Salaam 12.2 15.8 17.3
Total 100 100 100
 Youth MSMEs owned by youth (15–34)
Rural 65.0 49.8 49.8
Other urban 21.3 32.0 31.3
Dar Es Salaam 13.7 18.2 18.9
Total 100 100 100
 Other adults MSMEs owned by other adults
Rural 70.6 52.9 54.1
Other urban 19.2 33.1 30.0
Dar Es Salaam 10.3 14.0 15.9
Total 100 100 100
Source: Population is from HBS (2012) and MSME employment and number are from MSME 
survey (2010).
Table 8.7. Sectoral distribution of rural and urban MSME firms in the survey 
(weighted, percentage)
 Per cent of total in each location Per cent of total in each sector








Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 54.2 31.2 14.6
Manufacturing 19.8 10.1 7.2 14.9 71.9 21.1 7.1
Trade services 76.5 83.0 87.6 80.2 51.7 32.3 16.0
Others 3.8 6.9 5.2 4.9 41.1 43.5 15.4
Youth owners        
Youth total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 53.0 29.9 17.1
Manufacturing 15.1 11.2 3.5 12.0 67.1 27.9 5.0
Trade services 81.7 77.2 93.3 82.4 52.6 28.1 19.4
Others 3.2 11.6 3.1 5.7 29.5 61.0 9.5
Other adult owners       
Other adult total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 54.7 31.8 13.5
Manufacturing 21.8 9.6 9.3 16.2 73.5 18.8 7.8
Trade services 74.2 85.5 84.3 79.2 51.3 34.3 14.4
Others 4.0 4.9 6.4 4.6 47.6 33.7 18.7
Source: Authors calculations using the MSME Survey 2010.
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8.5.2 Self-reported Motivations of Small Business Owners
The MSME survey includes three questions designed to elicit the reasons for open-
ing a business. Responses to such self-reported motivations for a business could 
help us assess the extent to which rural entrepreneurs are in business solely for the 
purposes of survival, for example, ‘reluctant entrepreneurs’, or whether they are in 
business because they can make a good living this way. The responses to these ques-
tions are tabulated using sample weights in Tables 8.8–8.10. In these three tables, we 
also report responses separately for young and other adult owners in addition to the 
total samples. Again, in the youth and other adult panels of the tables, we only 
report variables that are statistically different between youth and other adults.
The first question is: What was your main occupation before you started this 
business? Responses to this question are reported in order of how often they were 
recorded in Table 8.8. The biggest difference between rural and urban entrepre-
neurs is that 56.5 per cent of rural entrepreneurs report that their main occupa-
tion prior to starting the business was farming; the share is only 19.3 per cent in 
urban areas outside Dar es Salaam. Very few respondents (4.8 per cent) in rural 
areas report that they were unemployed prior to starting the business; this is not 
true in urban areas where 11.3 and 9.7 per cent of MSME owners in other urban 
and Dar es Salaam report that they were unemployed before starting their busi-
ness. Unlike in rural areas, urban business owners are much more likely to report 
that they were previously employed in a private company or running a similar 
sized business in another line of business. It is also much more common for urban 
business owners to report that they were previously a housewife or homemaker 
(26.6 per cent in other urban and 34.1 per cent in Dar es Salaam) than for rural 
respondents (12.3 per cent).
The second and third panels of Table 8.8 are the summaries of the responses 
from youth owners and other adult owners of MSMEs. The responses to many 
questions are not significantly different between these two subgroups of MSMEs, 
and therefore such responses are not included in the table. For many of the 
remaining responses in Table 8.8, the differences between youth and other adults 
are insignificant in rural areas, but significant in urban areas. For example, similar 
large shares (52.5 and 59.8 per cent) of rural young and other adult entrepreneurs 
report that their main occupation prior to starting the business was farming; but 
in other urban areas, the share is only 15.6 per cent for young respondents while it 
is 23.0 per cent of other adult respondents. In other urban areas 14.2 per cent of 
MSME young owners report that they were unemployed before starting their 
business, while the share is only 8.5 per cent for other adult owners. Interesting, 
10.6 per cent of Dar es Salaam’s non-youth entrepreneurs report that they used to 
be a government employee or a civil servant, compared to only 1.9 per cent of 
youth entrepreneurs (and similar small shares, 0.5 per cent and 3.7 per cent, for 
young and other adult owners in other urban areas). The fact that 11 per cent of 
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Table 8.8. Occupation prior to starting business of MSMEs (weighted, percentage)






Unemployed 4.8 11.3 9.7 7.6
Housewife (homemaker) 12.3 26.6 34.1 20.0
In education, at various levels 3.2 5.5 5.4 4.2
Employed in large private enterprise in 
similar business
0.4 1.7 2.9 1.2
Employed in large private enterprise in 
a different business
1.7 4.7 6.9 3.4
Employed in a similar sized private 
business in the same line of business
0.6 1.5 1.9 1.0
Employed in a similar sized private 
business in another line of business
0.6 0.8 3.0 1.0
Ran a similar sized business in the  
same line of business
0.9 2.0 1.9 1.4
Ran a similar sized enterprise in  
another line of business
9.5 16.4 20.0 13.2
Civil servant/employed by the  
government
1.8 2.1 6.0 2.5
I was employed by some individual 0.6 2.2 1.9 1.3
Rearing of cattle 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.4
Farming 56.5 19.3 0.7 36.7
I was selling food 0.6 1.4 1.1 0.9
Others 4.8 3.5 2.4 4.0
None 1.2 0.6 2.0 1.1
Youth owners     
Unemployed 5.3 14.2 9.8 8.9
In education, at various levels 5.4 9.5 8.7 7.2
Employed in large private enterprise  
in similar business
0.7 2.0 3.9 1.7
Employed in a similar sized private 
business in the same line of business
0.6 2.4 3.5 1.6
Employed in a similar sized private 
business in another line of business
0.7 0.1 3.3 0.9
Civil servant/employed by the  
government
0.4 0.5 1.9 0.7
Farming 52.5 15.6 0.5 32.1
Others 3.5 2.9 2.5 3.2
Other adult owners     
Unemployed 4.5 8.5 9.5 6.4
In education, at various levels 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.5
Employed in large private enterprise  
in similar business
0.2 1.3 1.8 0.8
Employed in a similar sized private 
business in the same line of business
0.6 0.6 – 0.5
Employed in a similar sized private 
business in another line of business
0.6 1.5 2.7 1.2
Civil servant/employed by the  
government
3.0 3.7 10.6 4.2
Continued
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Table 8.8. Continued





Farming 59.8 23.0 1.0 41.0
Others 5.8 4.0 2.2 4.8
Note: This table is prepared based on the question ‘what was your main occupation before you started 
this business?’ in the MSME survey, and a unique answer is provided by individual MSME owners. 
Number of the full sample obs. is 4,163, and 1,853 for the MSMEs with youth as owners. The sum of 
each column in the first panel for all MSMEs is 100.
Source: Authors calculations using the MSME Survey 2010.
other adult owners of MSMEs in the country’s largest city seem to give up a paid 
government job to open their own enterprises deserves more analysis to fully 
understand the motivation of small business entrepreneurs.
The second question is: for what reason did you choose your line of business? 
Responses to this question are reported in Table 8.9 by three broad sectors: manu-
fac tur ing, trade services, and other services as well as by rural, other urban, and 
Dar es Salaam. Again, the responses that are statistically different between young 
and other adult owners are reported for these two subgroups separately in the 
table. In rural areas, half of all business owners say that the reason they chose 
their line of business is because they saw a market opportunity. This response is 
similar for manufacturing and trade services. The shares for the similar response 
are lower in other urban areas and in Dar es Salaam than in rural areas. The 
second most common reason for operating in a line of business in rural areas is 
that the owners’ capital could only finance that line of business, which is more 
common in urban areas. This seems to indicate that capital constraint for small 
business development is more binding in urban than in rural areas. The third 
most common reason for picking a line of business in rural areas was prior 
experience in that line of business, but apportionment for this reason are much 
lower than the two previous ones. Among young and other owners, the order of 
these three reasons are similar, which tells us that when coming to decide what 
kind of business, the reasons are similar regardless of young and other adult 
entrepreneurs in either rural or urban areas.
The third question is: if you were offered a full-time salary-paying job, would you 
take it? Responses to this question are reported in Table 8.10 and indicate that only 
46.6 per cent of all small business owners would leave their current business for a 
full-time salaried position, but the share is higher in rural areas and other urban 
areas (47.8 and 48.6 per cent respectively) than in Dar es Salaam (37.7 per cent). 
Young adults show a stronger preference for a full-time salary job (instead of being 
a business owner). In rural areas 54 per cent of young owners would prefer a full-
























Table 8.9. Reasons for business choice by broad sector in MSME survey (weighted, percentage)
 Rural enterprise Other urban enterprises Enterprise in Dar es Salaam













All MSMEs          
I had previous experience 
in this line
25.0 15.2 18.3 39.6 15.5 19.5 37.0 9.7 18.5
Friends/relatives are in  
this line
20.6 13.4 14.8 21.0 19.4 17.8 13.2 16.4 12.8
I saw a market  
opportunity
48.2 51.6 50.0 36.3 43.1 41.6 14.6 46.4 39.2
My capital could only 
finance this business
36.1 42.1 41.8 26.2 47.4 43.3 46.8 46.8 47.7
No apparent reason 2.9 6.0 4.5 4.3 2.9 4.2 3.2 5.2 4.7
I could start business 
gradually
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.6
Goods are easy to 
manufacture and sell
1.4 2.0 2.0 0.2 1.5 1.6 0.0 0.9 1.0
I just wanted to be near 
my house
0.8 1.0 0.9 0.0 1.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.4
I have been trained in it, 
I am an expert
1.6 0.4 0.6 6.2 0.1 1.1 9.4 0.4 0.9
Goods are available 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 2.7 1.4
I perceived it to be  
profitable
1.3 1.6 1.7 0.0 2.6 1.8 0.0 0.2 0.1
I liked it 0.7 1.0 1.3 3.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.1
Business does not have 
many problems
1.4 0.6 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.6 1.2
Other 1.0 2.5 2.2 5.7 2.4 3.1 1.3 3.2 2.4

























Youth owners          
I had previous  
experience in this line
22.9 13.9 17.6 42.7 12.5 18.5 30.8 11.1 19.2
Friends/relatives are in  
this line
22.3 14.9 15.0 26.8 25.2 22.1 2.2 21.4 15.4
I saw a market  
opportunity
52.1 51.7 50.9 37.7 43.3 40.4 2.2 43.0 36.2
My capital could only 
finance this business
37.7 44.5 43.6 15.4 45.3 39.9 74.3 48.6 50.0
No apparent reason 1.9 6.0 4.8 8.7 4.8 6.8 0.0 2.6 4.0
I just wanted to be near  
my house
0.0 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
I liked it 0.7 1.4 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.1 4.0 0.0 0.7
Other adult owners          
I had previous experience 
in this line
26.2 16.5 18.9 37.3 18.2 20.5 42.4 7.8 17.7
Friends/relatives are in  
this line
19.7 11.9 14.6 16.6 14.0 13.6 22.7 10.0 9.8
I saw a market  
opportunity
46.1 51.6 49.2 35.2 42.9 42.8 25.4 50.7 42.7
My capital could only 
finance this business
35.2 39.8 40.3 34.3 49.4 46.6 22.9 44.5 45.0
No apparent reason 3.5 6.0 4.3 0.9 1.2 1.7 5.9 8.5 5.4
I just wanted to be near my 
house
1.2 0.8 1.0 0.0 3.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.9
I liked it 0.8 0.7 0.7 4.3 0.2 1.2 0.0 2.4 1.6
Note: Number of the full sample obs. is 4,163, and 1,853 for the MSMEs with youth as owners. Multiple answers are allowed for individual MSME owners.
Source: Authors calculations using the MSME Survey 2010.
Table 8.9. Continued
 Rural enterprise Other urban enterprises Enterprise in Dar es Salaam
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Table 8.10. Job satisfaction in MSME survey (weighted, percentage)





All MSMEs     
If you were offered a full-time salary  
paying job, would you take it?
47.8 48.6 37.7 46.6
Who would you rather work for?     
A large private company 17.9 27.4 43.1 24.0
Government 68.6 62.9 44.6 63.9
Someone else’s business 10.5 6.2 10.8 9.1
Anywhere 3.0 3.4 1.5 3.0
And why do you say that?     
Better security of income 81.7 83.8 81.4 82.3
Shorter hours 5.1 5.7 3.5 5.1
Less risk 1.8 1.8 3.0 1.9
To get pension 1.5 1.6 – 1.4
I am less educated 2.2 0.9 1.9 1.8
They listen to the opinions of the 
employees
1.1 1.0 – 1.0
As long as I get a living 0.6 0.4 – 0.5
Job security 2.1 0.6 – 1.4
Others 2.2 2.3 9.9 3.1
None/Nothing 1.7 2.1 0.2 1.6
Youth owners     
If you were offered a full-time salary  
paying job, would you take it?
54.0 52.9 38.2 51.1
Who would you rather work for?     
A large private company 20.0 36.7 33.8 27.2
Government 65.4 54.8 49.6 59.9
Someone else’s business 11.0 6.0 14.0 9.7
Anywhere 3.7 2.6 2.7 3.2
And why do you say that?     
Better security of income 81.5 86.2 80.4 82.9
Shorter hours 4.0 4.6 3.5 4.1
Less risk 2.2 2.7 5.5 2.8
To get pension 0.9 1.4 – 1.0
I am less educated 2.7 0.7 3.6 2.2
They listen to the opinions of the 
employees
0.9 0.4 – 0.6
As long as I get a living 0.8 0.2 – 0.5
Job security 2.5 0.4 – 1.5
Others 2.8 1.4 6.6 2.8
None/Nothing 1.6 1.9 0.4 1.6
Other adult owners     
If you were offered a full-time salary  
paying job, would you take it?
42.6 44.4 37.1 42.5
Who would you rather work for?     
A large private company 15.7 16.9 54.3 20.4
Government 72.0 72.2 38.7 68.3
Continued
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areas where 52.9 per cent of young adults prefer a full-time paying job compared to 
44 per cent for other adults.
Approximately, 64 per cent all respondents who would prefer a full-time sal ar-
ied job say they would like to work for the government, and the proportions are 
68.6 and 62.9 per cent in rural and other urban areas but only 44.6 per cent in 
Dar es Salaam, where more government jobs are concentrated. The responses 
from rural and other urban MSME owners are consistent with results reported in 
Duflo and Banerjee’s analysis of the economic lives of the poor (2007). Between 
youth and other adults, other adults seem to prefer a government job than youth 
in rural and other urban areas, but the opposite occurs in Dar es Salaam where 
youth prefer government jobs than other adults. Large private companies are 
more attractive to small business owners in Dar es Salaam than in other places 
particularly among other adults. The predominant reason for preferring a full-
time salaried position is better security of income, which is consistent between 
youth and other adults and across different locations.
Table 8.10. Continued





Someone else’s business 9.9 6.5 7.0 8.5
Anywhere 2.4 4.3 – 2.7
And why do you say that?     
Better security of income 81.8 80.9 82.6 81.6
Shorter hours 6.2 6.9 3.5 6.1
Less risk 1.4 0.6 – 1.0
To get pension 2.1 1.9 – 1.8
I am less educated 1.7 1.1 – 1.4
They listen to the opinions of the 
employees
1.3 1.7 – 1.3
As long as I get a living 0.4 0.6 – 0.4
Job security 1.7 0.7 – 1.2
Others 1.5 3.3 13.8 3.5
None/Nothing 1.7 2.3 – 1.7
Note: This table is prepared based on three questions: (1) ‘If you were offered a full-time 
salary paying job, would you take it?’ (2) ‘Who would you rather work for?’ and (3) 
‘Why do you say that?’ A unique answer is provided by individual MSME owners to 
each of the last two questions. Rural, urban, and national total MSMEs, MSMEs owned 
by youth, and MSMEs owned by other adults for the sum of these two questions are 100 
respectively. Number of the full sample obs. is 4,163, and 1,853 for the MSMEs with 
youth as owners.
Source: Authors calculations using the MSME Survey 2010.
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8.5.3 The Productive Heterogeneity of Rural Enterprises
We use kernel densities of the log of value added to examine the productive 
heterogeneity of MSMEs. Value added is computed as the firm’s average monthly 
sales minus the firms’ average monthly costs of production and is in nominal 
units of local currency. Firms in the MSME database report sales monthly and 
thus we can take seasonality into account. Our analysis of the productive hetero-
geneity of firms in the MSME sector reveals two important features of these firms.
First, there is a significant degree of productive heterogeneity among both 
rural and urban enterprises. This can be seen by examining the density of the log 
of value added per worker in Figure 8.2. Value added per worker is reported for 
both rural enterprises and urban enterprises, and urban enterprises are further 
disaggregated into other urban and Dar es Salaam. We also create a figure 
(Figure 8.3) for value added per worker for small businesses owned by youth and 
by other adults. In both Figures 8.2 and 8.3 the vertical lines represent average 
labour productivity in Tanzania’s economy in 2010 in the agricultural sector 
(light gray), the trade services sector (middle gray) and the manufacturing sector 
(dark gray). Surprisingly, the distribution of the log of value added per worker 
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Figure 8.2. The distribution of the log of value added per worker among MSMEs in 
2010 by location
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urban firms. In fact, a test of stochastic dominance13 rejects the hypothesis that 
the rural and urban distributions are not identical. Also, there is little difference 
between small businesses owned by youth and owned by other adults. One reason 
for this may be the fact that medium-sized enterprises that are mainly in urban 
areas appear to be under-sampled in the MSME survey due to the reliance on 
households for the sampling framework.
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 also reveal that a little over half of the firms in the MSME 
sector have labour productivity levels higher than the economy-wide average in 
agriculture and that this is true in all the three locations. This is not surprising 
and is consistent with evidence presented by Diao, Kweka, and McMillan (2017) 
who show that average productivity in the sectors dominated by small firms is 
consistently higher than average productivity in agriculture. We can also see from 
Figure  8.2 that around 15 per cent of rural MSMEs have labour productivity 
higher than economy-wide manufacturing labour productivity. This too is con-
sistent with Diao, Kweka, and McMillan (2017) who find that 15 per cent of total 
MSMEs in Tanzania account for 70 per cent of the total value added generated by 
the MSME sector. By contrast, the remaining 85 per cent of the MSMEs account 
13 A stochastic dominance test compares the cumulative density function of the log of the value 
added in rural and urban areas. To establish whether the two curves originate from the same distribu-
tion, we have used the Komolgorov-Smirnov test of equality of distribution. We were not able to reject 
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Figure 8.3. The distribution of the log of value added per worker among MSMEs in 
2010 by young and other adult owners
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for only 30  per cent of the value added generated by the MSME sector. These 
results underscore the productive heterogeneity of the MSMEs in both rural and 
urban areas.
8.6 Using the MSME Survey to Identify ‘High Potential’ 
Rural Enterprises
The main takeaway from the previous section is that some rural MSMEs have 
the potential to contribute significantly to rural transformation in Tanzania. 
To identify the characteristics of these firms, we separate the ‘high potential’ 
MSMEs from the rest using both qualitative information and performance-based 
measures of labour productivity. Following Lewis (1979), we call these groups of 
firms the ‘in-between’ firms. This terminology is meant to capture the idea that 
the characteristics of these firms place them somewhere in-between Tanzania’s 
modern (most productive) and informal (least productive) firms. For example, 
the in-between firms may keep written accounts and be quite productive, but not 
be registered. For the purposes of this chapter, we include in the in-between 
group of firms only firms whose owners report that they would not quit their job 
for a sal ar ied position, and in which labour productivity is greater than econ-
omy-wide labour productivity in trade service sector, represented by a vertical 
line in the middle of Figures 8.2 and 8.3 between the line for the economy-wide 
labour prod uct iv ity of agriculture on the left and the line for the economy-
wide labour prod uct iv ity of manufacturing on the right. Using these criteria, we 
find that out of 5,609 sampled firms 944 firms that can be classified as belonging 
in the in-between sector, 45 per cent of which are rural firms, accounting for 
10 per cent of total sampled rural firms.
To understand what distinguishes businesses with high potential, we have 
identified several explanatory variables that have been commonly used and tested 
in the relevant literature. These variables cover a host of business characteristics 
and are likely to provide a complete picture of the determinants of high potential 
businesses. Four categories of variables were identified: owner’s personal charac-
teristics, business characteristics, infrastructure and technology, and financial 
and other services. Using a probit model, we explored the characteristics of the 
most successful businesses considering these four categories of variables as 
explanatory variables in the regression. The dependent variable is 1 if a firm 
belongs to the in-between14 category, the one we indicated in the fourth section 
as with high potential, and 0 otherwise. The regression shows that several 
14 As a reminder, for a firm to be considered in-between it must fulfil two conditions: First, its 
owner would not leave the business for a full-time salaried job, and second, labour productivity must 
be higher than the economy-wide trade productivity.
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vari ables that we expected to be statistically significant were not. The absence of 
significance does not mean that these variables are irrelevant to the analysis. 
Rather, it is possible that this is a consequence of the cross-sectional nature of 
the data, which constrains to provide comparison points for both business and 
owner’s characteristics. Nevertheless, we highlight a few main findings from the 
probit regressions focusing on the marginal effects in Tables 8.A4(a)–8.A4(c) in 
the Appendix.
Results for the owner’s personal characteristics suggest that in-between firms 
are less likely to be headed by females on the order of 5 to 8 per cent depending 
on the location of the business. The two most important determinants of in-
between firms are whether the owner is not poor and whether the owner views 
the business as growing. Both variables are highly significant and lead to 
 non-negligible increases in the probability of being in the in-between category. 
Common sense confirms the feasibility of these results. Non-poor business 
 owners are less likely to require loans and to have to sacrifice on labour or the 
quality of services provided due to lack of resources. Similarly, business owners 
who are optimistic about their firm’s future and potential are also more likely to 
be driven to achieve success and to use resources in ways that are productive. 
Thus, none of the results described showed differences in the signs and presence 
of significance across the three locations (rural, other urban, and Dar es Salaam). 
The variable of ‘seeing business as a market opportunity’ shows significant results 
for national total and urban enterprises, a 3 and 4 per cent increase in the probability 
of being in the in-between category, respectively, but not for rural enterprises. 
‘Membership to a business association’ also increases the probability of a firm 
falling in the in-between category. The absence of significance for young business 
owners is not surprising given that most business owners are young. Education, 
marital status, and whether the owner has taken expert advice are not significant. 
Education illustrates this point well. Evidence abounds about the positive effects 
of education on the performance of both businesses and individuals, but it needs 
panel data to verify it, as gains from education often are not immediately reflected 
in the performance of businesses. Similar logic can be applied to the owner 
receiving expert advice. Without more information about when individuals 
completed their education or how long has the owner received expert advice, it 
becomes difficult to gauge the true importance of these variables. The lack of 
significance of these variables may also reflect the lack of variability in the data.
A considerably more varied pattern of significance across geographies is found 
for business characteristics. Results for the variables under the business characteris-
tic are not particularly surprising. For example, a one-unit increase in the number 
of employees reduces the probability of being an in-between firm by slightly over 
2 per cent across locations. Businesses that run full-time, on the other hand, 
increase the probability of being in the in-between category by 6–7 per cent 
depending on location. Both signs fall within our expectations for two reasons. 
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First, the survey is designed to capture small businesses. Second, running a full-
time business indicates that the business probably experiences some degree of 
success, or else owners would be inclined to find other sources of income. Less 
obvious, however, is the fact that holding written accounts is only significant in 
rural areas. Moreover, the coefficients for firms that have regional customers and 
whose number of daily customers exceeds 20 a day are positive and significant 
both nationally and in rural areas, which suggest that the national results were 
likely driven by rural areas. Changes in the predicted probabilities associated with 
having regional customers range from 3–5 per cent for all firms and for rural 
firms respectively. Firms with a daily number of customers higher than 20 are 
also more likely to be in the in-between category; the predicted probabilities 
range from 5.8 to 6.8 per cent nationally and in rural areas. The lack of signifi-
cance of written accounts, regional customers, and number of daily customers in 
urban areas could be the result of lower variability among urban firms relative to 
rural areas, particularly because the survey has a much greater number of rural 
enterprises than urban. Non-significant variables such as market access, the 
nature of firms’ suppliers (whether small traders or nationwide), and whether the 
firm has a licence may be a result of the fact that the average firm in the dataset is 
relatively young (about four years old). This, in turn, might suggest that not 
enough time has gone by for firms to be able to develop a consistent and system-
atic source of supply. A similar case could be argued for market access. As for 
whether firms have licences, the lack of significance might be a result of delays 
from regulatory agencies to provide licences without much red tape. In all cases, 
additional data about when firms started resorting to suppliers or gained access 
to markets (or time to receive a licence) would shed light on additional potential 
reasons for the absence of significance of these three variables.
The variables related to infrastructure and technology are also considered in 
the regressions. The gains in predicted probability obtained by using a mobile 
phone to conduct business range from 2.5 to nearly 8 per cent nationally and in 
urban areas respectively. Curiously, the fact that the owner owns a calculator is 
only significant at the national level with an associated change in the predicted 
probability of being in the in-between category of 4.2 per cent. The most im port ant 
factor in the set of infrastructure and technology variables is ‘whether the 
business uses electricity to light their businesses’. Increased predicted probabilities 
are observed across geographies, with gains ranging from nearly 7 per cent in 
rural areas to slightly over 8 per cent in urban areas. The absence of significance 
for variables such as ‘whether the business has office equipment or a cooling facil-
ity’ might also be related to the age of the firm and its ability to set up a complete 
and fully functional office structure. Here too, panel data would provide insights 
about the importance of these variables.
Variables related to the access of financial and other services do not show a 
systematic pattern of significance. Significant results are observed for firms that 
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have received legal services and owners that use profits to invest in buildings and 
land in rural areas. The former is associated with a decrease in the probability 
of being in-between while the latter is associated with an increased probability of 
being in-between. None of the variables in these categories was significant at the 
national level. Businesses that use profits to reinvest in the business in urban areas 
observe a change in the predicted probabilities of being in-between of nearly 
9 per cent. While patterns of significance are scattered for this category, the sig-
nificant results fall within expectations. This last category is perhaps the category 
for which panel data would be the most helpful. The establishment of credit, and 
access to financial institutions and their services may require a considerable time, 
which in practice means that the effects of the variables in this category require a 
longer time-frame to be adequately measured.
8.7 Summary and Policy Implications
The results presented in this chapter may be summarized as follows. We have 
shown that although Tanzania remains heavily rural, the composition of eco-
nomic activity in rural areas has changed significantly over the past decade and a 
half. Between 2002 and 2012, the share of the population living in rural areas 
dropped by only 6.5 percentage points and remains high at 70 per cent. However, 
the share of the rural population engaged in nonfarm activities almost tripled 
over this same period going from a very low level of 6.8 to 20.5 per cent. This 
increase is similar among rural youth. This increase provides the motivation for 
our investigation into the nature of rural nonfarm activities and whether rural 
youth differ from other adults in the remainder of the chapter.
We began our investigation by studying the distribution of rural nonfarm 
activity at the household level. To do this, we first created a typology of households 
in rural areas classifying them into three groups based on the work status 
of  individuals living in the households. We find that 11.2 per cent of rural 
households participate only in the nonfarm economy and that the heads of these 
households tend to be more educated. The share of households headed by youth 
who participate only in the nonfarm economy is higher, at 17.9 per cent. We 
explain the differences between households with and without rural nonfarm activ-
ities using a probit model. We find that being a youth-headed household increases 
the probability of specializing in rural nonfarm activities by 2 to 6 per cent, but 
they do not seem very different from other households when agriculture is still 
part of their household’s livelihood. The most important determinant of whether 
a household engages in nonfarm activities is the education of the household head. 
For households whose heads have secondary or more education, the increase 
in the probability of engaging in nonfarm activities is between 8 per cent and 
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38 per cent. This could be a major factor to explain a higher participation rate of 
nonfarm economy among youth-headed households.
Next, we used Tanzania’s first nationally representative survey of micro-, 
small-, and medium-sized enterprises to investigate the businesses owned by the 
members of rural households. Again, we pay attention to the owners who are 
young. We found an enormous amount of heterogeneity among these businesses 
and youth as owners are often not a main factor to explain such heterogeneity. 
Roughly 20 per cent of these businesses in rural areas operate in the manu fac tur ing 
sector, a share almost doubling that in urban areas; the rest of these businesses are 
in the services sector. Around half of rural business owners report that they 
wouldn’t leave their business for a full-time salaried position, and slightly more 
than half of young owners prefer to leave for a full-time salaried job in answer to 
the same question. This is encouraging as it suggests that half of these businesses 
are owned by ‘gung ho’ entrepreneurs as opposed to ‘reluctant’ entrepreneurs. We 
also show a significant degree of heterogeneity in the labour productivity of these 
businesses, but the difference in labour productivity is unlikely to be related to 
rural and urban locations or owner’s age. Using a probit specification we explored 
the characteristics of the most successful businesses. We found the following for 
rural businesses: (i) those owned by females are less productive; (ii) businesses 
that operate full-time are more productive; (iii) businesses operated by owners 
who live in households that are not poor are more productive; (iv) owners who 
see their businesses as growing are more productive; and (v) businesses with 
more customers and regional (vs local) customers are more productive.
We conclude that policies designed to stimulate rural transformation need to 
be sufficiently targeted in order to achieve results, but there is little evidence that 
policies should target youth and other adult owners differently. Large pro-
grammes designed for small businesses in general are likely to be disappointing 
because of the underlying heterogeneity in types of firms and their productivity. 
Instead, policymakers interested in stimulating nonfarm employment and prod-
uct iv ity growth in rural areas will need to focus on the most productive small 
firms. To do this, policymakers will need to design products—financial and 
other wise—that are attractive to firms with potential for growth that are not 
attractive to businesses that are unlikely to succeed.
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Appendix
Table 8.A1. Summary statistics of main variables of 2012 HBS used in the 
regression: rural
Variable Number of HHs 
or EAs
Means SE LL UL
Youth-headed (between ages 15–34) 4,130 0.268 0.010 0.249 0.287
Female-headed 4,130 0.241 0.009 0.222 0.259
No primary education 4,130 0.270 0.013 0.243 0.296
Completed primary education 4,130 0.673 0.012 0.649 0.697
Completed secondary education or 
more
4,130 0.058 0.008 0.043 0.073
Number of youth (15–34) 4,130 1.577 0.051 1.477 1.677
No cultivated land 4,130 0.053 0.009 0.034 0.072
0–2 ha of cultivated land 4,130 0.565 0.019 0.528 0.602
2–5 ha of cultivated land 4,130 0.296 0.015 0.267 0.326
>5 ha of cultivated land 4,130 0.086 0.010 0.066 0.105
Household paid loans to bank or  
family friends in past year
4,130 0.023 0.005 0.013 0.032
Public transportation to regional  
HQ in EA
157 0.756 0.038 0.682 0.830
Electricity in the EA 157 0.238 0.037 0.165 0.311
Mobile signal in the EA 157 0.821 0.034 0.753 0.889
Internet in the EA 157 0.086 0.024 0.039 0.133
Bank in the EA 157 0.024 0.012 0.000 0.047
Cooperative primary society  
in the EA
157 0.381 0.042 0.298 0.464
Informal financial service in  
the EA
157 0.450 0.043 0.366 0.535
Major employer (that is, business, 
factory) in the EA
157 0.161 0.032 0.098 0.225
Weekly market in the EA 157 0.295 0.040 0.217 0.373
Note: The estimates account for survey sampling design.
Source: Authors calculation using data of 2012 HBS.
Table 8.A2. Summary statistics of main variables of 2012 HBS used in the 
regression: urban
Variable Number of HHs 
or EAs
Means SE LL UL
Youth-headed (between ages 15–34) 6,056 0.343 0.010 0.324 0.362
Female-headed 6,056 0.249 0.009 0.231 0.267
No primary education 6,056 0.084 0.007 0.071 0.098
Completed primary education 6,056 0.632 0.014 0.605 0.659
Completed secondary education  
or more
6,056 0.283 0.017 0.251 0.316
Number of youth (15–34) 6,056 1.747 0.042 1.663 1.831
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No cultivated land 6,056 0.702 0.034 0.635 0.769
0–2 ha of cultivated land 6,056 0.217 0.024 0.170 0.265
2–5 ha of cultivated land 6,056 0.054 0.010 0.034 0.074
>5 ha of cultivated land 6,056 0.026 0.011 0.004 0.049
Household paid loans to bank or 
family friends in past year
6,056 0.039 0.006 0.027 0.052
Public transportation to regional 
HQ in EA
223 0.943 0.025 0.894 0.992
Electricity in the EA 223 0.852 0.044 0.764 0.939
Mobile signal in the EA 223 0.846 0.031 0.786 0.907
Internet in the EA 223 0.292 0.037 0.219 0.366
Bank in the EA 223 0.155 0.024 0.108 0.203
Cooperative primary society in  
the EA
223 0.188 0.033 0.124 0.252
Informal financial service in  
the EA
223 0.650 0.040 0.572 0.729
Major employer (that is, business, 
factory) in the EA
223 0.416 0.044 0.329 0.503
Weekly market in the EA 223 0.207 0.039 0.129 0.284
Note: The estimates account for survey sampling design.
Source: Authors calculation using data of 2012 HBS.
Table 8.A3. Summary statistics of main variables of 2012 HBS used in the regression, 























0.249 0.401 0.459 0.246 0.232
Female-headed 0.265 0.269 0.215 0.178 0.227
No primary education 0.320 0.124 0.074 0.229 0.237
Completed primary 
education




0.020 0.177 0.359 0.045 0.099
Number of youth  
(15–34)
1.433 1.643 1.501 1.827 2.134
No cultivated land 0.010 0.291 0.427 0.017 0.042
0–2 ha of cultivated  
land
0.600 0.531 0.415 0.509 0.596
2–5 ha of cultivated  
land
0.314 0.148 0.114 0.348 0.232
>5 ha of cultivated  
land
0.075 0.030 0.044 0.126 0.130
Continued
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Table 8.A4(a). Probit results for probability of being in-between rural and 
urban enterprises, marginal effect: owner’s personal characteristics
 All  Urban  Rural








Marital status –0.0344  –0.0788  0.00685
 –0.0343  –0.0508  –0.0293
Female –0.0561***  –0.0847**  –0.0496***
 –0.02  –0.0415  –0.0178
Head of household is young (15–34) 0.013  0.00119  0.0203
 –0.0167  –0.0276  –0.0201
Owner is not poor 0.0656***  0.0871***  0.0450***





















Household paid  
loans to bank or family 
friends in  
past year
0.012 0.062 0.041 0.036 0.029
Public transportation  
to regional HQ in EA
0.736 0.899 0.850 0.749 0.764
Electricity in  
the EA
0.217 0.369 0.512 0.196 0.220
Mobile signal in  
the EA
0.844 0.830 0.871 0.759 0.763
Internet in the EA 0.069 0.181 0.110 0.087 0.139
Bank in the EA 0.019 0.006 0.045 0.037 0.012
Cooperative primary  
society in the EA
0.420 0.292 0.283 0.336 0.336
Informal financial  
service in the EA
0.406 0.479 0.497 0.537 0.504
Major employer  
(that is, business,  
factory) in the EA
0.131 0.328 0.439 0.123 0.193
Weekly market in  
the EA
0.255 0.429 0.406 0.322 0.369
No. of sample obs. 2,512 244 231 880 221
Note: The estimates account for survey sampling design, and the number of total rural household obs. 
is 4,130.
Source: Authors calculation using data of 2012 HBS.
Table 8.A3. Continued
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Owner has taken expert advice 0.0916  0.0284  0.135
 –0.0695  –0.0785  –0.0969
Saw business as a market opportunity 0.0280**  0.0481*  0.0148
 –0.014  –0.027  –0.0117
Views business as growing 0.0594***  0.0595**  0.0642***
 –0.013  –0.0241  –0.0124
Note: In Tables A4(a)–A4(c) dependent variable is a binary variable which takes the 
value of 1 if the firm is in the in-between category and 0 otherwise. Firms in the 
‘in-between’ category satisfy the following two conditions: (i) owner wouldn’t leave the 
firm for a full-time salaried job; and (ii) labour productivity is higher than economy-
wide labour productivity in trade. Number of the full sample obs. is 4,163, and 2,310 for 
rural. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Authors estimation using MSME data.
Table 8.A4(b). Probit results for probability of being in-between rural 
and urban enterprises, marginal effect: business characteristics
 All Urban Rural
Firm’s age 0.00134 0.000915 0.00142
 –0.001 –0.00202 –0.00105
Firm size (number of employees) –0.0241*** –0.0274** –0.0215*
 –0.00899 –0.0117 –0.0111
Business runs full-time 0.0723*** 0.0652** 0.0683***
 –0.0174 –0.0305 –0.0181
Firm has market access 0.00901 –0.00264 0.00115
 –0.0191 –0.0563 –0.0189
Firm keeps written accounts 0.0198 –0.0232 0.0544***
 –0.0176 –0.0303 –0.0165
Firm has licence 0.00994 0.0331 –0.00894
 –0.0201 –0.0372 –0.0143
Firm has regional customers 0.0343** 0.00709 0.0573**
 –0.0157 –0.0259 –0.0227








Firm’s suppliers are small traders –0.0163 –0.0395 0.0099
 –0.0136 –0.0272 –0.0128
Firm’s suppliers are nationwide 0.0496 0.0574 0.0176
 –0.0418 –0.058 –0.0567
Note: Number of full sample obs. is Number of the full sample obs. is 4,163, and 2,310 
for rural. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Authors estimation using MSME data.
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Table 8.A4(c). Probit results for probability of being in-between rural and urban 
enterprises, marginal effect: infrastructure, technology, and financial services
 All Urban Rural
Infrastructure and technology    
Owner uses a mobile to conduct business 0.0450** 0.0779* 0.0143
 –0.0216 –0.0407 –0.0163
Firm owner has a calculator 0.0424** 0.0464 0.0372
 –0.021 –0.0327 –0.0258
Business has office equipment 0.0285 0.0407 0.0219
 –0.0265 –0.0435 –0.0205
Business owns a cooling facility 0.0202 –0.0106 0.11
 –0.0317 –0.0374 –0.072
Business uses electricity to light business 0.0802*** 0.0837** 0.0692*
 –0.0252 –0.0326 –0.0392
Financial and other services    








Firm has received legal services 0.0343 0.159 –0.0824**
 –0.0883 –0.133 –0.033
Firm has received technical services –0.00217 –0.0268 0.0134
 –0.0493 –0.0668 –0.0493
Owner uses profit to expand business 0.0329 0.0892** –0.00386
 –0.0228 –0.0387 –0.0207
Owner uses profits to buy stocks in advance 0.0149 0.0158 0.0114
 –0.0143 –0.0286 –0.014








Observations 5,551 5,590 5,570
Nsub 5,551 1,427 4,124
F 10.38 4.553 27.28
P-value 0 3.16E-08 0
Note: Number of the full sample obs. is 4,163, and 2,310 for rural. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Source: Authors estimation using MSME dataset.
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Youth Mobility and its Role in  
Structural Transformation in Senegal
Elisenda Estruch, Lisa Van Dijck, David Schwebel,  
and Josee Randriamamonjy
9.1 Introduction
Senegal is a youthful country, with over 60 per cent of people below the age of 
24 years and up to 77 per cent of the population below the age of 35 years. Over 
100,000 new young job seekers (between 15 and 34 years old) join the labour 
market every year in Senegal (World Bank 2016).
Although the agricultural sector employs nationally almost half of the labour 
force, the sector accounts only for about 16 per cent of GDP (World Bank 2017). 
Low productivity growth in this sector combined with an unbalanced labour market 
has led to a wider economic stagnation of the rural economy. This creates major 
challenges for the rural youth to access productive and decent jobs and reach their 
work and life aspirations (Hathie et al. 2015). Whilst there is a growing body of 
empirical analysis on youth employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, im port ant gaps 
remain and especially in relation to youth in rural areas in the Francophone 
countries of West Africa, such as Senegal.
This chapter aims to complement the existing literature on employment dynam-
ics in Senegal, focusing in depth on rural youth in the context of structural trans-
formation. First, a stocktaking of the state of the agricultural sector and the wider 
rural economy is provided and how this relates to youth employment dynamics 
in rural areas of Senegal. In Section 9.2, through a literature review, the context for 
rural youth employment is discussed by looking in detail at the agricultural sector, 
the rural-non farm economy and the challenges and opportunities characterizing 
the rural labour market. Section 9.3 analyses the transitions of youth, either to the 
rural non-farm economy (RNFE) or to urban areas and abroad and attempts to 
provide a better understanding of patterns, motivations, and constraints youth 
face when engaging in the RNFE or in migrant labour. To do so, we use descrip-
tive statistics from the latest Household Data Surveys of 2001 (ESAM-II) and 2011 
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(ESPS II) and the Migration and Remittances Household Survey.1 The findings 
suggest that there are limited rural employment op por tun ities for youth, leading 
to a slow pace of rural poverty reduction. Rural youth still work mainly in poor 
quality jobs in agriculture, although they increasingly try: (i) to diversify their and 
their family’s income by engaging in rural nonfarm employment, or (ii) to look 
for options outside rural areas by migrating to urban areas or abroad. Section 9.4 
follows with a brief review of the main policies and programmes that have been 
implemented in the same period as the analysed data in Senegal in order to iden-
tify their strengths, weaknesses, and areas for improvement. We conclude with a 
discussion around the key findings.
9.2 State of Agriculture and the Rural Labour Market
Senegal is a lower-middle income country with the fourth largest economy in West 
Africa. In 2015, Senegal had a GDP growth rate of 6.5 per cent, becoming the 
second fastest growing economy in West Africa (World Bank  2016). However, 
between 2000 and 2015, Senegal experienced a lower average economic growth, 
of 4.1 per cent, than the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) with 6 per cent. This 
economic growth has not been large enough to match the high population growth, 
leading to an average GDP per capita growth of only 2.3 per cent in that period, 
half of that experienced in SSA (ibid).
In economic terms, the Senegalese economy is mainly dominated by the service 
sector, accounting for 60 per cent of GDP, followed by the industrial sector with 
24 per cent of GDP (Figure 9.1). Although the agricultural sector employs nation-
ally around half of the labour force, the sector accounts only for about 16 per cent 








Figure 9.1. GDP contributions, Senegal, 2017
Source: World development indicators, World Bank.
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of GDP. With an annual growth rate of 3.5 per cent, the agricultural sector is 
growing slower than the service and industrial sectors. Compared to the rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the agricultural sector is also growing at a slower pace 
(Figure 9.2). Growth levels fluctuate heavily as Senegal’s agriculture is highly 
vulnerable to unpredictable weather; severe floods and droughts are common and 
only 1.3 per cent of agricultural land is equipped for irrigation.
9.2.1 Agricultural Sector
On a macroeconomic level, the agricultural sector in Senegal seems to be stagnant, 
as labour- and land-productivity have remained constant or have grown slowly 
over the past decade (Figure 9.3 and Figure 9.4). Senegal’s low labour prod uct iv ity 
is caused by an unchanged employment rate in agriculture coupled with low 
techno logic al improvement (Seck  2016, Shaw  2014). The agricultural sector 
employs 46 per cent of the total employed population, composed by a male and 
female employment rate in the sector of respectively 49 and 44 per cent. Contrary 
to the Sub-Saharan African average, the employment rate has decreased only 
slightly, leading to a lower and stabilized agricultural value added per worker 
(ibid).
Similarly, land productivity, here projected by cereal yield, is around 20 per cent 
lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa average. Land and labour productivity are influ-
enced by a low uptake of technology. For example, in 2014, per hectare of arable 
land only 7 kilogram of fertilizer was used in Senegal, compared to 16 kilogram 









Agriculture Industry Services GDP GDP per capita
Senegal SSA
Figure 9.2. Drivers of economic growth, average growth, 2000–2015
Source: World development indicators, World Bank.
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According to the World Bank, agriculture is at fourth place in government 
spending after education, health, and nutrition, which represent the bulk of the 
state budget. The percentage of public spending on agriculture evolved in terms 
of GDP, rising from 9.8 to 10.9 per cent between 2005 and 2009 (World Bank 2014). 
The country would have thus achieved the Maputo objective, which requires that 
a minimum of 10 per cent of total public expenditure be directed at agriculture. 
However, at a time when the authorities declare their intention to prioritize 
agriculture in their strategy of accelerated growth, the growth in investment in 
the sector appears insufficient (Oya and Ba 2013). Out of the total budget for agri-
culture, subsidies for the distribution of agricultural inputs are the main compo-
nent of expenditure with 46 per cent of resources. Much needed infrastructure 







2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
SSA SEN
Figure 9.3. Labour productivity in agriculture (agricultural value added per worker, 
constant 2010 US$)







2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
SSA SEN
Figure 9.4. Land productivity (cereal yield, kg per ha)
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).
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research (3.1 per cent) and training (0.5 per cent) are negligible. Intra-sector 
 allocation of expenditure shows that agricultural public expenditure is concen-
trated on crop farming, receiving nearly 64 per cent of the total budget. Other 
sectors, such as livestock and fisheries, are hence left with little funds and support 
(World Bank 2014).
9.2.2 Rural Nonfarm Economy
The Senegalese rural nonfarm economy (RNFE) is dominated by manufacturing, 
and wholesale and retail trade, and is limited in size and employs only 23 per cent 
of the employed population (ANSD 2013). The RNFE is mainly composed of 
informal small-scale businesses and is characterized by a high level of self-
employment. The main hindrances to formalization of businesses are the lack 
of entrepreneurial and technical education or skills as well as underinvestment 
in infrastructure and the weakness of regulation and taxation institutions. Youth 
have special difficulties in finding the resources to create or upgrade their own 
businesses (Ndione 2015).
Increasingly, more rural households are diversifying their incomes and en gaging 
both in farm and nonfarm activities. In nearly a quarter of all rural households, 
both farm and nonfarm activities coexist (ANSD 2013). While nonfarm activities 
play an important role in household livelihood strategies in rural Senegal, they typ-
ic al ly complement farm activities rather than constitute a viable farm exit strategy 
(Ndione 2015).
In order to reduce rural poverty effectively and develop a wider rural economy, 
it is important to enhance the RNFE and its linkages with farm economy. The 
effects emerge through backward and forward production linkages from agricul-
ture to rural input suppliers and agro-processors, and through expenditure link-
ages as farm incomes are spent on locally produced goods and services or invested 
in nonfarm activities (Maertens 2009). Spillover effects from the nonfarm econ-
omy to the farm economy increase productivity and profitability in agriculture 
(Anríquez and Stamoulis 2007).
In Senegal, linkages between farm and nonfarm economic sectors, which are 
important in creating multiplier effects for growth and rural development, are 
weak. Small farmers are only to a limited extent involved in the value chain leading 
to low profitability and to a lack of employment opportunities and attractiveness 
for youth (Davis et al. 2002). Moreover, the agribusiness sector, which in many cases 
is more labour intensive and where added value along the agrifood value chain 
can be generated more easily, is small in Senegal compared to the Sub-Saharan 
Africa average (Schaffnit-Chatterjee 2014).
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9.2.3 Rural Labour Market
The stagnant productivity in the agricultural sector is indicative of a wider, cross-
sectoral problem of an unbalanced rural labour market, with a labour supply 
characterized by a large young workforce with limited education and access to 
productive resources, and a labour demand characterized by low rural investments, 
access to markets, and rural job creation (Hathie et al. 2015). Moreover, lack of 
access, especially for youth, to productive resources such as land, credit, and social 
capital, are restraining overall rural productivity levels in both agricultural and 
non-agricultural activities (ibid).
Data from ANSD 2004 and 2013 shows that indeed the Senegalese labour supply 
is characterized by a large share of poorly educated and low-skilled labour force. 
There are significant education limitations in the country, as the percentage of 
people over 25 years old having completed primary and secondary education is 
respectively 22 per cent and 6 per cent (ANSD  2013). Low levels of education 
characterize especially the rural and female population. The situation has however 
improved in the last decade as shown by the increase in the gross enrolment rate 
in secondary schooling between 2001 and 2011 from 16 to 40 per cent (ANSD 2004, 
2013). National alphabetization rates have also grown from 38 to 52 per cent, and 
from 23 to 33 per cent in rural areas (ibid). Rural areas continue to lag behind in 
terms of educational attainment as shown by the fact that only 30 per cent of the 
rural population has benefited from any form of education compared to 51 per cent 
in urban areas. There also remains a 10 per cent gap between rural young men 
and women (ANSD 2013).
Moreover, in rural areas, few youth transition from primary to secondary edu-
cation, due to high dropout rates and poor quality of education, which leads to 
low levels of literacy. Furthermore, the actual skills of the workforce are often not 
aligned with the labour market demand needs (Guarcello 2007). Skills acquired 
during higher education often do not match those required in the rural labour 
market. This indicates a deep structural shift that needs to take place in order to 
create more high-level jobs and utilize the increased human capital (ibid). At the 
same time, in line with the process of structural transformation, as agriculture moves 
away from subsistence farming and the RNFE increases in relevance, improving 
the skills of the rural workforce is key to facilitate the mobility of surplus labour 
within agriculture and towards other activities (ibid).
Labour supply is strongly influenced by the high population growth and subse-
quent youth bulge. The Senegalese population amounts to 14.3 million people and 
grew at an annual rate of 3.1 per cent between 2001 and 2011 (ANSD 2004, 2013). 
The country is demographically quite young with an average age of 22 years and 
with one-third of the population aged between 15 and 34 years. This means that a 
growing number of young people are entering the labour market every year, 
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resulting in an excess of labour supply and subsequent pressures on the labour 
market to integrate them all. Between 2001 and 2011, the strongest growth in 
population was observed in older age groups, indicating the youth bulge is slow-
ing down (ANSD 2013).
In rural labour markets, often the most decisive factors in improving the pay and 
working conditions of rural workers are a dynamic agricultural sector, increased 
public and private investment, and a tighter labour market (Oya 2010). In other 
words, besides improving the skills development and other supply-side policy 
interventions, demand-side interventions, such as investments targeting job 
creation, are critical (ILO 2008).
The formal labour demand is limited, as Senegal’s rapid population growth was 
not matched by job creation in the formal sector at an equal rate and thus led to a 
booming of the informal sector. The latter is dominated by subsistence agriculture 
and small-scale informal (family-based) firms (Golub and Hayat 2014). Although 
wages in the formal sector are three times higher than those in the informal sector, 
the formal private sector employs just 6 per cent of the total population (ibid). 
Conversely, in the informal sector, registration and taxation are absent, formal 
contracts and social protection rare, wages inefficiently low, underemployment the 
norm, and labour rights weak (Roubaud and Torelli 2013). Furthermore, the small 
size of the operations of many rural enterprises poses also constraints in terms 
of job creation as they lack economies of scale. Ultimately, agricultural labour 
demand is limited and characterized by intra and inter-year variations, on account 
of weather conditions and the seasonal nature of agricultural labour, limiting the 
number of long-term formal contracts even further (Leavy and White 1999).
There are still more people living in rural areas than in urban areas, re spect-
ive ly 57 and 43 per cent of the population, although urbanization is occurring 
at remarkable pace: while the urban population increases at an annual rate of 
3.9 per cent, the rural population grows annually by 2.6 per cent (World Bank 
2017). Urbanization is also driven by significant internal migration: by 2009, almost 
2 million Senegalese, or 14 per cent of the total population, had migrated within 
the country (IOM 2009). In the past, migration was essentially from rural to urban 
areas, generally from the semi-arid regions towards Dakar; or from rural to rural 
areas following a seasonal pattern (that is, those who migrate during the rainy 
season to provide additional support) (ibid). Today, the Dakar region, but more 
generally the urban axis or Dakar–Thiès–Touba (the second largest city in the 
country), polarizes 60 per cent of migration and represents 47 per cent of the 
country’s population. The attractiveness of this urban axis largely determines 
the structure and dynamism of economic activities, including service provision to 
surrounding areas. It also determines the opportunity space for many rural youth 
(in particular from the Groundnut Basin). Nonetheless, there are also other 
secondary cities and towns to consider, such as M’bour, which is growing due to 
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tourism and fishing activities, and Ourossogui and Louga, which are cities with a 
history of international migration that attract remittances and also an influx of 
(return) migrants (ibid).
The unbalance on the rural labour market affects youth in particular as shown 
by relatively high and growing youth unemployment and underemployment rates. 
In total, 11 per cent of rural youth (aged 15–34) are unemployed, with significant 
gender differences: 4.4 per cent of male youth and 15.4 per cent of female youth in 
rural areas (ANSD 2013). Compared to 14.7 per cent of male and 20 per cent of 
female youth in urban areas, unemployment is lower in rural areas. However, 
underemployment is more severe among rural youth, affecting 8.5 per cent of male 
youth and 29.3 per cent of female youth (ibid). Compared to urban areas, youth 
employment in rural areas is characterized by a lower labour income, higher levels 
of underemployment, and a stronger gender bias (Guarcello 2007).
The low agricultural productivity rate is causing incomes to remain low and 
poverty widespread in the rural space. Poverty affects 57 per cent of rural house-
holds compared to 33 per cent in urban households (ANSD 2013). Moreover, 
poverty reduction in rural areas is slower than in urban areas, with a decrease of 
respectively 12 and 20 per cent between 2001 and 2011 (ANSD 2004, 2013). Poverty 
is most severe among self-employed agricultural workers, among which, in rural 
areas 61 per cent remain poor, representing nearly 1.9 million people. Among 
other dependents, mainly contributing family members in rural areas, 64 per cent 
is poor representing nearly 1.4 million people (ANSD 2013).
9.3 Youth Transitions in the Rural Economy
9.3.1 Are Youth Leaving Agriculture?
The limited economic opportunities in the agricultural sector make the sector 
unattractive for youth and pushes them to seek employment opportunities in other 
sectors and locations.2 As such, rural Senegal is characterized by a high degree 
of intergenerational mobility between farm and nonfarm employment: only one-
third of farmers’ children stayed in farming, indicating a high rate of exiting from 
farm activities (Lambert, Ravallion, and Van de Walle 2011).
Those who stay in agriculture increasingly engage in mixed-income activities, 
working in both farm and nonfarm activities (Alobo Loison and Bignebat 2017). 
Diversification may function as a household strategy to manage risk and over-
come market failures, or represent specialization within the household. Therefore, 
2 The methodology used in this section is based on both data and policy analysis. The data analysis 
relies on two national household surveys of Senegal: ESAM-II (2001) and ESPS-II (2011), as well as a 
migration survey, MRHS (2009) (see description of the data in the annex).
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diversification can be into both high and low-return sectors, and can represent a 
pathway out of poverty or a survival strategy (Davis, Di Giuseppe, and Zezza 2016). 
And so, young people and their families decide to diversify either because of a 
lack of agricultural economic opportunities or because they are pulled by other 
income generating activities.
The Senegalese working age population, the population above between 15- and 
64-years- old, amounts to 8.3 million people. Of this working age population 
(above 15 years), only 57 per cent is active, being either employed or looking 
actively for employment (World Bank 2017). Between 2001 and 2011, the increase 
in the numbers of inactive people, in particular among youth, is striking (see 
Figure 9.5). The low activity rate can be partly explained as it includes students, 
people without remunerated activity (not including subsistence farmers), and 
retired people. The rise in the number of youth being inactive or unemployed also 
shows the lack of employment opportunities both in the urban and rural areas, 
which is demotivating people to enter the labour market. The activity rate is 
un even ly distributed among gender, with 68 per cent of working age men being 
active and 45 per cent of women. The lower activity rate for women can be related 
to social norms such that women often have more non-remunerated (household) 
tasks. Activity rates are higher in rural areas, 74 per cent for men and 50 per cent 
for women, than they are in urban areas (ESPS-II 2011).
Between 2001 and 2011, the share of employed people decreased in both rural 
and urban areas. However, the total number of people employed decreased in rural 
areas and increased in urban areas (Figure 9.5). The decline in total rural employ-
ment is mainly due to a fall in youth employment. Such fall is mirrored by, on the 
one hand, an increase in youth unemployment rates, from 2.5 per cent in 2001 to 
2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011
Rural - All ages Rural Youth (15–34) Urban - All ages Urban Youth (15–34)
Inactive/unemployed 801 1,816 358 991 1,614 2,486 1,120 1,070











Figure 9.5. Rural and urban working age population, by activity (per 1,000)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESAM-II 2001 and ESPS-II 2011. 
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9.6 per cent in 2011. In rural areas, unemployment is significantly more prevalent 
among female youth than male (15.4 per cent and 4.4 per cent re spect ive ly). And, 
on the other hand, labour participation of youth is lower because youth over the 
age of 15 stay longer in education.3 The literacy rate of the rural population aged 
above 15 increased from 23 to 39 per cent in that period, indicating an increase in 
school attendance (ANSD 2004, 2013).
Looking into rural employment across sectors, agriculture is clearly the dom-
in ant sector of primary employment in rural Senegal. Examining the structure 
of agricultural employment reveals that most farmers are either self-employed or 
employed in the family farm, and that working for a wage remains a marginal 
activity.
Figure  9.6 and Table  9.1 show that, between 2001 and 2011, the number of 
 people active in agriculture has decreased from 82 per cent of all employed  people 
to 77 per cent (or a decrease of annually 0.6 per cent). Table 9.1 in particular indi-
cates that such a decrease is mainly driven by a fall in self-employment, even if 
there is also a small increase in unpaid family work in household farms. Moreover, 
Figure 9.6 shows that the RNFE did not manage to absorb people leaving agricul-
ture, although the number of people active in the RNFE has grown from 18 to 
23 per cent (or an increase of annually 2.4 per cent). However, the increase in 
volume is clearly not high enough to offset the people leaving agriculture.
Disaggregating by age indicates that most of the decrease in agricultural 
employment is caused by changes in youth employment. Young agricultural 
3 Since 2001, education is compulsory and free in Senegal for children up to 16 years old. High 










2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011
All ages Youth (15–34) Non-youth
Employment in NFE Employment in agriculture Inactive or unemployed population
Figure 9.6. Rural working age population, by activity and age group (per 1,000)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESAM-II 2011 and ESPS-II 2011. 
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workers are mostly unpaid family members and are unlikely to be self-employed. 
Between 2001 and 2011, the share of rural youth employment in the agricultural 
sector decreased annually at a 0.5 per cent, a similar pace observed for the non-
youth mainly due to the decrease in self-employment. At the same time, the share 
of youth employment in the RNFE has increased annually faster than for the 
non-youth (2.2 and 1.7 per cent respectively), mainly driven by an increase in 
the number of non-paid family workers in the family enterprise. Youth are pro-
gressively working as unpaid family workers in the RNFE, suggesting they are 
being pushed out of agriculture rather than pulled by remunerative and decent 
employment opportunities.
Youth employed in the RNFE are on average slightly older, more often male 
and more educated when compared to youth employed in agriculture (for details 
on the individual characteristic of youth see Table 9.A1 in the Annex). The differ-
ence in years of education is remarkable. Youth employed in the RNFE have on 
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25% 4% 15% 34% 8% 20%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESAM-II, 2001 and ESPS-II, 2011.
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average been enrolled in school twice as much time as those employed in  agriculture. 
Looking at the households of youth employed in either agriculture or the RNFE, 
data show that the household heads of youth employed in the RNFE  compared 
to the ones employed in agriculture, are on average younger, more often female, and 
more educated (for details on the characteristics of households of youth see 
Table  9.A2 in the Annex). The household itself is also smaller and with less 
dependents. Only one-third of the households of youth employed in the RNFE are 
found in the poorest tercile of rural households, compared to two-thirds for the 
households of youth employed in agriculture. Likewise, one-third of the house-
holds with youth employed in the RNFE are in the richest tercile (compared to 
only 10 per cent of households of youth employed in agriculture), making them 
on average wealthier and less prone to poverty than households of youth employed 
in agriculture. As expected, households of youth working in the RNFE have less 
land and their farms are smaller. Correlated to the remoteness of agricultural 
fields, youth working in agriculture live further away from markets and in smaller 
towns than youth employed in the RNFE.
As income generating activities are often decided at the household level, it is 
important to have a closer look at the sector of employment of the household. 
According to the ESPS-II, 43 per cent of all rural households are only farming, 
23 per cent combine farm and nonfarm employment, and 26 per cent are nonfarm 
households. Households combining farm and nonfarm activities are similar to 
farming only households in terms of the characteristics of the household head 
(age, gender, marital status, farm size, access to land) but differ in years of schooling 
(1.29 years versus 0.81 years) and household size (13 members versus 10 members). 
Moreover, mixed households are on average wealthier than farming-only house-
holds (50 per cent versus 71 per cent of households in poorest tercile), as the income 
from nonfarm activities is an important source of household income. When 
comparing nonfarming households with those combining farm and nonfarm 
ac tiv ities, households heads among the nonfarming are more often women 
(24 per cent versus 11 per cent) and higher educated (2.41 years versus 1.29 years 
of schooling). Their households are on average smaller (9 versus 13 members) and 
are wealthier (29 per cent versus 16 per cent in richest tercile).
In general, the RNFE engages higher educated people from wealthier families 
than the agricultural sector does, which indicates that creating more jobs in the 
RNFE will contribute to alleviate rural poverty, especially if associated with inclu-
sive growth policies ensuring equal access to education. A large part of the rural 
population who remain in agriculture as a survival strategy could complement or 
substitute their income with nonfarm employment, if provided with employment 
opportunities in the RNFE. This would increase household’s incomes and could 
contribute to improve agricultural productivity, through increased resources for 
productive investments.
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9.3.2 Are Youth Leaving Rural Areas? Rural  
Youth Migration and Labour Market Transition
Another alternative of coping with low economic opportunities in rural areas 
is migrating. Senegal, like many developing countries, is marked by high levels 
of internal migration and particularly elevated levels of international migration 
(Herrera and Sahn 2013). Due to increasingly difficult living conditions within 
the country and the successful international migration experience of earlier 
migrants, many Senegalese, and in particular youth, decide to migrate abroad 
to the most developed African countries, as well as to Europe and the United 
States. The key destination countries are The Gambia, France, Italy, Mauritania, 
Germany, and Ghana (IOM 2009).
The decision to migrate is often taken at family or even village level and involves 
the strategic choice of sending its best offspring away with a view to diversify its 
risks, and to build a social network (Azam and Gubert  2006). Youth migrate 
mostly in search of a better job, especially those who are better skilled or educated, 
which leads to a brain drain (Dia 2005). Pursuing more advanced education as 
well as undertaking apprenticeships are also reasons for leaving, in particular to 
the region of Saint-Louis which hosts many universities and of the educational 
institutions. Macroeconomic push-factors inducing migration are the increasing 
number of Senegalese living in poverty, climate change, and the deterioration of 
the environment (progression of desertification and rainfall-related problems) 
which lead to a reduction in agricultural yields. For example, in the Groundnut 
Basin, the Delta, and Niayes regions, 51 per cent of young people who migrated to 
an urban area did not possess any resource (land or livestock) (Mercandalli and 
Losch 2017). Nonetheless, around one out of four international migrants returned 
to Senegal after five years abroad, indicating that circular or seasonal migration is 
a recurrent phenomenon (Flahaux, Mezger, and Sakho 2011).
An important effect of migration is the high volume of remittances sent by 
migrants to Senegal, which is one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Total 
remittances represent around 10 per cent of Senegalese GDP, exceeding foreign 
direct investment and official development aid. The money sent by international 
migrants increases per capita income in some regions by about 60 per cent com-
pared with households not receiving remittances from abroad (Diagne and Diane 
2008). Close to 50 per cent of remittances sent back to Senegal are used for current 
consumption, 25 per cent for precautionary savings, 20 per cent for real estate 
investments, and less than 5 per cent for productive investment (IOM 2009). The 
linkages between remittances and increased productivity in the household’s 
farm are therefore most likely weak. Additionally, in some cases remittances from 
migrated family members has led to a decline in labour market participation and 
reduced incentive to create own business by members who stayed behind as they 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
264 Elisenda Estruch et al.
relied more on remittances to meet their needs (Ndiaye et al. 2015). Reduced labour 
participation can also entail a positive outcome of migration when the flow of 
income increases educational uptake or reduces hazardous work.
According to the stocktaking of migrants in 2009 (World Bank 2009b), Senegal 
counts over 1.2 million migrants, of which 75 per cent are internal migrants. Over 
half of all migrants come from rural areas and 60 per cent are young, aged 15 to 34 
(ibid). Looking into migration flows, MRHS 2009 captures information from 
households that had internal or international migrants about the pre and post 
residence of former member (N=1278 for youth 15-34-year-old, and N=929 for 
non-youth 35-year-old and above). Figure 9.7 indicates that more people are leav-
ing rural areas than arriving. Rural youth are more likely to migrate to the urban 
areas (5.5 per cent of all rural youth) while their older counterparts are more 
likely to move abroad (4.3 per cent of all rural non-youth). Youth are leaving rural 
areas more often than their older counterparts do (8.5 per cent of all rural youth 
versus 7.6 per cent of all rural non-youth), indicating that the rural exodus has a 
young face.
Remarkably, people who move internationally are more likely to come from 
rural areas, for all ages. The fact that many people, particularly older people, are 
moving from urban to rural areas might indicate they stay and work for a while in 
urban areas but return to their place of origin at a certain time.
The main reasons for internal migration in Senegal are family-related (63 per 
cent), for work (17 per cent), and for education (14 per cent). When only look-
ing at the rural population, the importance of work increases considerably 




















Non-youth (>34 years) Youth (15–34 years)
Figure 9.7 Migration by origin, destination and age (as a percentage of total 
population)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MRHS 2009 from the World Bank.
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is  equally the main reason to migrate for rural youth (58 per cent for those 
moving in tern al ly and 69 per cent for those moving abroad). The main reasons 
for people to move out of the rural space are the attraction of employment oppor-
tunities outside rural areas or the lack of employment opportunities in the rural 
space itself. Gender is also a key factor that distinguishes the reasons rural 
individuals migrate: women’s number one reason to migrate is family-related 
(63 per cent) (ESPS-II).
The sector in which rural migrants were employed before moving varies by 
destination. Table 9.2 describes the migration patterns of youth active in agricul-
ture before moving. Senegalese youth migrants leaving rural agriculture are most 
likely to move abroad, followed by moving to an urban area, whereas a low 
percentage migrate to another rural area. Those moving to an urban area are 
mainly self-employed outside the agricultural sector.
Looking at the characteristics of migrant youth and their households, based on 
labour transition data, it emerges that the youth who move out of agriculture but 
stay in rural areas to work in the RNFE are on average more frequently males, 
older, and less educated than youth undertaking a migration-induced labour 
transition (see Table 9.A3 in the Annex for details). Especially in terms of educa-
tion, the difference is substantial (1.65 years versus 4.34 years). The households 
of the sub-group of youth who leave agriculture but remain rural are on average 
smaller, located in smaller communes, and poorer than households of youth 
undertaking a migration-induced labour transition. This indicates that the less-
educated workers from poorer households are staying in rural areas while more edu-
cated workers from richer households are leaving the rural space altogether. The 
potential employment opportunities and the distance of migration influences the 
chosen destination. Less-educated workers might have more employment possi-
bilities in rural areas, and poorer or disadvantaged households cannot always 
afford the elevated cost associated with long-distance migration.
Table 9.2. Migration patterns of youth leaving agriculture
Exit rural agriculture to Rural Urban Abroad
Agriculture 3.40% 10.26%  
Self-employment 38.23% 17.14%  
Other (paid or unpaid family worker) 17.07% 7.01%  
Non-agriculture 2.75% 32.23%  
Self-employment 24.11% 65.56%  
Other (paid or unpaid family worker) 20.58% 10.30%  
Total N=665 6% 42% 51%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MRHS 2009 from the World Bank.
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9.3.3 Are Youth Driving Rural Transformation?
A gradual rural transformation is taking place in Senegal as shown by the decrease 
in agricultural employment and the increase in the RNFE, although the latter is 
still small and involves few people. The young population nevertheless leads this 
process of rural transformation.
However, when looking at the type of employment that this process entails, the 
increase in employment in the RNFE has been entirely associated with more unpaid 
family work, indicating that youth are being pushed more out of agriculture than 
attracted towards productive activities in the RNFE.
The RNFE is dominated by wholesale and retail trade, by repair of motor 
ve hicles, motorcycles, and household goods, followed by manufacturing, real estate, 
and construction. Between 2001 and 2011 wholesale and retail trade increased 
from 7.8 per cent to 11.4 of rural youth total employment and manufacturing 
from 2.1 per cent to 4.5 per cent, increasing employment opportunities for youth 
in rural areas.
Comparing households receiving and not receiving remittances, data show 
that households with youth and receiving remittances are more likely to combine 
farm and nonfarm employment than households with youth not receiving remit-
tances, indicating that the presence of youth influences the decision to use remit-
tances to diversify the households’ income. These income flows allow the recipient 
households to diversify into the non-agricultural sector by dedicating productive 
members, most often youth, to these activities (see Table 9.A4 in the Annex). Most 
of the households with youth receiving remittances are nonfarm households. 
This logic is twofold: on the one hand, nonfarm households are eco nom ic al ly 
wealthier than other types of households so they have more resources to engage 
in migration; on the other hand, remittances sent back to these households 
strengthen their economic position which facilitates the transitions from agricul-
ture to the RNFE.
9.4 Agricultural Policies Influencing Youth  
and Rural Transformation in Senegal
The employment outcomes of rural youth in Senegal are in part a consequence of 
the agricultural, employment, and rural development policies of the Senegalese 
government over the years. Policy interventions have an impact on rural labour 
markets as well as on agricultural productivity, shaping the challenges and op por-
tun ities rural youth face.
During the French colonization, the Senegalese agricultural sector was strongly 
state-guided. After the country’s declaration of independence in 1960, the agricul-
tural sector struggled to adapt, resulting in a deterioration of the sector and an 
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elevated dependency on imported food (Oya and Ba 2013). After decades of weak 
performance in the agricultural sector, as of the year 2000, the sector regained 
national attention and a more active agricultural policy was put in place in order to 
economically revive the sector. As such, in the following years a set of large-scale 
policies were adopted, namely:
 • the Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Orientation Act (LOASP), which is the legal frame-
work for the development of agriculture and the reduction of poverty in 
rural areas (2004);
 • the Return to Agriculture plan (REVA) to promote youth employment in 
agriculture and avoid distress migration (2006);
 • annual programs of structural adjustment in an attempt to reduce the dom-
in ance of the groundnut production and diversify agricultural production 
(2003–7); and
 • the Great Push Forward for Agriculture, Food and Abundance programme 
(GOANA), aimed to increase domestic production of Senegal’s main food and 
export crops (especially rice) and achieve self- sufficiency and food security 
by 2015 (2008).
In December 2013, the government launched the Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE) 
which has been the reference for economic and social policy in the medium and 
long term, with the aim of making Senegal an emerging economy by 2035. Job 
creation is a key priority for the PSE and the plan envisages increasing the decent 
work opportunities at the rate of 100,000 to 150,000 new jobs per year. In line with 
the PSE, new programmes and projects were initiated, including
 • the Accelerated Programme for Agriculture in Senegal (PRACAS) which is 
the agricultural component of the PSE and the most important programme 
for agriculture (2014);
 • the Programme to Promote Youth and Female Employment (PAPEJF), 
which aims to contribute to the creation of decent jobs for youth and women 
(2013); and
 • the Project to Support the Promotion of Entrepreneurship of Youth in Rural 
Areas (PAJER) specifically targeting youth, entrepreneurship, and value 
chains (2015).
Acknowledging the specific lack of employment opportunities for youth, the 
National Agency for the Promotion of Youth Employment (ANPEJ) was created 
in 2014 to coordinate all youth-employment-related policies, envisaging policy 
coherence and efficient action. Moreover, a specific policy to promote youth 
employment in rural areas (PPEJMR, Politique de Promotion de l’Emploi des 
Jeunes en Milieu Rural) was under formulation in 2016 with the aim of addressing 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
268 Elisenda Estruch et al.
rural youth’s lack of access to labour market information, productive resources, 
and entrepreneurial skills.
Between 2000 and 2012, many of the agricultural policies were ambitious and 
lacked policy coherence, which hampered the implementation. Moreover, there 
was more attention on agribusiness development, neglecting the needs of small-
holders and rural youth (who often encounter obstacles in accessing land, credit, 
and so on). Also, migration policy was strongly focused on preventing rural migra-
tion instead of efficiently managing the flows of migrants and the remittances to 
rural areas (Oya and Ba 2013, Antil 2010, Banque Mondiale 2006).
As shown in previous sections, the employment situation of rural youth did 
not improve significantly between 2000 and 2012. On the one hand, employment 
in agriculture decreased but this decrease was not offset by more productive 
jobs in the RNFE. The policies and programmes in place would have neither 
led to a diversification of agricultural production, nor did the country become 
self-sufficient in rice and other staple crops. On the other hand, poverty decreased 
in rural areas but farmers and households dependent on agriculture have less 
secure and more vulnerable employment and have a higher incidence of poverty 
than the rest of the population.
Since 2012, the new government has been implementing what appears to be a 
more coherent policy framework for the agricultural sector and rural development. 
The needs of rural youth and their employment challenges are specifically addressed 
in many programmes and projects such as the ones described above. As they are 
relatively recent, it will take some time to assess their actual implementation and 
impacts.
9.5 Conclusions
In Senegal, low agricultural productivity growth, fuelled by underinvestment in 
the sector and an unbalanced rural labour market, has led to a stagnant agricul-
tural sector which has hampered the performance of the wider rural economy. 
Accordingly, rural economic development, in combination with a high population 
growth, has been too limited to enable significant results in reducing poverty in 
rural areas. This situation is creating major challenges for the rural population, 
in particular rural youth, to access productive and decent jobs.
The large majority of the rural population in Senegal is employed in agriculture, 
albeit there is a general downward trend in agricultural employment, particularly 
among rural youth. Data analysis shows that there has been a considerable re allo-
ca tion of agricultural labour into urban areas and abroad, and to a lesser extent 
into the rural nonfarm sector. These patterns would indicate that a process of 
rural transformation is taking place in the country.
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This gradual rural transformation is mainly brought forward by youth, who are 
entering the labour market, as their share of employment in the RNFE is growing 
faster than that of their older counterparts. However, some concerns emerge as 
the type of employment opportunities are being found in rural areas, as they are 
increasingly working as non-paid family workers in the RNFE, indicating that 
they are pushed out of agriculture rather than pulled by remunerative and decent 
employment opportunities in the nonfarm economy.
Rural youth and their families are increasingly diversifying incomes by en gaging 
in the agricultural and the nonfarm sector. Education and wealth of the family are 
key factors driving such diversification at household level: more educated youth 
within wealthier families are more prone to engage in the RNFE than less educated 
youth from less wealthy families. Hence, complementing or substituting income 
with rural nonfarm employment is a livelihood strategy providing a pathway out 
of poverty.
Many Senegalese youth are leaving the rural areas altogether and migrating to 
urban areas or abroad. Once again, higher education and household wealth play 
a key role in determining who undertakes this pathway. Those who are more 
educated and wealthier are moving to urban areas or abroad, while the least edu-
cated youth from the poorest households are more likely to migrate to another 
rural area to find employment in the nonfarm economy. Youth who exit agricul-
ture by migrating internally are most likely to find a job as self-employed in the 
nonfarm economy in urban areas.
In the past, the Senegalese government’s actions to tackle structural problems 
and lift agricultural productivity in the rural economy have had insufficient 
results in terms of agricultural productivity and job creation, especially of youth. 
Conversely, a new generation of policies and programmes seems to be now in 
place, targeting rural youth’s needs associated with financial support and a more 
supportive and stable policy environment. Developing the human capital of rural 
youth has become a priority for the government, although it is still necessary to 
further focus on enhancing the labour demand in rural areas.
To conclude, there remains a large untapped potential in the rural economy to 
boost opportunities for rural youth. Efforts to promote farmers’ productivity and 
incomes would also be helpful, as the skills of the agricultural workforce, especially 
youth, are crucial to tap into this potential. Moreover, higher labour prod uct iv ity 
reduces vulnerability and vice versa, and thus contributes to rural poverty reduc-
tion. At the same time, as young people may also exit agriculture, more jobs need 
to be created in off-farm agriculture-related activities. Development of midstream 
and downstream value chains promotes off-farm employment, providing oppor-
tunities for inclusive rural transformation.
The participation of young entrepreneurs should be ensured in this process of 
transformation, as well as the support for the development of agro-industry and 
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infrastructure to better connect rural and urban areas. Improved connections 
between rural areas and nearby small urban centres can play a catalytic role in 
mediating the rural–urban nexus and providing small-scale producers with greater 
opportunities, as well as serving as hubs for a thriving nonfarm sector. It is there-
fore essential to support the dynamic development of employment opportunities.
Inclusive policies and more targeted investments in agricultural and rural 
development, leading to rural transformation, should be further strengthened to 
promote more and better opportunities for the younger generations, while at the 
same time helping to end rural poverty in Senegal.
Annex: Data Description
For the data analysis of youth employment in the rural nonfarm economy (RNFE), two 
nationally representative cross-sectional surveys were used: the second ‘Senegal 
Household Survey’ (ESAM-II), conducted in February–April 2001, and the ‘Senegal Poverty 
Monitoring Survey’ (ESPS-II), conducted in August–December 2011. Both surveys were 
implemented by the Senegalese National Agency for Statistics and Demography (ANSD) 
in cooperation with the World Bank and other UN agencies (United Nations Development 
Programme, World Food Programme, and ILO).
The surveys include questions on household composition, education, household welfare, 
labour characteristics, sources of income, and more specific farm features such as land and 
technology. ESAM-II pooled 6,624 households of which 3,240 were rural. ESPS-II sur-
veyed in total 17,891 households of which 7,560 were rural.
To account for seasonal variation in agriculture, a 12-month recall period was used. 
Only a subsample (one-third) of the sampled households were administered the house-
hold consumption expenditure module that ESPS-II featured. Therefore, a separate house-
hold asset index that covered the entire sample was created to measure household wealth 
(following Sahn and Stifel 2003). The data used to create the ‘commune size’ variable was 
retracted from ANSD.
For the migration analysis, the ‘Migration and Remittances Household Survey’ (MRHS) 
implemented by the World Bank in 2009 was used (World Bank 2009a). The survey was 
conducted both at household and individual level and addresses labour market status, 
expenditure, motivation for migration, remittances, and so on. The MRHS surveyed a 
total of 17,878 individuals and 1,983 households, of which 36 per cent had no migrants, 
30 per cent had internal migrants, and 34 per cent had international migrants.
For the purpose of this analysis, youth are defined as people between 15 and 34 years old 
and the working population is defined at 15–65 years old. All data allows controlling for 
rural/urban areas and sectors, as well as for main household and individual characteristics. 
All structure and growth figures reported are derived from weighted data.
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Table 9.A1. Individual characteristics of rural youth employed according to sector 
of employment





Youth employed  
in rural nonfarm 
economy (N = 2233)
T-test
 Mean SE Mean SE  
Individual characteristics  
Age 23.05 0.06 25.39 0.11  
Female (%) 0.43 0.00 0.35 0.01 ***
Married (%) 0.54 0.00 0.49 0.01 ***
Years of schooling 1.70 0.03 3.11 0.09  
Household characteristics  
Age of HH head 52.13 0.15 50.39 0.33 ***
Female HH head (%) 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.01  
Years of schooling of HH head 0.81 0.02 1.94 0.08  
HH size 14.38 0.08 12.54 0.14 ***
Age dependency ratio 1.11 0.01 0.96 0.01 ***
Wealth index (%)      
– Poorest tercile 0.65 0.00 0.36 0.01 ***
– Middle tercile 0.25 0.00 0.35 0.01  
– Richest tercile 0.11 0.00 0.29 0.01  
Farm size (ha) 6.50 0.08 4.07 0.11 ***
Land tenure (%)      
HH land owned 0.89 0.00 0.68 0.01 ***
HH land rented in 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 ***
HH land used for free 0.02 0.00 0.25 0.01 *
Distance to market (in km) 61.45 0.67 28.70 0.95 ***
Community characteristics      
Population commune 6,2303 592.28 9,9709 3561.00  
Note: (a) Paired student t-test of youth employed in agriculture versus without youth employed in the 
rural nonfarm economy; (b) *** means statistical significance at 1% level, * means statistical 
significance at 10% level.
























Table 9.A2. Households with youth characteristics according to sector of employment
Households with youth Farming only  
HH (N = 3636)
Mixed farm—nonfarm 









Age of HH head 50.43 0.24 52.64 0.32 48.76 0.37  ***
Female HH head 0.10 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.24 0.01   
Married HH head 0.92 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.86 0.01  ***
Years of schooling of HH head 0.81 0.04 1.29 0.07 2.41 0.11   
Household size 10.47 0.09 12.93 0.15 9.40 0.13  ***
Age dependency ratio 1.27 0.01 1.15 0.01 1.14 0.02 ***  
Wealth index         
– Poorest tercile 0.71 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.36 0.01 *** ***
– Middle tercile 0.21 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.36 0.01   
– Richest tercile 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.29 0.01   
Farm size (ha) 4.81 0.09 4.81 0.13 3.28 0.10  ***
Land tenure         
– HH land owned 0.86 0.01 0.83 0.01 0.58 0.02 *** ***
– HH land rented in 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.00  ***
– HH land sharecropped 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00   
– HH land used for free 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.38 0.01  **
HH uses fertilizer 0.36 0.01 0.38 0.01     
HH uses agricultural equipment 0.49 0.01 0.45 0.01   ***  
Distance to market (in km) 62 1.13 39 1.08 24 0.90 *** ***
Population of commune 61,550 1,164 70,397 1,709 110,356 4,816   
Note: (a) *** means statistical significance at 1% level, ** means statistical significance at 5% level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ESPS-II, 2011.
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Table 9.A4. Sector of employment of rural households by remittances 
status
HH with youth Receiving remittances 
N = 1187
Not receiving 
remittances N = 651
T-test
Mean SE Mean SE  
Farming only HH 0.20 0.01 0.26 0.02 **
Mixed farm HH 0.19 0.01 0.16 0.01  
Nonfarm HH 0.51 0.02 0.56 0.02 ***
Notes: (a) Paired student t-test of HH with 15–34 receiving remittances versus HH 
with 15–34 not receiving remittances; (b) *** means statistical significance at 1% 
level, ** means statistical significance at 5% level, * means statistical significance at 
10% level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MRHS 2009 from the World Bank. 
Table 9.A3. Characteristics of migrated youth and their households according 
to labour transition
Youth (15–34 years old) 
migrants from rural areas




from rural areas 
N = 258
T-test
Individual characteristics of 
migrants before migration
Mean SE Mean SE  
Female 0.03 0.02 0.23 0.03 ***
Age of departure 22.27 0.65 20.33 0.39 **
Years of schooling before 
migration
1.65 0.35 4.34 0.38 ***
Characteristics of former 
household of migrants
     
Average household size 11.31 0.77 12.72 0.43  
Average monthly per 
capita expenditure
8,348 540 11,967 1,178  
Commune population 46,257 14,664 187,143 300,692 ***
Notes: (a) Paired student t-test of youth labour transition agriculture to rural nonfarm economy 
versus youth other labour transition; (b) *** means statistical significance at 1% level, ** means 
statistical significance at 5% level.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MRHS 2009 from the World Bank.
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10.1 Overview
The prospect of widespread youth unemployment in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
social instability and political unrest that this could bring, is a major concern for 
governments, both in Africa and in developed countries. Most development strat-
egies in Africa today emphasize the importance of creating more and better jobs 
for young people as the basis for achieving inclusive economic growth. Behind this 
focus on employment lies a sense of alarm or urgency, borne out of the view that 
Africa’s ‘youth bulge’ is an unprecedented global challenge, and that African coun-
tries will struggle to absorb enough young job seekers over the coming decades. 
These concerns are perhaps most pronounced in rural Africa, where most of the 
world’s poor population reside and where agriculture remains the primary income 
source for most households. The conventional view is that African youth do not 
aspire to work in agriculture, in part because the sector is characterized by low 
productivity and limited growth and is far from the dynamic lifestyles offered by 
cities. Yet employment prospects in urban areas are also limit ed and so most youth 
in Africa will inevitably need to find jobs somewhere in the rural economy.
Africa’s youth bulge does present a challenge, but for many people it is also viewed 
as an opportunity to further rural development. A young and better-educated work-
force could lead to greater use of more sophisticated farm technologies, commercial 
agricultural practices, and an expansion of rural nonfarm enterprises. These are 
crucial steps for accelerating agricultural transformation in Africa, and young men 
and women could be the ‘agents of change’ that the region so badly needs. The litera-
ture and debate around youth employment in Africa is therefore one of contrasts—
between urgent concern on the one hand and cautious optimism on the other.
This book has questioned some of the stylized facts that underpin the prevailing 
narratives and policy debate about youth employment in rural Africa. Is Africa’s 
youth bulge unprecedented? Are youth more likely to adopt modern farm tech-
nologies and practices? Are youth more likely to engage in rural nonfarm activities 
or migrate to urban centres? Are policymakers adequately responding to the 
youth employment challenge, and are rural youth themselves mobilizing and 
demanding policy reforms from their governments?
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To address these questions, the book has presented a series of thematic and 
country case studies that analysed household and firm surveys across a range of 
country contexts. This approach differs from recent studies on youth employment 
in Africa, which have usually relied on country-level data and/or focus on regional 
trends. Our detailed country focus and use of survey data allowed us to better 
reflect the wide variations that are observed across and within African countries. 
The book’s focus on rural Africa and the participation of youth in agricultural 
transformation also helps fill an important gap in the literature. This final chapter 
revisits the stylized facts and summarizes the authors’ key findings.
10.2 Nuancing the Facts
10.2.1 Africa’s Demographic Transition and Economic Trends 
are No Worse than Those of Other Developing Regions When 
They Experienced Their ‘Youth Bulges’ Three Decades Ago
Chapter  1  identified when developing regions experienced their peak youth 
bulges, as measured by the share of young people in the working age population. 
Africa’s youth bulge peaked in the early-2000s, which was almost three decades 
later than in other regions. Population projections indicate that, by the middle of 
this century, Africa will be the only region contributing to growth in the global 
workforce. By then, Africa will need to create 30 million new jobs every year as its 
population expands. However, while the timing of Africa’s youth bulge is unique, 
its scale is not. Youth were about a third of Sub-Saharan Africa’s working age 
population in the early-2000s, which was close to what is was in other regions 
three decades ago. Thus, while the absolute size of Africa’s youth bulge may be 
daunting from the view of smaller and more developed regions, it is more im port-
ant to consider the youth bulge from the perspective of African countries them-
selves and ask whether they are able to absorb enough young job seekers.
Using historical data, including surveys and population censuses, Chapter  1 
compared the economic conditions in Africa since the early-2000s to the condi-
tions in other regions around the time of their youth bulges. Africa certainly faces 
different conditions today than other regions did in the past, including a more 
competitive global economy. However, there are areas where Africa’s trends are 
no worse, and are sometimes better, than they were elsewhere. Africa in the early-
2000s was at a similar stage of development as East Asia and South Asia were in 
the late-1970s and early-1980s. Although Africa has fallen short of emulating 
East Asia’s pace and pattern of economic development, it has greatly exceeded 
the growth rates achieved in South Asia soon after its youth bulge peaked. Like 
Africa, South Asia experienced continued growth in its rural population, despite 
urbanization, but unlike Africa, agricultural growth in South Asia was almost 
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/10/19, SPi
Conclusion 279
nonexistent at that time, whereas agriculture has grown rapidly in Africa in recent 
years. Like other regions, Africa has significantly improved school enrolment, but 
not to the same extent as East Asia or Latin America, and the quality of schooling 
in Africa is of major concern. Overall, the authors concluded that Africa’s youth 
bulge is not unprecedented, and that Africa may not have a ‘youth problem’ per se. 
Instead, Africa faces the broader challenge of creating better jobs for all of its 
working age population, both young and old alike. At the centre of this challenge 
is the need to transform African agriculture and the rural economy.
10.2.2 Evidence that Youth are More Likely to Adopt Improved 
Farm Technologies is Mixed, and Even Where It Exists, the 
Effect on Agricultural Productivity May Be Small
Raising agricultural productivity is the first step in transforming the agricultural 
sector, allowing farmers to, at a minimum, meet their own food needs. The pre-
vailing view is that, because youth in Africa today are better educated and more 
familiar with information technology than adults, they are more likely to adopt 
advanced farm technologies and practices (e.g. use improved seeds and chemical 
fertilizers, or benefit from receiving extension services). Making agriculture 
attractive to youth also requires increasing farm profitability, which depends not 
only on agricultural intensification, but also commercialization. The question 
therefore is not whether youth are better educated than adults—they surely are—
but whether youth are able to translate their education into more productive and 
commercial farming practices.
The five country case study chapters used nationally-representative surveys 
that spanned the post-2000 period and included information on farm input use 
and rural services. The authors found mixed evidence that young farmers use 
better technologies. Chapter 5 on Ethiopia, for instance, found that youth-headed 
households were less likely to have received and used advice from extension of  cers, 
and more importantly, less likely to have used improved technologies, such as 
fertilizers, seeds, or row planting. That said, younger farmers in Ethiopia were 
found to be more likely than older farmers to use labour-saving technologies, 
such as tractors. Similarly, Chapter 6 on Malawi found that young farmers (aged 
15–24 years) use fewer modern inputs than older farmers, although input use 
was found to be higher when the more expansive definition of youth was used 
(ages 15–34 years). The authors concluded that it is only once youth become 
heads of their own households that they have a greater propensity than previous 
generations to seek out and use improved farming techniques. This underscores 
the importance of youth having access to farmland and thus being able to make 
decisions about farming practices. Chapter 7 on Ghana found that it was educa-
tion, rather than youth itself, that implied greater use of farm inputs. This is 
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surprising, since younger farmers are often expected to be more open to new 
technologies and knowledge than older famers are, even when they have similar 
levels of schooling.
Overall, the new evidence presented in the country chapters suggests that it 
does not necessarily follow that having a younger population leads to greater 
adoption of improved farm technologies. Moreover, while education is strongly 
associated with the use of improved technologies, at least in our case study 
countries, the effect of input use on farm productivity may still be relatively small. 
This could explain why agricultural productivity growth in Africa has remained 
sluggish, despite substantial improvements in educational attainment.
10.2.3 Youth are More Likely to Engage in Rural Nonfarm Activities, 
but the Level of Off Farm Employment Remains Low  
and Most Youth Continue to Work in Agriculture
History suggests that higher agricultural productivity and commercialization 
leads to an expansion of the rural nonfarm economy, including the processing 
and trading of agriculture-related products, as well as other kinds of occupations 
that arise to serve nonfarm workers as they concentrate around rural markets. 
Thus, as agricultural transformation progresses, we expect to see more farm 
households diversify into nonfarm activities or even specialize in off-farm work. 
This process should create new job opportunities for rural youth, especially 
those without access to farm land. The prevailing view is that youth themselves, 
by being better educated and less inclined to work on the farm, may be well-
positioned to establish rural businesses and drive this stage of agricultural 
transformation.
New evidence from our country case studies confirms that youth are generally 
more likely than adults to be employed in off-farm jobs. However, the extent to 
which this is true varies across countries, and its implications for rural trans -
forma tion are unclear. Chapter 5 on Ethiopia, for example, found that youth aged 
25–34 years have a greater probability of working in nonfarm enterprises, but that 
the size of the nonfarm sector remains extremely small. While youth are driving 
growth in off-farm employment, the nonfarm sector itself is not a significant 
driver of rural transformation in Ethiopia. Similarly, Chapter 6 on Malawi found 
little evidence of any significant process of rural transformation or of youth being 
in the vanguard of any changes in employment patterns. Malawian youth are 
more likely to extend their schooling than start new businesses in the rural non-
farm economy, and once Malawian youth leave school, they are still more likely to 
work in agriculture.
Chapter 7 on Ghana is more supportive of the prevailing view. It found that 
youth are far more likely than adults to run nonfarm enterprises, especially in the 
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less developed northern region of the country. However, Ghana is transforming 
rapidly and many households, irrespective of the age of their members, are leav-
ing agriculture to work in the rural nonfarm economy. What is concerning, how-
ever, is that young Ghanaians are less likely than adults to find work in the formal 
sector, and instead engage in informal trading and other low-productivity occu-
pations. Ghana’s youth are participating in the country’s structural change, but it 
is adults who are benefiting more from this process. As in Ethiopia and Malawi, 
the Senegalese case study in Chapter 9 found that youth who leave agriculture are 
often pushed into unpaid family work in rural nonfarm enterprises, rather than 
being pulled into more remunerative and decent off-farm employment op por tun-
ities. Perhaps for this reason, most Senegalese youth who leave agriculture go in 
search of employment outside of the country.
Chapter 8 on Tanzania used firm-level data to examine the factors that deter-
mine the success of rural nonfarm enterprises. As in the other case studies, the 
authors found that youth are more likely than adults to engage, and even special-
ize, in rural nonfarm activities. However, amongst rural firms, those businesses 
that are run by adults are generally more productive than those run by youth. 
Overall, the five case study chapters reveal considerable differences across coun-
tries, but they all conclude that, even when youth are more likely to work in the 
rural nonfarm economy, they are also more likely to have low productivity jobs in 
the informal sector or run less successful nonfarm businesses. This limits the con-
tributions of youth to rural transformation in these countries.
10.2.4 Education is Important for Rural Nonfarm Employment,  
but on Its Own it is not Enough to Ensure Success
A common finding across all five case study chapters is that people working in 
nonfarm jobs tend to have more years of schooling. This is often seen as one of 
the reasons why youth are more likely to work off the farm. Chapter 8 on 
Tanzania, for example, found that households whose heads have at least second-
ary education are as much as 38 per cent more likely to engage in nonfarm ac tiv-
ities. However, the returns to education may be lower for youth than for adults. 
As mentioned above, adults in Tanzania are far more likely to work in more prod-
uct ive sectors or run more successful nonfarm businesses. These households are 
also less likely to be poor.
Moreover, all the case studies identify factors other than education that are also 
important determinants for participation and success in off-farm work. Chapter 7 
on Ghana, for example, found that better access to markets, public transportation 
and electricity increase the likelihood of a rural household working in the non-
agricultural sector, regardless of whether the household head is young or educated. 
Chapter 6 on Malawi found that education alone is insufcient to en able youth to 
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obtain nonfarm employment. The authors found that older Malawians are more 
likely to work in the nonfarm sector, and from this they concluded that capital 
accumulation, work experience, and the development of social and economic 
networks are more important than education in enabling in di vid uals to find work 
outside of agriculture. Chapter 5 on Ethiopia also found that younger youth (aged 
15–24) are no more likely to engage in nonfarm work. The authors concluded 
from this that work experience and social networks may be important, beyond 
just education levels, which are higher for this age group.
Thus, while the higher education levels of youth are undoubtedly an asset, 
there is no guarantee that youth will lead or benefit from the rise in the rural 
nonfarm economy. Investing in education is therefore necessary but insufcient. 
Investments in infrastructure and market development are also important to 
ensure that youth (and adults) can participate in the process of agricultural 
transformation.
10.2.5 Participation in the Rural Nonfarm Economy  
Differs for Young Men and Women
Evidence on the roles of young men and women in the agricultural trans for ma-
tion process is mixed. On the one hand, Chapter 6 found that males dominate 
off-farm employment in Malawi, whereas women are more likely to remain in 
agriculture. Interestingly, the authors find that women who recently gave birth are 
less likely to engage in nonfarm employment of any sort, whereas infant care does 
not appear to affect the extent to which women engage in farm work. Chapter 9 
also found that young men in Senegal are more likely than young women to be 
employed in the rural nonfarm economy, possibly reflecting the large education 
gap between men and women in this country. As in Malawi, Senegalese men were 
also found to be more likely than women to emigrate in search of work.
In contrast, Chapter 7 found that being a female-headed rural household in 
Ghana increased the probability that the household engages in nonfarm ac tiv-
ities, although this relationship weakens over time. Although Chapter 8 found 
that men and women in Tanzania are almost equally likely to work in the rural 
nonfarm economy, the authors also found that women are less likely to run more 
productive or successful nonfarm enterprises. Female-run enterprises in Tanzania 
tend to be in lower-value manufacturing, such as food processing, rather than 
higher-value services. It should be noted, however, that these gender differences 
are less important than other factors, such as education, in explaining why some 
businesses are successful. One implication from this is that investing in women’s 
education in Tanzania, and possibly elsewhere, should help close the gender gap 
by allowing young women to participate in and benefit more from agricultural 
transformation.
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10.2.6 Youth are More Likely to Migrate, but not  
Always for Work Reasons or to Urban Areas
Agricultural transformation is initially driven by increases in agricultural prod-
uct iv ity and then by deepening farm-nonfarm linkages as farmers commercialize 
and rural markets become more important. Eventually, however, the focus shifts 
to supplying urban consumers in fast-growing cities and towns. At this stage, 
workers in rural areas may decide to migrate in search of better job op por tun ities 
in urban areas. Agriculture continues to be the core of the rural economy, but the 
national economy is increasingly driven by urban development. The prevailing 
view is that, given land shortages in rural areas and higher returns to education in 
urban areas, youth are more likely than adults to migrate, and may therefore con-
tribute more to economic growth and structural change.
Chapter 2 used household panel survey data to examine the pattern of migra-
tion in four African countries, and to evaluate what determines youth decisions to 
migrate in two of these countries. The author found that younger people are more 
likely to migrate. However, most migration is between rural areas, rather than to 
cities and towns, and the main reasons for migrating are often not work-related. 
Rural–rural migration, for example, is higher amongst women and is often mo tiv-
ated by marriage. Migration distances are also quite short. In contrast, workers 
who move to urban areas are not only more likely to claim moving for employ-
ment reasons, but they also travel far greater distances. That said, there is consider-
able variation across countries. In Ethiopia, for example, many young migrants to 
urban areas move to attend secondary schools that are unavailable in rural areas.
Migration generally leads to greater income diversification, but new migrants 
often work in agriculture before finding employment in the nonfarm sector. 
Chapter 2 found that, in Malawi and Tanzania, migration to urban destinations 
offered more employment opportunities for youth in the non-agricultural sector. 
However, while the probability of finding a job in a high-return activity is higher 
for youth who move to urban areas, this does come with greater risk of becoming 
unemployed. In contrast, intra-rural migration also promotes income diversifica-
tion, but migrants are less likely to work exclusively in rural nonfarm jobs, and 
the income gains from migration are smaller.
The author of Chapter 2 concludes that rural–urban migration in Malawi and 
Tanzania facilitates the movement out of agriculture, usually into higher-return 
activities. However, only a small share of rural youth become rural–urban 
migrants. In contrast, far more youth are likely to migrate between rural areas 
and so this is the more formative mobility pattern in the transformation process. 
It is the main driver of income diversification amongst youth, although it rarely 
involves a shift into exclusive non-agricultural employment. This means that, 
while youth are more likely to urbanize than adults, the importance of this for 
youth and for structural change should not be overstated.
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10.2.7 Rural Nonfarm Job Opportunities are Better Closer  
to Bigger Cities, but Jobs in the Food System may be  
More Important Closer to Smaller Towns
As mentioned above, the case studies found that access to urban markets is a 
major factor in determining the likelihood of youth working in the rural nonfarm 
sector. However, two of the case studies also found that it is important to differen-
tiate between urban centres of different sizes. Chapter 6 on Malawi, for example, 
found that better access to large urban centres of 50,000 people or more is strongly 
associated with nonfarm employment, but that proximity to smaller urban 
 centres had little influence on the employment choices of youth in surrounding 
rural areas. The authors concluded that smaller towns have less of a role to play in 
changing labour patterns and contributing to structural change in Malawi.
Chapter 7 on Ghana conducted more detailed analysis of how urbanization 
affects employment outcomes for youth and adults. The authors found that proxim-
ity to large cities in the south of the country greatly increased the likelihood of a 
household engaging exclusively in non-agricultural work. The authors also found 
that manufacturing is more dominant in areas that are less urbanized (i.e. closer to 
smaller towns than bigger cities). This is because informal manufacturing in these 
rural areas primarily consists of food processing for local markets, which can take 
place at the household level. In contrast, households living closer to big cities 
are more likely to have members employed in the service sector, including jobs in 
the formal sector and outside of the agriculture-food system. Unlike in Malawi, the 
authors conclude that smaller towns in Ghana are im port ant for promoting youth 
employment in rural areas. The difference between the two countries may be that 
economic growth and urbanization are slower in Malawi and less of the country’s 
rural population live in peri-urban areas. In fact, Malawi’s rural population density 
is one of the highest in Africa. For these reasons, the linkages between small towns 
and rural areas in Malawi may be weaker, or less important, than they are in Ghana.
10.2.8 Youth are Only Slightly More Likely to Protest  
than Adults, but They are More Likely to be Driven by  
Concerns about Unemployment
Some of the concerns about youth employment in Africa stem from the view 
that underemployed youth are especially prone to anti-government behaviour, 
including public protests and violence. A contrasting view is youth are better 
educated today and so may place more demands on their governments to enact 
policy reforms that address employment issues. Chapter 4 examined the political 
participation of youth using historical data on local protests and household 
surveys from 16 African countries. The author asked whether youth are more 
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likely to protest than adults, and if the issues that motivate youth have changed 
over time?
She found that youth are more likely to protest than adults, but that the gap is 
extremely small, suggesting that concerns about youth protest may be overstated. 
Protest activity is a form of mobilization used in almost equal measure by both 
age groups. For young and old, being better educated and/or poor are strong 
motivators for protest. However, the author found that young people are also 
more likely to protest if they are unemployed and if they lack trust in political 
institutions. If governments in Africa wish to avoid protests, then youth employ-
ment needs to be a high priority, and job creation projects need to match young 
people’s skills and aspirations. Governments need to generate greater trust that 
youth policies and initiatives are aimed at enhancing youth’s long-term economic 
prospects rather than simply mobilizing their short-term political support.
10.2.9 Youth Employment is Now a Major Policy Goal,  
but the Means of Achieving this Goal are not  
Well Represented in Current Policies
Creating more and better jobs for youth is a major policy priority for most 
African countries today. This differs from the early-2000s, when policies often 
focused on poverty reduction rather than job creation (i.e. on ‘pro-poor’ rather 
than ‘inclusive’ growth). However, making youth employment a policy goal does 
not necessarily mean that national policies include the kinds of interventions 
needed to promote youth employment. Chapter 3 developed a framework for 
systematically classifying policies based on whether they adequately address key 
constraints to youth employment in rural areas. The authors applied the frame-
work to 47 national, rural and agricultural policies in 13 African countries.
They found that policies tend to be strongest on labour supply issues, such as 
self-employment and skills development. Most national policies, for example, 
emphasize rural education as a means of improving the prospects of young job 
seekers. Policies are much weaker on labour demand issues, such as how to stimu-
late private sector job creation in the agriculture-food system beyond the farm—an 
area that the country case study chapters identified as being particularly important 
for rural youth. Industrial policies, for example, rarely identify concrete interven-
tions for private sector development or discuss how demand for young rural work-
ers will be incentivized. As the case study chapters found, rural youth are far less 
likely than adults to be employed in the private sector, and so national policies 
should explicitly support informal businesses in rural and peri-urban areas.
The authors found that social and policy dialogue is the weakest area in the 
design of national policies. A lack of participation by rural youth in the policy 
process means that their specific needs are given insufcient attention. For 
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ex ample, policies rarely identify rural youth as a target group, but instead focus 
on youth in general, often implicitly giving greater weight to the needs of urban 
youth. This is alluded to in Chapter 4 on the political participation of youth, 
which discussed the commonly-held view that rural youth are less likely than 
urban youth to use protest to demand policy reforms from their governments. 
Governments need to promote institutional channels that enable youth to partici-
pate in decision-making, such as cooperatives, producers’ organizations, and 
youth associations.
10.3 Way Forward
There is clear need to strike a better balance between alarm and optimism when it 
comes to Africa’s youth bulge. Addressing youth employment in Africa is a global 
challenge, but it is one that was overcome by other developing regions when they 
experienced a similar demographic transition three decades ago. The pressure to 
create jobs in rural areas is particularly acute, given that Africa’s rural population 
is growing, and its rural economy is still underdeveloped. Yet even in rural areas 
there is cause for optimism. Evidence suggests that agriculture is transforming 
in many African countries, albeit slowly, and that youth are often participating in 
this process. More needs to be done by governments to help young farmers adopt 
better technologies and run successful rural businesses. To do this, however, we 
need a better understanding of the constraints facing African youth. This book 
provided new evidence that allowed us to revisit some of the stylized facts that 
shape the policy dialogue around youth employment in rural Africa. Further 
research is needed:
First, global and regional studies have helped position youth employment as a 
major policy objective within the global development community. However, the 
insights from our case studies confirm that more detailed analysis is needed at 
country and subnational levels. Country case studies are more likely to reveal the 
unique characteristics of national employment dynamics and structural change 
and provide a firmer basis for decision-making. More importantly, our findings 
revealed major variations within countries, such as between peri-urban areas out-
side small towns versus big cities, or between young men versus women. Studies 
that rely on national and cross-country data cannot provide the information 
needed to design policies that address the specific needs of different geographies 
and population groups.
Secondly, more and better survey data is needed on employment, migration, 
and businesses in rural areas. The case studies showed how many rural workers 
are engaged in multiple farm and nonfarm activities, yet data on secondary 
employment and part-time work is often quite limited. More information is 
needed on migrant and emigrant workers, including the economic relationships 
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they have with households in home countries and rural areas. Finally, more data 
is needed on rural firms. Household surveys are crucial for understanding workers’ 
constraints, but many businesses in rural Africa are not household enterprises 
and so are not captured by household surveys. It is difcult to design policies to 
promote private sector development in the rural nonfarm economy without 
information on what makes some businesses successful and others not.
Finally, national policies need to be evaluated based on their contributions to 
achieving employment goals, including youth employment in rural areas. 
Chapter 3 in this book showed how current policies often fall short of addressing 
the constraints facing young job seekers. However, policies should be evaluated, not 
just on their design, but on their implementation and outcomes. Understanding 
the gap between design and implementation, for example, requires multi dis cip-
lin ary approaches that consider both political and economic constraints in the 
policy process. While the scale of policy reforms and actions needed to address 
Africa’s youth bulge is daunting, there is fortunately an increasing alignment of 
interests and incentives: African governments have made youth employment a 
policy priority, and African youth are demanding policies that improve their job 
prospects. This creates promising opportunities to enact pol icies that effectively 
address rural youth employment—policies that are grounded in local evidence 
rather than stylized facts.
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